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This thesis is a historical study of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, with specific
reference to its role in relation to the Bulgarian State. Against an extended discussion
of the Byzantine and early Ottoman eras, it focuses on the 19th and 20th centuries,
with a detailed examination of church-state relationships in the later Ottoman,
Communist and Post-communist periods. Although covering a wide socio-historical
range, the research falls specifically within the discipline of ecclesiastical history and
is intended to contribute to the fields of World and Balkan Christianity. The thesis is
based substantially on Bulgarian sources: unpublished archival, published literary
and oral resources. Full account is given of Bulgarian Orthodox self-understanding
and its interpretation of the formation of the Bulgarian State. The thesis asks critical
questions of key elements in Bulgaria's traditional historiography, subjecting it to
socio-historical criticism, exposing discrepancies between renowned myths, which
highlight the heroic and salvific work of the Bulgarian Church during the period of
Ottoman domination and verifiable history. These myths have produced a powerful
relationship between the BOC and the Bulgarian nation portraying the BOC as the
contemporary champion of the Bulgarian nationalist cause.
The thesis is an historical analysis of the relationship which developed between the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, nation, state and society. It is organised in eight
chapters covering the lengthy period from the inception of the Bulgarian Church to
the present day. Chapter I provides an historical evaluation of four critical moments
in the formation of Bulgarian Orthodox identity (865-1396). Chapter II, focussing on
the earlier Ottoman period, investigates the religio-historical context in the country
prior to the National Revival, which commenced from the late 18th century and
considers archival evidence of enforced Ottoman conversion. Chapter III focuses on
the National Revival and argues that the journey towards cultural revival was driven,
not by the Church, but by foreign and secular forces. Chapter IV investigates the
development of the National Church movement and argues that foreign national
intrigue helped to give birth to the conception of Bulgarian ecclesiastical
independence. Chapter V moves on from the Ottoman period to the birth and
consolidation of the Bulgarian state and considers the upheavals of war on church-
state relationship. Almost fifty years of communism took a heavy toll on the Church
and Chapter VI investigates this difficult era, seeking to clarify the political and
ecclesiastical manoeuvrings which have affected the BOC to the present day.
Chapter VII focuses on the post-communist era, and examines the church-state
relationship in relation to the struggles between pro-socialist and anti-democratic
political forces. Chapter VIII uses the collated evidence to construct a historical
interpretation of church-state relations and evaluates their contribution towards the
formation ofBulgarian ecclesiastical nationalism.
The comparative analysis of archival evidence and received theory challenges
prevailing 'mythological' assumptions of Bulgarian historiography. The thesis seeks
to offer a balanced interpretation of Bulgarian and European history, shorn of
nationalistic bias, with the aim of propounding an accurate understanding of the
national role of the BOC and its mission to the Bulgarian nation and people.
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Ignorance of Eastern Orthodoxy is the scandal ofWestern Christianity.1
1. AIM OF THE RESEARCH
As a Western Christian who has worked in Bulgaria for over a decade, the researcher
and author of this thesis agrees with the sentiment expressed in the words quoted
above from Anthony Ugolnik. It is not only the general lack of knowledge displayed
by the western public and their political leaders that is surprising, but the historical,
cultural and spiritual ignorance exhibited by my missionary peers in Bulgaria is
indeed a scandal. Without an understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy's history, culture
and rich Christian heritage, how can western Christendom seek to minister in
predominantly Orthodox societies without indulging in intra-Christian proselytism?
If western Christians are to minister in the Balkans with any degree of cultural
sensitivity and respect, it is imperative that they have an understanding of Eastern
Orthodox life, history, thought and doctrine.
This missiological and cultural imperative prompts the research that has been
undertaken in the preparation of this thesis. However, it was not Ugolnik's reference
to the ignorance of Western Christendom that underlay the investigation. Anyone
interested in the position of the church in Bulgaria is confronted by a seemingly
contradictory reality: although a mere 0.5% of the population are actively involved in
the church, over 85% of Bulgarians consider themselves to be Orthodox, or more
precisely Bulgarian Orthodox. The connection between religious, societal and
national identity is acutely felt at every level of Bulgarian society to the extent that it
is believed that 'to be Bulgarian is to be Orthodox'. One could liken this bond to an
umbilical cord transferring strength and security between mother and child, between
church and nation. This raises important questions about the relationship between the
church and the people, their history as a nation, and their identity as a state which it
is the intention of this thesis to pursue. The question is not whether there should be a
1
A.Ugolnik, The Illuminating Icon, (Grand Rapids, 1989), p.30
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church-state relationship; this may be an issue for Western secular analyists of
Balkan politics, but not for Bulgarians themselves for whom it is a given fact of
history and modern national identity, the sole distinguishing factor separating
Bulgarians from those powers that have dominated them in the past. The question,
rather, is the nature of this relationship, and its import for the church.
In order to answer this question the thesis will examine aspects of Bulgarian history
from the ninth century when King Boris introduced Christianity to the Kingdom of
Bulgaria, establishing the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as an autocephalous entity,
and inaugurating its relationship with the state. Against this background, more
detailed attention will be given to the evolution of the church's relationship with
political power when the latter exercised itself in the form ofByzantine and Ottoman
imperial rule, Bulgarian nationalism, and Communist and post-Communist national
governments. This thesis will demonstrate that the impact of the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church (BOC) upon Bulgarian history and its relationship with state and society, has
been built on a mixture of historical fact and fiction, myth and manipulation,
especially during the Bulgarian national revival. The national myths depict the BOC
as synonymous with national self-consciousness. Ugolnik's 'scandal of ignorance'
applies therefore not only to Western neglect of Bulgarian history, but to
historiographical trends within Bulgaria itself.
It is hoped that this thesis will contribute toward the remedying of both dimensions
of ignorance by offering an account of the historical development of church-state
relations in Bulgaria that recognises the power of myth while at the same time
seeking to give a more dispassionate interpretation of the empirical history of the
church in Bulgaria.
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Although covering a broad socio-historical spectrum, the research falls specifically
within the discipline of ecclesiastical history and is intended to contribute to the
fields of World Christianity and Balkan missiology. The research is based primarily
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on Bulgarian sources including unpublished archival, published literary and oral
materials. These have been extensively consulted in a way that combines textual
analysis and qualitative interpretation. The result is not an innovative account of the
history of church-state relations in Bulgaria, for the contours of this history are quite
well established in terms of periods, persons and problems, and they are broadly
accepted as the framework within which this thesis has been written. It is hoped,
however, that the research herein offers a re-interpretation of that history that is
original, and contributes a new perspective to European, Balkan and Orthodox
Church history.
The focus of the thesis centres on the Bulgarian national revival period, which
commenced in the late eighteenth century and remains a historic, economic, social
and cultural phenomenon in which Bulgaria takes great pride for, following five
centuries of Ottoman domination, it led to Bulgaria reclaiming ecclesiastical
autonomy in 1870 and national independence in 1878. Following this pivotal period
in history the Bulgarian state raised the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to a pre-eminent
position within Bulgarian society. Contemporary Bulgarian historiography claims
that without the church the nation would not have survived the Ottoman era that is
portrayed in terms of Islamic tyranny, and that the national revival would not have
occurred. The BOC is therefore portrayed as the cultural and spiritual protector and
liberator of the nation. The present hierarchy of the BOC not only accepts this
honour, but actively advances its position as national saviour by maintaining that
anything which is not 'orthodox' is to be identified as the antagonistic or hostile
'other'.
By subjecting this period of history to scientific scrutiny, based substantially on the
evidence of the archival record itself, this thesis will reveal a number of
discrepancies between verifiable history and modern interpretations of history. For
example, against the received opinion that the BOC struggled to preserve the
Bulgarian nation under the evil tyranny of Ottoman rule, the archival evidence
proffers a picture of a religiously tolerant Ottoman society. This contradiction
requires critical questions to be asked of key elements in Bulgaria's traditional
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historiography, subjecting it to socio-historical criticism, and distinguishing myth
from verifiable history.
Following an extended discussion of the Byzantine and early Ottoman eras, the thesis
will focus its investigation on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, providing a
detailed account of the evolution in church-state relationships during the later
Ottoman, inter-war, Communist and Post-Communist periods. Comparative analysis
will measure prevailing mythological assumptions against archival evidence, thereby
offering a balanced interpretation of Bulgarian and South-Eastern European history.
Qualitative research was undertaken to comprehend contemporary attitudes of
Bulgarian society toward the church. Between March and June 2003 thirty-five
research assistants, in ten centres (Sofia, Plovdiv, Veliko Turnovo, Varna, Burgas,
Stara Zagora, Sliven, Shumen, Blagoevgrad, Ruse) asked a number of questions,
listed in Appendix Four - 7,203 questionnaires were returned for analysis. A number
ofGroup discussions were also organised to assist toward a further comprehension of
Bulgarian relations with the Orthodox Church. The results from the returned
questionnaires were used as a starting point for a discussion forum, which took the
form of an introductory overview of the situation followed by a period of open
debate directed by a chairperson. It was agreed that there was a distinction between
Bulgarian 'Orthodox' religiousness and affiliation to the Church. The general
conclusion was that this is because Orthodoxy is comprehended not as religion but as
a national and cultural identifier.
The primary objective of this research is to advance an interpretative narrative of
church-state relations in Bulgaria throughout this pivotal era in Bulgarian history that
clarifies the evolution of political and societal thinking on the national role of the
BOC based on verifiable sources and shorn of nationalistic bias. By doing so it will
elucidate the influence ofpolitical, religious and national ideology on history.
3. SURVEY OF LITERARY SOURCES
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Such claim as this thesis can make to originality amongst other western histories of
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the priority it gives to Bulgarian sources, archival,
published and oral. In this way full account is given of Bulgarian national self-
understanding and its interpretation of the role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in
the formation and development of the Bulgarian State. It is within this framework
that critical analysis will be applied, on the basis of the archival record itself, in order
to come to a scientific assessment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in its relations
with the Bulgarian nation, state and society throughout the research period.
This investigation would have been impossible only few years ago, and even today
remains a formidable task. Although national state and church archives are now
officially open to the public they continue to remain beyond the reach of those
without proper contacts. Even when one is granted admission, investigation remains
a difficult exercise. For example, the archives of the Bulgarian Holy Synod, although
in the process of reclassification, remain in great disarray; many of the most
important documents having been lost, stolen or destroyed. The majority of the
archives examined in the course of this research are housed, classified and well
maintained within the Sts. Kiril and Methodius National Library in Sofia.
Recent bilateral agreements between Bulgarian and Turkish governments have
resulted in the opening of archives relating to the Ottoman period that were
previously closed. Amongst the disclosed Turkish archival sources that have been
critical for the present research is the Basbakanlik Ottoman archive, which is now in
the process of being translated into Bulgarian. This archive includes the Jizie
(idoKU3ue) tax registers for Bulgaria that provide data on religious affiliation of the
populace. These registers make it possible to trace religious demographic change
during the Ottoman period, from the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries. The Ottoman
archives held within Rila Monastery, which date from the early fifteenth to the late
nineteenth centuries, also provide the researcher with a wealth of detailed material
6
that evidences a surprisingly stable relationship between the Ottoman authorities and
the Christian population of Bulgaria.
A vast array of published literature in the Bulgarian language is available for the
study of the history of the Bulgarian Church. However, this literature needs to be
handled selectively and with appropriate criticism. The first book of the Bulgarian
National Revival, Paisii Hilendarski's A Slavo-Bulgarian History (1762), must take
pride of place. This book marks the transition in Bulgarian cultural history from a
state of stagnation to creative thought and action, leading to independence almost one
hundred years later. However, it was to take a further sixty-seven years before
Hilendarski's expectations received widespread public influence, due to another
work, by the Russian author Yuri Venelin, entitled The Ancient and Present Day
Bulgarians (1829). This fired the historical and national imagination of the
Bulgarians, raising Bulgaria to a pre-eminent place amongst other Slavic nations by
uncovering its Slavic origins, rather than its presupposed Turko-Tatar connections.
Marin Drinov's Historical Survey of the Bulgarian Church (1869) can be described
as the first modem history of the Bulgarian Church. However, it was a Czech,
Constantin Jiracek, whose Geschichte der Bulgaren (1876) was the first to recognise
the presence of a double yoke of tyranny upon the Bulgarians, in the form of
Ottoman political, social and economic oppression combined with Greek religious,
cultural and linguistic subjugation.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a negative attitude towards the
Ottoman authorities came to predominate in Bulgarian literature. As the national
independence movement strengthened, the need to generate animosity toward the
Ottomans became important. Stefan Zakhariev's attempt to promote a faked
seventeenth century document entitled, The Chronicle ofMetodi Dragonov (1870), is
a perfect example of this operation. The chronicle was for many years accepted as
the most striking evidence pointing to enforced Islamic conversion of Bulgaria's
Christian population, and was intended ultimately to create civil unrest in nineteenth
century Bulgaria. Histories written during the communist era such as Petur Nikov's
Revival of the Bulgarian Nation (1929) and particularly Petur Petrov's The Fateful
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Centuries of the Bulgarian Nation (1975) and More Traces of Violence Regarding
the Imposition of Islam (1987), continued to emphasise the enforced conversion of
innocent Bulgarian Christians to Islam. A similar anti-Islamic sentiment pervades
Bulgarian history to the present day as Ottoman oppression continues to be included
in Bulgarian educational textbooks as historical fact.
If few Bulgarian scholars have challenged this reading of history, it must be due in
part to the strength of the traditional relationship between church and nation. Only
three contemporary Bulgarian authors have braved the animosity of popular opinion
by questioning the role of the church as national saviour: Ina Merdjanova in
Religion, Nationalism and Civil Society in Eastern Europe (2002); Daniella
Kalkandjieva in The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and National Democracy (2002)
and Maria Todorova in Balkan Identities (2004).
Within English language literary sources the starting point for any information on
Bulgaria has been Mercia MacDermott's History ofBulgaria (1982) and Professor
Richard Crampton's A Concise History of Bulgaria (1997). However, their
interpretation of the role of the Orthodox Church is concise in the extreme. Although
dealing with the Balkans in general, Misha Glenny's The Balkans (1999), gives a
clear perspective of Bulgaria's political progression during the period 1804-1999,
particularly in comparison to the other Balkan states. One of the most significant
authors writing on Bulgarian affairs over the last decade has been Janice Broun,
particularly her journalistic investigations into the Bulgarian Church schism.
Nevertheless, the book that challenges the traditional Bulgarian historical perspective
to the greatest degree is Carsten Riis's Religion, Politics, and Historiography in
Bulgaria (2002).
4. CHAPTER OUTLINE
The thesis is organised in eight chapters covering the lengthy period from the
inception of the Bulgarian Church in the ninth century to the present day. Although
the historical focus of the thesis centres on the activities of the Church during the
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national revival period it is necessary, to fully appreciate the historical depth and
intricate development of relations, to investigate an earlier period in Bulgarian
history. Chapter One fulfils this requirement by providing a brief historical
evaluation, covering the period 865-1396, of four critical moments which influenced
the formation of modern Bulgarian Orthodox identity. The chapter will demonstrate
that 'nationalism' has been an integral part of the Bulgarian Church from its
inception and has helped create the unifying link between church and nation
throughout the centuries.
Chapter Two investigates the early Ottoman period of Bulgarian history, covering
the four centuries from the Ottoman conquest to the onset of the Bulgarian National
Revival process (1396-1812). It examines the socio-historical factors that shaped
Christian-Muslim relations during the era, and challenges the widely accepted
catastrophe theory which argues that during the period of Ottoman domination
Bulgaria suffered under a relentless process of Islamicization, at the hand of the
Ottoman authorities. Progressing from this argument, the chapter emphasises the
significance of two Bulgarian clergymen, Paisii of Hilendar and Sofroni of Vratsa, as
the first promoters of the national revival. By comparing their activities with the
Ottoman evidence the chapter will ask whether the catastrophe theory is national
myth or a verifiable fact of Bulgarian history.
Chapter Three examines the cultural regeneration of the Bulgarian National Revival
that grew in intensity during the nineteenth century. By investigating the political,
economic and social circumstances that made renaissance possible, the chapter
provides a framework in which the role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church during
this period of cultural awakening can be assessed. Whereas the Church claims to
have kept alive Bulgarian cultural, educational and linguistic traditions, it will be
argued that the journey towards cultural revival, although influenced by the Church,
was driven more by foreign and secular forces.
Chapter Four focuses specifically on the struggle to re-establish Bulgarian
ecclesiastical independence after its abolition by the Ottomans in 1393. It
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investigates the development of the National Church movement, and seeks to explain
why independence was not achieved until 1870. The chapter will offer a critical
analysis of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church's claim that its endeavours were central
to the National Revival movement, providing a model for liberation from Ottoman
domination. It will demonstrate that the concept of Bulgarian ecclesiastical
independence germinated not from national sentiment, but as a result of foreign
national intrigue. It will be argued that it was the involvement of foreign political
agents from Poland, France and Russia that steered the Bulgarian Church toward
independence.
Chapter Five investigates the period between the establishment of the independent
Bulgarian State and the end of the Second World War (1878-1945). Church-state
relations are analysed in relation to the struggle for national independence, and it will
be shown that, far from being raised on a pedestal and praised for its role during the
national revival period, the church was actually marginalised from the political arena
and denied a political voice in the new state. It will be argued that the church forged
a role for itself in Bulgarian foreign and national affairs by willingly becoming an
instrument in Bulgarian geopoliticism, allowing itself to get used by the government,
as a necessary medium toward the realisation of its goal of national unification.
Chapter Six investigates the effects of almost fifty years of communism in Bulgaria
from 1944-1989. It seeks to clarify the church's position as a national institution
under socialism, by examining the development of Orthodox church-state relations
under the communist regime, which stood in sharp contrast to the atheistic rhetoric of
the government. The church's involvement in the Process of National Rebirth - the
term for the policy of socialist self-legitimisation by appealing to Bulgarian history
in ways that suited its purposes - will be examined, with critical appraisal of the so-
called catastrophe theory. In light of new evidence allegations of church
collaboration in these events will be considered.
Chapter Seven moves forward in time to research church-state relations in post-
communist Bulgaria (1989-2005). It examines this period through the perspective of
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the struggles between the church's pro-socialist and anti-democratic political forces,
a clash that culminated in schism. In its efforts to survive, the BOC emphasised its
historical/cultural role as saviour of the Bulgarian nation. Nevertheless, the church
failed to reassert itself as a dominant force in contemporary Bulgarian society. A
number of qualitative research techniques will be applied in an attempt to assess
contemporary society's attitude to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.
Finally, Chapter Eight collates all the evidence to construct a historical interpretation
of church-state relations in Bulgaria in relation to modern debates about the genesis
and nature of nationalism. Against the historical analysis of previous chapters, it
rejects the modernist hypothesis that nationalism only developed as a concept in
relation to the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth century, and argues
instead for a direct connection between modern Bulgarian nationalism and pre-
nineteenth century pro-Bulgar sentiment. In a concluding reflection on the nature of
the relationship between church and nation in Bulgaria, the chapter seeks to relate the




1. THE BULGARIAN CHURCH: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CRITICAL MOMENTS IN THE FORMATION OF BULGARIAN ORTHODOX
IDENTITY (865-1396)
The historical focus of this thesis centres on the period dating from the onset of the
Bulgarian National Revival in the late eighteenth century through to the present
status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC). However, in order to respect the
sacred historical tradition of Orthodoxy, to fully appreciate the development of
relations between church, nation, and state in Bulgaria and to provide a significant
comprehension of Bulgarian national and ecclesiastical self-understanding, it is
important to investigate an earlier era in Bulgarian history. This chapter aims to
provide a brief historical synopsis covering five centuries from the introduction of
Christianity into Bulgaria (865) to the period of the Ottoman conquest (1396).
Thereby the investigation will be enabled to identity and analyse the critical
processes that have formed modern Bulgarian Orthodox identity.
The chapter will demonstrate that when Bulgaria's Khan Boris opted for Byzantine
rather than Latin Christianity, he determined the destiny of Bulgaria residing in the
framework of Eastern Orthodoxy. It will also show that the church not only
influenced the Bulgarian nation, but was itself considerably affected by forces both
secular and nationalist, which help to explain the formation of modern Bulgarian
Orthodox identity. The evolution of terms such as nation and nationalism,
particularly in the Balkans, are commonly considered to have originated in the
nineteenth century during the birth of nation states. This chapter will argue, however,
that such concepts germinated within Bulgaria and her Church at a much earlier stage
in her history.
This chapter includes an historical examination of four significant events that have
contributed to the formation of Bulgarian Orthodox identity and shaped the trends of
modern Bulgarian history: the introduction of Christianity into Bulgaria, Byzantine
and Latin ecclesiastical disputes over jurisdiction of Bulgaria, the importance of
vernacular translation and the influence ofBogomilism. The critical episodes chosen
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for investigation have been widely accepted by secular and ecclesiastical
historiographers as being important markers in Bulgarian history, without suggestion
that they were crucial in the formation of the Bulgarian Church.2 Other Eastern
scholars such as D.Obolensky, L.Simeonova and F.Dvornik have produced detailed
historical studies of particular 'critical' events such as the Bogomil movement, the
Latin and Byzantine disputes, and the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition, but again have
not analysed them as significant in Bulgaria's ecclesiastical formation. The
highlighting of these particular issues as pivotal in the construction of Bulgarian
ecclesiastical organisation has arisen solely as the result of this research. The
findings of this research will advance the argument that Eastern Orthodox religion,
Slavic vernacular translation and Bulgarian nationalist sentiment cohered as an
indigenised national characteristic only after the Bulgarian Church transformed itself
by accepting and promoting the popular dissenting traits of the Bogomil movement.
1.1 KHAN BORIS AND THE CONVERSION OF BULGARIA
This section will investigate the intimate involvement of Khan Boris (852-888) in
Bulgaria's Christianisation process. It will look briefly at Bulgaria's history before
Christian conversion and will explore some of the diplomatic, political and spiritual
problems that faced the khan during Bulgaria's transition from a system of traditional
religious belief. It will plot Boris' participation through the institution and
development of ecclesiastical organisation and will seek to determine whether the
progress of the Church under his reign mirrored his own nationalistic desire.
1.1.1 BULGARIA BEFORE CHRISTIANITY
The Bulgarian State was initially established in A.D.681 within the former Roman
imperial provinces to the south of the River Danube. Under the command of Khan
Asparuch (681-700) the Bulgars crossed the Danube and established themselves in
the provinces of Moesia and Thrace. Asparuch and his successors were imposing
figures whose warlike tendencies and territorial gains led quickly to Bulgaria's
2 See I.Duichev (1972), R.Poptodorov (1971) and S.Runciman (1930)
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south-eastward expansion to the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. The Bulgars
were not the only people to inhabit the region at this time. Slav raiding parties had
been settling in the provinces since the early sixth century, while Emperor Justinian I
(527-565) had been trying to restore Roman imperial authority in Africa and Europe.
Nevertheless, the Slavs proved no match for the aggressive Bulgars and although in
the majority soon acquiesced to the new invaders.
The Byzantine Empire was also compelled to acknowledge the marauding Bulgars in
a humiliating peace treaty agreed with Khan Asparuch in 681. From this firm
foothold the Bulgars increased in power and territory over the following centuries. In
811 Khan Krum (803-814) defeated and killed Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus I
(802-811) as the Byzantine Empire sought to vanquish its Bulgar problem.3 Two
years later Krum defeated Nicephorus' successor, Michael I, sacked the city of
Adrianople and reached the walls of Constantinople. Only Krum's sudden death in
814 spared the Empire further humiliation. Krum's successors, Omurtag (814-831)
and Malamir (831-852), agreed terms with the Byzantine Empire halting the
eastward expansion of the Bulgar State which instead continued westward into
Macedonia. Thus by the early ninth century Bulgaria's population comprised the
proto-Bulgars and majority Slav inhabitants.4
Little is known about the religious beliefs and practices that the proto-Bulgarians
brought with them from the Central Asian plains. It appears to have been a highly
syncretistic faith influenced by Iranian traditional beliefs. They preserved certain
traits from the traditional religion of their Turkic forefathers. An inscription from the
reign of Omurtag records a sacrifice to Tangra, who has been linked to the Turkic
sky-god Tengri.5 The cult site at Madara, near Shumen, preserves the most celebrated
symbol of the proto-Bulgarians traditional religion in the rock face relief known as
the 'Horseman ofMadara' which is accompanied by an inscription to the god Tengri.
Byzantine sources also describe sacrifices of human beings and animals offered by
3 This was the first time that a Byzantine emperor had lost his life in battle since the death of Valens at
the hands of the Goths in 378
4 The proto-Bulgars were a Central Asian tribe based originally in the Greater Volga region
5 G.Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica, 11(1958)296
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Khan Krum outside the walls of Constantinople before the horrified eyes of the
Christian defenders of the city.6
Fig.1 The 'Horseman of Madara'
The traditional religion of the Bulgars quickly came into contact with Christianity
which had survived within the inherited Romano-Byzantine society. Add to this
original Christian presence the many thousands of Christian prisoners taken during
Bulgaria's wars of expansion and the Christian population constituted a significant
number.7 This Christian element was constantly suspected of owing allegiance to the
Byzantine emperor and patriarch in Constantinople and therefore faced intermittent
persecution. The hostile attitude toward Christianity was linked to a fear of
Byzantine imperialism, the perception being that the Christians would make converts
from among the Bulgars, weakening traditional religious beliefs and strengthening
Byzantine authority among the majority Slav population. This perception was so
pervasive that when Khan Omurtag's son, Enravotas, converted to Christianity, it is
• • • 8recorded that he was executed as part of the Christian repression of 833.
By the ninth century the tension between the Bulgarian State and the Christian
religion had become acute. The number of Christians among the khan's subjects had
grown alarmingly, and now included members of the Bulgar elite. Moreover,
diplomatic relations with neighbouring states were becoming increasingly
6
R.Browning, Byzantium and Bulgaria: A Comparative Study Across the Early Medieval Frontier,
(London, 1975),'p. 140
7
Theophanes, 'Chronographia', Greek Sources for Bulgarian History, (Sofia, 1954), this records that
over ten thousand prisoners were deported from the city of Adrianople alone
8
Metropolitan Simeon, 'Theofilact ofOhrid's epistolae', C6 BAH, XXVII (Sofia, 1931)
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complicated as surrounding Christian nations refused to cooperate with Bulgaria's
'pagan' state. Lastly, Bulgaria's traditional religious beliefs were becoming
internally divisive, in so far as they distinguished between Bulgar and Slav, at a time
when her rulers were attempting to replace tribal polycentrism with a centralised
government.
1.1.2 THE CONVERSION OF BULGARIA
Historians identify the baptism of Khan Boris in 865 as the moment of Bulgaria's
conversion to Christianity. However, Bulgaria's process of Christianisation
commenced long before the reign of Boris. Indeed, as soon as the Bulgar invaders set
foot south of the Danube they began to feel the impact of Byzantine Christian
civilisation. Tens of thousands of Christian prisoners of war continued to practice
their religion among the non-Christian Bulgar population. We know Christian
influence was strong as it had reached within the Bulgarian royal family.
Nevertheless, the fear of Byzantinisation through Christianisation set Bulgaria in an
anti-Byzantine orbit. The problem facing Boris was that adopting Byzantine
Christianity as the religion of State would have implied becoming a small cog in a
larger ecclesiastical and political wheel. How would it be possible for Bulgaria to
enjoy the advantages of Christianity without falling under the political sway of the
Byzantine empire? It was this religious and political dilemma which had forced the
Bulgars to look westwards and which motivated Khan Omurtag to form an alliance
with the Frankish empire against Byzantium.9 Thus, by the time Boris became ruler
the pro-Frankish partnership dominated Bulgarian foreign policy.10 At this point
South-Eastern Europe divided into two main coalitions: the Bulgarian and Frankish
kingdoms on one side, and Byzantium, Moravia, and the Slav tribes of Serbia and
Croatia on the other.
In 862 Boris met with Louis, King of the Franks, to discuss military and religious
collaboration, inviting him to send clergy to teach and convert the Bulgarian nation
9 Annales Fuldenses, MGH- Scriptores, III, pp.367-368
10 V.Giuselev, Prince Boris I, (Sofia, 1969), p.38
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to Christianity." As a result, the following year Byzantium encouraged its coalition
partners to attack Bulgaria, alarmed by the rumour that Boris was planning to accept
Latin Christianity. Besieged on three fronts and simultaneously stricken by natural
disaster, earthquake, plague and disastrous harvest, Boris was forced to sue for
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peace. The main conditions of the treaty were that the alliance with the Franks had
to be terminated and Bulgaria would accept Christianity via Constantinople.
Boris' worst fears materialised as his infant Christian nation fell completely under
the control of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which acted as an agent of the
Byzantine government. The Bulgarian ruler, having accepted the faith of the
Byzantines, was compelled to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Byzantine
emperor, much to the consternation of Pope Nicholas I.13 Despite western concerns
Boris showed no signs ofwillingly subjecting himself to Constantinople's demands.
Indeed, to counter Byzantine influence he immediately appealed to the West for help.
Thus, as the Christianisation process advanced, a ruthless competition arose between
Rome and Constantinople for ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Bulgaria.
1.1.3 PROBLEMS FACING BORIS DURING THE CONVERSION
PROCESS
1.1.3.1 Diplomatic, Political and Spiritual Reasons for Conversion
By the ninth century Christian presence in Bulgaria could no longer be ignored. Even
Boris' own family had been influenced by the religion: his sister was a Christian as
was his cousin Khavkan Petur, later to be sent as an envoy to Rome and
Constantinople.14 Boris himself may already have been personally convinced of the
truth ofChristianity and his later abdication to enter a monastery in 889 suggests that
he had become a deeply religious man. However, apart from personal matters of
faith, other factors emerged to drive the khan towards a decision in favour of
converting his nation to Christianity.
11 Annates Bertiniani, MGH-Scriptores, I, p.448
12 V.N.Zlatarski, History of the Medieval Bulgarian State, Vol.1, (Sofia, 1937), p.22
13
Pope Nicholas I, 'Letter to Hincemar, Archbishop of Rheims', MGH-Epistolae Karolini Aevi, IV,
p.601
14
Theophanes, IV, pp. 162-163
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Amongst these factors was the continuing struggle to unite the cultural division
between the Bulgar and Slav inhabitants and fully integrate the population into a
single nation. Boris, the diplomat, comprehended the delicate situation that existed
and the divergent possibilities for his nation's domestic and international future. He
needed to consolidate the ethnically divided population and a common religion
offered a means to this end. Boris understood that the only way to persuade the
majority Slav population to accept his reign and Bulgar authority would be to create
a Christian dominion. He also needed to transform Bulgaria into a legitimate
international power and by adopting Christianity he would gain wider diplomatic
acceptance for Bulgaria.
These factors drove Boris toward the establishment of Christianity in Bulgaria.
Despite constant Byzantine pressure to accept their ecclesiastical rule, Boris
struggled to maintain his freedom to choose the direction of conversion that would
allow him to reap the most benefit for his nation. Thus, Boris attempted to ally with
the Franks rather than Byzantium. However, Boris' attempt to capitalise on his
conversion by exacting diplomatic advantage for the Bulgarians came to nothing.
Christianity, rather than being invited in, was imposed on Bulgaria by her most
menacing foe. The Bulgarian ruler had miscalculated the international implications
ofBulgaria's conversion. Despite recognising the internal pressures pushing Bulgaria
towards Christianity, he failed to comprehend the significance that the Christian
world would attach to the conversion of his nation, therefore underestimating the
extent to which outsiders would insist on being involved in Bulgarian affairs in the
name of the Christianising process.
1.1.3.2 Dealing with Dissenters
Byzantium's aggressive entry into Bulgaria, justified in the name of assisting its
conversion, introduced elements into the Bulgarian social context that significantly
compromised Boris' authority. Confusion circulated throughout the country, centred
around the conviction that the acceptance of Christianity and repudiation of
traditional religion would have drastic consequences on Bulgaria. This fear and
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resentment led the boyars to organise a nation-wide revolt in 865.15 For the Bulgarian
aristocracy Boris' acceptance of Christianity was not only a denial of ancient
tradition but a symbol of betrayal, gifting the nation into the hands of its fiercest
enemy. Furthermore, with the introduction of this new religion, the khan no longer
claimed to be primus inter pares among the boyars, but accepted the Byzantine title
of prince established by the grace ofGod.16
This situation made it difficult for Boris to maintain his authority. Coupled with the
onslaught of foreign influences, prevailing domestic unrest undermined, at least
temporarily, Boris' control over the nation. He re-established order by brutally
crushing the rebellion in a crucial battle near the capital of Pliska. Fifty-two of
Bulgaria's aristocracy, the leaders of the revolt, were put to death, along with their
families and servants.
1.1.3.3 The Institution of the New Religion
Boris survived the social and political disturbances that had gripped the nation
immediately after his decision to Christianise Bulgaria, but other problems awaited
him. After consolidating his authority in Bulgaria Patriarch Photius of
Constantinople (r.858-867, 877-886) wrote Boris a letter painting the ideal portrait of
a Christian leader. He hailed Boris as the new Constantine and reminded him of his
duties to Christianise the nation, he alone being responsible to direct his realm from
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"darkness to light." In order to live up to Byzantine expectations Boris ought to
accomplish for his own people what Constantine the Great had achieved for the
Romans: to convert his subjects to the true faith whose one and only source was the
Patriarchate of Constantinople. For Boris, only recently relieved of the crisis
accompanying his conversion, Photius' letter laid upon him the terrible burden of
teaching his subjects the outward forms and basic tenets of the Christian faith. Boris
did not shirk his responsibility. From the time of his baptism to the end of his reign
he absorbed himself in the establishment ofChristianity among his subjects.
15
'Boyar' - Bulgarian aristocracy: Annales Bertiniani, I, p.448
16 J.V.A.Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans, (Ann Arbor, 1983), p.l 19
17
Epistulae et Amphilochia, eds. B.Laourdas & L.G.Westerink, Vol.1, p.20, (Leipzig, 1983)
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The first major task Boris faced in instituting Christianity within Bulgaria was to
provide for the baptism of his subjects. Understanding that it was his personal duty to
undertake this fundamental step in the Christianisation of Bulgaria, Boris supervised
this mission for the remainder of his reign. During the time between his conversion
in 864 and his appeal for Latin assistance in 866, Byzantine priests undertook the
task of baptising the nation.18 Latin priests took up the baptismal role after replacing
the Byzantines, but Boris remained unhappy with the progress being made and asked
for additional clergy to accomplish the task. Some twenty years later the baptism of
the nation had still not been completed, particularly in the remote regions of the
country. Therefore in 885 when the disciples of Cyril and Methodius arrived after
their expulsion from Moravia, they were welcomed and put immediately to the work
of baptising the Macedonian Slavs.19
Boris was also faced with the problem of educating his subjects in the basic concepts
of Christian doctrine. However, this process did not occupy Boris' attention, his
efforts were almost exclusively directed towards baptising the nation. This lack of
attention stemmed from the khan's inadequate grasp of the doctrinal side of the new
faith and from his inclination to perceive Christianity purely as a ritualistic
discipline. By the year 866 Boris had already revealed that he was confused by the
various strands of the Christian faith which were present in Bulgaria: "should we
obey all of these according to the various meanings or what should we do?" It
would seem likely that his confusion about the source and the content of Christian
doctrine had some bearing on his decisions to abandon Byzantium and Rome during
his reign.
Whilst investigating the range of activities involved in establishing the Christian
religion in Bulgaria one is struck by how often the crucial issues seem to have rested
on relatively minor matters. Boris' concern with these minor issues and Pope
Nicholas' meticulous care in providing explanations for what seem to be petty
18
Pope Nicholas I, 'Responsa ad Consulta Bulgarorum', E.Perels (ed.), Epistolae Karolini aevi, VI,
(Munich: MGH, 1925), p.599
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20 Pope Nicholas I, p.599
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technicalities, as opposed to Patriarch Photius' total neglect of practical
consideration, may well provide the secret to the Christianisation process in Bulgaria.
These 'minor issues' were dealt with superbly by Nicholas in his Responsa Nicolai
Papae ad Consulta Bulgarorum. The issues dealt with ranged from the treatment of
rebel boyars, to the permissibility of sexual intercourse during lent, from the
organisation of the church in Bulgaria, to the procedure for dealing with Islamic
books which had played a part in Bulgarian traditional beliefs, from the use of jokes
and spells to the function of Christian prayers. The Consulta was above all concerned
with behaviour rather than doctrine. It dealt not with trivialities but with matters that
vitally concerned the lives of every Bulgarian. What was Christianity going to mean
for the way Bulgarians dressed, washed, ate, made love or war, and how offensive
would the new faith be to their ancestral gods?21 One is thus drawn to the conclusion
that the decisive elements in the process of instituting Christian practice in Bulgaria
were the ability of both the khan and the church to provide two things: the
substitution of Christian practices for everyday traditional usages not acceptable to
the Church and meaningful rationales for abandoning practices which were less
clearly religious but which ran counter to Christian tradition. Conversion, therefore,
did not involve the glorious rebirth which Photius and Nicholas eloquently described;
rather it entailed the tortuous process of substituting Christian practices as
recognisable equivalents for time honoured traditional usages. The burden upon
Boris was to make evident the equivalence and acceptability of the new ways.
1.1.3.4 The Development of Formal Ecclesiastical Organisation
While contending with the numerous complications associated with the teaching of
Christian doctrine and practice in Bulgaria, Boris engrossed himself in the
development of formal organisation within the emerging Bulgarian ecclesiastical
community. This problem was complicated not only by the novelty ofChristianity in
Bulgaria but also by the involvement of external foreign elements, which had to be
respected whilst establishing a specifically Bulgarian ecclesiastical organisation.
21 L.Simeonova, Diplomacy ofthe Letter and the Cross: Photius, Bulgaria and the Papacy, 860s-
880s, (Amsterdam, 1998), pp.197-200
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There is no clear evidence to indicate what organisational pattern the first Byzantine
clergy followed after their arrival in 864/5. We can, however, compare the
procedures employed by the Byzantine mission to Moravia in 863 when Patriarch
Photius commissioned Constantine-Cyril and Methodius to lead a missionary
expedition. If the same procedures were used in Bulgaria, we can assume that the
original Bulgarian mission would have been led by one or two figures whose
authority rested primarily on their reputation as pious, learned men of exemplary
Christian life and their designation as missionary and spiritual leaders by the imperial
government and patriarch. Photius made it abundantly clear from the outset that the
leadership and head of the emergent Bulgarian Church would come from
Constantinople. Indeed, nowhere in his pastoral letter to Boris did he indicate the
need to establish indigenous ecclesiastical organisation in Bulgaria: the Greek
leadership of the Patriarchate would suffice.
Khan Boris was clearly not satisfied with this declaration. In order to preserve the
independence of his country, whilst continuing to reap the benefits of his new
association with the Byzantine Empire, it was essential to construct an autonomous
ecclesiastical organisation in Bulgaria. Boris must have been deliberating the idea of
creating a separate patriarchy, as in 866 he asked Pope Nicholas I if it would be
possible for Bulgaria to have its own patriarch and if so, how would he be ordained,
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and interestingly, could a khan hold the position of patriarch? In these questions we
can observe the political manoeuvrings of Boris' mind. He had begun to envisage a
hierarchical arrangement of the most ambitious kind. However, as Photius before
him, Nicholas promptly dismissed these possibilities. Instead he laid out a plan for
the Roman organisation of the Bulgarian Church: a bishop would be appointed to
Bulgaria, who in time would be granted the title of archbishop, who would then
consecrate other bishops, who in turn would be able to elect future successors to the
archbishop's position. Both schemes left the khan in no doubt that Bulgaria would
always remain subordinate to external control from either Constantinople or Rome.
22
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This ecclesiastical dilemma will not be covered in detail here, as the Latin-Byzantine
struggle for Bulgarian ecclesiastical jurisdiction will be dealt with in the next section.
However, it is important to recognise that, disappointed by both Rome and
Constantinople, Boris exposed his intense desire to establish autonomous Bulgarian
Church authority. He dispatched a diplomatic delegation to the Ecumenical Council
of Constantinople in 870 to establish whether Bulgaria belonged under Byzantine or
Latin jurisdiction. In doing so the khan created an auction for the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction of Bulgaria where the winner would be the one offering the best
incentive. The synod of the council granted jurisdiction to the Patriarchate of
Constantinople.
In a letter written in 872/3, Pope John VIII indicated that Patriarch Ignatius (867-
877) had appointed an archbishop in Bulgaria, contravening previous Byzantine
rulings, and suggested that this concession was made by the Patriarchate to gain
jurisdiction in Bulgaria in 870.23 The evidence suggests that following a tenuous start
Boris was now satisfied with the organisational progress of the Bulgarian Church.
Indeed, by the 880s the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Bulgaria was so pliable to his will
and so oriented to Bulgarian problems that it no longer felt any particular interest in
the continuing jurisdictional battles between Constantinople and Rome. Toward the
end of his reign Boris took steps to increase the number of indigenous clergy by
sending large numbers of Bulgarians to Constantinople for monastic training. It is
particularly significant that he sent his son, Simeon, to become a monk in 878. One
might suspect that Boris planned for Simeon ultimately to return to Bulgaria and
assume the role as its first patriarch.
1.1.3.5 The Introduction of Indigenous Clergy24
In 885 an unexpected opportunity arose which permitted Boris to progress toward his
goal of introducing indigenous clergy sooner than expected. After the deaths of both
Cyril and Methodius, the Germanic clergy forced their Slavic speaking disciples to
flee Moravia abandoning their efforts to develop a Slavonic liturgical tradition in the
23
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24 The introduction of indigenous clergy is dealt with in detail in Section 1.3.2 'The Slavonic Mission
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region.25 A number of these clergy found their way to Bulgaria where Boris
welcomed them. The biographies of two of those Slavic missionaries, Kliment and
Naum, provide insight into Boris' use of their talents and illuminate further his plans
for Bulgaria.26
In the Macedonian region of his realm, where the population was predominantly
Slav, Boris commissioned Kliment to be a missionary leader and teacher to the Slavs.
The description of his task indicates that he enjoyed considerably greater authority
than his title suggested as he worked independently of the Byzantine archbishop in
Bulgaria. He was used specifically to convert Slavs to the new religion and to
represent the khanate where Bulgarian lordship had not been popular. We know that
he established schools where the best students were singled out to be ordained as
presbyters, deacons and priests. This would prove to be a successful strategy in
bridging the gap between Bulgar and Slav communities. The continuation of the
Cyrillo-Methodian tradition began to produce solid Bulgarian ecclesiastical figures
erudite in Byzantine theology but with Slavic linguistic skills. As indigenous clergy
increased, Bulgaria's dependence on Greek and Latin clergy decreased. By 893 the
Bulgarian State had approved the Slavonic alphabet and liturgy as the official
language of church and state.
1.1.4 THE IMPACT OF BORIS ON BULGARIA'S CONVERSION
When Boris died in 907 the Bulgarian Church had developed substantially from its
inception some forty years earlier. This progress reflected Boris' own nationalistic
desires for an autocephalous church within an independent and unified nation. His
initial reasons for accepting Christianity had not been purely spiritual, but were also
politically motivated, hoping that the new religion would be the unifying factor to
bring the Slav and Bulgar elements of his population together as one nation. There
was also the factor of power. Boris foresaw that his own authority would be
internationally enhanced as a result of accepting Christianity and hence modelled his
25
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leadership style on the Byzantine emperor. However, many problems hindered his
progress, particularly whilst the establishment of Christian organisation was
dependent on external foreign involvement, reluctant to permit the growth of an
independent Bulgarian ecclesiastical hierarchy. These anti-Bulgarian attitudes
prevented the khan from promoting the organisational structure he so desired,
especially since the two sources ofmissionary aid were engaged in bitter competition
for jurisdiction in Bulgaria. However, the arrival of the missionary fugitives from
Moravia put at the khan's disposal clergy prepared to teach, organise and establish an
independent Slavic speaking church without Byzantine or Latin assistance.
Boris was the driving force behind every aspect of the Christianisation process in
Bulgaria. He chose the moment of Bulgaria's conversion, he defined the rules that
would govern his nation, he punished those who opposed the introduction of the new
religion in Bulgaria, he decided which missionaries could enter the country and when
their practice did not concur with his desires he expelled them in pursuit of his
nationalistic goal. He eventually gained control of the ecclesiastical personnel who
worked in Bulgaria and in doing so made the decisive move that resulted in the
eventual adoption of the Slavonic rite within Bulgaria.
1.2 BYZANTINE & LATIN ECCLESIASTICAL DISPUTES OVER
BULGARIAN JURISDICATION
The competition between Constantinople and Rome for ecclesiastical authority in
Bulgaria took place prior to the Great Schism of 1054. Nevertheless, the tension
between East and West was already apparent, the issue in Bulgaria being essentially
one of canonical influence and territorial jurisdiction. The section will investigate the
various periods of Latin and Byzantine ecclesiastical control in Bulgaria, revealing
that in order to gain outright dominance one of the Churches eventually conceded to
Bulgaria's nationalistic desire.
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1.2.1 BULGARIA & BYZANTIUM
By the mid-ninth century, Bulgaria, then the third largest kingdom in Europe, had
indicated its readiness to adopt Christianity. This interested the Latin, Frankish and
Byzantine Empires. The Bulgarians and the East-Franks had been on diplomatic
terms since the late eighth century when the expansion of their respective kingdoms
established a common border. Connected by the menacing threat of Byzantium and
Moravia they renewed their treaty sometime in the early 860s. For this reason the
Frankish clergy were the natural candidates to undertake the first missionary work
amongst the Bulgarian population.
Flowever, neither Constantinople nor Rome could afford to tolerate a strengthening
of the Bulgar-Frankish alliance. For reasons of their own each empire wanted to
bring Bulgaria under its jurisdiction, as a huge eastern territory would be a powerful
ally in the field of continental diplomacy. Bulgaria's conversion to Byzantine
Christianity would eliminate the constant military threat that Bulgaria presented to
the empire and would create a missionary stepping stone for the proliferation of
Eastern Christianity into Eastern and Central Europe. Equally, Bulgaria's conversion
to Latin Christianity would open a route for the advance of papal influence among
the Slavs, creating a Latin stronghold adjacent to Byzantium's capital and spiritual
heart. A fierce rivalry developed over this mission field between the Christian
powers of the day, leading Boris to ponder which of these Churches would best
benefit Bulgaria.
1.2.1.1 Renewal of Byzantine Missionary Enterprise
The seventh and eighth centuries had been the unhappiest experienced by the
Byzantine Empire in its long history. Its eastern and western territories had both been
steadily eroded; the Mediterranean had been lost to the Lombards; the Avars had
overrun its Danubian provinces and the eruption of Islam in the Middle East had
wiped out the empire's oldest and holiest provinces; Slav and Bulgar infiltration of
the Balkans further weakened this once great empire. Nonetheless, Byzantium
survived this turbulent period. The Islamic threat temporarily abated after the
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displacement of the Umayyad caliphate of Damascus by the Abbasid caliphate of
Baghdad in the middle of the eighth century. New administrative structures, or
'themes', were established within the slimmed down empire, enabling the tempo of
diplomatic and economic life to quicken once again. One can point to the re-opening
of the University of Constantinople in the 830s as a major reason for the resurgence
of self-confidence and self-assurance within the empire.27 The university in turn gave
birth to a new body of scholars, ecclesiastics and politicians, from whom a revived
sense of mission developed within Church and State. The key to understanding the
Byzantine Empire's sense of mission is the notion that the emperor was the divinely
appointed instrument of God for the achievement of His purposes on earth through
the diffusion of the Orthodox Christian faith. Thus, the re-conquering of the Balkans
meant both the Christianisation of the Slavs and their submission to imperial
authority. Of this process Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus commented:
The nations of those parts [the Balkans]... shook off the reigns of the
empire of the Romans and became self-governing and independent,
subject to none... . But in the time of Basil, the Christ loving emperor
(867-886), they sent diplomatic agents, begging and praying him that
those of them who were unbaptised might receive baptism and that they
might be subject to the empire of the Romans, and the glorious emperor,
of blessed memory, gave ear to them and sent out an imperial agent and
priests with him and baptised all of them... and after baptising them he
appointed for them princes whom they themselves approved and chose,
from the family which they themselves loved and favoured.28
Unfortunately the conversion of Bulgaria was not so serene, but the quotation does
reveal how the governing circles in Constantinople looked upon their world. Their
words also help us understand the Bulgarian khan's reluctance to accept Christianity
from Byzantium, for this would have been tantamount to acknowledging the
suzerainty of its emperor.
1.2.1.2 The Byzantine Mission
Two events in the early 860s marked the beginning of a new assertive phase in the
Constantinople Patriarchate's ecclesiastical policy. The first was a request for
27
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Byzantine missionaries received from Prince Rastislav of Moravia; the second was
the Bulgarian announcement that the nation was preparing to adopt Christianity. The
Byzantine Church willingly dispatched clergy to Moravia with the goal of extending
the empire's sphere of influence in Central Europe. However, an alliance with
Moravia also provided the empire with a means of exerting pressure upon Bulgaria,
which lay between Byzantium and Moravia. This mission was entrusted by Patriarch
Photius to his friend Constantine-Cyril and his brother Methodius, who according to
their Slavic vitae were chosen because of their profound knowledge of the Slavonic
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tongue.
No sooner had the Byzantine mission left for Moravia than Photius found himself
with another challenge: Bulgaria's readiness to accept Christianity. However,
Bulgaria's final adoption of Byzantine Christianity was the result of a military
operation planned with the utmost precision by Caesar Bardas.30 Photius was
surprised by the Bulgarian decision, admitting in an encyclical letter that he thought it
strange that the "barbaric and Christ-hating Bulgarian people" should have turned to
the Christian faith so suddenly.31 The two Byzantine missions were therefore
undertaken in response to unexpected challenges, rather than as the result of careful
planning. Patriarch Photius was clearly a man of quick and sober mind, capable of
rapid assessment and action. Ostrogorsky rightly points out that "the greatness of
Photius lies in his appreciation, clearer than anyone else at that time, of the near
approach of this era of new tasks and possibilities, for which he, more than anybody,
helped to prepare the way."32
After the baptism of Khan Boris, Patriarch Photius sent him a long letter providing
him with not only religious instruction but also advice on leadership. The contents of
the letter included most of the patriarch's published papers including his, Biblioteka,
Questions to Amphilochios, and Mystagogia. However, the way in which the letter
was received by the Bulgarian court must also be considered. Modern scholarship has
29
M.Kantor, Medieval Slavic Lives ofSaints andPrinces, (Ann Arbor, 1983), pp.65-66
30 G.Cankova-Petkova, 'Contribution au sujet de la conversion des Bulgares au christianisme',
Byzantino-Bulgarica, IV( 1973)21 -39
31
Epistulae et Amphilochia, ibid., Vol.1, Ep.2, p.41
32
G.Ostrogorsky, History ofthe Byzantine State, (New Brunswick, 1969), p.226
28
suggested that the patriarch's letter was ignored in Bulgaria for two reasons: it was
too difficult to translate the classical Greek text into the Bulgarian vernacular, it being
almost impossible to find Bulgarian equivalents for the abundance of Christian
terminology,33 and secondly, Boris had no time to take interest in the patriarch's
copious admonitions because of the turmoil caused by Bulgaria's recent conversion.34
While there is a certain legitimacy in these opinions, this research would suggest that
they are overly simplistic. Could Photius, one of the most erudite men of his age,
have been so naive as to send a sophisticated document into the hands of an
unintelligent barbarian? Surely a man who had spent many years in the imperial
foreign office would not send an important diplomatic message that could not be
interpreted. Moreover, Greek had been the official language of diplomacy between
Byzantine and Bulgarian governments over the two centuries prior to Bulgaria's
conversion. Also, the argument regarding the difficulty in translating Christian
terminology is specious. Apart from having Christians among his own family,
government and subjects, Boris employed aides whose sole task it was to guide
Bulgaria through the Christianisation process. Therefore one must consider that
Photius' letter was ignored not because of failure to comprehend it, but because the
khan had already decided to abandon Constantinople and turn again to the West.
1.2.2 BULGARIA & THE PAPACY
The situation in which Pope Nicholas I found himself in the mid-ninth century with
regard to Latin Christian expansion in eastern and south-eastern Europe was rather
depressing. Byzantine Emperor Michael III had repeatedly refused to transfer
Illyricum (the former Roman province that included the Balkans) back to the Papal
See. Moravia's relationship with Rome was practically cut off due to the Byzantine
mission operating in that region, and Bulgaria's union with the Patriarchate further
blocked any papal initiative to expand its influence eastwards. Finally, gaining
confidence Byzantium had begun to adopt an attitude towards the papacy that could
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only be characterised as denying papal claims to primacy in the Church. However, by
the end of 866, this discouraging scenario took a fortuitous turn, with Bulgaria
becoming the missionary battleground in which the pope would go on to challenge
the patriarch not only for control of the Balkans but also for the primacy of the
Church. Indeed, the dispute over Bulgaria was to mark a turning point in the east-
west ecclesiastical conflict, transforming the existing rivalry over spheres of
jurisdiction into a doctrinal controversy with calamitous consequences for
Christendom as a whole.
1.2.2.1 A Fortuitous Turn
Although the situation in the east appeared dire Nicholas I adopted an
uncompromising attitude. In a letter to the Byzantine emperor, he elaborated on the
theme of the pope being divinely instituted as ruler over the whole of Christendom,
princeps omnem terram,35 Dvornik rightly points out that this document, proclaiming
papal primacy, is one of the most important documents in the evolution of the
papacy.36 The arrival of a Bulgarian delegation in Rome in August 866, formally
asking for Latin assistance to replace the Byzantine clergy was heralded as a
godsend. The papal secretary describes the reaction to this news in the following
manner: "Upon hearing this, the most blessed pope, filled with great joy, rendered
ample praise to Christ and, rejoicing together with the entire Church which was
divinely entrusted to him, he with devoted heart and humble voice released endless
praise of our Lord, who had done such a miracle... ,"37 The pope immediately
dispatched clergy to Bulgaria under the leadership of two bishops, Formosus, bishop
of Porto and Paul, bishop of Populonia. On their arrival in Bulgaria Boris gave them
full authority within his kingdom, and with this they set about dismissing all
Byzantine clergy from Bulgaria, replacing the Greek with Latin liturgy and re-
baptising all the people into the Latin Church.
35 From Pope Nicholas I, Epistolae, in ed. E.Perels, Papst Nikolaus undAnastasius Bibliothecarius,
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In response Patriarch Photius composed a letter alerting Boris to the dangers of the
erroneous practices of the Latin Church, for the first time accusing them of doctrinal
aberration. A copy of this letter was sent to the eastern patriarchates in an effort to
obtain support for the Bulgarian cause, stating that Rome was trespassing onto
Constantinople's missionary field, diffusing erroneous doctrine and ritual and
demanded that papal policy regarding Bulgaria be decided by the arbitration of an
ecumenical synod.38 Thus, by the spring of 867 the East-West conflict was further
aggravated by the dispute over Bulgaria. Photius poured oil onto the fire by accusing
the Latin Church of doctrinal error, thereby involving Bulgaria circumstantially in
the argument that would later culminate in the Photian schism.
Photius' irritated response did not hinder the success of the papal mission in
Bulgaria. This was due to the tact of one man, Formosus, the bishop of Porto, who
won the khan's affections and trust, so much so that Boris destined him for the post
of patriarch. After only twelve months of the Latin mission Boris wrote to the pope
suggesting that Formosus be appointed patriarch. Boris' predisposition toward
having a patriarch has already been mentioned. However, in this instance it was the
ambition of Formosus that came to the fore using Boris' predilection to prompt the
khan to propose his promotion to the pope. Nicholas refused to endorse his
appointment under the pretext that canon law could not permit Episcopal translations
between dioceses. Behind this decision lay another surreptitious reason. It was
claimed that Boris had fallen under the spell of Formosus and the pope was aware
that the bishop might use this power over the khan to direct the affairs of his diocese
outwith papal control.40 For this reason Formosus was removed from the Bulgarian
mission by papal order. That such fears existed is confirmed by the charges raised
against Formosus in Rome in 876, amongst which he was accused of having sought
38 Photii Epistulae et Amphilochia, Vol.1, Ep.l, p.53
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to usurp the Bulgarian archdiocese and having by means of "most terrible promises"
attempted to corrupt the Bulgarian khan.41
1.2.2.2 Bulgarian Exasperation
In June 868 another Bulgarian delegation arrived in Rome to enquire about the
possibility of appointing an archbishop of the pope's choice. However, the new pope,
Hadrian II (consecrated on 14 December 867) steadfastly ignored the khan's
requests. The following year Boris sent a letter to Hadrian demanding that Formosus
be returned to Bulgaria as their archbishop immediately. Hadrian, an adversary of
Formosus, refused Bulgarian demands again. Almost four years had passed since
Bulgaria had turned to the pope in Rome, who consistently failed to recognise the
increasing exasperation of Boris, even though a source close to the pope admitted
that Khan Boris was "unable to endure the pope's unwillingness to meet his
,,4?
expectations.
Meanwhile Byzantium had not remained idle. The patriarchate continued its
ferocious denunciation of the Latin mission and behind its rhetoric the machinery of
Byzantine diplomacy moved stealthily. Witnessing Boris' exasperation with Rome,
it was put to the khan that Constantinople's position could be more accommodating
than it had previously been. Boris therefore decided to raise the question of
Bulgaria's ecclesiastical allegiance at the Eighth Ecumenical Council (869/70). The
Bulgarian question was not on the main agenda, but a carefully prepared action by
delegates of the khan determined the final session. They requested an authoritative
and binding ruling on the issue of to which Christian see, Rome or Constantinople,
Bulgaria would belong. The council re-convened for an extraordinary session on 4
March 870 with only one issue to debate, the future of the Bulgarian church. When
asked what clergy, if any, the Bulgarians had encountered when they first settled in
the disputed territory, the Bulgarian delegation stated that they had found Greek
speaking clergy. This tipped the balance in favour of the Patriarchate of
41
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Constantinople and the council ruled that the Church of Rome had no jurisdictional
rights in Bulgaria.43
1.2.2.3 Bulgarian Satisfaction
With the decision of the Ecumenical Council Boris achieved his heartfelt desire.
Bulgaria was granted an archbishop and was given maximum autonomy over its
internal affairs. Although remaining under the Patriarchate of Constantinople its
dependence on Constantinople was limited to dogmatic issues while disciplinary
matters were to be solved by the Bulgarians themselves. Indeed the notitiae
episcopatuum compiled under Emperor Leo VI reveal that by the end of the century
the Bulgarian bishoprics were no longer viewed by the Patriarchate as being under its
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.44 Khan Boris must have been satisfied with the progress
the Bulgarian Church had made thus far. The great Christian Sees of Rome and
Constantinople recognised that they could not take Bulgarian compliance for granted
and therefore had to compromise and negotiate on matters of internal jurisdiction, as
Bulgaria progressed on its path toward its goal of establishing an autocephalous
church.
Today the Church in Bulgaria propagates the myth of a pure unbroken Orthodox
lineage, from the moment of the nation's conversion to the present. However,
historical sources reveal an ecclesiastical struggle taking place during the ninth
century between Rome and Constantinople for control of Bulgaria. The ultimate
beneficiary in this dispute was Bulgaria, emerging initially with an archbishopric and
eventually an autocephalous church. Under the leadership of Khan Boris Bulgaria
played a strategic game with the leading Christian powers of the day, at one moment
accepting their authority and then playing them in opposition to one another, in order
to achieve a greater aim. The contest between these competing Christian Sees only
succeeded in promoting increased nationalistic desire for a separate church within
Bulgaria.
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The role and legacy of Constantine-Cyril and Methodius in the development of
Slavic linguistics, whether reflected in their own actions in connection with the
Byzantine mission to Moravia, or in the activities of their disciples in Bulgaria, has
come to be known as the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition. The role of these missionary
brothers, and of their disciples, in the Slavicisation of ecclesiastical organisation in
Bulgaria and indeed throughout the Slavic world is legendary. To appreciate this
tradition and gauge its influence on Bulgaria it is necessary to consider briefly the
life and work of Cyril and Methodius, the introduction of the Slavic vernacular
tradition and the establishment of the cult ofCyril and Methodius within Bulgaria.
Our knowledge of the tradition comes from a variety of sources. Particularly
informative are the brothers' extensive vitae, known collectively as the Pannonian
Legend, but usually referred to as Vita Constantini and Vita Methodii.45 There is also
an Italian Legend, which is a Latin version of the vita of Constantine. This was
composed by Gauderich, bishop of Velletri, who participated in the Latin ordination
of the brothers in Rome.46 Yet another document bearing directly on the careers of
Cyril and Methodius, particularly on the Bulgarian chapter of their mission, is the so
called Bulgarian Legend, which includes the vitae of their disciples Kliment and
Naum, composed at the beginning of the twelfth century by the Metropolitan of
Ohrid, Theophylact.47
1.3.1 CONSTANTINE-CYRIL (826-69) & METHODIUS (815-85). A
BRIEF HISTORY
The brothers were born in Thessalonica into a family with a strong tradition in the
imperial civil service. By birth and later by education and profession they were part
of the Byzantine elite. Methodius, the elder brother, held the high administrative post
45 An English translation of the Vitae of the brothers is available in, I.Duichev, Kiril andMethodius:
Founders ofSlavonic Writing; A Collection ofSources and Critical Studies, (Boulder, 1985)
46 P.Devos & P.Meyvaert, 'Trois enigmas Cyrillo-Methodiennes de la Legende Italique resolues grace
a un document inedit', Annalecta Bollandiana, 73(1955)375-461
47 Theophylact's vitae available in I.Duichev (1985), pp.93-126
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of archon in one of the Slav provinces before becoming a monk and then abbot on
Mount Olympus. Constantine, a scholar of outstanding ability, held the chair of
philosophy at the University of Constantinople during the 850s, earning himself the
epithet 'Constantine the Philosopher'. However, as a result of political upheaval in
Constantinople, he relinquished his academic position and was ordained as a deacon
before joining his brother on Mount Olympus. Their joint ability and experience
were highly valued in Constantinople which resulted in the brothers serving on a
number of imperial missions.
Fig.2 Cyril & Methodius
On diplomatic, linguistic and ecclesiastic grounds the brothers were well equipped
not only to serve but to lead these imperial missions, particularly in respect to their
missionary enterprise in Moravia. This event, which was to dictate the rest of their
lives, was initiated at the request of Prince Rastislav of Moravia to send his people "a
bishop and teacher... able to explain to them the true Christian faith in their own
language [Slavonic]."48 Thessalonica, the brother's hometown, was at that time a
bilingual city which explains their knowledge of the Slav language. Methodius'
biographer explains that the Byzantine emperor, in urging the brothers to go to
Moravia, induced them by saying "you are both natives of Thessalonica and all
Thessalonians speak pure Slav."49 Nevertheless, the success of their mission, and
future Slavic missions, depended not only on the ability of its members to preach and
teach in the Slavonic dialect, but on the provision ofwritten Slavonic translations of
48 Vita Constantini, XIV, p.2-4
49 Vita Methodii, IV, p. 8
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the Scriptures and Liturgy. Before departing for Moravia it was the brothers who first
devised an alphabet for the writing of Slavonic.
In the autumn of 863 the Byzantine mission arrived in Moravia bearing with them
the new Slavic alphabet and various translated liturgical texts. The mission
immediately had two tasks: the first religious and cultural, the establishment of a
Slavonic church through the translating of liturgical and biblical documents and the
training of a Moravian indigenous clergy; secondly, political and diplomatic,
establishing a working relationship with Rastislav and the resident Frankish clergy.
In the first of these tasks the mission achieved noticeable success, particularly as the
liturgy had so far been celebrated in Latin, a language unknown to most Moravians.
However, in the second task they met with opposition from the Frankish clergy who
regarded the Byzantines as unauthorised intruders competing for the religious loyalty
of the Slavs. From a legalistic point of view, the brothers were working in a region
that was traditionally part of the sphere of influence of the Latin Church. The
introduction of Slavonic liturgy was especially criticised by the Latin Church which
claimed that only three languages were worthy of expressing the Word of God:
Hebrew, Greek and Latin. It became obvious that if the Slav mission was to survive
it would require securing the support of Rome.
Thus, in the winter of 867/8 Constantine and Methodius arrived in Rome to defend,
and seek blessing for, the Slavonic ministry. They met with the pope at an
advantageous moment in history: Rome had just gained the spiritual allegiance of
Bulgaria, bordering Moravia, and dreams of a Slavonic world under the Holy See
were becoming a real possibility. Hadrian II therefore gave the brothers his full
support and issued a papal bull authorising the use of the Slavonic liturgy. The pope
also ordained Constantine giving him the name Cyril and appointed Methodius as
Archbishop of Pannonia. In doing so Rome endeavoured to use the brothers and their
Slav ministry to bring the Slavs in central and Eastern Europe closer to itself.
Unfortunately a few weeks after his ordination Cyril died and according to his wishes
was buried in Rome. Methodius returned to Moravia, this time with the blessing of
the pope and the Latin Church. Over the next twelve years his mission worked to
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establish a Slavonic church but faced increasing opposition: the Frankish clergy
continued to do everything to undermine their position; Svatopluk, the new Moravian
ruler began to favour the Frankish clergy rather than Methodius; and finally Rome
itself began to lose interest in the Slavonic liturgy eventually leading to papal
proscription against the use of the Slavonic vernacular.50 In 885 Methodius died,
tired of relentless Frankish opposition and the indifference of Rome. With the death
ofboth of its leaders the mission edged toward disaster. The work that the missionary
brothers had devoted so much of their life to accomplish was frustrated and their
disciples were eventually driven out of Moravia altogether. Nevertheless, the
brothers had not completely failed in their task. So influential were their Slavonic
translations that by the following century the use of the Slavonic liturgy was
universally accepted among the Slavic peoples of central and Eastern Europe,
progressing to become one of the great ecclesiastical traditions within Eastern
Christendom.
1.3.2 THE SLAVONIC MISSION IN BULGARIA
From the ashes of the Moravian mission arose a phoenix that was to have
momentous consequences for Bulgarian Christianity and culture. After their
expulsion from Moravia, three of the missionary brothers' closest disciples, Kliment,
Naum and Angelarius, managed to flee by sailing down the Danube to Belgrade,
which was then a Bulgarian frontier town. Khan Boris enthusiastically welcomed the
Slavonic missionaries. He understood the implications and advantages to be had in
using these clergymen in the continuing Christianisation of Bulgaria. If they could
achieve the same level of success in Bulgaria as had been achieved in Moravia, the
stranglehold of Byzantine culture on Bulgaria might be broken. It is significant that
while Boris' delight has been recorded, there is no mention in any Greek source
about the arrival of the Slav missionaries in Bulgaria. This reveals a certain coldness
on the part of the Byzantines towards the use of Slavonic in Bulgaria. It appears that
for the Byzantines, what had been permissible in distant Moravia would not be
tolerated in neighbouring Bulgaria, as they considered that the khan would use it to
50 A.Schmemann, TheHistorical Road ofEastern Orthodoxy, (London, 1963), pp.257-258
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increase Bulgarian independence. The Byzantine authorities were correct in their
assumption as Boris placed the weight of his royal patronage behind the work of the
Slav clergy. He made the decision to send the missionaries to evangelise his
Macedonian provinces. The Macedonian Slavs as well as being Boris' most recent
Christian converts were also the most difficult of his inhabitants to govern. He
therefore sought to endear them to his rule by means of Slavonic Christianity,
bidding for their heart and soul against the Byzantine Empire by offering them a
faith, culture and government that they could understand and accept. Bulgaria would
then be bound by two strong bonds - a common Christian faith and Slavonic
language.
The first task for the missionaries was exactly the same as it had been in Moravia: to
train an indigenous clergy and multiply the number of Slavonic liturgical and literary
materials. Kliment was commissioned by Khan Boris to be the mission leader and
teacher of the Slavs, and was dispatched to Macedonia where he spent the remainder
of his life teaching, preaching and writing. It is said of his ministry that he taught no
less than 3,500 students, many of whom went on to become priests.51 Naum initially
remained at the royal court where he busied himself with the Christianisation of the
khan and his royal household before joining Kliment in Macedonia. It should be
noted that, at the same time as taking Christianity to the Slavic population of
Bulgaria, the Slav mission also contributed to an intensification of the Slavicisation
of the Bulgars.
In 894 Boris convened a national congress to announce his abdication and to name
his son Simeon as his successor. During his reign the Bulgarian church had become
firmly established under the Slavic mission of Kliment, many Slavonic books had
been translated, indigenous clergy had been trained, so much so that reliance on
Greek clergy was no longer required. Therefore, during the congress, Boris took the
opportunity to complete his last great reform. The Greek language of Church and
State was officially replaced by the Slavonic and Bulgaria was divided into seven
dioceses: Drista, Philippopolis, Serdica, Provadia, Margum, Bergalnitsa and Ohrid.
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Simeon's first act as Bulgarian ruler was to promote Kliment to the rank of
Metropolitan of the new Ohrid diocese. The Bulgarian acceptance of Slavonic
Christianity had been eager and rapid. Indeed, it was so spectacular that it has been
called a cultural revolution. In the words of Kliment of Ohrid, "the rain of divine
59
understanding came down upon my people."
1.3.3 THE BULGARIAN CULT OF CYRIL & METHODIUS
That Bulgaria eventually became the repository of the Slavonic legacy of Cyril and
Methodius was the result of a series of circumstances, some of them fortuitous. Its
value within Bulgaria cannot be underestimated. However, a Bulgarian myth
surrounding the creation of the Slavonic vernacular, and the place Bulgaria played in
its creation, has somewhat distorted reality. The onset of this distortion can be traced
to the period of Ottoman political domination over Bulgaria and Greek hegemony of
the Bulgarian church, when the championing of the rights of the Slavonic vernacular
became a medium of Bulgarian political and ecclesiastical independence and
nationalism. The promotion of these distortions can clearly be seen in modern
Bulgarian authorship, particularly in the writing of Professor Emil Georgiev of the
Department of Slavonic Literature in Kilment Ohridski University.
Prof. Georgiev included in the symposium 'Bulgaria's Share in Human Culture' an
essay entitled 'Creation of the Slav Script'. He argued that Cyril and Methodius "laid
the foundations of Bulgarian and Slavonic letters which evolved into the Slavonic or
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more precisely Old Bulgarian language." He suggests that the beginnings of the
missionary brothers' work can be traced back to Bulgaria and that they were in fact
Bulgarian by birth. Therefore, the Slavonic heritage is not Byzantine but more
correctly Bulgarian.54 However, historical sources clearly state that the brothers were
born in Salonica (Thessalonica); although they lived in and had an aptitude for
Slavonic culture and language they cannot by any means be classed as Bulgarian.
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Modern scholarship has raised the query whether the Slavonic mission can even be
classed as Byzantine, suggesting that it was in fact Latin. This quandary arises as a
result of the evidence that from the moment of Cyril and Methodius' arrival in
Moravia until their deaths, their eyes were turned towards Rome rather than
Constantinople: it was to Rome that the brothers travelled to receive support for their
work, Methodius visiting the city three times. Cyril insisted on being buried in Rome
against his family's wishes. It was Rome and not Byzantium that defended the
Slavonic work in Moravia, and today Rome continues to revere the brothers as
blessed saints.55 Both brothers were ordained into the Latin Church, Cyril as a monk
and Methodius as Archbishop of Pannonia. Whatever correspondence we have
concerning the brothers comes from Rome, while contemporary Byzantine sources
remain silent about their activities. Indeed, according to Methodius' biographer the
Byzantine emperor was so angry with them that if he [the emperor] had laid hands
upon them, they would not have escaped alive.56 Why then is their mission
traditionally associated with Byzantium? The brothers were of course born as
Byzantine citizens and were sent to Moravia with the emperor's blessing. However,
all evidence suggests that during the lives of the brothers their mission leaned
towards Rome rather than Byzantium. It is only from later perspective, particularly
after the adoption of the legend by the Bulgarians, that the mission's work can be
viewed as Byzantine.
This research would argue that from the moment the Slavonic mission was ejected
from Moravia it ceased to be either Latin or Byzantine, becoming solely Bulgarian.
Indeed, from that moment, the promotion ofCyril and Methodius as Holy Saints and
the introduction of their cult in Bulgaria had a dual purpose. On one hand the aim
was to establish the Slavonic alphabet as an acceptable script but more importantly,
Slavonic vernacular as a holy language blessed by God. Therefore the myth was
accentuated that the brothers were sent to the Slavs by God, giving the Slavs and the
Slavonic vernacular divine significance. In this respect it was important to raise the
relevance of Bulgaria, proclaiming Cyril and Methodius, not only to be Slavs, but
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especially as being born Bulgarian Slavs writing specifically for their nation, who
with divine approval continued to spread God's gift amongst the Slavonic world.57
This instilled in the Bulgarian people a cultural and vernacular nationalism, an
increasingly pro-Bulgar and anti-Byzantine spirit, but it did not stop the
Byzantinisation of the Bulgarian church. Despite the introduction of the Slavonic
language it actually preserved the Byzantine character of Christianity which indwelt
the Slavonic liturgy. Not even wars with Byzantium conducted by Simeon, and later
by Samuel, could change this. Bulgaria was, despite her unwillingness, a Slavic
component ofByzantium.
This section has brought to the fore the elevated and even 'sacred' position that the
Cyrillo-Methodian tradition has established for itself within Bulgarian culture. The
development of the vernacular tradition had several significant outcomes: It enabled
Bulgaria to develop an indigenous clergy, speaking the language of the people and
sharing their same nationalistic desire; a Slavic Church rather than Greek Church in
Bulgaria; a Bulgarian Church no longer reliant on Greek clergy or Greek hierarchy in
Constantinople; and finally a Slavic language and a Slavic Christian culture which
would become the medium for Bulgarian political and ecclesiastical independence
and nationalism. The tradition has become so important to the people of Bulgaria that
myth has developed around it, elevating its cultural and spiritual importance over and
against the Greek forces that were threatening to subjugate Bulgaria.
1.4 BOGOMILISM - A DISSENTING TRADITION
Generally speaking, the Bogomil movement is considered to have been
inconsequential in the history of Byzantine Christianity. However, this research
would advance the theory that aspects of Bogomilism greatly influenced the
Bulgarian church, enabling it to develop as a popular nationalist body. It is necessary
then to briefly examine the history of Bogomilism, a dualistic Christian movement,
and analyse its effect on the development of the Bulgarian church. This heterodox
movement arose in Bulgaria during the tenth century through the transmission of
57 A.N.Tachiaos, 'The Cult of Saint Methodius in the Byzantino-Slavonic World', in Christianity
Among the Slavs: The Heritage ofSaints Cyril andMethodius, (Rome, 1988), pp.131-142
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Zoroastrian and Paulician beliefs, originally from Sassanid Persia, via the Russian
Steppes and Armenia. The Bogomil movement gained popularity as it responded to
economic, political and religious circumstances in Bulgaria, particularly its resistance
to the Byzantinisation of Bulgarian culture, law and religion. For this reason
Bogomilism has come to be recognised as one of the major 'problems' of Byzantine
history.58 The influence it has exerted on the history of all Balkan peoples, especially
on Bulgarian Church and State, on their society and literature, on their religion and
folklore, make a study of Bogomilism essential to this research.
1.4.1 THE RISE OF BALKAN DUALISM
During the eighth and ninth century Byzantine foreign policy was aimed above all at
defending the empire from the incessant threats to its eastern borders. As the
Byzantine armies defended these borders, groups of heterodox Armenian believers,
calling themselves Paulicians, came under their control. Several Byzantine emperors
pursued a policy of transporting groups of these Paulicians into Thrace and
Macedonia, assuming this to be an effective way of breaking up troublesome
heretical communities. By settling them in a region largely inhabited by Byzantine
Christians they hoped to render them accessible to Orthodox Christian influence.
However, Constantine V Copronymus (741-775) records his reasons for Armenian
transportation differently: to re-populate Thrace after the effects of plague and to
create a defensive buffer zone against Bulgar attacks. Constantine's biographer also
comments that these Armenian refugees were beginning to diffuse their dualistic
heresy in the Balkan region.59
Although the Paulicians were originally settled in towns within the Byzantine
Empire, they were soon incorporated into Bulgarian territory. Any Bulgar attack on
the empire pre-supposed an invasion of Thrace. Thus records of Bulgar invasions by
Khan Telets in 763 and Khan Krum in 796 tell us that many prisoners were taken
from these border towns to be resettled in the Bulgarian provinces. It appears highly
58 A problem for the Orthodox Church in the sense that Bogomilism was a popular heterodox religious
and social movement which challenged the authority of the established Church.
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Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C.de Boor, (Hildesheim, 1963), p.422
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likely that among those taken prisoner would be large numbers of Paulicians who
were placed in these defensive zones and whose missionary zeal would now be
exerted in Bulgarian territory. The policy of Byzantine colonization therefore proved
to be a failure in regard to its intended purpose: as a military defensive force the
Armenian refugees in Thrace did not justify the hope placed in them by the
Byzantine authorities. Moreover, far from abandoning their heterodox beliefs as a
result of contact with Orthodox Christians, the colonists indulged in vigorous
proselytism spreading their convictions throughout Thrace. In one respect they did
contribute to the weakening of Bulgaria, the gradual penetration of the Paulicians
into Bulgaria and the consequent spread of their heterodox doctrines became a
serious menace to the evolving Bulgarian church. They paved the way for several
anti-ecclesiastical movements, the most important of which was the Bogomil
movement.
1.4.2 BOGOMILISM IN BULGARIA
According to its religious content, Bogomilism was simply a dualistic Christian
heterodox movement, but in its Bulgarian context it was a popular social movement
conditioned by the economic, religious and political circumstances of the tenth
century. Bogomilism rejected established Christian institutions and preached the
value of poverty, simplicity, and asceticism. It espoused antiestablishment concepts
condemning existing political and social institutions.
This was a very different time in comparison to those heady days under Boris and
Simeon's rule. The reign of Tsar Petur (927-969) reflected a new relationship with
the Byzantine Empire. In the first year of his reign an alliance between Bulgaria and
Byzantium was cemented by a treaty, in which Emperor Romanus I Lecapenus (920-
944) recognised Petur's title as Basileus, granted the Bulgarian church autocephality
in 925, and through Petur's marriage with Maria Lecapena, the emperor's
granddaughter, Byzantium gained a foothold in the Bulgarian royal court. Intense
Byzantinisation ofBulgaria ensued.
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There are important internal explanations for the Byzantinisation of Bulgaria during
Petur's reign. The presence of a Byzantine tsarina increased Byzantine influence at
Petur's court. Bulgarian officials began using Byzantine court titles. Byzantine
influence also affected religious and cultural activities: church architecture,
decoration, literature and music. The hope that Petur's reign would continue the age
of Bulgarian independence and prosperity was shattered by the rapid Byzantinisation
of Bulgar society. Evidence of this Byzantinisation can also be witnessed in the
economic changes of the tenth century, particularly in the growth of large land
estates which saw a steady increase in the economic and social power of the
landowner, the Church being one of the most powerful. As the Church rapidly grew
in property and wealth, life became increasingly difficult for those living on church
land, and resulted in their alienation from the Church. This new pattern in social
structure and distribution ofwealth caused widespread misery amongst the Bulgarian
peasantry, which by the middle of the tenth century erupted in revolt against the
authorities of Church and State, in which anti-Byzantine overtones were apparent.
The very suddenness of Bulgaria's conversion in the previous century had left many
in Bulgaria Christian, but in name only. The mass of the population were
insufficiently educated in, and therefore insecurely committed to, their new church.
Therefore, during this period of increasing animosity towards the church it was
natural for the population to seek something else in which to put their faith and hope.
If they could not trust the church they would escape into heterodoxy, especially
toward a belief system which offered sensible explanations and practical answers to
their present sufferings. The Bogomil teachings achieved this, satisfying both
spiritual hunger and offering practical advice on life in the present situation. As
Bogomilism appeased mounting social pressure its popularity increased in times of
hardship.
It has been suggested that the Bogomils were little more than a nuisance to the
authorities of Church and State.60 However, aware of growing discontent among his
population and equally aware of the emerging religious/social movement which was
60 D.P.Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism, (New York, 2004), p.52
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gaining popularity around it, Tsar Petur wrote to the Patriarch of Constantinople,
Theophylact Lecapenus (933-956), seeking guidance on how to deal with this heresy.
This would appear to be a response to something more than a mere nuisance within
general society. In Theophylact's reply, which provides us with the earliest evidence
for the existence of Bogomilism in Bulgaria, the patriarch describes the heresy as
both "ancient" and "newly appeared" and defines it as "Manichaeism mixed with
Paulicianism."61 It is unlikely that Petur found the patriarch's comments
enlightening; its abstract terminology, its tendency to describe heresy in terms of its
doctrinal ancestry, and its almost total lack of practical advice were not very helpful
to the predicament that faced the Bulgarian ruler. This lack of appreciation was
typical of an Orthodox hierarchy who regarded Bogomilism simply as a delusion. In
fact, there is only one example of an Orthodox writer, the Bulgarian priest Cosmas,
who, despite his antipathy toward the Bogomils, was aware that behind their
teachings lay a problem of singular poignancy to which the Church in Bulgaria was
not able to respond. This was the Church's teaching that God was the source of all
perfection and that the whole world, visible and invisible, was his creation, yet in this
world moral and physical evil, suffering, cruelty, decay and death were clearly
present. How then, the people begged, could God, the supreme good, be the cause of
all suffering and evil? The Bogomils responded with an answer that was at least
logical and consistent: evil and suffering were inherent in the world because this
world was the creation of the Evil One.62 In pitting metaphysical 'good' against a
material 'bad' they rejected orthodox Christian doctrine but attracted troubled Bulgar
society.
Superficially Bogomilism appears to have had much in common with Paulicianism.
Both were Christian dualist movements whose adherents denied that a good God
could have made the visible evil world; both rejected that Christ had taken real
humanity upon himself. They also rejected the Old Testament, and both renounced
the Byzantine Church, its authority, hierarchy and sacraments. However, the view of
61 The letter of Theophylact Lecapenus to Tsar Petur appears in I.Duichev, 'L'epistola sui Bogomil
del patriarca constantinopolitano Teofilatto', Melanges E. Tisserant, (Rome, 1964), pp.88-91
62 The discourse of Cosmas Against the Bogomils can be found in Y.Stoyanov, The Hidden Tradition
in Europe, (New York, 1994)
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spiritual reality which lay at the heart of Bogomil belief was quite separate from that
of the Paulicians. The Bogomils believed in one God, the source of all being, who
had two sons, Christ and Satan. This view has its parallels in the Near Eastern
religious ideas of Zurvanism, which postulated the existence of a High God, Zurvan,
who was father to Ohrmazd, the God of Light, and of Ahriman, the God of
Darkness.63 Ivan the Exarch comments that this beliefwas present in Bulgaria before
the rise of Bogomilism and may therefore date from a period when the Bulgars lived
on the Russian Steppes and had direct contact with Sassanid Persia.64
However, there is no need to postulate such a singularly exotic origin for Bogomil
dogma. The Bulgarian priest, Father Bogomil, is considered to be the founding father
of the Bogomil movement. He encouraged his disciples to live as monks, to meet
together for prayer at regular times of the day and night, to remain celibate, and
abstain from eating meat and drinking alcohol. He believed monasticism to
approximate most closely the life of Christian perfection. However, the Christian
tradition stated that the monastic life involved giving up things which were of their
nature God given, in order to respond better to Christ's invitation to self-denial,
whereas the Bogomils gave up these things because they believed them to be
inherently evil and therefore incompatible with Christian living. Bogomilism was
indebted to the Bulgarian church in another way, owing much of its success to the
introduction of vernacular translation. It was the Old Slavonic text of the New
Testament which Father Bogomil used as the foundation of his teachings. Yuri
Stoyanov rightly observes that the materials used in Bogomil development came to
hand because of the Ohrid School of translation founded by Kliment and Naum:
"What remains undisputed is the link of a rich and diverse apocryphal literature in
tenth century Bulgaria, some of which came to be adopted for the purpose of
Bogomil propaganda."65 These considerations suggest that Father Bogomil's
movement was deeply indebted to the Christian Church, from which it derived its
monastic concept of holiness and desire for the New Testament scriptures. His
dualism owed much to the Paulicians and had close resemblance to the beliefs of the
63 R.C.Zaehner, Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma, (Oxford, 1955), appendix
64




Zurvanite Zoroastrians with whom the Bulgars had contact before settling in the
Balkans. Bogomilism therefore revealed itself to be a highly syncretistic religion.
In 969 the reign of Tsar Petur was cut short by an unprovoked Russian invasion.
Svyatoslav of Kiev, prompted by Constantinople, invaded the Bulgarian Empire as
part of Byzantium's decision to reconquer the Balkans. Despite the initial success of
the invasion the advance was stopped in western Bulgaria (modem day Macedonia)
by an army commanded by a group of brothers, known as the Cometopuli (sons of
the count). The youngest of the brothers, Samuel, was crowned tsar of a new
independent Bulgarian State in 997. Within his kingdom, due to the strong anti-
Byzantine persuasion, Samuel was obliged to pursue an essentially pro-Bulgar
nationalistic policy, both ecclesiastically and politically. To be successful this policy
required the collaboration of all the people in the pursuit of one end - the destruction
of Byzantine power and its dominion over Bulgaria. Consequently, during this period
Bogomilism was able to expand unchecked. The explanation for Tsar Samuel's
leniency toward the Bogomil movement is simple: it was the only anti-Byzantine
movement with clear Slavonic orientation. However, the Byzantine Empire
continued its offensive against Bulgaria and under Emperor Basil II (976-1025) the
First Bulgarian Empire eventually collapsed and became a Byzantine province,
remaining so for the following one hundred and sixty-eight years.
Bulgaria remained an integral part of the Byzantine Empire until 1185 when she
secured her independence once more. During this period of Byzantine domination
there had been numerous outbreaks of social unrest making it clear that a sense of
Bulgarian cultural identity and separateness had survived. This was due in part to
Bogomil influence, particularly because of its pro-Slavic, anti-Byzantine tendencies.
Bogomilism had also assisted in preventing any commitment to the ruling Byzantine
State or Church. However, in 1202 Tsar Kaloyan, wishing to secure Bulgaria's
independence, during the period of the fourth Crusade and the Latin rule of
Constantinople, opened negotiations with Pope Innocent III, leading to a reunion of
the Bulgarian church with Rome. In 1206 Innocent sent his legate to Bulgaria to
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persuade the new ruler, Tsar Boril, to prosecute the Bogomils.66 This resulted in
Boril presiding over the Council of Turnovo (1211) which finally legislated against
Bogomilism in Bulgaria.
1.4.3 THE SUCCESS OF BOGOMILISM
The success of the Bogomil movement in medieval Bulgaria indicates that the impact
of Byzantine Christian culture could be withstood and repelled, not by the Bulgarian
Church, but by a strong heterodox dissenting tradition. The most effective carrier of
Byzantine influence to the Bulgarian population was the Christian clergy who
instilled in their flocks a loyalty to the mother church in Constantinople. However,
the Bulgarian priest Cosmas in his discourse Against the Bogomils paints a gloomy
picture of the state of his country's clergy. He described them as greedy, wealthy
landowners who had lost contact with their flocks and alienated the people from the
church. He charged the parish priests with sloth, drunkenness and peculation, going
so far as to place the main responsibility for the spread of Bogomilism on the
depravity of Bulgaria's ecclesiastical personnel. By the same token the Bogomils, by
the austerity of their lives, their intimate knowledge of the New Testament scriptures,
their bold proselytism, and their courage in the face of persecution, appeared to the
Bulgarian people to be the true bearers of Christianity.
Monasticism, which developed rapidly in tenth century Bulgaria, also proved to be a
two-edged sword in Byzantine hands. Undoubtedly the monks made a notable
contribution to the cultural life of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the overall picture of
contemporary Bulgarian monasticism was not an edifying one. Cosmas writes of
monks who ignored their vows, lived worldly lives, engaged in business, indulged in
gossip, and simply wandered the country on the excuse of pilgrimage. Cosmas
explains that the Bogomil doctrine, that the human body was intrinsically evil, had
gained wide acceptance within monasticism. This led to a contamination of
Orthodoxy by dualist doctrine; it is therefore significant that Cosmas' apologetic was
66 This attempt to halt the advance of Bogomilism was contemporaneous with the pope's suppression
of the Albigensian heresy in Southern France.
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written against both the Bogomils and the abuses of contemporary Bulgarian
monasticism and Church personnel.67
For four centuries the Bogomils revealed themselves not only to be anti-Byzantine
but also ardently pro-Bulgarian, the relationship of the Bulgarian church to
Constantinople was never so apparent. The mass popularity of Bogomilism led to the
movement being anathematised by both the Byzantine and Latin Churches, but only
after four centuries of existence. The evidence suggests that the success of the
Bogomil movement only accentuated the unpopularity of Byzantine Church and
State, especially their policy of Byzantinisation in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Church
appears to have failed to meet the spiritual and practical needs of the Bulgarian
people and this resulted in increasing alienation. After the demise of Bogomilism,
during the period of Ottoman domination, we witness the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church actually taking on many of the popular characteristics of Bogomilism,
becoming the main advocate of Bulgarian nationalism and the chief motivator of
anti-Greek sentiment. In doing so the BOC sought to meet the spiritual, political and
practical desires of the Bulgarian people. It was with these dissenting characteristics,
fully adopted from Bogomilism, that the BOC reached its apogee during the period
of the National Revival.
1.5 CONCLUSION
As a historical introduction this chapter has provided only a preliminary sketch of
five centuries of Bulgarian Church history. However, respecting the sacred position
of tradition and history within Eastern Orthodoxy, it has been essential to place this
research in a correct historical framework. This was achieved by selecting widely
acclaimed elements from Bulgarian history that this research deemed elemental to
the formation of Bulgarian Orthodox identity. From the outset the chapter had two
goals: to increase the reader's awareness of the preliminary processes that helped
create Bulgarian Orthodox and national identity; and to facilitate appreciation of how
initial relationships developed between the BOC and the Bulgarian nation, state and
67 J & B.Hamilton, Christian Dualist Heresies, (Manchester, 1998), pp. 114-134
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society. In achieving these goals the chapter assists the reader to comprehend fully
the syncretistic and nationalistic nature of Bulgarian Orthodoxy. This chapter
establishes that the Bulgarian Church developed as a result of a series of contacts
with historical issues, which were not necessarily ecclesiastical, but rather secular
and nationalist, which it then adopted and absorbed within its own characteristics.
In the section entitled 'Khan Boris and the Conversion ofBulgaria' we witnessed the
Bulgarian Christianisation process being defined by a series of non-ecclesiastical
issues, dictated from the outset by the nationalistic desires of Khan Boris. These
issues included the need to cement a union between the proto-Bulgar and Slav
inhabitants of his kingdom and his desire to establish an autocephalous church within
a strongly independent nation. This first stage in the development of state
nationalism helped to define the independent nature of the Bulgarian Church. In the
second section we witnessed what can only be called 'ecclesiastical nationalism'. In
the international struggle for jurisdictional authority over Bulgaria we observed how
three Christian power centres - Constantinople, Rome and the East Franks -
attempted to enforce their model of Christian doctrine and practice as well as the
political might of their nations upon Bulgaria. The ultimate beneficiary in these
ecclesiastical disputes was Bulgaria who eventually gained an independent and then
autocephalous Church. Through a series of fortuitous events we observed how the
birth of the Slavonic vernacular tradition taking place in Bulgaria, creating a form of
'linguistic nationalism'. This tradition enabled the Bulgarians to rid themselves of
Greek language and liturgy and replace it with Slavonic as the official language of
the Bulgarian church and state. The Cyrillo-Methodian tradition therefore united
Bulgaria as one nation speaking one language. Flowever, following an intense period
of Byzantinisation, the Bulgarian Church became the enemy of the people, alienating
itself from the nation, losing its original independent focus. Through the pro-
Bulgar/anti-Byzantine tendencies of the Bogomil movement 'popular nationalism'
arose. The Bulgarian Church had lost sight of the very thing that had helped define it
in the first place. Consequently, after the demise of Bogomilism, we witness the
Church taking on many of the popular nationalistic characteristics of Bogomilism.
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By observing and analysing these different historical factors, some endowed with
mythic value, this research has been able to make appropriate judgements on
Bulgaria's early ecclesiastical development. In light of the evidence this research
would argue that Bogomilism helped to indigenise Bulgarian Orthodoxy, thus
securing the church's future role as popular national saviour. The Bulgarian church
had been struggling to equate local and universal aspects of the Church. However, by
connecting Orthodox faith, vernacular language and Bulgarian culture, the Bulgarian
church used popular heterodox traits to find a balance between those local and
universal aspects of church authority. Thus religion and nationalism became
inseparable, a fact one cannot fully comprehend without looking closely at the
Bogomil tradition in Bulgaria.
The evidence provided in this chapter would suggest that from its inception,
nationalism has been an integral part of the Bulgarian Church. Throughout the
transitional period of Bulgarian Church history covered in this chapter nationalism
directed ecclesiastical development. From its establishment the Bulgarian Church has
been indelibly linked with the Bulgarian nation by a unique relationship in which
nationalism was an elemental factor.
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CHAPTER TWO
2. RELIGIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE BULGARIAN
NATIONAL REVIVAL
This chapter will explore the religio-historical situation in Bulgaria prior to the
National Revival period. It will accomplish this by exploring the socio-historical
factors that moulded Christian-Muslim relationships during the period. It will
concentrate on the widely held catastrophe theory, which argues that during the
Ottoman period Bulgaria suffered destruction of her economic, cultural and spiritual
development due to the relentless Islamisation process of the Ottoman authorities.
This theory has established itself at the core of Bulgarian national history but is at
variance with modern Islamic research that speaks of religious toleration within
Islamic society. This chapter will seek to offer an alternative theory through its
investigation of contemporary source materials from Ottoman and Bulgarian
archives. The chapter continues its religio-historical investigation with a study of two
Bulgarian clergymen who were influential in the period prior to the national revival,
Paisii of Hilendar and Sofroni of Vratsa. A literary investigation of Paisii's Slavo-
Bulgarian History predominates as it is claimed to have been a main motivating
textbook of the Bulgarian National Revival.
2.1 THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Bulgaria, during the reign of Tsar Ivan Alexander (1331-1371), experienced one of
her richest cultural periods. Many churches and monasteries were erected, numerous
literary works were produced and religious art flourished in the painting of frescoes,
icons and the illumination of manuscripts. However, due to internal fragmentation
the kingdom devolved into three regional states governed by Tsar Ivan Shishman
(1371-1393), Ivan Stratismir the tsar's half brother, and Ivanko a rebel boyar. This
political disunity made Bulgaria easy prey for conquest.
The lack of harmony within Bulgaria was mirrored by a similar lack of unity
amongst the other Balkan states resulting in their inability to join in combined
defensive action against Ottoman expansion. The Bulgarian military attempted to
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check the Ottoman advance, failing at the battle of Chernomen, near Adrianople in
1371. Shishman attempted to remain in power by becoming a vassal of Sultan Murat
I (1362-1389) but to no avail. The Ottoman military advanced along the Maritsa
Valley, seizing Stara Zagora, Plovdiv, Samokov and Sofia, before proceeding toward
the capital city of Turnovo. Tsar Ivan Shishman fled the city leaving it in the hands
of Evtimi the Bulgarian patriarch. Under the patriarch's leadership Turnovo resisted
the Ottoman onslaught for three months, surrendering on 17 July 1393. The
conquerors entered the city and destroyed the royal palace, the palace Church of
'St.Petka', the Patriarchal Church of 'St.Ascension', and the Boyar Church. They
condemned the resistance leaders to death but Patriarch Evtimi was exiled to
Bachkovo Monastery in the Rhodope Mountains. This marked the cessation of
Bulgarian church independence simultaneous with the political collapse of the
/:o
kingdom. A year later Patriarch Anthony IV (1391-1397) of Constantinople named
Metropolitan Jeremias of Moldavia Exarch over Turnovo, taking the first step
towards the dissolution of the Turnovo Patriarchate.69 By 1396 Bulgaria had
completely succumbed to Ottoman rule. It would be another five centuries before
Bulgaria would claim her independence once again.
Bulgarian historiography depicts the years under Ottoman control as the 'dark
centuries', in which Bulgaria was reduced to slavery under the Ottoman yoke.70 It is
characterised as a time of Islamic despotism in which the Ottomans allegedly
committed genocide and destroyed the economic and cultural life of the nation,
persecuting Christians and forcing their conversion to Islam.71 These hardships
constitute part of the catastrophe theory that established itself in Bulgarian national
mythology during the nineteenth century struggle for national independence, later to
be enhanced during the communist regime as Bulgarian national-socialists sought
religio-historical legitimation for a number of their political campaigns.72 Ottoman
and Islamic research, however, has brought to our attention a number of
68 G.Chavrokov, Centres ofBulgarian Literacy IX-XVIII, (Sofia, 1987), p.137
69 O.Todorova, The Orthodox Church and the Bulgarian Nation through the 15th - third quarter ofthe
18th century), (Sofia, 1987), pp.43-46
7(1 P.Nikov, Revival of the Bulgarian Nation, (Sofia, 1929); P.Petrov, The Fateful Centuries ofthe
Bulgarian Nation, (Sofia, 1975); C.J.Jirecek, Geschichte der Bulgaren, (Prague, 1876), pp.448-478
71 For example Snegarov (1958) and Gandev (1972)
72 M.Kiel, Art andSociety ofBulgaria in the Turkish Period, (Assen, 1985), p.53
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incongruities within the catastrophe theory. On the basis of detailed analysis of
Bulgarian and Ottoman archival materials, including Ottoman tax registers and other
documentation from Rila Monastery in Bulgaria, this chapter will evaluate the
Islamic perspective, and offer a critique of the Bulgarian mythological paradigm.
2.1.1 ISLAMISATION UNDER OTTOMAN CONTROL
The Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria undeniably affected the religious demography of
the country. At the outset of the conquest, midway through the fourteenth century,
the number of Muslims in Bulgaria was insignificant, whereas, by mid nineteenth
century, Muslims constituted almost a third of the population.73 This fact is a major
component in the popular notion that the conquest was succeeded by five centuries of
continual repression and enforced conversion to Islam.
Bulgarian historians argue that coercion, as a method of Islamisation was an integral
part of Islamic law. In support of this argument they cite an Ottoman collation of
rulings on religious and legal matters by various Sheikh-s al-Islam. For example in
this collation the question is raised: "If an unbeliever, after accepting Islam, refuses
to give up the Christian God, becoming apostate, what should be done with him?"
The answer follows, "The law of the apostate is to be applied (that is he is to be
killed)". The same question asked of a female convert produces the advice, "Place
her in prison until she is ready to accept the will of Allah".74 A similar question is
then asked of a person who converts while drunk but later recants: "Place him in
prison and beat him until he returns to Islam."75 Bulgarian historians also refer to the
loathsome devshirme, or child-tax, whereby boys aged between seven and fourteen
were taken from their Christian families and converted to Islam. They would be
given a rigorous education, learning the Turkish language, customs and military
training under the sultan's administration, after which they would enter the ranks of
his elite janissary corps.
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It is beyond doubt that the Ottoman era in Bulgaria, particularly the years
immediately after the conquest, were marked by moments of violence, which
included subjecting towns and villages to the sword, mass killings, torture, rape,
mutilation, and an element of enforced conversion.76 It is also true, however, that in
the context of official Ottoman politics Islamic laws were normally applied with
some discretion within a complicated system of social relationships that questions an
uncritical assumption of bipolar contrasts between the Muslim rulers and their
Christian subjects. This complex relationship reflects the ambiguity between Qur'an
and hadith literature, which creates both a basis for repressive Muslim policy
towards ahl al-kitab, 'the people of the Book', but also provides justification for their
co-existence; whereas the Qur'an spells out a basis for co-existence and respect for
ahl al-kitab the hadith tends to have a more negative attitude towards 'the people of
the Book' stating they have to be 'humbled' or equally 'humiliated'.
In the face of such contradictions we shall attempt to demythologise the early
Ottoman period in Bulgaria, offering an alternative to the distorted and selective
view of the Bulgarian national myth. Among preserved Ottoman archives one of the
most important sources for studying this period are the Ottoman land and tax
registers, particularly the jizie (dotcmue) registers.77 The Bulgarian jizie registers
indicate that this was not an individual poll tax but rather a tax imposed on every
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non-Muslim household. Thus, as the Ottoman administrative system distinguished
between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of juridical status and taxation these
registers allow us to follow any changes in religious affiliation.
This research focussed on the jizie registers from the Rhodope region, as this district
became one of the most densely populated Muslim areas, and remains so today. At
the end of the fifteenth century, in the village of Zumevo, the register records that
there were 241 Christian households and only 1 Muslim home, but by the beginning
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of the seventeenth century there were only 120 Christian families.79 Bulgarian
historian Petur Petrov submits this as proof of Islamic conversion in this region.80
However, while this demonstrates a decrease in the number of Christian inhabitants,
it does not prove that Islamisation was coerced, it simply means there were fewer
Christian families living there. During the same period the village of Belotnitsi
records only 36 of 129 Christian families remaining. But the 1723 jizie register for
this village may help us, as it records not only that a meagre 30 Christian families
remained but also one solitary Muslim family, emphasising the fact that a decrease in
the Christian population was not necessarily accompanied by an equivalent increase
in Muslim numbers. In a contemporary report the region's judicial representative
explains that the Rhodope region had suffered two epidemics of bubonic plague.
From another source we find that Zurnevo and Belotnitsi, along with a number of
neighbouring settlements (all of which were predominantly Christian), were centres
of iron production, but that many families were forced to migrate to the developing
••81cities when iron production decreased due to the purchase of cheap foreign imports.
This evidence shows that the decline in the Christian population was the result of
various factors and cannot be attributed to the single cause of enforced conversion.
Another approach to Islamisation must therefore be taken into consideration, the
socio-economic view. This approach attempts to understand the role that socio¬
economic factors played in the Islamisation process. This has raised disagreement
and confusion amongst Bulgarian scholars as it reveals evidence of voluntary
conversion to Islam, determined not by coercion but through economic motivation.
The common hypothesis is that Islamic manifestation of the Imperial regime was
influential in Bulgaria on account of its immediate proximity to the Ottoman capital.
From here Bulgarian historiography constructs the theory of ruthless Ottoman rule,
leaping to the conclusion that large groups of the Christian population converted
under duress.82Although this investigation of the Rhodope jizie registers revealed no
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evidence of conversion under duress it does confirm that many Bulgarian Christians
converted to Islam.
Of utmost importance in the construction of any new Ottoman state, before
everything, was to master the newly conquered territory. Thus, in the Ottoman
territorial plan for the Balkans we read of a period described as 'the Islamising ofthe
new lands' when Islamic character would be introduced upon the lives of the
conquered community.83 This raises the problematic question of priority -
Islamisation through regional colonization or conversion. This issue relates directly
to the legal concept of Dar al-Islam, i.e. the Islamising of a territory, not by the
conversion of individual inhabitants, but by the implementation of Islamic law.
According to one of the earliest tax registers from 1445 not one Muslim was
recorded in the Rhodope region. By the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries
the jizie registers document a small rise in Muslim households throughout the region,
84
with many villages having no more than twelve Muslim families. This would
suggest that the initial introduction of Islam among the Bulgarian Christians was
through colonization - Ottoman mastery upon the territory was a gradual process. By
1723 we find the following situation in the 108 villages of the Nevrokop region: ten
villages with only Christian residents; twenty four with mixed populations, and
oc
m #
seventy four exclusively Muslim. The Ottoman jizie registers record the
chronology of the Islamisation process exceptionally well and the gradual increment
in Islamic numbers suggests the absence of extreme activities in the region.
The reason for conversion most frequently proffered in Ottoman documentation is
'economic factors'. It is indisputable that fiscal relief was a major stimulus, as we
know from available information that new Islamic converts were exempt from
paying not only the jizie, but also land tax.86 In this way a Christian's economic
status could be improved by converting to Islam. This establishes a motive for
83
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conversion and explains the slow pace and process of Islamisation. However, the
Ottoman authorities had nothing to gain by enforcing conversion upon their Christian
subjects as the loss in tax revenue would have impoverished the empire, hence a
seventeenth century traveller comments: "very many unable to bear any longer this
cruel tyranny, wish to turn Turk; but many are rejected, because say their lords, in
receiving them into the Moslem faith, their tribute would be much reduced."87 Thus
there was valid rationale for conversion to Islam deriving from Christianity's
subordinate position within the Ottoman Empire. Social equality and access to a
higher social standing could only be obtained by converting to Islam; it was for this
reason that immediately after the Ottoman conquest Bulgaria's Christian nobility
• • 88converted enabling them to maintain their social position.
Despite these evidences of the nature and reasons for the gradual Islamisation of
Bulgaria under the Ottomans, the national mythological view continues to
predominate as it provides an account that responds to the interests of Bulgarian
folklore and national revival histories. The fact remains that the majority of
Christians within Ottoman society enjoyed relative peace, some even prosperity. A
number of Muslim religious leaders actively advocated interfaith tolerance in
Bulgaria. Sheikh Bedreddin Simawi (1364-1420), for example, emphasised the unity
of human society and the equality of all people, regardless of their ethnic and
confessional identity. He exhorted Muslims to overcome their differences with
Christians and to co-operate across the religious divide.89 However, "the myth of an
interfaith, interracial Utopia in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews worked together
in equality and harmony in a golden age of free intellectual endeavour" has little
justification.90 For many Bulgarian Christians Ottoman domination caused a
discontinuity in the course of their previous cultural and historical development.
Islam was regarded by the local population as the "invaders" religion and hence an
instrument of subjugation. This predetermined a general attitude towards the Islamic
faith as alien, hostile and militant.
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The death of two Christian men in 16th century Sofia highlights this conflicting
relationship. In 1515, Georgi a young Christian goldsmith, was burned at the stake in
Sofia for having publicly disparaged Islam. Father Pejo, who penned this 'martyr's'
life, describes Georgi as a God-fearing Christian lured into a trap by Muslim
scholars. After unsuccessfully seeking to convince Georgi of Islam's advantages the
scholars demanded that he be burned. Although the Christians requested his release
they were ignored by the Muslims who, supported by Islamic legal institutions,
enjoyed superiority over the Christians.91 A similar fate befell Nikola, a Christian
shoemaker who claimed to have converted to Islam after being misled by a Muslim.
On Easter of 1555 he recanted and returned to Christianity but under the sharia was
92
charged with apostasy and stoned to death. These examples display a troubled
relationship between the two religious communities during this period but
importantly they also provide evidence of a still vibrant Christian community
surviving in a sixteenth century Ottoman administrative centre. A German priest,
Stefan Gerlach, who visited Sofia in the summer of 1578, confirms the presence of
this active Christian community. According to Gerlach the district of Sofia contained
three hundred active churches and he comments in his diary that the main church in
Sofia had recently been restored with wonderfully painted murals. His words
93disclose that Bulgaria's Christians were not exposed to debilitating oppression.
Although the catastrophe theory paints a picture of an oppressed Church, Bulgaria's
Church and Christians were not generally victims of Islamic violence. Indeed a
number of Ottoman documents actually guaranteed protection for the Orthodox
Church. The earliest evidence of protection being offered to Bulgarian Christians
was to the monks of Rila Monastery in a firman dated October 1402. This was
granted by Suleyman, the eldest son of Bayezit I, following the Battle of Ankara (28
July 1402), in answer to a request from the monks to prohibit any aggression or legal
challenge upon their estates:
We the monks, who live in Rila monastery and who have possessed
until now the royal act for our right of free life, declare and moum thus:
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our property and estates, which we have held for a long time, are
gradually being taken away from our hands and are being destroyed.
Foreigners/Bandits have violently forced their way onto our properties,
invading our estates, not only against our will but against the will of the
sharia and the Canon.94
The firman confirmed the privileges granted by Tsar Ivan Shishman to the monks in
the Rila Charter of 1378.95 The archives of Rila Monastery include many such
documents from the Ottoman era that testify to a surprising stability over this
prolonged period.96 In total there are 325 documents in Rila's archives, dating from
1402 to the 19th century, which make it possible to follow the relationship of the
monastery with Ottoman state and society. Of these fifty are firmans, granted for
various provisions by the office of every Ottoman Sultan relating to the rights of the
monastery and the monks. Forty of the documents are entitled, hudutnameta
\xydymHaMema\ (law of frontiers), that defined the borders of the monastery's estates
and another forty, hujeti \xydotcemu\ (legal proofs), granting ownership of real estate
in Thrace and Macedonia. In so doing the Ottoman authorities not only protected a
Christian monastic institution but also the monks' trading activities and property
rights. Machiel Kiel confirms this from other sources claiming that the sultan
protected the monastery's estates and granted them extensive tax exemptions.97
Contrary to this evidence, however, the Bulgarian mythological view claims that the
Ottomans destroyed Rila Monastery and drove the monks away, and the fifteenth
century Bulgarian author Vladislav Gramatik blames Rila's destruction on the
Ottomans.98 The archives in Rila speak of groups of haidouks repeatedly pillaging
and burning the monastery and one document speaks of an attack by 100 Samokov
cavalrymen who kidnapped eight of the monks, returning them once a ransom had
been paid. But there is no mention of specifically Islamic violence against the
monastery. Nevertheless, Rila Monastery seems to have been destroyed by fire at
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least twice, once in the fifteenth century and again in the eighteenth century. After
the first fire we know that the reconstruction in 1466 was only made possible with
financial help from the Russian monastery of 'St. Pantelemon' on Mount Athos, but
this in turn was only made possible when the Ottoman administration granted
permission for the Russian monastery to work in the region." Also after the
monastery was completely devastated by a second fire, Sultan Mustafa III (1757-
1774) gave permission for the construction of a new monastery and provided an
element of financial support towards this project.
Gramatik's negative impression of Ottoman rule is further eroded by his own words
in The Carrying of the Relics of St. Ivan Rilski from Turnovo to Rila Monastery.
Through this text we gain insight to Bulgarian Christian relationship with Ottoman
society. When Ivan Rilski died in 946 he was buried in the Rila valley southwest of
Sofia. After his canonization Tsar Petur I (927-969) exhumed Rilski's body and
brought it to Sofia. At the creation of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom Tsar Ivan
Assen I (1186-1196) had the relics transferred to his new capital of Turnovo.
However, after the restoration of Rila Monastery in 1469 the monks ask Sultan
Mehmet II (1451-1481) for permission to return the relics of St. Ivan to Rila. Not
only was permission granted but they were also allowed to carry the relics in holy
procession from Turnovo to Rila Monastery. It is interesting that the only recorded
disturbance the monks faced on their journey was from the Christians of Turnovo
who refused to release the relics. Gramatik's account of the procession gives us
precious insight into Christian society at this moment. He tells us that the monks
travelled to Nikopol where the relics were received with great honour by the town's
population, and in Sofia St. Ivan's relics lay in state for six days. As the monks left
Sofia for Rila the Christian inhabitants followed in procession burning torches and
incense.
This account yet again portrays a very different picture than that of general Bulgarian
history. It shows that Christian life was active and visible, rather than hidden away in
remote monasteries. Christian clergy could freely travel and be received openly by
99 BOA, MAD 525, f. 19
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their fellow Christians. This leads us to conclude that the initial phase of Ottoman
conquest in Bulgaria was marked by violence as the conqueror's sought to Islamise
the new lands, but after this initial phase passed the Christians as 'ahl al-kitaV were
treated with toleration and permitted to practise their religion.
2.1.2 HELLENISATION UNDER OTTOMAN CONTROL
For many years the most striking evidence of enforced Islamic conversion upon
Bulgaria's Christian population came from a seventeenth century manuscript entitled
the Chronicle ofMetodi Draginov. This was a brief account, supposedly written by a
local priest from the village of Korova in the western Rhodopes of enforced mass
Islamisation in his parish. It is set during the reign of Sultan Mehmed IV when
Gavril, the Greek Metropolitan of Plovdiv, reported the local Bulgarian population to
the Ottoman authorities for refusing to pay their taxes, suggesting that by doing so
they were usurping the sultan's authority. As a result Turkish troops were sent to the
village who forcibly converted the population to Islam. In general surveys of
Bulgarian literature the Chronicle had been accepted as one of the few original texts
from the seventeenth century and therefore considered trustworthy.100 The Chronicle
was published in 1870 by the patriotic Bulgarian writer Stefan Zakhariev.101
However, modern scholarship revealed similarities between Zakhariev's find and
two other chronicles which described the same events: the Bakunski Chronicle
(1893) and the Belovski letopis (dated to the beginning of the nineteenth century). In
1984 the literary historian Iliya Todorov, after years of academic debate, published
the definitive verdict on all three chronicles.102 Apart from factual discrepancies he
noted that the texts were modern and remote from the language of seventeenth
century documentation, indeed, they reflected nineteenth century forms and
conventions. This pointed to another inconsistency, that being the clear anti-Greek
sentiment which resounded from the texts. This presented an anachronism as the
Bulgarian-Greek ecclesiastical conflict only became widespread during the
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nineteenth century. However the most important contribution of Todorov was his
critical and historical placing of the Chronicle ofMetodi Draganov clearly within the
genre of Stefan Zakhariev. The Chronicles had been forged. The invalidity of the
Chronicles means that they cannot be used as proof of seventeenth century mass
Islamic conversion. However, analysis of the manuscripts actually puts the emphasis
of the Chronicles not on conversion at all but on the act of betrayal on the part of the
Greek clergy. They are therefore historical proof of a nineteenth century
ecclesiastical struggle. Konstantin Jirecek's Geschichte der Bulgaren draws attention
to the fact that Bulgaria was subject to what he called "the double yoke", that is
Ottoman political, social and economic oppression combined with Greek religious
and linguistic subjugation.103
The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 may have brought about the end of
the Byzantine era, but for the Greek Church it brought the fulfilment of one of its
most cherished aims - the subjugation of the Bulgarian Church. As has been
previously mentioned, the Bulgarian Church had fallen with the Bulgarian monarchy,
its Patriarchate being dissolved in 1394, where after it fell subject to the authority of
the Patriarch of Constantinople. With the implementation of the millet system in
1454 the Patriarchate of Constantinople gained even greater authority, both secular
and spiritual when Sultan Mehmet II (1451-1481) granted a herat recognising the
patriarch as the official representative of all the empire's Christians.
Sultan Mehmet II quickly realised that supporting the Orthodox Church would prove
to be an ideal weapon against the West, at the same time ensuring the loyalty of his
Christian subjects. Indeed, many Orthodox clergy believed that the alternative, union
with the Latin Church, would have been a greater heresy than submission to the
Ottoman sultan. Thus, Grand Duke Notaras asserted that he would rather see, "the
turban of the sultan than the tiara of the Pope in Constantinople."104 Mehmet
assumed the role of defender of the Orthodox faith and in so doing redefined himself
and the sultanate, as the successor of Byzantium and undertook to re-establish the
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Church on a solid foundation by institutionalising its position within his empire.105 In
doing so he granted the Church greater powers than it had ever held under Byzantine
rule. As well as authority in all spiritual matters the berat invested the Patriarch with
considerable civil authority, making him head of not only the Orthodox Church, but
also the supreme leader of the sultan's Orthodox subjects. In effect the Patriarch
assumed a status equivalent to that of an Ottoman vizier.106
The millet was an administrative system for controlling the recognised religious
confessions within the Ottoman empire. It followed the Islamic tradition of allowing
ahl al-kitab a degree of internal autonomy under its own religious leadership. Thus,
the 'people of the Book' were absorbed into the Ottoman empire and granted
protection and toleration in their forms of worship, provided they accepted the
dominion of the sultan. Hence in 1454, the year after the fall of Constantinople the
population of Bulgaria was divided according to religious creed each group being
governed by its own religious leaders.107 The word millet literally means
'community' - often rendered 'mini-nation' - and for the Ottomans nationhood meant
religious affiliation. Turkish, Bulgarian or Albanian Muslims, for example, spoke
different languages and enjoyed widely different cultural traditions but were still be
part of the same 'nation'. As far as the Ottoman state was concerned, religion took
precedence over culture, language and race in defining identity. Consequently,
Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Romanians were all gathered together in
one 'Roman' millet and subordinated to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Constantinople.108
The Patriarchate in Constantinople, and the ambitious Greeks within it, the most
powerful of whom were the Phanariots, gained increasing power under Ottoman
administration. They grew rich and acquired enormous influence, both in
ecclesiastical and secular matters, by purchasing various offices from the sultan. It
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has been recorded that a man could buy the patriarchal title for as little as a thousand
gold pieces in the fifteenth century rising to the highest recorded purchase of one
hundred and fifty thousand gold pieces. This enabled the buyer of patriarchal office
to sell ecclesiastical districts to the highest bidder, who in turn obtained a percentage
of the taxes collected by the local clergy.109 This meant that the Bulgarian peasant
was subject to a regime of double taxation, from the Ottoman state on the one hand,
and the Greek clergy on the other. Commenting on this extortion a British
representative at the Sublime Porte commented: "Here, as everywhere else in Turkey
every sort of injustice, malversation of funds, bribery and corruption is openly
attributed by the Christians to their clergy."110 It is therefore highly probable that
those who entered the Church, as result of a purchasing a clerical title, would not be
ideal for the spiritual task set before them. Rather, their position was a financial
investment from which they grew rich by levying fees for all sorts of religious
services. While Greek clergy replaced the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Bulgarian
Church, at a local level Bulgarian priests continued in their parish positions, a
situation which endured until the seventeenth century when the Greeks began to
control every aspect of Bulgarian Church organisation, being the only ones who
could afford to pay the bribes required to secure parish appointments. Thus, what the
Ottomans did not take from the Bulgarians in the form of land, taxes and slaves, the
Greek clergy appropriated by unscrupulous means.
For many Bulgarians the Greek yoke became heavier to bear than the Ottoman rule
of their nation. For the Greek clergy the opportunity of ridding themselves once and
for all of these troublesome Bulgars was a possibility too fortuitous to miss. This
situation led to charges that the Greek Patriarchate set out to conduct a systematic
campaign of Hellenization to destroy Bulgarian national consciousness and culture.
The consequence of their actions is evident in the words of an English traveller who
wrote of his experience in a Bulgarian village:
Danil was a Bulgarian, a patriot, vexed by the villagers' apathy. He
tried to explain to them that by being forced to listen to the Church
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service in Greek rather than in their own Slavic tongue, they were being
exploited by an anti-Bulgarian clergy. But they bolted raw cabbage and
washed it down with rakiya and only said it did not matter; many of them
spoke Greek. The priest took a suck on the bottle and was of the same
opinion. He spoke the local Slavic dialect for ordinary purposes, but he
had learned all the services in Greek. It was a good service so what did it
matter? Danil was very annoyed, and told me that they were very
ignorant; really they were all Bulgarians, and ought to have Bulgarian
priests, but they did not know. Nor as far as I could see, did they care.111
The epoch of Ottoman rule and ecclesiastical Hellenization in Bulgaria had such a
profound effect upon the pattern of life and was so enduring that even the Bulgarians
themselves began to forget their national identity. The most damaging aspect of
Patriarchal rule was its success in subverting large sections of the Bulgarian
population, making them believe that both Bulgarian language and culture were
vulgar and barbarous, only fit for the uneducated of society. However, it cannot be
claimed that Bulgarian culture and desire for national and ecclesiastical
independence abated completely. It would perhaps be fitting to claim that Bulgaria
went into a literary and cultural period of hibernation.
Immediately after the fall of Turnovo (1393) many of Bulgaria's leading clergy and
educated people fled for refuge to the monasteries. The Mount Athos monasteries of
Hilander and Zograf, and particularly Rila, one of the more remote Bulgarian
monasteries, played important roles in keeping Bulgarian culture and language alive
during the Ottoman period. In these havens of 'Bulgarianness' the Old Slavonic
manuscripts were preserved and copied, the arts of iconography and fresco painting
were kept alive. They also became centres of education and literary activity, where
Bulgarian culture was not only commemorated but restored. Responsibility fell on
the Bulgarian clergy to keep alive a vestige of indigenous culture, art, language,
education and religion.
A number of Bulgarian monasteries were able to survive these turbulent years by
transforming their property into vakif lands whereby they secured their own income.
Those monasteries able to retain their property sent out monks to collect revenue in
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the form of alms or taxes. These itinerant monks were to play an essential role in
linking the Bulgarian people to the Bulgarian Church and therefore to what remained
of Bulgaria's fading culture. As this work grew in stature the monasteries developed
'cell schools' in which small numbers of young men could be trained for service in
the Bulgarian church or for monastic orders. However, we must not be tempted into
making this painfully slow process into anything approaching a modern national
revival. What the monasteries achieved was the preservation of a sense of ethnic
separateness without which the Bulgarian national revival would have been
impossible. This in itself was a remarkable achievement in view of the Patriarchate's
general hostility to nationalistic sentiment.
The most detailed exposition of antinational attitude within the Patriarchate during
this pre-revival period in Bulgaria can be found in the booklet entitled Paternal
Instruction, published in Constantinople in 1798 by Patriarch Gregory V. This
advanced the thesis that the Ottoman Empire was a divinely sanctioned institution
established to ensure the religious liberty of Orthodox Christian believers and to
protect them from the heretical west:
Behold, how our merciful and omniscient Lord has arranged things, to
preserve again the integrity of the holy and orthodox faith of us, the
pious, and to redeem everybody; He raised from nothing this powerful
kingdom of the Ottomans instead of our Roman kingdom, which had
somehow started to deviate in matters of our Christian orthodox spirit.
And He raised that Ottoman kingdom above any other kingdom, to prove
beyond doubt that this was according to His divine will.... The Devil
devised another evil trick in the current century, that is, the now much
talked of system of liberty, which on the surface seems as if it were good.
But there is an enticement of the Devil and a destructive poison destined
to cast people down into catastrophe and disorder. Everywhere this
illusory system of liberty has caused poverty, murders, losses, plunder.
Deceitful, Christian brethren, are the teachings of those new apostles, be
careful.
He [the Sultan] is, after God, the Lord,
The depository of the goods and guardian of life.
Both divine and human laws command strongly,
Call both young and old to submission.
And above all, the Scripture says, that we should pray for our leader
constantly...
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And that he who opposes such authority opposes God Himself.
As we are indebted to the Sultan for all the charities
We enjoy, both old and young of us,
Not only should we surrender every possession of ours
But also detest every anarchy. 112
The Greek Patriarchate was therefore a strong supporter of Ottoman administration
and an equally militant obstructer of nationalistic sentiment. Such tenets would prove
to be somewhat troublesome when the national consciousness of the Bulgarian
people was aroused during the period ofBulgaria's National Revival.
2.1.3 PROTESTS AGAINST OTTOMAN DOMINION
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were undoubtedly the nadir of Bulgarian
social, spiritual and cultural history. However, contrary to the tendency of many
Bulgarian historians, we should not assume that under these circumstances the
Bulgarians were unconscious of their condition under Ottoman rule. On the contrary
they were still aware that they belonged to a community under Turkish feudal
oppression and Greek ecclesiastical hegemony, restricted in their opportunities to
progress and prosper, but determined to resist and engage in various forms of feudal
struggle.
During this pre-liberation period it was the Bulgarian peasant class who took a stand
against the status quo. Due to Ottoman land reforms Bulgarians' financial burden to
their vali's increased. As armed conflicts between Ottoman and European states
broke out in the eighteenth century, Bulgarian taxes and their obligation to give
provisions to the Turkish military and arbitrary acts ofplundering increased.
Thus in the eighteenth century it was the rural population of Bulgaria, the peasant
class, who were the first to take up the struggle against their oppressors. It was they
who appealed against the seizure of their lands; it was they who opposed the
interminable forms of taxation that impoverished them. However, they held no hope
of obtaining Ottoman justice, as an eighteenth century Bulgarian commented:
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"Muslim justice has gone so far in its unfairness that if devils were appointed as
judges, with full authority to make whatever use they pleased of their powers, I
believe they would be ashamed to do what the Turks are doing."113 Their struggle
was expressed firstly in the simple refusal to pay taxes. During poll-tax collections
people would go into hiding, while others would flee to safety, many emigrating to
Romania, Serbia and Russia. It was from Bulgaria's peasant population that the
haidouks emerged, outlaws who engaged in armed resistance against their feudal
landlords. A Turkish document from the end of the seventeenth century testifies to
the activities of a haidouk detachment of one hundred men under the leadership of a
Bulgarian Orthodox priest from Cherna Reka.114 Another Turkish document from the
seventeenth century points particularly to the Bulgarian clergy as the chief supporters
of the haidouk movement and mentions the monasteries of Lesnovo, Turnovo and
Kriva Reka as refuges for these outlaws: "priestly brigands of the region have joined
the outlaws and monks bind up the outlaws wounds and offer them shelter and
food". 115
It was the peasants who rose up in revolt, regularly under the leadership and with the
support of Bulgarian clergy. Trouble flared up wherever and whenever circumstances
were favourable, particularly during the Turkish wars with the European states and
mostly in the districts close to the theatre of military operations. For example, the
'Long War' fought by the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans at the turn of the
sixteenth century created the belief in Bulgaria that a military campaign south of the
Danube was imminent. This resulted in a civil uprising in the Turnovo region in
1598, which was suppressed with great brutality. Almost a century later, in 1686,
there was another people's revolt around Veliko Tumovo, this time prompted by
Russian intrusion into the Balkans after the failure of the Ottoman armies to take
Vienna in 1683. Two years later another protest occurred in the Chiprovets region;
the town was destroyed and two-thirds of the population killed in government
reprisals.116
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These random peasant struggles are all we really know about national and cultural
consciousness in pre-revival Bulgaria. Nevertheless, there were vestiges of
intellectual political activity that have been lost to the western historian because of
their lack of a Bulgarian label. This in large part has been caused by the confusion
between religion and nationality under the millet system. For example, thousands of
Bulgarians joined Greek and Serbian armed units involved in their own political
struggles, in the conviction that they were participating in a wider 'Greek' or
'Orthodox Christian' rebellion against imperial oppression, of which their own sense
of a Bulgarian national struggle was a part. The Roman Catholic Church was also
active in seventeenth century Bulgaria in stirring up political and religious unrest. A
number of Bulgarians came to prominence in this Catholic movement. However, its
essentially foreign nature deprived them of gaining lasting significance. For example
Petur Bogdan Bakshish who became Archbishop of Antivari in Montenegro is
commonly ignored as a Bulgarian because all his works were written in Latin.
Archbishop Petur Parchevich, urged the Bulgarians to revolt on behalf of Catholic
Austria but was ejected from the country. The Jesuit missionary Christophorus
Peichich Bulgarus, again stirred agitation claiming Roman superiority over the
Orthodox Church.117
Nevertheless, three documented peasant revolts, involvement in a number of foreign
skirmishes, and Roman Catholic agitation, after almost three hundred years of
Ottoman dominion does not represent a maelstrom of rebellious activity pointing
towards a future national revival. Indeed, it took almost another century before a
Bulgarian monk articulated the dire situation of the Bulgarian people and yet another
century before the Bulgarian people were in a position to actively respond to his call.
However, in the course of these centuries it would be the Bulgarian clergy who
would coalesce these uncoordinated but defiant strands into a unified and
nationalistic call for an independent Church.
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2.2 FIRST AWAKENINGS: FATHER PAISII OF HILENDAR (1722-
1798)
In 1761 Blasius Kleiner, a Franciscan monk from the Alvinic Monastery (situated in
modern Romania, then part of the Bulgarian Franciscan province), prepared a history
of Bulgarian Catholicism, the first part of which he devoted to a general history of
the Bulgarians. Kleiner, after encountering difficulties with this history, laid stress on
how little was actually known about the Bulgarians and their ancient state
commenting, "this extremely belligerent nation... has been more prone to doing
glorious deeds worthy ofmention than to describing them".118
This is how an eighteenth century Franciscan monk conceived the journey of the
Bulgarian nation through history. For Kleiner Bulgaria's past was unknown and
obscure. Flowever, when he comments that the deeds of the Bulgarians were neither
'described' nor 'understood' his words conceal the unfortunate truth of the deleted
memory of a nation, of the absence of a literary heritage - a heritage that had either
disappeared or been destroyed by centuries of domination. This was the view of a
benevolent, tolerant and educated foreigner whose audience consisted of the literate
readers of his own faith and language. However, only a year later in 1762, a very
different Bulgarian history appeared compiled by a Bulgarian for Bulgarians.
By the time the Mount Athos monk Paisii of Hilendar completed his Slavo-Bulgarian
History centuries of Islamisation and Hellenization had not only eradicated the
Bulgarian state from memory, but had also destroyed or banished its aristocracy, its
literary heritage, and its church. In the time that elapsed since 1369 servitude sank
into the people's consciousness and obliterated all memories ofBulgaria's past. Thus
in 1871 the Bulgarian historian Marin Drinov could write that the middle of the
eighteenth century had been the most terrible time under the Ottoman yoke: "a time
when all hope was utterly lost".119 Yet it was from this despair that Paisii's voice
arose urging his fellow Bulgarians to remember their nation, to have pride in her
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history, culture and language, warning them of the threat of national extinction. For
that reason Paisii wrote his history so the past could be preserved within one book
and easily read by future generations. He wrote to enable his compatriots know their
history, so they might know themselves and dare be themselves.
Through his narrative Paisii recalls the major events of Bulgarian history. Of special
significance for him was the fact that among all Slavs it was the Bulgarians who
were the 'most glorious', for it was they who adopted Christianity first, as they were
the first to have their own patriarch and hold sway over the largest territory. He
remembers these moments of historical grandeur and suggests that what had
happened once could happen again. Paisii's Slavo-Bulgarian History could therefore
be described as a beacon in the darkness, giving warning of present danger and
suggesting a strategy for survival, an exit from servitude under Turkish political and
Greek ecclesiastical dominion, offering a hope of an independent future. By knowing
their history, Paisii hoped that the Bulgarian people would realise that in losing their
past they had also lost their identity. It was on the basis of this realisation that Paisii
sought to cultivate a desire for knowledge and freedom among his fellow Bulgarians,
with his History providing the basis for the necessary changes in both the Bulgarians'
outlook and their self-esteem. His Slavo-Bulgarian History created the energy,
knowledge and the myths necessary to transform Bulgarian hopelessness into a hope
and desire for freedom.
In can be no surprise then that Paisii of Hilendar is credited with being the 'Father of
the Bulgarian National Revival'. He also enjoys reputation as a brilliant historian:
"Father Paisii stands much higher than many first historians of other nations whose
attempts to write the histories of their people stand beneath all manner of criticism on
120
the score of invention, credulity, and ignorance". However, his Slavo-Bulgarian
History may not have been as influential in his own times as modem Bulgarian
history presumes. By 1862, one hundred years after Paisii's History was completed,
and only fifteen years away from Bulgaria's liberation, there was no published
edition available in Bulgaria. Paisii himselfmay have contributed to this anonymity.
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That he was intensely patriotic, there can be no doubt, but it is also abundantly clear
from examining his work that he was a deeply humble man. Circulating the patriotic
message of the book was more important to him than that attention be drawn to his
name. Thus in his original draft he gave these instructions: "Copy this little history
and pay those who can write so that you can have it copied, and keep it lest it should
disappear".121 Accordingly his work was widely and repeatedly copied, which
unfortunately led to copyists ignoring its original authorship substituting their own
name.
The absence of printing facilities for Cyrillic publications in Bulgaria also
contributed to Paisii's obscurity. Indeed, until the late eighteenth century the only
source for printing Cyrillic text was in Moscow. The first accessible Cyrillic press, in
Vienna, did not become available until 1770, almost ten years after Paisii finished his
History}22 The first book published in Bulgarian did not appear until 1806, its author
being Paisii's first known copyist, Sofroni of Vratsa. Paisii's original handwritten
draft of Slavo-Bulgarian History is therefore one of the few authentic documents in
Bulgarian literary history that have been preserved, being stored in the Bulgarian
Monastery of St. Georgi-Zograph on Mount Athos. This draft is in fact the history of
the first Bulgarian book of the National Revival period inspired by the idea of
spiritual and national renewal of the Bulgarians.123
Apart from the few autobiographical details, with which Paisii provides his readers
within his History, we know very little about the man. He was born in Bansko in
1722, and was buried in Samokov in 1798. He entered Hilendar Monastery in 1745,
when he was 23 year old, remaining there until 1761. In that year he moved to the
Bulgarian Zograph Monastery, also on Mount Athos, where he resided until 1791,
and then returned to Hilendar where he remained until his death. It is likely that he
began writing his History around 1760 when he became deputy-abbot of Hilendar
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Monastery. In this ecclesiastical post he was given opportunity to travel in search of
materials. Undoubtedly, his desire for knowledge came much earlier - probably soon
after 1745, when he arrived on Mount Athos. Within this monastic setting Paisii
found himself in a novel social and cultural environment; not only was Mount Athos
a centre of Balkan Christian spirituality but also a repository for new western cultural
and educational ideas. In 1753, the Greek reformer Eugenius Bulgaris established his
Athonite Academy where his students studied a secular gospel of philosophy and
modern sciences. As a result new and pervasive ideas permeated the monastic
environment rousing national sentiments. In his role as an alms-collector for the
monastery Paisii travelled around Bulgaria witnessing at close quarters the dire
situation of the Bulgarians who remained spiritually and culturally undeveloped. He
connected closely with his fellow Bulgars who were suffering from a decaying
feudal system and the slow redevelopment of the Ottoman empire.
Paisii was keenly aware of the autonomous nature of Bulgarian Christianity. He
reveals this by explaining the significance of Rila Monastery to his fellow
Bulgarians: "It is of great use to all Bulgarians, which is why all Bulgarians ought to
keep it and make donations to the holy Rila Monastery, so that the great benefit and
praise they derive from it should not become extinct".124 He regarded Rila as a
repository of Bulgarian Christian piety, a place where Bulgarian national spirituality
and nationality were preserved. The monastery was a stronghold of the Bulgarian
spirit, a positive sign that Bulgaria had not been totally eradicated by Islamic and
Greek influence. It was, therefore, from his direct experience with the Bulgarian
people, infused with western renaissance thinking and roused by Balkan rivalry and
patriotic fervour, brought on by reviving Greek nationalism and with a keen
understanding of Bulgaria's autonomous national and spiritual character that Paisii
perceived the need for a modern Bulgarian history, the lack ofwhich he linked to the
low self-esteem of Bulgarians.
He finished his draft version of Slavo-Bulgarian History in 1762. However, a little
before its completion he moved from Hilendar to Zograph Monastery. It appears that
124 ed. B.Atanasov, (2000), p.234
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1762 was a troublesome year in Hilendar, the result of a number of unpleasant
disagreements amongst the Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians about the glories and
greatness of their respective nationalities and cultures. During these disputes the
various histories of the nations involved were discussed, and Paisii found that
Bulgaria was regularly disregarded since it had no history to speak of Evidence of
these quarrels can be found in the autobiography of the Serbian enlightener Dositei
Obradovic, a contemporary of Paisii, who resided in Hilendar from 1765 where he
mentions that, "Serbs and Bulgarians quarrelled and behaved obstinately because
they could not come to an agreement on whose Hilendar was."125 However, in the
serenity ofZograph Paisii was able to complete his history.
It is beyond any doubt that, along with the numerous historical characters appearing
in the pages of Paisii's Slavo-Bulgarian History, it is Paisii's personality that reaches
out to us from the past most vividly: Paisii the monk, the enlightener, the patriot
working for the benefit of the Bulgarian people. He personified most effectively
amongst his contemporaries the qualities of the New Balkan Renaissance, illustrating
the power of knowledge that would become the most important condition for the
development of human society. Realising that ignorance and a lack of historical
memory led to Bulgaria's spiritual death and slavery, he set upon himself the task of
rebuilding the foundations of Bulgarian national culture, giving his fellow Bulgars
historical knowledge - the first and most decisive prerequisite for recreating national
identity.
The political incisiveness of this new Renaissance figure, however, suggested one
more important task, developing in the minds of the Bulgarian people the idea of the
actual geographical territory inhabited by the Bulgarian national community. Thus by
mentioning throughout his History many different towns such as Sofia, Preslav,
Turnovo, Plovdiv, Vidin, Samakov, Ohrid, Skopje etc., he sketches within the
mentality of the Bulgarian an image of an actual geographical nation. Paisii
understood clearly that establishing an awareness of belonging to a national
community was an important prerequisite for creating patriotic pride and creative
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energy for the formation of national consciousness and the future development of the
nation itself.
Led by his convictions, Paisii pinned his hopes for national revival on those who had
been involved in the first social uprisings, the "ploughmen, diggers, shepherds and
simple craftsmen."126 He departs from medieval historiographic traditions by
combining the stories of Bulgaria's rulers and saints with those of their subjects,
celebrating the fact that the latter were ready to dethrone usurpers and weak rulers in
the interests of the nation itself. Contrary to medieval religious norms, he rejects the
dogma of the eternity of established order, and identifies the Greek Patriarchate and
the Turkish government as enemies of the Bulgarian national idea. It is here that the
concept of "Church freedom" figures for the first time in Bulgarian National Revival
thinking. He speaks of Turkish slavery and Greek priests as the common face of evil
oppressing the Bulgarian nation. His history does not preach Christian reconciliation;
rather, it sows the seeds for future struggle to overthrow ecclesiastic and political
domination. Therefore, one may say that Paisii's ideas rest in the very foundations of
the Bulgarian revolutionary ideology, paving the way for the deeds of people such as
Bozveli, Slaveikov, Karavelov, Rakovski, Levski and Botev.
2.2.1 DESIGN & EXECUTION
The full title of Paisii's work is Slavo-Bulgarian History ofthe Bulgarian People and
Kings and Saints and ofall the Bulgarians Acts and Events. Collected and Arranged
by the Ordained Monk Paisii, who lived on Athos and had come there from the
Diocese of Samokov in 1745 finishing this History in 1762 for the Benefit of the
Bulgarian People. Its very length suggests the scope of the historical material it
includes. It begins with a preface entitled 'The Benefit of History' which is almost in
its entirety taken from the foreword of Cesar Baronius' Annales Ecclesiastici. This
fitted neatly into the author's own designs as Baronius' preface was a dissertation on
the significance and benefit of historical knowledge:
126 ed. B.Atanasov, (2000), p. 157
76
History gives wisdom not only to every person on how to conduct
himself or his home, but also to great rulers on how to exercise their
power well: how to keep their God-given subjects in fear of the Lord, in
obedience, serenity, truth and righteousness, how to subdue and eliminate
rebels, how to rise in arms against foreign foes in wars, how to defeat
them and how to conclude peace.127
Paisii's message begins with a secondary introduction, entitled 'A Foreword to
Those Who Wish to Read and Hear What Was Written in This History'. The one
who speaks here is not so much the monk and leachei but an eulighlener and apostle
to Bulgaria. From the style of writing it is clear that Paisii's intent was not simply to
instruct his reader, but to press his opinions on them, not by coercion, but by
reminding them of Bulgaria's noble history. His tone of intimate conversation
changes to rebuke when he sees this history being ignored:
But some people would not wish to know about their Bulgarian
ancestors, and they turn to a foreign culture and a foreign language, and
they neglect their Bulgarian language... . You unreasonable and foolish
men! Why are you ashamed to call yourselves Bulgarians, why do you
1 7R
not read and speak your own language?
Paisii was clearly an experienced wordsmith making frequent use of the impact of
figurative expression to instil feelings of guilt and shame within his readers: "Why
are you silly fellow ashamed of your race and favour a foreign language?"729 He
follows these personal arguments by giving beneficial examples to stimulate his
readers: "But see here, you foolish fellow, there are many nations wiser and more
glorious than the Greeks. Yet, does any Greek abandon his language and knowledge
and race as you do, o senseless man/"750 The anger and occasional sarcasm gradually
subside and turn into encouragement, but not without a residual note of reprimand:
"You, Bulgarian, do not fool yourself, know your ancestry and language and study in
your own tongue! Bulgarian simplicity and innocence are much to be preferred."757
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In support of his nationalist thesis, Paisii put forward his most compelling arguments
in three particular areas:
1. That of contemporary life: Unlike others, Bulgarians "will invite in their
home anyone and feed him" and will gladly "give alms to those who beg
from them."132
2. The biblical: From Adam to David and Joseph whoever "was righteous or a
holy prophet or a patriarch" was not "a merchant or an overly clever or
haughty man" but "the uncouth and humble on earth, farmers and
shepherds."133
3. The historical: "Did the Bulgarians not have their own kingdom and state?
So many long years did they reign and they were glorious and famed the
world over... Throughout the Slavic world, the Bulgarians were the most
glorious, they were the first to call themselves tsars, the first to have a
patriarch, the first to be Christianised, they conquered the largest domain.
Thus among all the Slavs they were the mightiest and the most revered, and it
was out of the Bulgarian race and language that the first Slavic saints
arose...."134
As early as the Introduction, Paisii puts forward an important idea that will find fuller
expression throughout his History, that the dignity of a nation is gained and judged
through its political as well as spiritual and cultural achievements. In the main body
of his work he offers an overview of the political, spiritual and cultural history of the
Bulgarians from the time of the biblical flood to the fall of Bulgaria under Ottoman
rule.
From here we enter into the main exposition with Paisii's historical material grouped
in seven chapters. The first chapter entitled 'Historical Texts on the Bulgarian
People' sets forth Paisii's view of the biblical origins of the Bulgarian people, tracing
their roots to Japheth, the third son of Noah. He thus classifies the Bulgarian nation
among God's elect. However, he lays special emphasis on the Slavic character of the
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Bulgarians and takes pride in distinguishing them among the Slavic peoples for their
number and strength. He outlines the arrival and settlement of the Bulgarians in the
Balkan Peninsula, their numerous wars with Byzantium for the consolidation of their
state, and their international recognition up to the reign of Tsar Mihail Shishman
(1323-30).
Paisii not only relates particular historical events but also takes every chance to point
out the might and the valour of the Bulgarians in these events. His use of extra-
Bulgarian sources is of importance here as evidence to support his nationalistic
theories. Of special value are the opinions of Bulgaria's enemies, particularly the
Greeks, when they comment on the merits of the Bulgarians: "The Bulgarians are
wild and invincible in war.... Fierce are the Bulgarians and invincible in
combat...."135
Challenged by the arguments of his fellow Slavic monks in Hilendar that Bulgaria
had no history, Paisii entitled his second chapter, 'Here Reader, Take note, We Will
Tell you Briefly about the Serbian Kings'. In this section he offers analysis of the
successes and failures of the Serbian state and voices his dissatisfaction at Serb
misrepresentation of historical truth:
Their kingdom was small, very narrow, and existed for a short time...
Out of folly they consider themselves from the beginning to have been
more glorious than the Bulgarians with their kingdom, army and land.
But this is not true. All peoples on earth know the Bulgarians and in all
histories this is recorded and found in writing. About the Serbs there is
nothing written....13
Along with his history of the Serbian people the chapter covers Bulgarian events up
to the eve of the Ottoman conquest during the reign of Tsar Ivan Shishman (1371-
95). He warns against chauvinistic arrogance that leads to an unjust and dangerous
overestimation of one's nation at the expense of other peoples. He repeatedly relies
on the evidence of historical sources in Greek and Latin to back up his claims. In this
chapter he also reproaches the Byzantine policy of conciliation with the Turks at the
135 ed. B.Atanasov, p. 166
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expense of the Bulgarian state but includes a bold statement concerning the common
blame of both nations: "If there had been love and concord between the Greeks and
the Bulgarians, the Turks would never have defeated them.. ,."137
He continues by giving an apocalyptic description of the misfortunes that struck the
Bulgarians after the invasion of the Ottomans: the violent abduction of "young and
handsome lads" during the raising of the devshirme, the turning of the best Bulgarian
churches into mosques, the plundering of houses, crops and vineyards, the slaughter
of those who were rich and educated. "Thus" he utters tragically, "the people of that
first generation after the Bulgarian Tsardom was conquered, had great sorrow and
grief and they shed many tears until that first generation passed". 138
However, to rekindle a positive knowledge of Bulgaria's 'glorious' past he includes
two short chapters entitled, 'It is Necessary Here to put together the Names of the
Bulgarian Kings and Tsars' and 'A Short Collection about how Renowned the
Bulgarian Kings and Tsars Were'. He lists the names and records the deeds of all
Bulgaria's rulers in chronological order. The enumeration of the royal names, almost
biblical in style, creates the impression of an impregnable and steadfast dynasty
throughout Bulgaria's history. The second of the chapters in this section continues
the royal tradition, aiming at awakening national pride and a sense of honour and
dignity in the Bulgarian people by describing the deeds of the more eminent and
successful Bulgarian mlers.
In the following chapter, 'About the Slavic Apostles', Paisii explains how other
Slavic nations boast about their pious men and defenders of the Orthodox faith.
However, when doing the same in Bulgaria, he pronounces that we deal with
something of a higher order. Here he establishes the Bulgarian character of the work
of Cyril and Methodius and their disciples; it was they who created the Bulgarian
alphabet, who translated into Bulgarian the Scriptures that would bring the light of
knowledge and of the Christian faith to the Bulgarian people, and only thereafter to
other Slav nations:
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Thus of the whole Slavic race it was the Bulgarians who received Slavic
letters, books and Christianity. Although the Muscovites, the Russians,
the Serbs and others boast that they adopted the Slavic letters and
adopted Christianity earlier, that is untrue. They are unable to present any
evidence for this. 139
Apart from Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Paisii devotes a special chapter to other
Bulgarian saints entitled, 'Here we Gather in Short the Names of the Bulgarian
Saints who Shone out of the Bulgarian People in Latter Times'. He elaborates the
significance of these saints in spiritual, cultural and political terms. He lays particular
stress on their interests in the field of literature and education and also their concern
for the establishment and consolidation ofBulgarian culture and state.
Finally, in the 'Epilogue' Paisii concludes his History as he introduced it, as though
conversing with friends, with whom he has been sharing intimate thoughts. He talks
again about his motives for writing this history and shares some of the conditions
under which he had worked, concluding with the remark, that he had become,
"gradually eaten up with zealousness and pity for my Bulgarian kin for there had
been no history put together of the glorious exploits since the early ages of our
ancestry, our saints and tsars."140
In many ways the introduction and epilogue of the Slavo-Bulgarian History are the
most important chapters of the book presenting us with personal insight into the
character of Paisii of Hilendar. He corresponds with his readers in conversational
style, clearly explaining his motives, describing who he is and the conditions under
which he was working at the time. Although his method of recalling history contains
evidence of the medieval traditionalist it also demonstrates that he was a creative
writer in the contemporary renaissance style, writing his history with his own
patriotic motives in mind but not to flatter his own literary vanity. It was written, he
comments, "for the benefit of the Bulgarian people."141
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It has been generally assumed that Paisii was prompted to write a Bulgarian history
by the disputes between the Slavic monks ofHilendar over which Balkan nation was
the greatest. He himself acknowledges, "The Serbs and the Greeks reproached us
many times for not having our own history."142 His bruised nationalistic pride cannot
be overlooked as a motivation of his endeavour. Equally as important, we argue, was
his desire to promote the development of Bulgarian society. In his role as alms-
collector, his travels throughout Bulgaria left a deep impression on him, notably with
regards to the trials and tribulations of the Bulgarian peasantry. He was distressed to
witness the social inferiority of his fellow Bulgarians to the Greeks and was angered
by their willingness to adopt Greek language and culture:
They neglect their Bulgarian language and learn and speak Greek instead
and they deem it shameful to call themselves Bulgarians.... I saw many
Bulgarians behave in that manner, take up a foreign language and
customs, and scorn their own/45
It was above all his relationship with the Bulgarian people that ignited Paisii's desire
to infuse them with a renewed sense of national consciousness and common cultural
identity. He acknowledges this himself when he comments: "I was gradually eaten
up with zealousness and pity for my Bulgarian kin for there had been no history put
together of the glorious exploits since the early ages of our ancestry, our saints and
tsars."144 These were the words of a man who had observed and understood the
material and spiritual plight of the Bulgarian people under Ottoman and Greek
dominion. However, through his writing we can also sense the hope that he has in his
fellow Bulgars, his faith in their potential to recover their esteem in Bulgaria's
history, and to grow as a nation asserting their rights for spiritual and political
independence. It was this belief in the virtues of his people, in the constructive forces
inherent within them that inspired Paisii not only to write his History, but also to
disseminate its message throughout Bulgaria.
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2.2.2 CONCLUSION
The arrival of Paisii's Slavo-Bulgarian History was an epochal event in Bulgarian
history marking the transition from a nation's cultural and spiritual stagnation to
creative and independent thought and action. Although concise it was nonetheless a
remarkably significant work. Though written in a medieval traditional style it
contained the influence of renaissance thinking. Having comprehended the historical
fate of his compatriots, knowing their present and foreseeing their future, Paisii cast
the first spark into the people's minds that would give birth to national, spiritual and
political awareness. He achieved this by establishing a goal, which would be
advanced by future generations, calling for the education of his people in the
Bulgarian vernacular, for Church independence and for the restoration of the
Bulgarian state. Those who would follow Paisii during the National Revival period
turned the goals expressed within Slavo-Bulgarian History into their own political
manifesto, pointing to a new age of independence, an age where the love of nation
and race would become the highest virtue. Paisii thus defined the goals which
Bulgarian society would aspire to at the outset of the National Revival.
To assess the real value of Paisii's History, one ought to ask the critical question of
what the Bulgarians really knew about their history in the era under Ottoman rule
before its dissemination. This question is important because memory of the past
shapes the present and the future of both the individual and the nation. Bulgarian
histories could be found in European libraries; however, barring certain exceptions
this evidence would have been unknown and inaccessible to the vast majority of
Bulgarians. Moreover, historical records were kept in the libraries of a large number
of churches and monasteries, but were known only to a limited number of literate
priests and monks. Certain historical moments also found reflection in folklore but
they took on legendary and mythical character. Thus, leaving aside a small number
of exceptions, the majority of Bulgarians in their life under Ottoman rule, in the
course of four centuries, had lost all understanding of their nation's historical
significance and cultural identity, believing that their people had been living since
time immemorial a life subordinated to the will of an alien ruler.
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By evoking the memory and reviving the knowledge of an independent and mighty
Bulgarian empire, Paisii instigated the slow process of awakening and developing
Bulgarian national consciousness, associated with a feeling of pride ofbelonging to a
national whole, unified by language, territory, historical fate, spiritual and material
culture. It can be no coincidence that Paisii's History, which had been borne out of
the need of the Bulgarian people, proved to be in harmony with their expectations
and requirements. That is why Bulgarians look on Paisii of Hilendar as an
outstanding figure of the Revival period, as a revolutionary enlightener and as the
initiator of the Bulgarian liberation. His message continues to be relevant to his
people, traversing the centuries of Bulgarian history. The Bulgarian poet Hristo
Radevski could thus writes during the Second WorldWar:
Hear Paisii's words resound
in the dark and hollow rumble!
Remember your people and your country!
Remember Levski's legacy profound
and the song ofGranny Tonka, wise and humble.
The call of our fathers is in us today
and in the solemn hymns of our sons.
Be ready! Is that what they say?
You must finish what we have begun! 145
2.3 FIRST AWAKENINGS: SOFRONI, BISHOP OF VRATSA (1739-
1814)
Somewhat neglected and generally underrated by modern Bulgarian history, Stoiko
Vladislavov ofKotel, a contemporary of Paisii of Hilendar, was a man who advanced
the development of Bulgaria's cultural awakening. He was born into a family of
successful cattle-dealers before being ordained as a priest in 1762. The genesis of his
personal cultural awakening came some three years later, in 1765, when Father Paisii
visited Kotel complete with his Slavo-Bulgarian History. Paisii's History made such
an impression on the young priest that he copied it and placed it in the local church
with the following warning attached: "May he who appropriates or steals this book
145 H.Radevski, The Third ofMarch, (Sofia, 1938)
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be anathematised and cursed by the Lord God and by the twelve apostles, by the holy
fathers and the four evangelists. May hail, iron and stone fall on him and may he
perish forever."746 He was so influenced by Paisii's ideas that he decided, during
1775, to spend six months on Mount Athos enveloping himself in the atmosphere
that had inspired Paisii's patriotic zeal.
Stoiko's own patriotic thoughts evolved in the midst of turbulent times. During the
first Russo-Turkish War (1768-74), Russia sent agents into Bulgaria in an attempt to
rouse the people to revolt, encouraging them to believe that their liberation from
Ottoman domination was imminent if they rose in support of the Russian cause.
When Russian troops entered Bulgaria via the Dobrudzha in 1773, the promise of
liberation became tangible. Many Bulgarians, including men from Stoiko's parish,
fought beside the Russians in volunteer partisan units. However, after the surrender
of the Ottomans in 1774, Russia withdrew her troops from Bulgarian territory
leaving the population at the mercy of the Ottoman military. Stoiko and the
inhabitants of the Kotel area suffered greatly during the retribution of the Ottoman
troops. Infuriated by Bulgaria's participation in the war, the Turks wreaked
vengeance devastating the town and surrounding villages murdering at will.147 It was
in the midst of these repercussions that Stoiko left for Mount Athos. Thus, while the
claim of Bulgarian historians that his stay on Mount Athos was inspired by Paisii's
History may be partly true, his timing would suggest that recuperation and escape
from Ottoman recrimination was an equally valid possibility.
His stay on Mount Athos affected him profoundly, igniting in him the spirit of
enlightenment that had stimulated Paisii. On his return to Kotel, as well as acting as
priest, he initiated an educational work, teaching the children to speak, to read and to
write in vernacular Bulgarian rather than the standard Greek. He also willingly
adopted the role of local politician, interceding on behalf of his parishioners over the
crippling taxations placed on them by the Porte, the landowners and the Patriarchate.
His patriotic preaching, social work and educational activities brought him to the
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attention of the local Ottoman officials and Greek clergy who decided to punish his
insubordination. According to Stoiko's own biography, The Life and Sufferings ofthe
Sinful Sofroni, he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment where he was ill-treated
and fed rotting food, resulting in the loss of his hair.148 On his release and return to
Kotel he fell foul of the local chorbadzhi who disliked his patriotic methods and
forced him to leave town. He then became the priest in Karnobat, but there fell foul
of the Ottoman authorities: knowing that a local Christian girl had been chosen by
the regional Pasha to be one of his wives, Stoiko disregarded this official
arrangement and married her to a local Christian man whom she loved. Once more
he had to flee, now in fear of his life, re-settling as priest in Karabounar, where he
continued preaching and teaching in Bulgarian. In 1794 he was ordained as Bishop in
the Diocese of Vratsa, taking the name Sofroni. That such an honour should be
placed on this man is somewhat incomprehensible, considering the trouble he had
caused the political and ecclesiastical authorities, and the anti-Bulgarian bias of the
Greek Patriarchate. However, as Greek clergy were unwilling to officiate in this
diocese, because of the mortal danger involved, the choice of a Bulgarian becomes
understandable.
The area of Bulgaria where Sofroni's new diocese was situated had been terrorised
from 1792 until 1815 by armed bandits known as kurdzhali, a movement composed
of brigands, disaffected imperial troops and discontented Janissaries who saw in the
Porte's proposed army reforms the end of their power. The leaders of these kurdzhali
took control of large areas of Ottoman territory causing a virtual breakdown in the
Porte's central governmental structure. This unstable period known in Bulgaria as the
kurdzhaliistvo was a time of hardship causing much distress. English traveller
E.D.Clark described its effects on the Bulgarian people:
They are at present in a most wretched condition, owing to the
extortions of the kurdzhali. In a short space of six months, they have paid
their tax gatherers eighty purses, a sum equivalent to forty thousand
piastres. Poverty is very apparent in their dwellings... nor can it be
otherwise, where the wretched inhabitants are so oppressed by their
148 S.Vrachanski, Autobiography ofSofroni Vrachanski, (Sofia, 1914), p.36
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lords. The whole of the earnings of the peasant is taken from him; he is
scarcely allowed any means of subsistence.149
Further depredations of the kurdzhali are graphically depicted in Sofroni's biography
where he reports: "Conditions defy description when these ferocious and cruel
infidels went to war. How many evils do they do to the Christians! They do
everything that came to their minds. The number ofpeople they murdered! The many
times they seized me and beat me up and cracked my head. They almost killed me,
but God preserved me." 150 Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) was revolted by the
activities of the kurdzhali ofwhom he said in 1795:
These villains like parasites and reptiles have invaded many villages,
towns and cities of our state, and the population, especially the raya's,
have cried out to heaven for relief from the unheard of plunder and
torture... Law and order in the land is compromised, the state laws are
disregarded, complete anarchy reigns within the Empire... The
impetuous torrent of those barbarous hordes is sweeping all over Rumelia
[South Eastern Bulgaria].151
As terrible as this period was for the Bulgarian people the rise of the kurdzhaliistvo
merely reflected the extent of the Ottoman Empire's decaying structures. One of the
most notorious kurdzhali leaders was the ayan Osman Pasvangolu (1758-1807). His
father had been the Pasha of Vidin before being executed on suspicion of sedition
against the sultan. From 1792 he determined to avenge his father's death. He
attracted rebels against the empire, devastated villages and generally opposed the
reforms of Sultan Selim III. In 1794 he captured his native town of Vidin (at the
centre of Sofroni's diocese) and proclaimed himself as the independent ruler of the
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autonomous province. Up to the year 1800 the Porte sent armies against
Pasvangolu but they failed to remove him from power and in the end were forced to
recognise his authority. During this violent period Sofroni's diocese was besieged
not only by Pasvanoglu's marauding kurdzhali, but also by the sultan's troops.
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Pasvanoglu's province consisted of over 200 Bulgarian villages reaching from Vidin into Southern
Bulgaria
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Although Bishop Sofroni mentions the violent struggles that took place during the
period of the kurdzhaliistvo, the Greek historian Stavrianos claims that Pasvanoglu
was only able to retain his position of authority for such an extended period by
satisfying the needs and winning the support and respect of the local population. He
argues that Pasvanoglu is remembered not because of his violent practices but rather
because he restored order, protected the poor from the extortions of the tax
collectors, and provided security for his Christian subjects.153 The testimony of a
contemporary English traveller reporting from Pasvanoglu's capital, Vidin, agrees
with Stavrianos in this respect: "Vidin owes its rise chiefly to the emigration of poor
families from Wallachia and Moldavia, who pass over the Danube, and take refuge in
Bulgaria, to avoid the tyranny and extortion practised by Greek and Turkish tax-
gatherers...."154 Neale is suggesting here that people migrated to Vidin both for their
safety and because of its fair conditions. However, a study of the demographic
composition, distribution and movement of Bulgarian peoples during this particular
period disagrees with these reports and arguments. The effects of the kurdzhaliistvo
period and especially the Russo-Turkish Wars had a profound effect on the peoples
of Bulgaria. Indeed, a tidal wave of emigration is recorded between the 1790s and
the 1820s when almost half a million people left Bulgaria to settle in Romania,
southern Ukraine and Russia.
Undaunted by these precarious circumstances Bishop Sofroni set out for his new
diocese. Unfortunately, from 1795 the violent disorders worsened as villages were
plundered and burned by both the kurdzhali and the sultan's troops. However, it is
important to note that this was not Islamic violence directed specifically at
Christians, but rather the result of war in which innocents suffered. On many
occasions Sofroni himself was forced into hiding fleeing from village to village, he
hid in caves, forests and once in a harem. Although in continual fear for his life
Sofroni never stopped preaching and teaching the people in vernacular Bulgarian; his
patriotic teaching excited the eager ear of Bulgarians who suffered at the hands of
bandits and government troops alike. Sofroni was able to persist in his patriotic
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ministry for six years within his Vratsa diocese before being tricked, apprehended
and imprisoned for three years in Vidin. On his release in 1803, due to the continued
activities of the kurdzhali, he was unable to continue his ministry in Bulgaria and
was obliged to leave for the safety of Bucharest.155
In Bucharest the sufferings of Sofroni finally came to an end. He was welcomed and
treated as a hero by the Bulgarian emigres. However, the guilt of abandoning his
flock led Sofroni to commence on a new literary career with an autobiographical
work entitled The Life and Sufferings of the Sinful Sofroni'. Therefore, I am working
day and night to write a few books in our Bulgarian language, so that if I, a sinner,
cannot speak to them verbally for them to learn from me, then they can read my
writings and benefit from them and pray to God for me, unworthy one, that He
should correct my ignorance. 156 In it he paints an extensive picture of Bulgarian life
in the second half of the 18th century. He writes in the religious style of the day but
uses a Bulgarian vernacular form mixed with Old Church Slavonic. His work also
diverges from the traditional style by imbuing itself with the secular concepts of the
European Enlightenment. Indeed, one might suggest that Sofroni's Life, although
marking an incipient development in the Bulgarian National Revival movement, was
his homage to Paisii's History.
With financial support from the Bulgarian merchants of Bucharest Sofroni published
his autobiography in 1806, incidentally the first book to be printed in Bulgarian. It
was originally entitled Nedelnik (Sunday) and contained, in addition to the main
autobiographical section, a preface of various sermons and homilies. Between 1806
and 1809, still clearly influenced by the new educational concepts of the European
Enlightenment, Sofroni translated a number of works into Bulgarian including
Aesop's Fables, The Mythology of Cynthippus the Philosopher and Theatron
Politikon. Theatron Politikon was Sofroni's last known publication in 1809 and
included ideas of liberty relating particularly to the reformation of social
relationships. Sofroni writes in his introduction to the book:
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I, humble in zealousness for my people, have worked and translated from
Greek into Bulgarian, because this book is very useful and necessary to
men. And not only to the rulers who are in power, in that it will teach
them gently how to rule their states and subjects justly and honourably,
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but it is also necessary and useful to everyone.
In Bucharest Sofroni busied himself not only with literary activity but continued in
his political struggles on Bulgaria's behalf. For example, during the third Russo-
Turkish War (1806-1812) he was actively engaged in political manoeuvring. After
the fiasco of the first Russo-Turkish War he was well aware that Russia's political
and military aid was essential if any hope of Bulgarian liberation was to succeed. He
urged upon his fellow Bulgarians the need for cordial Russo-Bulgarian relations. It
was therefore with the blessing and authority of Bishop Sofroni that the Bulgarian
emigres made contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg in the
hope of receiving Russian aid in any future plan for liberation. Shortly after the
outbreak of war he sent a letter to the Russian authorities, which spoke of the close
ties of blood and religion that existed between the Russians and the Bulgarians, and
offered Russia the help of the Bulgarians in the war. The letter also included, perhaps
for the first time, a Bulgarian plea to be liberated by the Russian army, and the desire
to become part of a greater Russian Empire. This indeed was a premonition of
Bulgaria's future fascination with Dyado Ivan (Grampa Ivan - Russia) - but in this
instance it is important to note that Bulgaria saw the immediate result of their
liberation as union with Russia. Thus, in his Appeal to the Bulgarian People he urges
his fellow-countrymen to welcome the Russian troops as brothers.158
Bishop Sofroni of Vratsa, or humble Stoiko Vladislavov, must be regarded as an
extremely influential figure in the history of Bulgaria's cultural and spiritual
awakening. Perhaps of even greater importance than Father Paisii of Hilendar, for his
exploits put into practice what Paisii had only preached. He not only propagated the
ideas of the European Enlightenment but also modelled his ministry on them. He
aspired, through his ecclesiastical role, to reform social relations, to fight against the
ignorance of his contemporaries, to introduce a new educational model, to break the
157 N.Genchev, The Bulgarian National Revival Period, (Sofia, 1977), p.36
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yoke of slavery that entrapped his fellow Bulgarians and engender new international
political relationships, which would help achieve the liberation of his people. He
must also be considered an equally influential figure in the sphere of Bulgarian
literature. Apart from being the author of the first modern book printed in Bulgarian,
he is important for his insistence that future books be written in the vernacular, rather
than Old Church Slavonic or Greek. He was not only the first person to copy Paisii's
History, but also the first to re-copy the original into a vernacular Bulgarian edition,
enabling it to be read widely. He was greatly influenced, as was Paisii, by the
humanist ideas of the European Enlightenment, perceiving knowledge and education
as being of paramount importance in the resurrection of the Bulgarian people. He
thus assumed the role of educator with a vision for a new model of education,
making him the forerunner of future Bulgarian school reforms, beginning in the
1830s. Thus, in the fields of politics, education, spiritual and cultural awakenings
Bulgarians have many reasons to acclaim Bishop Sofroni.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has endeavoured to explain the religious and social context of
Bulgarians in the Ottoman empire during the period prior to the National Revival.
Attention has been drawn to the 'double-yoke' of Bulgaria's oppression under
Ottoman political, social and economic control combined with Greek religious,
cultural and economic subjugation. It was in these circumstances that the Bulgarian
peasantry began to revolt, not out of nationalistic desire, or anti-Islamic sentiment
but due to economic and social hardship. It is beyond doubt that the Ottoman
conquest and extended process of Islamisation impeded the development of
Bulgarian culture and stifled national identity. Allegations of Islamic persecution
against the Christian population and Church extending over five centuries, however,
is simply not bome out by the archival evidence. Although faced with moments of
persecution the Church was not imperilled by Islam, the greater danger came from
its oppression by the Greeks and the Constantinople Patriarchate. This fact is
corroborated by Paisii of Hilendar. It is important to note that Paisii never incited
his fellow countrymen to revolt against the Ottoman authorities. It was enough for
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him that Bulgars regain a knowledge of whom they once had been, and a vision of
whom they could be again, within the Ottoman empire. What was of specific
importance to Paisii was that Bulgaria would stand against the ecclesiastical
hegemony of the Greeks. Bishop Sofroni of Vratsa embodied and developed
Paisii's desires. Although he criticised both Ottomans and Greeks, his criticism of
the Turks was political in nature as he understood that Bulgaria's freedom would
only be achieved through separation from the Ottoman empire. Inherent in
Sofroni's own desires was the idea of Bulgaria regaining spiritual, cultural and
territorial independence, but only through unification with Russia. Although the
harsh and occasionally violent Ottoman regime was mentioned by Paisii and
Sofroni, they neither overstressed nor embellished its nature. An investigation of
Ottoman and Bulgarian archives from this pre-National Revival era concurs with
their understanding and confirms the conclusion that although the Ottoman
authorities were viewed as conquerors, unwanted by Bulgarians, their five
centuries' rule of Bulgaria was marked more by tolerance than oppression of the
Christian population. The Bulgarian catastrophe theory must therefore be
considered anachronistic, the fabrication of a later nationalist sentiment that invokes
Paisii and Sofroni, while neglecting their historical realism.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. THE JOURNEY TOWARDS CULTURAL AUTONOMY
This chapter will examine events surrounding the cultural regeneration of Bulgaria
which grew in intensity during the nineteenth century. It will achieve this by
investigating the underlying circumstances that made renaissance possible. It will
look at the political perspectives of the Ottoman Tanzimat reform programme and its
effect on the economic and social conditions of Bulgaria. The chapter will
concentrate specifically on the development of education in Bulgaria from the
medieval religious model to the advent of the secular 'New Bulgarian' model and the
emergence of a culturally aware Bulgarian intelligentsia. The chapter will also look
at foreign influences upon the cultural development of Bulgaria and will analyse the
Ottoman Vilayet Law of 1864, specifically designed to discourage developing
national and international cultural tendencies. This will provide a framework from
which the chapter will consider the role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church during
this period of cultural awakening, in which it claims to have kept alive Bulgarian
cultural, educational and linguistic traditions. From this foundation the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church professes to be the most important indigenous agent of National
Revival - a claim that will be critically assessed as the chapter moves to its
conclusion.
3.1 TOWARD CULTURAL REVIVAL
For the Balkans, enveloped within a weakening Ottoman Empire, the eighteenth
century was a time of awakening and enlightenment. Bulgaria, during the first half
of the century, remained largely untouched by the changes that were transforming
Europe or by the growing cultural and national awareness amongst the Greeks and
Serbs. By the end of the eighteenth century the repercussions ofNapoleon's victories
over Austria were affecting all Balkan peoples. In 1809 Napoleon created the Illyrian
Provinces from territory ceded by the Austrians, comprising part of the far western
Balkans, resulting in the emergence of modern nationalism in Croatia, Slovenia and
Serbia. In northern Bulgaria Osman Pazvantoglu took advantage of the chaotic
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conditions and in 1795 declared his region independent of Ottoman central
government, spreading the message of the French revolution, liberte, egalite et
fraternite,159 These external events hastened the process of cultural and national
awakening in Bulgaria, but her national revival could never have occurred without
the simultaneous decline and reform of Ottoman imperial structures.
3.1.1 ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
By the early nineteenth century the Ottoman empire was a major world power whose
territories included vast areas of Europe, Asia and Africa. Behind its impressive
facade, however, Ottoman administration was in a state of serious decline. Dubbed
the 'weak man' ofEurope, the empire's once successful administrative system was in
a state of terminal meltdown; the original provincial administrators, complete with
their excellent bureaucratic training and strict merit system of advancement, had
given way to the officeholder who bought his position and treated it as a personal
investment that should yield the highest financial profits. This resulted in the
exploitation of the peasantry with minimum benefit to Ottoman central government.
The most serious problem was the failure of central government to exercise authority
over the ayan class - the local administrators and notables - who turned their areas of
responsibility into personal fiefdoms: "Ottoman government was government in little
more than name".160 Escalating anarchy created the urgent necessity for a
reorganisation of imperial structure with the primary purpose of re-establishing the
authority of central government.
The era of Ottoman reform began in the last year of the reign of Sultan Mahmud II
(1808-1839) who promulgated the Gulhane Rescript (1839) that regulated
administrative and military expenditure and prepared the way for more extensive
legislation in the Edict of Reforms of 1856. The reforms aimed not only at re¬
establishing central governmental control with a diminution of the Sultan's power,
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but also reconstituted the very nature of the state by introducing equal rights and
responsibilities of non-Muslim and Muslim subjects. In 1829 a new clothing law
sought to eliminate visual differences amongst males by requiring the adoption of
identical headgear; by appearing the same all men would presumably become equal.
This law anticipated the later Tanzimat decrees of 1839 and 1856, namely, the 1839
edict, the Hatt-i Sherif, which elaborated further the need to eliminate inequality and
create justice for all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim; and the 1856
imperial edict, the Hatt-i Humayun, announced by Sultan Abdulmecid I (1839-1861).
This reiterated the state's duty to guarantee equality between the people of the
empire and also created a concept of common Ottoman citizenship (Osmanlili),
introducing for the first time the idea of Ottoman patriotism in an attempt to stem
rising nationalist/separatist movements.161
The Constantinople Patriarchate, fearing a loss of primacy amongst the empire's
Christians, opposed these reforms particularly where they affected the internal
administration of the Christian millet-s. The Hatt-i Humayun required each Christian
community to elect a local assembly of laypersons as well as clergy to implement
reform of its own administration and submit their results for the Porte's approval.
The ecclesiastical hierarchies interpreted this as a direct attack on their traditional
authority. The Greek Metropolitan of Izmir, for example, is reported to have
commented when the firman was replaced in its ceremonial pouch after its official
promulgation: "God grant that it not be taken out of that bag again".162 Despite
patriarchal resistance the reforms went ahead, and between 1860 and 1862 the
internal structure of the millet-s were reorganised as the principle of secular
participation in ecclesiastical leadership was implemented. In Bulgaria the Hatt-i
Humayun was reinforced by the findings of the Grand Vizier, Kibrisli Mehmet
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Pasha, who reported widespread Patriarchal corruption. However, as only Greeks
were eligible for election to these lay positions, the Bulgarians continued to have
virtually no representation. Indeed, by 1865 only two of sixty-five Assembly
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members were Bulgarian. Thus, while the 'reformed' millet embraced the secular
principle, it continued to be charged by a spirit of Hellenic superiority.
The implementation of these reforms was complicated by external pressures on the
Porte imposed by the European powers, each of whom saw patronage of different
Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire as a means of political influence.
Russia thus presented itself as the patron of the Orthodox community, while France
and Austria competed for the protection of the Catholics, and Britain for the small
Evangelical or Protestant communities that were coming into existence at this
time.164 The millet reform therefore involved several paradoxes: While the
reorganisation was intended to eradicate abuse, corruption continued; although the
stipulation of fixed salaries for higher clergy was intended to reduce corruption, it
encouraged financial dependence on ex gratia payments by European consuls. As for
the Porte's desire to extend the principle of popular government and increase the
loyalty of minorities to the Ottoman state, the fact that the reorganisation retained the
millet as a socio-political unit served to reinforce the lack of homogeneity among
Ottoman peoples. Although the power of the clergy was reduced and a degree of
secularisation introduced, lines of religious distinction did not disappear and indeed
began to take on the additional dimension of nationalism that was disseminated
through secular education. Thus, millet reform actually militated against the Ottoman
vision of Osmanlilik. It can been concluded, therefore, that "the old clerical
obscurantism, which kept the mass of non-Muslims in ignorance" would have been a
better ally toward continued Ottoman dominion.165
3.1.2 BULGARIAN CULTURAL RENAISSANCE
By the mid-nineteenth century European influence and Ottoman reform combined to
stimulate cultural awakening in Bulgaria. This was due in large part to the work of
pioneer Bulgarian educators whose work was only made possible through subsidy
164 Russia's influence grew after the 1774 Treaty ofKuchuk Kainardji was agreed between Russia and




received from the rising class of wealthy Bulgarian merchants and artisans, who
equally would not have appeared had it not been for the Ottoman reform programme.
One of the first reform measures introduced by Sultan Mahmud II was the liquidation
of the janissary corps in favour of a regular army based on the European model, with
European military training, weaponry and uniforms.166 It was primarily to the
Bulgarian farmers and producers of cloth that the Porte turned for its source of
supply to feed and clothe this new army. As a result the farmers grew wealthier, as
did the manufacturers of aba, a coarse woollen cloth, and gaitan, a decorative lace
used to adorn uniforms. Large scale purchase of aba and gaitan began in the 1820s,
and by 1848 the Porte had concluded a number of commercial agreements with the
trade guilds of Bulgaria to build factories in Sliven and Plovdiv.
A consequence ofmilitary reform was the increased pressure to amend the system of
land ownership in Bulgaria. This had been tied, in theory, to the Ottoman practice of
levying soldiers, as well as taxes, for the sultan's military forces. The hated sipahi
system of military recruitment and taxation was rendered obsolete by the
introduction of a professional army, and during the 1830s it gradually diminished.
New land tenancy agreements were drawn up that enabled wealthy Bulgarians to
purchase property. Thus, whilst the peasantry continued to encounter difficulty,
Bulgarian merchants and manufacturers grew increasingly affluent. The economic
revival had cultural and political repercussions as these new merchants began to
exert their influence upon Bulgarian society. As their contact with the outside world
increased they were influenced by new ideas, in conjunction with increased political
and social freedom and with the necessary finances, businessmen and trade guilds
began to invest in Bulgaria's cultural renaissance.
3.1.3 CULTURAL RENAISSANCE: EDUCATION
Although the Bulgarian Orthodox Church claims to have kept alive the country's
cultural and educational traditions throughout the Ottoman period, a major
expression of Bulgaria's national revival was its investment in secular education
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during the nineteenth century: "Without the educational movement the Bulgarian
national revival would have been impossible."167
Bulgaria's medieval educational system, centred within its many monastery
complexes, had been eliminated as a result of the Ottoman conquest in the late
fourteenth century. Monasteries were destroyed, scholars were killed, and others
were deported to Asia Minor, while some took part in the mass migrations to Serbia,
Romania and the Ukraine. However, during the second half of the fifteenth century,
the consolidation of Ottoman power over the whole Balkan region witnessed a
gradual revival ofBulgarian education in the form of ecclesiastical 'cell schools'.168
For three centuries (15th-18th) these cell schools offered the only education available
to Bulgarian Christians. Typically they operated within monasteries or convents,
although some later appeared in private homes and businesses. The teachers were
predominantly monks or priests. Thus the Church claims: "the monasteries and the
cell schools were the last flickering light of Bulgarian civilisation."169 Documentary
evidence tells us that during the fifteenth century seventeen cell schools opened in
Bulgaria, twenty-nine were added in the sixteenth century, another thirty-one in the
seventeenth century, and seventy-five in the eighteenth century, by the end of which
there were no less than one hundred and fifty-two cell schools in Bulgaria.170
The number of students in a monastery school would normally have been quite
small, between ten and twenty, with tuition consisting of mastering the basic
elements of reading, writing and arithmetic, as well as instruction in Church Slavonic
and Greek. The curriculum was specifically religious in character, with students
learning the Psalter, the Gospels and the Book of Hours, along with other Church
books. Secular knowledge appears to have been largely ignored, and most of the
students became priests or monks. The cell schools therefore represented a system of
clerical education, following the medieval, religio-scholastic model.
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Scholars of the Bulgarian National Revival period, such as M.Arnaudov,
I.Shishmanov, B.Penev and H.Gandev, have nonetheless argued that religious cell
school education maintained a minimum of knowledge without which the awakening
of Bulgarian economical, political and spiritual progress would have been
impossible. They claim that despite the low standard of education the cell schools
ensured the formation of a socially active group who emerged as the spiritual
restorers of Bulgarian society during the eighteenth century. To this degree they
contend that a denial of the value of the 'cells' is unjustified.171 It must be
recognised, however, that the sum total of learning to be gained from these schools
was reading and writing in a language that meant very little outside of the Church.
The church's elementary educational programme was incapable of meeting the needs
of the emerging commercial class of Bulgarian merchants.
Bulgarian aspirations towards secular education undoubtedly stemmed from Greek
cultural influence that introduced the ideas of the European Enlightenment. By the
second half of the eighteenth century the first signs of Greek spiritual and cultural
restoration could be perceived. In many towns of the Ottoman empire Greek
educators opened secular schools in which they taught mathematics, philosophy,
history, languages, natural history and science. It was to such schools in Istanbul and
Bucharest that the Bulgarian economic elite sent their children, and it was not long
before Greek schools opened in a number of Bulgarian towns. It was within these
schools, as distinct from the old 'cell schools', that Bulgarian students began to
receive an education that prepared many for future participation in Bulgaria's
National Revival, students such as - Vasil Aprilov, Petur Beron, Georgi Rakovski,
Ilarion Makariopolski, among others.
The success of secular Greek education prompted the reform of the traditional cell
schools, a need which had been advocated in the previous century by Paisii
Hilendarski and Sofroni Vrachanski. For example, Sofroni wrote:
171 P.Mitev, (1999), p.56
99
Ah! Reckless Bulgarian stupidity! The sombreness and gloominess of
drunkenness, they cannot manage to find a wise schoolmaster or teacher
to teach the children wisely... so they walk as the blind in the darkness.
Oh, foolish and unwise people! It appears that the other Christian nations
teach wise philosophy. Now then look and ask what you can do. Why do
you not spend money for schools and for academies and for teachers of
grammatics and philosophy?172
Sofroni's appeal illustrates an orientation towards renaissance thinking in his desire
to construct a modern secular educational system in Bulgaria. One may argue that the
cell school system had achieved a level of success with progressive graduates such as
Paisii and Sofroni. However, although Paisii and Sofroni were products ofmedieval
religio-scholasticism it was not the system that influenced the reformist activities of
both men, which were borne more precisely from their individual experiences of
European Enlightenment teaching on Mount Athos.
Sofroni Vrachanski's desire for modern secular schools imbued with Bulgarian
national character highlights one of the major problems of Greek education in
Bulgaria. Greek schools mediated a spirit of Hellenic superiority and nationalism.
The teachers preached the concept of megali - the creation of a 'Greater Greece' and
nurtured an admiration of Greek culture within their students. Many Bulgarians
succumbed to Greek influence but others refused to submit to the Hellenising ideals
of their tutors. For example we know that pupils from the Andros Greek School
formed a secret 'Slavo-Bulgarian Philosophical Society'. The students were
undeniably influenced by Greek teaching as it heightened their awareness of
nationalist ideals, but rather than accept the megali paradigm they directed their
nationalist fervour toward Bulgaria and the plight of their own people.173
This led to the creation of the first Hellenic-Bulgarian school in Svishtov in 1815.174
This school and others that followed taught the same range of subjects as Greek
schools but with the addition of Bulgarian language. Many of the graduates went on
to infuse new life into the reformation of Bulgarian education and by the late 1820s
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they were at the centre of the spiritual and cultural revival ofBulgaria that had begun
in earnest. They urged the patriotic chorbadzhi - town leaders and wealthy
businessmen - to support the reformation of traditional education in their towns and
aided by the activities of trades guilds they advocated the construction of new school
buildings. The Hellenic-Bulgarian school may therefore be considered as a
transitional educational form between the medieval religious model and what is
• • 17S
known as 'New Bulgarian education'.
Thus through the early nineteenth century there arose a strong united Bulgarian
movement for national secular education that embraced the whole country. However,
the educational movement acquired real strength and growth through the 1830s-40s
with the introduction of the monitorial method of teaching commonly known as the
Bell-Lancaster system, the essence of which was that one teacher would instruct a
large number of pupils by enlisting the aid of the more advanced students to help the
younger children.176 An exceptional role in Bulgarian education was played by Dr.
Peter Beron (1800-1871), one of the first Bulgarians to understand the need to
construct a wholly Bulgarian educational system. He was bom in Kotel where he
attended his local cell school. He later studied at the Greek school in Bucharest
before graduating with a medical degree from Munich University in 1831. He is
remembered in Bulgaria for his innovative educational booklet A Primer with Sundry
Precepts published in Brashov, Romania in 1824, in which he expounded his
educational ideas categorically rejecting the religious cell school model and
advocating a completely Bulgarian secular and nationalistic model in its place. He
understood that Bulgarian education would only be successful if mediated through
the spoken language of the people and thus wrote his Primer in the common
vernacular.
Through the initiative of Vasil Aprilov, a wealthy Bulgarian emigre from Odessa, the
first Bulgarian secular school using the monitorial model and teaching in the
175 P.Mitev, (1999), p.59
176 This model is named after the British educationalists Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838) and Andrew
Bell (1753-1832)
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vernacular was established in Gabrovo in 1835 to serve, "all of Bulgaria".177 Aprilov
belonged to that part of Bulgarian society that Paisii Hilendarski had berated as
becoming Greek. However, under the influence of the Russian scholar Yuri Venelin
(see next section) he adopted Pan-Slavism and sought to redeem his earlier Greek
bias by helping rebuild Bulgarian national consciousness. He perfectly exemplified
the process of change that took place from Paisii's era to the middle of the nineteenth
century. In 1833, at Aprilov's suggestion, the influential leaders of Gabrovo
requested before the Metropolitan of Turnovo, that the Church support the opening
ofBulgarian secular schools in his region. The Metropolitan initially refused, only to
succumb to the pressure of local community support for educational reform. He
recommended that a Bulgarian priest, Neofit Rilski, be appointed to the post of
schoolmaster and on 2 January 1835 the school opened marking a significant
development in Bulgarian education and a major leap in her cultural revival.
The success of the New Bulgarian educational movement played a decisive role in
the forming of Bulgaria's national consciousness during the National Revival period.
Nevertheless, although the argument for a secular approach to educational revival
had been won, its cultural direction was still an issue of contention. Four contending
positions struggled to dominate each advocating its own idea for the future direction
of Bulgaria's educational and cultural development: Firstly, the leaders of the
National Action group believed that Bulgaria's cultural renaissance would be
achieved only on the basis of her national traditions without any foreign cultural or
political influence; secondly, the Graecophiles believed that Greek language,
literature, culture and education were the only means of securing a better Bulgarian
future; the third grouping consisted of Russian emigres, including Aprilov, who were
influenced by Pan-Slavism insisted that Bulgaria's future development should be
closely associated with Russian culture, language and literature; the final group
believed that the Ottoman empire would eventually reform in the spirit of western
liberalism and culture, thus ensuring the proper conditions for the cultural and
educational advance of Bulgarian society within the framework of a remodelled
empire.
177 M.V.Pundeff, p. 106
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Comprehending fully the development of the secular educational movement, this
researcher's assessment of the role of the Church in shaping Bulgaria's educational
revival in the nineteenth century is more qualified than the conventional claims of
Bulgarian nationalist historiography. The Church's educational role in medieval and
early Ottoman times is not in question, and the cell school system did preserve an
indigenous educational tradition through the centuries in which there was no
alternative. The expansion of the cell system in the eighteenth century demonstrates
the effort of the Church to respond to the growing demand for education, while at the
same time failing to produce the kind of education that the commercial elite required.
Although it can be argued that the cell schools provided a transition to modern
education they remained pre-modern themselves and eventually gave way to Greek
and later to Bulgarian initiatives in secular education that focused on the nation
without the mediation of the Church. The clergy acquiesced in this change
reluctantly for it clearly signalled a diminution of one of their traditional conduits of
power over the general populace. This was in line with the Ottoman Tanzimat
reforms which, among other things, were designed to develop a balance between
secular and clerical authority in the administration of their empire's Christian
communities. Thus it is impracticable to build a simple bridge between the cell
school system and Bulgaria's National Revival. It is impossible, therefore, to sustain
the claim of traditional Bulgarian scholarship, that the Church fulfilled a major role
in keeping Bulgaria's cultural and educational traditions alive when in reality it was
losing its influence to shape the direction of Bulgaria's National Revival
intelligentsia.
3.2 RUSSIAN & TURKISH INFLUENCE ON BULGARIAN CULTURAL
ASPIRATION
The development of education in Bulgaria introduced a number of contending
foreign influences that sought to promote their own politically and/or religiously
motivated ideas for the future direction of Bulgaria's cultural revival. Russian
influence, particularly in the form of Pan-Slavism, proved to be a principal foreign
agency guiding Bulgaria's cultural renaissance. Originating in seventeenth century
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Russia, Pan-Slavism developed as an intellectual and cultural movement during the
nineteenth century and was intended to promote the political and cultural unity of all
Slavs. The philosophy was steeped in Eastern Orthodox tradition and dreamed of
restoring Constantinople, or later of establishing Moscow, as the capital of an
Orthodox Christian empire, which implied the liberation of all Balkan Slavs from
Ottoman authority, under Russian direction. Throughout the Russian empire
supporters of their 'little Slav brothers' established benevolent societies, raising
funds for Bulgarian refugees, finding employment for emigres, and scholarships for
Bulgarian students to study in Russian educational establishments. Thus the
propagation of Pan-Slavism in Bulgaria was a decisive factor influencing the
direction of her cultural development specifically oriented towards Russia. However,
it was the work of one man in particular who ignited Russian intellectual and cultural
interest in Bulgaria.
3.2.1 YURI IVANOVICH VENELIN (1802-1839)
If Paisii Hilendarski re-introduced Bulgarians to their history, it was the Russian,
Yuri Venelin, who fired the historical and national imagination of the leaders of the
Bulgarian national revival with an influence that overshadowed Paisii until the
latter's reputation was restored by historian Marin Drinov in 1871.
Venelin was born in Carpathian Hungary in the village ofVelika Tibava in 1802. His
father was a Uniate priest whose premature death destined the young Yuri to fulfil
his family's wish that he study theology. However, his dislike of the subject led to
him changing that destiny when he enrolled in Lvov University to study history.
After graduating he was given a teaching post in Kishniev Seminary, and it was
during this period that Venelin first encountered Bulgarian refugees who had fled
their country as a result of the Russo-Turkish Wars.178 This first contact with
Bulgaria proved decisive in guiding the rest of his life. In 1825 he travelled to
178 In the second half of the 18th century a series ofwars took place between Russia and Turkey. The
Bulgarians took part hoping that liberation would ensue. Although Russian troops entered Bulgarian
territory on these occasions the Bulgars gained nothing and indeed suffered terribly from Turkish
reprisals when Russian troops withdrew until the 1877-78 War of Liberation: Russo-Turkish Wars
1768-74, 1787-91, 1806-12, 1828-29, 1877-78
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Moscow and become acquainted with a number of influential Slavophiles, among
them Mihail Pogodin, the editor of the The Moscow Gazette, who encouraged him in
his historical research and influenced his pro-slavophile views. In an article for the
Gazette Venelin voiced for the first time his future Bulgarophile predilection:
In their language we conduct our services today, and in that
language we wrote almost up to the time of Lomonosov - the cradle of
the Bulgars is indivisibly linked with the cradle of the Russian people....
While we [the Russians] moan over the fate of the Greeks, while we
discuss whether or not the eagle of Byzantium should rise again - we do
not remember the Bulgars; not even one Slav has wept over the body of
the dead lion. 179
This article would be the foundation for his first major publication in 1829, a 230-
page historical work entitled, The Ancient and Present-Day Bulgarians in their
Political, Ethnographic, Plistorical and Religious Relationship to the Russians.
Historical-Critical Researches.180 His research caused a commotion within the
academic world of Slavic studies questioning all existing theories relating to the
origins of Bulgaria. The problem of Bulgarian origins, or Bulgaristics, had become a
central issue in nineteenth century Slavic studies as arguments revolved around the
interrelationship between Slavic peoples and their languages.181 Safarik, for example,
claimed that Bulgarian was merely a dialect, a "sub-species", of the Serbo-
Macedonian language.182 However, the common understanding was that the
Bulgarian language was non-Slavic, having its origins in Turko-Tatar. The
controversial nature of Venelin's work, however, was that it claimed to have
uncovered the Slavic origins of the Bulgarian people, and assigned them to a pre¬
eminent place in the history of all Slav peoples.
As a result of his research Venelin was awarded a scholarship from the Russian
Academy of Sciences that enabled him to conduct a two-year field trip to Bulgaria
179 Y.Venelin, The Moscow Gazette, (translated from a photocopy of the newspaper cutting dated
Moscow, 1828)
18° y.Venelin, The Ancient and Present Day Bulgarians in Their Political, National, Historical and
Religious Relations with the Russians, (Lvov, 1829)
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and Macedonia where he collected historical, philosophical and archaeological
materials. He arrived in Bulgaria in 1830, finding the country in turmoil after the
Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29.183 For his own safety he restricted his travels to
Varna, the Dobrudzha and Silistra. This was sufficient for him to complete a 300-
page manuscript entitled, Grammar of the Present-Day Bulgarian Dialect that he
presented to the Russian Academy when he returned to Moscow in 1831.
In 1849 he published a second book on Bulgarian history, with financial aid from a
Bulgarian merchant, entitled, Critical Researches on the History of the Bulgarians,
by Y.I. Venelin. From the Arrival ofthe Bulgarians on the Thracian Peninsula to 96S,
to the Subjection ofBulgaria by the Russian GrandPrince Svyatoslav.iM The crux of
this book was his assertion that the medieval missionary brothers, Cyril and
Methodius, were Bulgarian and not Greek, and that Macedonia belonged to Bulgaria:
"Macedonia is the name of a country, but its inhabitants are Bulgarians, who can also
be called Macedonians because they live in Macedonia. Therefore, Macedonian
i oc
means Bulgarian."
Venelin's research had opened an important door for the evolution of the Bulgarian
National Revival. By negating the Turkish origins of Bulgarian language and culture,
he lifted the burden of historical guilt from the Bulgars, for now, as Slavs, they had
reason to struggle against the cultural burdens placed upon them by centuries of
Ottoman domination. His publications created a sensation among the Bulgarian
intelligentsia and began a trend which would draw the centre of Bulgarian
intellectual, spiritual, cultural and political gravity towards Russia.
Venelin's most ardent supporter was the Bulgarian emigre, Vasil Aprilov, who was
converted to the cause of Bulgarian nationalism after reading his work. As Aprilov
developed his Bulgarian school network, it became the medium through which
183
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Venelin's pro-Bulgarian propaganda was disseminated among the new class of
students, secular and nationalist in orientation. Aprilov provided financial backing
for Venelin's third book, On the Birth of New Bulgarian Literature, published in
1838, and it was under Venelin's influence that Aprilov published his own work, The
Dawn ofNew Bulgarian Education, in 1841, both books proving highly influential in
Bulgaria's cultural revival.
Yuri Venelin must be credited as being the founder of nationalist romanticism within
the Bulgarian National Revival movement, and as "oracle and arbiter" of all things
Bulgarian.186 His academic reputation within Russia raised awareness of Bulgaria
transforming it from being a neglected and insignificant country, elevating it to a
position of pre-eminence in Slavic national, cultural and linguistic consciousness.187
For this reason he holds a place of honour within Bulgarian society, being recognised
today as a saint of Bulgaria's National Revival period. Bulgarian nationalists erected
a marble tombstone on his Moscow grave, on which is etched the epitaph: "He
reminded the world of the oppressed but once famous and powerful Bulgarian people
and passionately desired to see their rebirth. Almighty God fulfil the prayer of They
servant."
3.2.2 THE MOSCOW SLAVONIC CHARITABLE COMMITTEE AND ITS
MISSION TO BULGARIA (1858-1876)
Having accepted Venelin's hypothesis of Bulgaria's pre-eminence amongst the Slav
nations, Russian Pan-Slavic societies began actively to promote their mission in
Bulgaria during the second half of the nineteenth century. Particularly significant in
Bulgaria's ongoing national and spiritual restoration was the work of the Moscow
Slavonic Charitable Committee (MSCC). With its introduction in Bulgaria we
observe an intermingling of Russian charitable acts and Russian political
machinations.
186
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The MSCC applied to the Russian government for approval toward the end of 1857,
and was recognised officially on 26 January 1858. Its letter of application expressed
the motivation behind the organisation. The letter criticised the growing influence of
western Christian mission in Bulgaria, especially through the activities and
propaganda of the Jesuits who were perceived as "destroying the influence of
Russia" and "eroding Orthodoxy with cosmopolitan and universal education".188 In
addition to the Jesuits, the letter named the following groups as enemies ofBulgarian
Orthodoxy: the Polish emigres, the School of St. Lazur in Rumelia (Eastern
Bulgaria), the Roman legation in Constantinople under the leadership of the
Bulgarian, Bishop Kazanov, the influence of the Maltese College in Turkey and the
presence ofRoman Catholic and Protestant missionaries in Bulgaria.189
Christian missionary interest in Bulgaria introduces a subject somewhat different
from the central theme of this chapter. However, as it was raised as a major reason
behind the creation of the MSCC, brief comment is necessary. Missions were
predominantly a feature of the nineteenth century, although this was truer of the
Protestants than of the Catholics. Roman Catholic aspirations on Bulgaria were much
older, originating during the struggle for Christian dominance between East and
West in the ninth century. Subsequently, repeated and temporarily successful efforts
were made by Rome to acquire jurisdiction over the Bulgarians. During the
seventeenth century the Counter Reformation movement sought to gain territory in
the Balkans through the use of the Uniate formula. Although this movement gained a
number of Bulgarian converts, its essentially non-Bulgarian nature deprived the
Catholics of gaining lasting significance. Hence when Roman Catholic missionary
activity revived in the nineteenth century, a small national catholic element was
already at hand. On the other hand, Protestant missionary involvement in Bulgaria
was purely a nineteenth century phenomenon. As with the Catholics, political
considerations were not entirely separate from Protestant missionary work, and owed
a great deal to the benevolence of foreign diplomats in the Ottoman empire.
However, the central feature of the Protestant missionary movement was the Bible,
188
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its translation into the vernacular, its distribution, and its use to promote literacy.
Nonetheless, as with the Roman Catholics, the Protestant missionary movement's
non-Bulgarian nature relegated it to playing only a small and somewhat insignificant
role in Bulgaria's national revival.
The MSCC also criticised the influence of the Turks and Greeks on Bulgaria, stating
that the Bulgarians, as the largest 'Slavic tribe' in the Ottoman empire, merited the
help of other Slavic Orthodox peoples. To support the struggling Bulgarian Church
they proposed the following measures: To provide finances for Bulgaria to support
the Church, schools, and other beneficial establishments (they quote as examples, the
Community for Bulgarian literature, and Bulgarian national, cultural/community
centres)190; to provide educational literature and ecclesiastical materials for the use of
Orthodox societies and to provide scholarships for promising young Bulgars to study
• 191
in Russia.
After receiving official recognition the Moscow Committee energetically engaged in
the propagation of its Pan-Slavic objectives throughout Bulgaria. Naiden Gerov, one
of the leaders of Bulgaria's Odessa emigrant population, persuaded Russian patrons
to support the Bulgarian cultural and ecclesiastical cause and especially the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church in its growing dispute with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Gerov and the MSCC spoke on every aspect of the Bulgarian Church, particularly
"on the non-Slavic Greek oppression of Slavic Bulgarians".192 The apparent altruism
of their argument must be qualified by the fact that Russian Orthodoxy claimed
Moscow to be the 'third Rome'.193 Thus the charitable goals of the MSCC were
pursued, not merely for themselves, but in the political interest of creating an
independent Slavic Orthodox state within the ecclesiastical orbit of the Moscow
190 These centres known in Bulgaria as chitalishta (uHTajimita) have no adequate English translation.
A combination of the German 'Kulturheime' and the English 'Community Centre' capture the essence
of the establishments.
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192 A.Andreev, 'The Russian Orthodox Church in the 17th Century - Reform and Schism', BUR (3:14-
31,1995)
193 The concept ofMoscow as the 'Third Rome' was first articulated by the Russian monk Filofei in a
letter to Tsar Ivan III soon after the fall of Constantinople in 1453: "Pious Tsar! Listen and remember
that all Christian Kingdoms have now merged into one, your [tsardom]. Two Romes have fallen, the
third stands firm and there will not be a fourth." (B.Dmytryshyn, Medieval Russia: A Source Book,
850-1700 (FortWorth, TX, 1991), pp.259-261
109
Patriarchate. However, Pan-Slavic ideology was not always consistent with regard to
Bulgaria. When the nineteenth century Greek-Bulgarian Church dispute initially
broke out, the Pan-Slavist movement was for a time unable to decide where its
loyalties lay: "the Russian Orthodox Church was spiritually subordinate to the Greek
Patriarch in Constantinople. But the romantic vision of Russia restoring Byzantium
could hardly be realised with Greek participation".194 Thus, Pan-Slav, Russian
Orthodox and Russian government policies began to coalesce in a pro-Bulgar, anti-
Greek direction.
The appearance of the Moscow Committee in 1857-58 was connected directly to
Russia's dire external political situation. After the Crimean War (1853-56) Russia
had fallen into international isolation. The Paris Peace Treaty rescinded the territorial
gains that she had made through military victory. However, the Tsarist government
in St.Petersburg was unwilling to abdicate their interests and influence among the
Orthodox populations of the Ottoman empire. Since he could no longer play a
leading role in European politics, the Tsar sought alternative ways to maintain
Russian influence. The Pan-Slav movement proved to be a powerful instrument in
this direction, the MSCC providing a medium through which the Russian
government could pursue its political aims.
Neither was the MSCC's emphasis on the Slavic character of Orthodoxy innocent of
political intent. The Bulgarians had traditionally identified themselves as being
'Orthodox' rather than 'Slav'. It was Venelin's influence, as we have seen, that
encouraged educated Bulgars to welcome the nomenclature 'Slav', but the
predominantly peasant population remained 'Orthodox and Bulgarian'. This
remained the case during the nineteenth century, as is evident from a multitude of
archival documents - letters from village communities, school and church boards
which almost always identify people simply as Orthodox, without reference to their
Slavic roots.195 In an attempt to unite their 'Slav-Orthodox' brothers, the MSCC
actively fought against "western Christian propaganda" whose activities they
194
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declared were "dangerous for Russia, Bulgaria, the Slavs and the Orthodox".196
Russian diplomats in Constantinople were particularly cautious of the activities of
the influential Bulgarian, Dragan Tsankov, in his connection with the Roman
Catholic Church, as he attempted to increase the influence of the Uniate Church in
Bulgaria. Russian unease had been further provoked by a letter from Archimandrite
Peter, of the Constantinople Russian Church, who cautioned the Russian
government: "... not to trust and not to assist this Bulgarian [Tsankov] who was
being influenced by questionable emissaries."197
The MSCC sent a representative, A.Rachinski, to investigate these matters further.
He arranged a meeting between the Russian ambassador, Prince Lobanov-Rostovski
and Dragan Tsankov to discuss the Uniate question and some of the articles
published in the magazine Bulgarian Literature, in which Tsankov had advocated the
idea of Bulgaria's former royal family contacting the Pope as evidence of the
"indisputable leadership of the Roman Pope" in matters pertaining to Bulgarian
church and society.198 Following this meeting the ambassador reported directly to the
Director of the Asian Department, in a letter dated 18 April 1859, stating that
Tsankov and his articles were "harmful" and that he should be removed from the
editorial staff of the magazine forthwith.199
MSCC representative, A.Rachinski, travelled on to Bulgaria to continue his
investigations into the progress of "western religious propaganda". In two letters
addressed to the Chairman of the Moscow Educational Board and to prominent
Slavophile, A.N.Behmetiev, Rachinski comments on the absence of any reliable
Orthodox religious education in Bulgaria advising: "... we must act quickly before
the strong influence of insidious Jesuit politics prevails."200 He describes the
worrying content of Catholic teaching, especially their emphasis on Bulgarian history
and the country's close connection with Rome, highlighting their 13th century union
which had secured Bulgaria's independent Patriarchate; as union with Rome had
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secured Bulgaria's ecclesiastical independence in the past, so, he feared, it could
again. He criticised the dispassionate and neutral position of the Russian Church,
warning that this would only help the West succeed in discrediting the Patriarchate
and secure Bulgarian union with Rome: "The West entices the Bulgarians with the
idea of union and with this idea undertaken to achieve national independence."201 In
a second letter he suggested a number of ways in which the activities of the Uniate
movement in Bulgaria could be curtailed including: the establishment of a pro-active
Bulgarian Orthodox fraternity and the need to convince the Ecumenical Patriarch to
accept Bulgarians onto the Holy Synod. He also made known his intention to visit a
number of the new Bulgarian secular schools to find out to what extent "it was
possible to expect interest for his suggestion to create children strong in the Orthodox
faith."202
Rachinski's letters express the serious misgivings within the Pan-Slav movement
regarding the influence of western religious propaganda in Bulgaria. The connection
of Bulgaria with western missions was seen as being disastrous for Orthodoxy, the
Slavs, and especially for Russian interests in the Balkan Peninsula. The letters are
evidence of the initial construction of a programme to oppose these trends, which
included making contacts with diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria,
Constantinople and high-ranking state representatives in Russia.
The Moscow Slavonic Charitable Society played a significant role in directing the
development of Bulgarian cultural and ecclesiastical independence. It was also
instrumental in expanding Russian influence in Bulgaria and the Balkans during the
unfavourable period after the Crimean War. In achieving these two diverse goals we
observe a degree of synchronisation in the activities of the Pan-Slav movement and
official Russian state politics. The MSCC thus succeeded in realising its priorities of
strengthening Russian influence among the Bulgarian population, and using the





3.2.3 MiDHAT PASHA (1822-1883) AND THE DANUBE VILAYET
As part of the continuing Tanzimat reform programme and in response to what the
Porte considered to be insidious Russian influence and Bulgarian national
resurgence, the Ottoman authorities sought to develop a new policy in its Bulgarian
province. A completely different system of provincial administration was required,
which, while securing the authority of central government, would provide an element
of latitude for local officialdom, making administration efficient and expeditious.
The Vilayet Law (1864) was the result, the aim of which was to eliminate local
discontent and therefore indigenous support for foreign intervention within the
region.
The chief architect of the new law was the Grand Vizier, Fuad Pasha, who had
previously dealt with Greek separatist movements after the Crimean War. In a letter
to Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) in 1863, he warned of other nationalist separatist
movements emerging on the Balkan Peninsula encouraged by European intrigue.203
In the Vilayet Law he aimed to re-balance central and provincial authority, and to
advance equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, on the assumption that with
the guarantee of individual rights, an increased sense of Osmanlili citizenship would
both counter the threat of nationalist and religious unrest.
In order to test this new system the Danube or 'Tuna' Vilayet was created as a 'pilot
area' in effect a 'super-province' combining the three eyalets of Silistra, Vidin and
Nish. It extended from the Danube River to the Balkan Mountains, approximately the
northern half of modern Bulgaria. The administration of this experimental province
was given to one of the empires most efficient and forward-looking provincial
governors, Ahmed Sefik Midhat Pasha. Born in Constantinople, the son of Pomak
parents, Midhat had entered the Grand Vizier's Secretariat on completion of his
education and was rapidly promoted to the Medjliss- Vala (Grand Council of State)
as Sanie.204 By 1851 he was First Secretary to the Grand Council, in which capacity
he was dispatched to the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo to settle local disputes.
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Success brought him to the attention of the Grand Vizier, Reshid Pasha, who
appointed him to a post within the Superior Council of State.205
In this new role he was deputed to settle disturbances in the province of Adrianople
in 1854. It was here that he developed his particular leadership style of bringing
together local notables, Muslim and Christian. Having been given the chance of
airing their views on what troubled their region, he would then have them agree on a
plan of action, from which he tolerated no subsequent dissent.206 In 1861 he was
appointed Vali of the Nish eyelet to accomplish what he had previously achieved in
the Adrianople province. It was during this spell that he envisaged a new and
innovative plan for territorial reorganisation and provincial government, which
would not only suppress trouble but would seek to prevent its return. This plan would
evolve to become the Vilayet Law.
As governor of the Danube Vilayet, Midhat Pasha used his organisational skills
initially to pacify the province without the use of armed force. Depending on local
consultations, he established that grievances turned on two main problem areas: the
absence of any road network, which made it exceedingly difficult for tradesmen to
access any commercial markets and rampant brigandage throughout the region that
rendered life and property insecure.
He then struck a bargain with the regional leaders: to recall all Ottoman troops in the
vilayet to their barracks and to undertake civil improvement throughout the region,
on the condition that local leaders would use their influence to placate their fellow
countrymen and discourage emigration and separatist activities. His bargaining skills
were successful, as the vilayet became a hive of industry: 3000 kilometres of paved
roads,207 around 1400 bridges, street lights, public buildings and schools were
constructed. Model farms were created, complete with European machinery; a ferry
service began on the Danube; brigandage was effectively stamped out with the
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establishment of local gendarmerie, and agricultural banks were created, with a view
of relieving the difficulties of the mainly peasant population.208
As a result of his governorship, agriculture and industry began to flourish bringing
peace and prosperity to the province. This provided the framework in which Midhat
addressed the deeper underlying cultural/religious issue. He understood that the New
Bulgarian educational movement played a decisive role in forming Bulgarian
national awareness in the minds of Bulgaria's emerging intelligentsia. He was also
sensitive that the appeal to Orthodoxy was an integral part of incipient Bulgarian
nationalism. Therefore, he determined to establish a secular school structure that
embraced all people, with the purpose of cultivating the concept of Ottoman
citizenship among Bulgarian Christians and Muslims who, by studying together and
enjoying the advantages of secular education together, would see their future within a
reformed Ottoman polity rather than looking abroad, especially to Russia.
Entirely new schools would be created in the vilayet, based neither on Christian cell
schools or Islamic medresses, but on secular European models. The success of
Midhat's educational directive is evident from reports in the vilayet's own
newspaper, Tuna. For example, its very first issue from March 1865 announced the
creation of a provincial printing office solely for the publishing of educational
literature.209 Later the newspaper reported that the first publication from this printing
house would be an alphabet book for free distribution to every pupil.210 Midhat's
appreciation of the necessity for a unified educational system which would diminish
Bulgarian national sentiment and Russian interference can be demonstrated by his
governmental decree: "If children above the ages of five or six are not sent to school,
and if older children are not sent either to school or for vocational training, the
parents will be held responsible."211 Later that same year Midhat instructed the
deputy mufti of Pleven that, "schools were above everything else in importance" and
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and if they were not available, he should create them.212 He announced that a junior
school would be opened in every town and a senior school within the administrative
centre of every sanjak?n However, the success of Midhat's school building crusade
can be clearly demonstrated by comparing the number of Bulgarian schools with
Turkish mixed schools. By 1877 the Bulgarians had established 1,504 schools
throughout the Balkan region.214 Against this number Midhat opened a total of 2,890
schools, not in the Balkans as a whole, but solely within the Danube Vilayet, 150
medresses, 2,700 junior schools and 40 senior schools.215 Midhat Pasha's reforms
within the Danube Vilayet created conditions of peace and prosperity, where the
regions children were educated together in harmony.
In only four years Midhat Pasha succeeded in dealing a powerful blow against
Bulgarian separatists and Russian instigators. Bulgarians within the vilayet where
more content than any time previously with their existence under Ottoman control
and saw no immediate reason to change their situation. Why then is the vilayet
experiment deemed unsuccessful in Bulgarian eyes? An explanation may be sought
from the massive influx of refugees into this region in 1864. From the 1830s onwards
the Ottoman empire had experienced an extensive demographic population shift
when over one million people, almost entirely Caucasian Muslims, migrated to the
empire. This was accelerated by Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856),
and a last great migration of Tartars and Circassians into the empire in 1864.216
Around 500,000 starving refugees marched towards Bulgaria and Macedonia, with
the vast majority settling in the Danube Vilayet. Their arrival was not unwelcome as
central Ottoman government considered that the refugees would help serve as a
cushion of defence along the Serbian and Danubian borders. It is recorded that the
population of Varna increased by fifty percent overnight due to the influx of
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refugees.217 This created tensions with the resident population, and resulted in the
eviction of Bulgarians from their homes and villages.218
Without provisions the refugees began to terrorise the Bulgarian countryside:
".. .taking vengeance on their non-Muslim neighbours in a manner hitherto unknown
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in the Ottoman empire." Consequently many Christians fled once more across the
Danube into Romania, where they joined the Bulgarian nationalist cause. Whereas
previous lawlessness in the region of the Danube Vilayet had been indiscriminate -
as, for example, under the rule of Pasvanoglu some fifty years previously - the new
conflict assumed definite confessional contours. Muslim refugees targeted Bulgarian
Christians. The lines of confessional conflict were more sharply drawn than at any
time since the Ottoman conquest. Thus an event outwith Midhat's control fatally
damaged his efforts to neutralise the Bulgarian separatist movement.
Midhat Pasha's administration of the Danube Vilayet demonstrates both the potential
of Ottoman reform and its inherent weakness. He showed that it was possible to
modernise the administration and infrastructure of an Ottoman province by
regulating and cultivating a sense of common Ottoman citizenship among its
inhabitants, both Christian and Muslim. The Grand Vizier, Fuat Pasha, announced on
May 15, 1867, that the empire had found "... a form of administration corresponding
altogether to the needs of the country, to the customs of the population, and to the
demands of the concept of civilisation which presses upon the empire from all
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directions." Yet, inter-confessional concord, founded on administrative reform and
economic advancement, was vulnerable to a reversal of social and economic
circumstances. This proved to be the case in a matter which was not of Midhat's
making, and quickly exceeded his control, with the movement of war refugees into
the Danube Vilayet. In retrospect this was one of the Porte's biggest blunders,
marking the beginning of the end of its western empire. Had Midhat's model been
allowed to continue without such interference, Bulgaria's cultural and national
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journey might have been very different. Despite his success as governor, Midhat was
removed from office, and with his demise the last best hope for Osmanlilik
citizenship was squandered.
3.3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has considered the claim of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church that it was
the most important indigenous cultural agent of Bulgaria's National Revival. In
highlighting the factors which actually prompted cultural revival, it becomes evident
that these did not initially include a consciousness of the past gained through reading
Paisii, or the religious educational traditions of Bulgarian cell schools, but rather
foreign influences, particularly via Greece and Russia. These were contacts gained
through commerce and education, and through the seepage of international secular
ideas into the Balkans. However, Bulgaria's cultural awakening could not have taken
place without the upheaval of reform experienced in the Ottoman empire during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries - upheaval which brought about the
profound economic, social and political changes without which Bulgarian nationalist
sentiment could not have been translated into action.
What clearly emerges from this chapter is that the medieval religious traditions of
Bulgarian Orthodoxy were rejected by the emerging intelligentsia, who considered
the Church to be archaic and therefore inadequate to meet the requirements of
Bulgaria's national progress. Consequently, the Church experienced a weakening of
its traditional authoritative position within Bulgarian society. With the
implementation of the Tanzimat reform programme the laity was given increased
responsibility within millet administration resulting in a further diminishment of
ecclesiastical authority, and with the development of secular education, the Church
lost its influential role within Bulgarian society. Although the Bulgarian Church
strove to maintain its cultural identity, its 'distinctiveness', through the tradition of
medieval church education, using Old Church Slavonic as a defence against the
Islamisation and Hellenization policies of the Ottoman and Greek authorities, it is
evident that these traditions were unwanted and disregarded by Bulgaria's
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intelligentsia. Cultural identity based on religion rather than on the idea ofnation was
the aim of the Bulgarian Church at this moment.
This research supports the conclusion that cultural awakening and nationalist
romanticism did not originate within the Church, but through secular enlightenment
thinking, particularly through the agency of Greek education and Pan Slavism.
Therefore, the claim of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church that during this period of
history they were the saviour of Bulgarian tradition, culture, language and education
is somewhat questionable and should be considered the product of latter nationalist
embellishment which sought to enhance the mythical importance of the Church.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. THE STRUGGLE FOR BULGARIAN ECCLESIASTICAL
INDEPENDENCE
The re-establishment of an independent Bulgarian Church, after its dismemberment
in the fourteenth century following the Ottoman conquest, was not the aspiration of
every Bulgarian Christian. Rather, spiritual and cultural resignation characterised
Bulgarian society during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. As this chapter will
reveal Bulgarian ecclesiastical independence was not realised until 1872. Through an
examination of nineteenth century Bulgarian archival sources the chapter shall
endeavour to answer why autonomy took so long to achieve. The overwhelming
influence of the Greek Patriarchate which had so distressed Paisii Hilendarski slowly
began to infuriate Bulgarian communities. The chapter will investigate the
vicissitudes of this Bulgar-Greek dispute and map the journey towards Bulgarian
ecclesiastical independence. External forces shall also be assessed to discern if
foreign influence affected the direction of the Bulgarian Church movement. Finally
the chapter will critically analyse the Bulgarian Orthodox Church's claim that it was
central to the National Revival movement supporting liberation from Ottoman
domination, inspiring the people with bravery and courage to strive for national
freedom.
4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE BULGARIAN CHURCH MOVEMENT
The Bulgarian-Greek ecclesiastical dispute originated in 1393, following the
Ottoman conquest, when the Bulgarian Patriarchate was abolished and the remains of
the Church made subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. The
Bulgarian ecclesiastical hierarchy were removed from power and replaced by Greek
clergy. Initially Bulgaria's new religious leaders maintained the taxation
arrangements of their predecessors, but soon their demands increased and continued
to escalate thereafter. As a result of ongoing financial crises the Sublime Porte
discovered a lucrative source of revenue deriving from the selling of religious office
offering the Patriarchal throne and other church appointments to the highest bidder.
During the centuries ofOttoman domination only the wealthiest Greek families could
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afford the cost of ecclesiastical office, thus Greeks came to dominate every Church
office in the empire. As these clergyman expected to recoup their expenses church
taxes escalated, ultimately placing a heavy economic burden on the poor.
It was the increased tax burden imposed by the Greeks that first provoked Bulgarian
discontent as the oppressed expressed their dissatisfaction at the economic pillage of
the Ecumenical Patriarchate.221 However, this early discontent merely manifested
itself in attempts to secure protection from the Ottoman government against the
ruthless exploitation of the Greek clergy. The first sign of any organised movement
against the Greek Church authorities can be witnessed in the nineteenth century
conflict between the Bulgarian population and the Greek clergy. This conflict
contained a new element, that being a desire to replace Greek bishops with
Bulgarians, which although isolated and at first unsuccessful developed into a
national movement calling for an independent Bulgarian Church.
Archival sources indicate that the first recorded conflict to contain this new element
arose between the Bulgarian town leaders and the Greek bishop of Vratsa during the
1820s. At the end of the eighteenth century the town of Vratsa, in north-western
Bulgaria, became the centre of a newly created eparchy. Until that time the town had
been subordinate to the Metropolitan of Turnovo. However, due to Vrasta's
remoteness and the level feudal unrest caused by the kurdzhalistvo period it had been
nigh impossible to collect taxes. As a consequence the Patriarch created the Vratsa
eparchy in 1781 and ordained a permanent bishop to the region.222
The inhabitants of Vratsa expressed their discontent at receiving a Greek bishop by
ignoring demands to pay their ecclesiastical taxes. Indeed, the failure to collect these
taxes was reported to have been the reason for Bishop Antim's removal in 1813.223
Learning from their failure the Patriarchate, alongside the appointment of another
Greek bishop to Vratsa, announced that a Bulgarian, Dimitraki Hadjitoshev, would
221
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work as his deputy having the responsibility to gather taxes.224 Nevertheless, giving
the position of tax collector to a Bulgarian did not alleviate the situation as we read
in a letter from Bishop Methodius to the Metropolitan of Turnovo in 1821 that the
inhabitants of the eparchy refused to be brought into line and pay "that which is
due."225
Hadjitoshev wrote to the Metropolitan directly asking him to reduce the crippling
level of taxation but received the reply that this would be impossible as the
Metropolitan also had to meet his demands to the Patriarchate. For this reason
relations between the bishop and the town leaders deteriorated and Hadjitoshev
joined his fellow Bulgars in seeking the removal of Bishop Methodius. At the
beginning of 1824 he composed a statement arguing against the further appointment
of Greek bishops to the eparchy and sent it to neighbouring town leaders asking them
to countersign it. However, they refused to do so afraid of repercussions and advised
the leaders of Vratsa not to forward the statement to the authorities.226 These actions
did not remain unnoticed and in a personal letter to Hadjitoshev the Metropolitan
warned him "to be as one voice with [Bishop] Methodius for the sake of not causing
a disturbance amongst other Christians," or he would be forced to report the unrest to
the Ottoman authorities without pity for the people of Vratsa.227 Consequently
Bishop Methodius reported Hadjitoshev to the Patriarchate, presenting him as a
troublemaker and a rebel, insisting that he be sent to Constantinople to answer
directly for his actions. At the request of the Patriarchate the Porte issued an order on
21 November 1824 for the arrest and interrogation of Dimitraki Hadjitoshev. The
inhabitants of Vratsa actively campaigned for his release before Patriarch
Chrysanthos I (1824-26) who eventually granted their request in 1826. Imprisonment
had not eroded Hadjitoshev's anti-Greek convictions as upon his release he
224 EMA HEKM, f.40, ed.7,1.44
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immediately attempted to replace Bishop Methodius with the Bulgarian
archimandrite Gavril Bistrichanin.228
The conflict had begun with the general dissatisfaction of the Vratsa inhabitants
directed against the economic exploitation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The
dispute progressed, however, beyond the limits of the initial conflict with their
request for a Bulgarian bishop, no doubt hoping that a Bulgarian would be tolerant
toward their financial predicament. The leading figure in this movement was
Dimitraki Hadjitoshev, the only person in a position to stand with confidence before
the Metropolitan and defend the interests of the Bulgarian people. The fact that after
his death the movement waned reveals that the Bulgarians of the Vratsa eparchy
were not yet sufficiently prepared to continue the struggle.
At the end of the 1820s, in a completely separate incident, the Bulgarians of the
Samokov eparchy also took a stand against Greek Patriarchal authority. During the
period of Ottoman control until 1766 the eparchy had been part of the Ipekska
Patriarchate, later falling under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. With
this decision the former Bulgarian Metropolitan was forced to relinquish his post.
It appears that the eparchy was left for a number of years without a Metropolitan, as
the first ecclesiastical representative from Constantinople arrived in 1772. From the
town chronicles it is evident that the first Greek Bishop earned the respect of his
flock during his forty-seven year reign in office230. The Greek hierarchy who
succeeded him, however, were not held in the same high regard. Indeed we read from
a contemporary letter that "the Samokov Christians watched the abuse of power
which the Greek bishops forced upon them, they wept before the Constantinople
Patriarch... begging for a worthy bishop who they could elect."231 In their lament to
the Patriarch the people suggested a Bulgarian, Neofit Rilski, the abbot of Rila
Monastery for the position of bishop. This first attempt to select a Bulgarian proved
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to be unsuccessful as yet another Greek, Ignatius II (1830-1837), arrived as
Metropolitan.
However, the clash between Bulgarian and Greek clergy within the eparchy of
Turnovo had the farthest-reaching consequences for the development of the
emerging Bulgarian Church movement. Turnovo was one of the most important
regions of Bulgaria its eparchy embracing the largest part of the country. Turnovo
had been the capital city of Bulgaria at the time of the Ottoman conquest and
remained an important administrative, ecclesiastical and commercial centre through
the centuries of domination. From the nineteenth century the town played an
increasingly important role as a centre for the rising Bulgarian artisan community.
Alongside an accompanying increase in Bulgarian confidence Greek influence in the
region decreased. These social/cultural changes were reflected in the religious
situation with an increasing dissatisfaction amongst the population of the eparchy
toward the Greek clergy. This disharmony reached its peak with the arrival of Greek
Metropolitan, Panaret on 6 June 1838. He was described as being "a mad repulsive
Greek... who swears in Church and for no reason arrests Bulgarian clergy, forcing
r)\)
them to dig iron ore from the regions mountains... ."
Outraged by his behaviour the town leaders of Turnovo demanded that Panaret be
removed and put forward the name of a Bulgarian as his replacement. The choice of
Neofit Bozveli (1785-1848) would prove to be inspired as he would emerge as one of
the most important characters of the Bulgarian Church movement. Bozveli was not
an arbitrary selection, he had been intricately involved in regional social activities for
some time and was one of the main protagonists behind the demands for Panaref s
removal. Bozveli was another product of Hilendar Monastery on Mount Athos, who
after leaving the monastery busied himself in patriotic preaching, teaching and
literary activities. He spent two years travelling through the Turnovo eparchy
engaging in the social problems of his fellow countrymen and actively campaigned
232 C6HVHK, XV, 1898, p.313
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against Greek clergy gradually directing his protests towards Metropolitan
Panaret.233
Once the decision to stand for the post of Metropolitan had been taken Bozveli left
for Constantinople to receive Patriarchal endorsement of his nomination arriving in
the spring 1839. The leading Bulgarians of Turnovo signed a request on behalf of the
eparchy supporting Bozveli's nomination and took the unprecedented action of
presenting it directly to the Porte.234 News of Bozveli's attempt to gain governmental
support soon reached the Patriarchate. They could not allow the appointment of a
Bulgarian, particularly such a bitter opponent as Bozveli, to the largest ecclesiastical
region of Bulgaria. The Patriarchate therefore made every effort to frustrate the
mission of the Tumovo delegation and in response immediately proposed a Greek
candidate, Neofit Byzantos, at the same time offering a financial incentive to the
Turnovo leaders. With this Patriarchal bribe the majority of the town leaders
switched their support to the Greek cause and Byzantos was elected in August 1840.
To alleviate Bulgarian dissatisfaction the Patriarchate appointed Bozveli as the
Metropolitan's deputy promising that he would, in time, be promoted as Bishop of
Lovech.
The attitude of the new Metropolitan towards his Bulgarian subjects was antagonistic
from the start and relationship with his deputy very quickly became strained, so
much so that Bozveli refused to remain in his post and fled Tumovo for the sanctuary
of Lyaskovski Monastery. This action was used to the Metropolitan's advantage
when he accused Bozveli of disobedience demanding that he be punished for
dereliction of his duties. Subsequently, in March 1841, Bozveli was arrested and
exiled on Mount Athos.235 Deprived of guidance and leadership the Bulgarians in
Tumovo stayed their activities against the Greeks until the summer of 1844 when
Bozveli was released.
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4.1.1 THE BULGARIAN CHURCH MOVEMENT IN CONSTANTINOPLE
After his release Neofit Bozveli returned to Constantinople where he had previously
made contact with a number of influential people from the large Bulgarian colony
during his visit in 1839. At this time it is estimated that between 30-50,000
Bulgarians lived and worked in the Galata district of the Ottoman capital, including
successful merchants, master craftsmen and thousands ofmigrant workers employed
in the state's manufacturing workshops.236 The most important contact Bozveli
acquired was that of Ivan Stoyanovich Mihailovski, better known by his ordained
name of Ilarion Makariopolski. Makariopolski was yet another product of Hilendar
Monastery who had been educated in an atmosphere of ardent Greek nationalism and
Bulgarian animosity. The Bulgarian educator Vasil Aprilov had secured him a
scholarship to study in Russia but the Greek ecclesiastical authorities forbade this
privilege. Thus, when Bozveli met Makariopolski he was resident in Constantinople
festering with anti-Greek emotions. The two became friends and quickly reached the
conclusion that Constantinople would be the ideal centre to fight against the
Patriarchate.
In Constantinople they found fertile ground for their activities as many of the
colony's educated Bulgarians were already aware of their 'Bulgarianess'. They
quickly gained the ear of leading Bulgarians and succeeded in winning them to the
anti-Greek ecclesiastical cause. Nevertheless, a large part of their success was
achieved purely by engaging in their priestly roles; Bozveli and Makariopolski
ministered to the Bulgarian community, creating a small unofficial church within the
'Hambar' and conducting the Slavonic liturgy for leading Bulgarians within the
privacy of their homes.237 In doing so the Bulgarian community came to discern their
'distinctiveness' within predominantly Greek Christian society and their need for an
independent place of Bulgarian Slavonic worship.
In September 1844 Bozveli and Makariopolski met Mihail Chaikovski, a Polish
agent working in conjunction with the French Embassy, who advised the two
236 P.Mitev, The Bulgarian National Revival, (Sofia, 1999), p.78
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Bulgarians to present a petition before the Porte elucidating the needs of their fellow-
countrymen.238 As a result of this meeting and complete with a mandate to represent
the Bulgarian people before the Porte, Bozveli and Makariopolski formulated a
petition composed of six basic requests:
• That Bulgarian Christians have the right to elect Bulgarian bishops to
their eparchies.
• That they be allowed to extend Bulgaria's school network.
• For permission to publish newspapers in the Bulgarian language.
• To erect a Bulgarian Church in Constantinople.
• To establish mixed law courts in Bulgaria; in which Bulgarians would be
protected from Greek hegemony.
• For permission to form a Bulgarian delegation, independent of the
Patriarchate, that would express national demands directly before the
Sublime Porte.
Initially the Ottoman authorities showed interest in the Bulgarian requests and during
1845 Bozveli and Makariopolski were frequently received before the Ministry of the
Exterior and the Grand Vizier to further expand on the Bulgarian Church question.
However, the anti-Greek activities of Bozveli and Makariopolski alarmed the
Patriarchate and in an attempt to neutralise their threat Patriarch Meletios III
attempted to divide the two leaders by offering Bozveli a lucrative position within
the Patriarchate and later the Metropolitanship of Trapezund (in north-eastern
Turkey). When Bozveli refused to accept either position he and Makariopolski were
exiled, on the authority of the Patriarch, to Mount Athos where Bozveli died on 12
June 1848.
The Church movement had developed somewhat from its earlier uncoordinated
escapades as despite the death of one of its principal leaders the Constantinople
Bulgarians vowed to continue their fight against the Patriarchate. They immediately
concentrated their struggle on the building of a Bulgarian Church in Constantinople
238 See section 4.1.2 'Foreign involvement in the Bulgarian Church dispute'
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and Alexander Exarch (1810-1891) was set the task of obtaining permission to build
this church. With the assistance of Stefan Bogoridi, a nephew of Sofroni Vrachanski
and confidante of the sultan, a firman was granted (1849) permitting the building of
the Church. This firman proved to be immensely important as it was the first
Ottoman document to refer to the bulgarmiletani, thus officially recognising a
distinction between the Bulgarian people and the Greeks.239 Bogoridi gifted the
Church movement a prime location within the Phanar district of Constantinople for
the building of the church.240 The site was consecrated on 9 October 1849 and a large
church subsequently built. The success of the Bulgarian community in
Constantinople prompted the spread of discord against Greek clergy throughout
Bulgaria, which only now coalesced into an organised national Church movement.
4.1.2 FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BULGARIAN CHURCH DISPUTE
The evolving struggle between Bulgarians and the Constantinople Patriarchate was
dependent, at one time or another, on external factors which either impeded or
facilitated the Church question. Primarily this dispute affected the Ottoman
government as the Bulgarian request for ecclesiastical independence disrupted the
administrative status quo established by the Porte after the conquest of the Balkan
Peninsula. Thus the Porte insisted it play the role of supreme arbiter during the
dispute cleverly balancing its support between each side. In so doing the Porte
established a pattern of contradictory politics: Ottoman government could not ignore
the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate who through the centuries had assisted in
strengthening Ottoman dominance over the Christian rayah; neither, on the other
hand, could the Ottoman authorities ignore the desires of a flourishing national
movement that had its raison d'etre in the proclamation of the Porte's reform
programmes. Consequently Ottoman government had to constantly reconsider its
239 The Bulgarian people remained part of the general Orthodox millet. However, the finnan
recognised that the Constantinople Church was solely the property of the Bulgarian people. The
church would be administered by a twenty strong council who had the authority to appoint priests.
This governing council was the first new and specifically Bulgarian organisation to receive official
recognition in the Ottoman empire since 1393.
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position in regard to this delicate situation, a position further complicated by the
attitude of the European powers to the Eastern Question.
4.1.2.1 French & Polish Participation
France had been one the first European powers to establish diplomatic contact with
the Ottoman empire in 1535 in an agreement between Suleman I (1520-1566) and
Francis I (1494-1547). By means of this agreement France acquired all trading
privileges with the empire, quickly brushing aside competition from Dubrovnik,
Genoa and Venice, so much so that by the eighteenth century three-quarters of the
empire's average annual trade was executed through France.
Alongside political concessions the French also acquired a number of religious
privileges. Within the sixteenth century agreement it was stated that French subjects
would not be troubled because of their religion; thus the immunity of Catholics, their
clergy and institutions were guaranteed under this agreement. Gradually the Ottoman
authorities recognised the rights of the French to protect, not only their own subjects,
but also the subjects of other European states who travelled under the French flag.
Under this protection and with the co-operation of French diplomats many Catholic
missionaries successfully operated within the Ottoman empire. This missionary
movement became particularly active after the creation of the Jesuit order in 1540
and after Pope Gregory XV's congress on the dissemination of the faith the Catholic
mission established itself in Bulgaria.241 Catholic propagation proved successful
amongst Bulgarian Orthodox believers due to their complicated national, political
and social position under the 'double yoke'. Many converted to Catholicism to
benefit from the privileges and protection of the Catholic Church.
Throughout the nineteenth century French diplomacy was particularly active in the
politics of the Porte competing against the strengthening position of Russia.242 Thus,
in 1841 the French ambassador fought to secure a new firman protecting the ancient
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rights and religious privileges of the French. At the same time the French protested
against a corresponding acknowledgement for the rights of the Eastern Orthodox
granted at the insistence of the Russians. In response to increasing Russian influence
the French raised the question of consolidating their political and religious influence
in the Ottoman empire particularly among the resurgent Balkan nations. The
resultant plan had a number of concrete aims: Together with the Vatican the French
government would send Catholic clergy into the Balkans who would attempt to unite
the numerous separate Catholic communities; they would propagate the faith and
establish new educational institutions organised by the Lazarists; and seek to open
new consulates throughout the Ottoman empire.243 This organisational plan for
French cultural-religious expansion was gradually applied in Bulgaria.
Large part in introducing the French to the Bulgarian situation was played by the
Polish emigrant community in Paris led by Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770-1861).
For thirty years he directed Polish agents, scattered throughout Europe and Asia,
engaged in activities directed against Russia in hope of re-establishing a Polish state.
The antagonism between this enemy of Poland and the Ottoman empire determined
the pro-Ottoman orientation of the Polish emigrants. This created a contradiction in
Polish diplomacy, in that while they were united with every Slav nation in their
struggle for independence they were also eager to assist the Porte in its reform
programme. Czartoryski commented: "Whilst we [the Poles] are not ready, until then
we will support the Ottoman state with all our strength; as every premature move of
the Slavs will be thrown as booty into the hands of the Russians, therefore we should
lead them towards Poland."244
The desire, so clearly outlined in the words of Czartoryski, coincided with the aims
of France and the Porte and led to tripartite collaboration. Therefore in 1840 we
observe the Polish community in Paris considering how to expand contact with the
Bulgarians. The most successful suggestion was a programme entitled, 'The Project
for Slavic Fellowship (1840)', the purpose ofwhich was to "propagate civilisation by
means of establishing the influence of the French" and would be "in total agreement
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with the Lazarist's."245 This included two points, establishing contact with
Bulgarians in Paris and establishing contact with Alexander Exarch (the influential
Bulgarian who had organised the building of the Bulgarian Church in Constantinople
and who also held strong French sympathies).246 At the same time Czartoryski
organised a network of Polish agents in Bulgaria led by Mihail Chaikovski.
Travelling throughout Bulgaria these agents made contacts with the Bulgarian
population and acquainted themselves with the problems of the nation. In so doing
they did not fail to notice the contradictions between the Bulgarian people and the
Greek Patriarchate. It was in this conflict that Chaikovski perceived opportunity to
strike a blow against the traditional prestige of Russia amongst the Orthodox Balkan
nations. The Poles quickly opted to support Bulgarian demands and actively assisted
the Bulgarian Church movement, influencing many of the leaders of the movement
including Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski.
The efforts of the Polish agents to draw the Bulgarian people away from Russia
failed. The primary desire of the Bulgarians to have their own bishops was shared by
Chaikovski, who reckoned that a first step towards striking a blow against the
Constantinople Patriarchate would be the ordination of "at least three Bulgarian
bishops in Bulgaria." The second stage of the Polish plan foresaw complete
separation from the Patriarchate and the creation of an independent national
Bulgarian Church, which would deeply insult Russian pride. It was then hoped that
subsequent difficulties created by Russian dissatisfaction would eventually lead to
the incorporation of the Bulgarian Church with Rome. In this task the role of the
Lazarist mission would have been important, as they were to educate and convert the
spirit of the Bulgarian Church movement toward Catholicism. Hence the Poles
played a vitally important role in the Bulgarian Church movement acting as an
instigator and an intermediary between the Bulgarians and the Porte. However,
Polish actions provoked such a hostile reaction from the Russians that when they
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ultimately relied on the Ottoman authorities to settle the Bulgarian-Greek dispute, at
the decisive moment the Porte gave way to fierce Russian pressure.
Undeterred the French charged with the idea of separating the Bulgarians from
Russian influence continued to work toward this end. In a memo dated 16 January
1849 the French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested a number of proposals for
Ottoman reforms which included the appointment of Bulgarian bishops and even a
Bulgarian Patriarch.247 These proposals were handed to Grand Vizier Ali Pasha by
the French ambassador. Ali Pasha's response toward the idea of Bulgarian separation
from the Greek Patriarchate revealed great insight. Fie expressed misgivings that an
eventual Bulgarian Patriarchate would be a strong instrument in the hands of Russia,
falling under Russian influence, rather than that of the Greeks. At the same time he
promised the French ambassador that the Porte would seek to restrict the powers of
the Greek clergy in Bulgaria. The Grand Vizier's words made a strong impression on
the French ambassador: "I need to confess that the thoughts of the minister on the
probable consequences on the creation of a Bulgarian Patriarchate deservedly have
good reason."248
That moment came to define the future attitude of the French toward the Bulgarian
Church question, namely that they did not need to be directly involved in the dispute.
Rather, they needed only support the aims, reforms and authority of the Ottoman
empire who the French considered to be a barrier against "the ambitions of barbaric
Russia."249 Nevertheless, they still endeavoured to weaken Russia's influence in the
region by promoting the idea of union between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic
Churches - announced in a Papal encyclical dated 6 January 1848. To this end the
Catholic Slavic Institute was established in Paris (1850), for the preparation of Latin
missionaries amongst the Eastern Orthodox Slavs. A comment by the head of the
institute reveals a leading motive behind its purpose: "... there is nothing that would
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strike a strong blow against Russia than the unification of the schismatic churches of
the East with the Catholic Church."250
4.1.2.2 Russian Interest
Whilst the French had received religious privilege from the Ottoman government on
the basis of a sixteenth century alliance, Russia needed war and strength of arms to
gain any acknowledgement of legal rights and privileges within the empire. As a
result of the 1st Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774) and the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca
Russia obtained permission to build an Orthodox Church in Constantinople and
protect those who worshipped there. A clause in the treaty guaranteed the freedom of
worship for Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman empire and sections 16 and 17
guaranteed the specific safety of Orthodox Christians in Bessarbia, Moldavia,
Romania and the Russian Archipelago. Subsequently, this concession became the
pretext under which Russia claimed the right to intercede on behalf of all Orthodox
subjects of the sultan.251
With her victory in the 4th Russo-Turkish War (1828-1829) Russia stabilised and
expanded her economic, territorial and political foothold in the Ottoman empire.
During this period Russian policy towards Turkey changed. A covert committee was
charged with drawing up the future direction of Russian Near Eastern politics that
would benefit Russia through the preservation of the Ottoman empire, rather than
seeking its collapse. In essence the government of Nikolas I understood that in the
near future Russia would not be in a position to break the territorial status quo in the
Near East as the western European powers would not permit this.252 Russia's new
pro-Ottoman policy was applied during the Turkish-Egyptian conflict of 1832-33 and
for their assistance in overcoming the Egyptians the Ottoman government of Sultan
Mahmud II (1808-1839) entered into the Hunkiar-Iskelesi Alliance Defence Treaty
ANF, f. 19, 6237a
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(1833). This resulted in Russia and Turkey promising to consult on everything that
would bring about mutual peace and security.253
By means of these treaties Russia was recognised officially as the protector of
Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman empire. The role of 'protector' emerged during
the eighteenth century when the Eastern problem was at the forefront of Russian
politics. During this period the emphasis on the 'kinship tie' between Russia and
Byzantium brought about the myth that the Russian Tsar's were the inheritors of the
Byzantine emperor, called upon to rescue the Orthodox faithful from the Islamic
yoke: "The idea of religious messianism served as a reason and a cover for the
expansionist goals of the ruling circles in the East."254 As a result of this belief
Russian support was given solely to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the personification
ofOrthodoxy within the Ottoman empire.
The idea of universal Orthodoxy, rather than that of independent Slavonic religious
communities, became the cornerstone of Russian Near Eastern politics. Thus any
attempt to introduce a split within Orthodoxy was received as a hostile act. This
principle of ecumenical harmony predetermined the attitude of Russia towards the
Bulgarian Church question. Nevertheless, it appears that Russia was ignorant of the
complexities behind the Bulgarian dispute. They were so completely absorbed in the
struggle against Catholicism that the Bulgarian-Greek dispute found Russian
diplomats unprepared and uninformed concerning the contradictions between the
Bulgarian people and the Patriarchal authorities. Indeed in 1844 the Russian vice-
consul, who was supposed to be the chief informant on Bulgarian events, stated that
there were no existing contradictions between the Greek clergy and the Bulgarians.
Thus when Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski went before the Porte
253 Article 1. There shall be forever peace, amity and alliance between His Majesty the Emperor of all
the Russia's and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, their empires and their subjects, as well
by land as by sea. This alliance having solely for its object the common defence of their dominions
against all attack, their Majesties engage to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon
all the matters which concern their respective tranquillity and safety, and to afford to each other
mutually for this purpose substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance, in The Great Powers
and the Near East, 1774-1923, ed. By M.S.Anderson (London: E.Arnold, 1970), pp.42-43
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requesting Bulgarian ecclesiastical independence the Russian government was
dumbfounded.
Russian diplomatic correspondence from this period reveals that the Polish agent
Mihail Chaikovski was considered to be behind these "seditious ideas".255 This
supposition was further proven when a Bulgarian resident in Constantinople, Hadji
Alexander, reported that it was Polish agents "who raised the idea of a separate
administration for the Bulgarian national clergy."256 This unanimity between the
Bulgarians and the Polish agents further determined the position of Russian
diplomacy towards the Bulgarian Church movement. Russian ambassador V.Titov
protested against Bozveli and Makariopolski calling them "destroyers of the Greek
Church and supporters of the Polish and French clergy." Titov went on to insist that
Chaikovski be expelled from Constantinople as his activities were in "complete
<ycn
contradiction with the agreements between Russia and the Porte."
The reaction of Russia towards the Bulgarian situation was indisputably a result of
her traditional political/religious outlook, seeking to preserve the ecclesiastical status
quo of the Balkans. Nevertheless, Bulgarian collaboration with an enemy of Russia
forced the Tsar's government to stand against them, convinced that the anti-Greek
movement had been inspired by their Polish rivals with the aim of undermining
Russian influence amongst the Slavic peoples of the Balkans. This conviction was
entirely due to a lack of information concerning the nature of the Bulgarian-Greek
dispute and it was only later that Russian diplomats comprehended the underlying
difficulties and the main trends in the development of the Bulgarian people in this
struggle.258 However, with the onset of the Crimean War Russia's Bulgarian
conundrum would take an unexpected turn.
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4.1.2.3 The Crimean War (1853-1856)
The motives behind the Crimean War were many, complex and outwith the scope of
this research. The immediate cause of the war was, however, directly linked to
Franco-Russian religious rivalry in the Ottoman empire. Although the war did not
affect Bulgaria directly, its consequences would have dramatic effect upon the
Bulgarian Church question. The war ended in Russian defeat at the hands of a
coalition ofBritish and French forces and the resultant Treaty of Paris (1856) proved
both humiliating and unpalatable for Russia. The Treaty rescinded Russia's role as
sole 'protector' of Orthodox Christianity in the empire, replacing it with a five-power
collective protectorate of Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia. As a result
Russian influence within the Porte, which had steadily increased since the Treaty of
Kucuk Kaynarca (1774), rapidly declined.
Under the terms of the Paris Treaty the European powers demanded that Sultan
Abdulmecid grant further concessions to his Christian subjects. In line with this they
accepted the sultan's second great document of the Tanzimat, the Hatt-i Humayun.
Particularly meaningful for the Bulgarians was the paragraph within this document
guaranteeing the right of every ethnic and religious community to have independent
representation in Constantinople. This declaration rekindled the flame of the
Bulgarian-Greek dispute encouraging the Bulgars to believe that finally the law was
on their side. Thus the Hatt-i Humayun provoked another step in the development of
the Bulgarian Church dispute that had advanced, from merely seeking protection
against Greek economic pillage, to requesting Bulgarian bishops and now demanded
a complete break from the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the creation of an
independent Bulgarian Church (particularly as they were now recognised as
bulgarmiletani - a separate ethnic Bulgarian and Orthodox Christian community).
In response to the terms of the Hatt-i Humayun the leaders of the Church movement
wrote to every town in Bulgaria asking them to send a delegate to represent their
region before the Porte. By the end of 1856 forty representatives had arrived in
Constantinople and the following year they presented around sixty petitions to the
136
259Porte demanding an independent Bulgarian Church. The activities of the
delegation in Constantinople exerted influence on the pace of the Church dispute, so
much so, that by the end of the 1850s every Bulgarian eparchy was disputing the
rights of Greek clergy in their region.260
In the autumn of 1857 the Porte ordered Patriarch Cyril VII to convene a Church
Council to discuss the developments of the Bulgarian situation and institute
appropriate reforms. The Council sat for almost two years but could not reach a
settlement as the Greeks continually frustrated discussions regarding an independent
Bulgarian Church. As a direct result of Council negotiations Ilarion Makariopolski
was appointed as Bishop to the Bulgarian Church in Constantinople in September
1858. Nevertheless, the generally unproductive outcome of the Church Council
convinced the leaders of the Bulgarian Church movement that the time had come to
take decisive action and break with the Patriarchate. On Easter Sunday, 3 April 1860,
within the Bulgarian Church in Constantinople, Ilarion Makariopolski publicly
declared Bulgarian ecclesiastical independence. By omitting the name of the
patriarch from the liturgical prayers and replacing it with the name of the sultan, he
symbolised Bulgaria's rejection of Patriarchal authority and loyalty to the sultan. In
response to this action another Church Council was summoned in 1861 attended by
the Patriarch's of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch. This Council
condemned Bulgarian actions anathematising all those associated with the incident,
especially Bishop Makariopolski. Undismayed the Bulgarians instructed the
Patriarchate that the independent Bulgarian Church would be known as the
'Bulgarian People's Christian Church'.
4.1.2.4 The Uniate Movement
A number of Bulgaria's ecclesiastical leaders had supported the Easter action of
Makariopolski in the hope that it would force the hand of Russia to support their
cause freeing the Bulgarian Church from its ties with Constantinople. Unfortunately




Orthodoxy. This inevitably strengthened the confidence of those who believed that
Bulgaria would be better off seeking alternative foreign advocacy.
Through the proficient work of French diplomacy and Roman Catholic missionaries,
trained in the Catholic Slavic Institute in Paris an appealing 'middle-course' was
offered to the Bulgarian people. This middle-way did not totally reject Orthodoxy. It
offered communities the genuine possibility of religious self-government, retaining
their beloved Slavonic Orthodox liturgy, while recognising the Pope rather than
Patriarch as its spiritual head. A leading proponent of the Bulgarian Uniate
movement was Dragan Tsankov, who with French financial assistance published the
newspaper Bulgaria which advocated Uniatism as the only possible solution to
Bulgaria's present situation. This formula achieved considerable success with many
Bulgarian parishes accepting union with Rome. It must not be assumed, however,
that the reason behind these conversions was anti-Orthodox sentiment, rather they
were borne of pro-Bulgarian nationalistic frustration as is indicated by the inscription
on the Uniate Church in Kukes: 'On March 1, 1858 we recovered our national
tongue.'261
In December 1860 a group of leading Bulgarians in Constantinople signed an act of
union with Rome nominating as their spiritual head Josef Sokolski, abbot of Gabrovo
Monastery. On April 2 1861, Pope Pious IX consecrated Sokolski as Archbishop and
appointed him as his representative in Bulgaria. The Porte, glad that a solution had
been found to the Bulgarian problem, which did not increase Russian influence,
welcomed the success of this movement. Thus on his arrival in Constantinople
Sokolski and the Bulgarian Uniate Church were presented with a berat officially
recognising the new Church.
The Russians zealously followed the activities of this new Church and its ardent
Catholic missionary supporters. Alarmed by the dramatic increase of French
influence, gained at Russian expense, the Russian government organised the removal
of the Uniate archbishop from Bulgaria to Odessa. We can only speculate whether
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this action was a kidnapping or a personal request from Sokolskifor assistance? What
is clear is that a few months later it was reported that Sokolski had reverted to
Orthodoxy. In a letter to his fellow Bulgarians he rejected Catholicism and
encouraged all the leading figures of the Uniate movement to do likewise. The
Uniate Church remained without a spiritual head until 1863 when Raphael Popov
was appointed to the vacant post of archbishop.262 However, by then the Uniate
movement was in disarray.
Although short lived the Uniate movement had one major consequence. The
Russians who had until then opposed the creation of an independent Bulgarian
Church realised that they were in danger of losing their influence in the Balkans
completely if they did not alter their traditional policy on the ecumenical harmony of
Orthodoxy. In the midst of these difficulties direct Russian involvement in Ottoman
Near Eastern politics became a necessity. Due to the importance of this task one of
Russia's foremost diplomats was appointed to the foreign ministry post in
Constantinople. Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev (1832-1907) was appointed as Foreign
Minister in June 1864 and promoted as Russian Ambassador to the Porte in 1867. In
a strategy aimed at eliminating Russian obstacles created by defeat in the Crimean
War and the Treaty of Paris, thus restoring Russia to a prominent place in Ottoman
affairs, Ignatiev immediately established four objectives that would indirectly affect
the Bulgarian question. Firstly, that Russia must take steps to restore its influence
over the Balkan Christian population; secondly, that Russia had to intimidate the
Ottoman government to show that it was still a force to be reckoned with; thirdly, the
Russian Foreign Ministry would direct its efforts at breaking up the accord of the
European powers, which in Ignatiev's opinion was "fictitious and based on
exceptional circumstances"; and finally, Russian diplomacy must combat the
dominant position of France at the Porte.263
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4.2 BULGARIAN ECCLESIASTICAL INDEPENDENCE
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The diplomatic and personal archives of Russian ambassador, Nikolai Ignatiev,
provide us with a glimpse behind the complexities of the Bulgarian question during
the period 1864-1870. Although written from a Russian perspective they nevertheless
give us opportunity to appreciate the fundamental issues in the ongoing struggle for
Bulgarian ecclesiastical independence. In Ignatiev's attempt to achieve his four-stage
objective he encountered a number of obstacles, the most serious of which was the
dispute between the Bulgarians and the Greeks. He understood that his ability in
dealing with this dispute would affect future Russian diplomacy in the Balkans.
However, from the onset we witness a clear modification in Russia's Bulgarian
policy, when he comments: "My principal preoccupation in this question is to
procure for the Bulgarians, without breaking from the Greeks, a national form, while
defending them from the efforts of catholic propaganda and thus conserving them to
Orthodoxy and to our [Russian] influence."264 While continuing to seek the unity of
Orthodoxy and thus maintain the supremacy of the Constantinople Patriarchate,
Russia was now willing to support Bulgaria in an attempt to have independent
national representation.
With this overall objective in mind he worked closely with the leaders of the
Bulgarian Church movement attempting to assist the Bulgarians achieve some of
their original aims. In April 1865, through Ignatiev's direct intervention, Patriarch
Sophronios III (1863-1866) promised the leaders of the Church movement that the
Patriarchate would seek to replace Greek bishops with Bulgarians in the eparchies
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that desired this. Having established this concession the Bulgarians urged the
Russian ambassador to help them obtain permanent representation on the Patriarchal
Synod. For the Greeks this was a step to far and refused the request.266
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The enmity between the Greek and Bulgarian clergy was so intense that Ignatiev
attempted to arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement via another more progressive
direction. He achieved this by gathering together a number of leading businessmen
from both communities in an ad hoc committee to discuss the Church question.
Unhindered by ecclesiastical differences or by canon law this lay committee
presented an alarming project before the Church authorities. As well as supporting a
level of Bulgarian representation on the Patriarchal Synod its most startling proposal
allowed the Bulgarian Church a level of administrative autonomy within the Danube
267
Vilayet. Not surprisingly the Patriarchal Assembly, which met in April 1866,
denounced these proposals as "heretical" and an infringement of "the natural rights
of the Greeks." They also claimed that allowing the Bulgarians representation in
Constantinople would ultimately be a threat to the Patriarchate and rejected the
findings of the ad hoc committee.268 The Bulgarian-Greek dispute had reached
impasse yet again.
Ignatiev quickly realised that the Porte was implicitly involved in encouraging this
deadlock and advised St.Petersburg that Ottoman policy toward the Bulgarian-Greek
• 76Q
dispute was one of divide and conquer. This policy can be clearly discerned
throughout the years of the Church dispute in the Porte's practice ofmaking mutually
exclusive promises to either side. For example, telling the Patriarchal authorities that
they would never support Bulgarian aspirations, while simultaneously pledging to
help the Bulgarians. The words of the Porte were simply meant to appease both
parties while keeping them at loggerheads with one other. The complexity of the
situation is easy to see. The Russian ambassador understood that the Greeks and the
Bulgarians had to reach an agreement with each other without interference from the
Porte. Unfortunately, the Bulgarians were unable to foresee a time when the Greeks
would ever concede to their requests and thus placed all their hopes on Ottoman
intervention - therefore the circle of impasse persisted.
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4.2.1 THE CRETAN UPRISING (1866-1868)
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We observed that as an indirect consequence of the Crimean War the Bulgarian
Church question advanced considerably. So now with the Cretan Uprising, an
unrelated event would positively affect Bulgaria finally breaking the perpetual cycle
of impasse. The details behind the Cretan revolt again are outwith the subject matter
of this research, suffice to say that failure to promulgate promised reforms on the
island caused the Christian inhabitants to rise in protest against the Porte. This
quickly evolved into open revolt supported by large numbers of Greek troops and in
the summer of 1866 the Ottoman military contingent surrendered. After the
insurgents had dispersed the Ottoman forces reformed and wreaked revenge on the
islanders.270 The Greek government, with aspirations of territorial advancement,
declared its support for Crete creating an immediate breakdown in Greek-Ottoman
relations.
This local insurgency soon took on international proportions and in the midst of the
crisis Bulgaria became an important pawn. In order to win the support of the
Bulgarians, to unite against the Porte, the Greek government advised the
Constantinople Patriarchate to be more sympathetic in its attitude towards the
Bulgarian Church question. We cannot tell if Patriarchal sympathy played a part but
the Bulgarians during the crisis did support the Greeks in their struggle, so much so
that Naiden Gerov reported that the Bulgarians were following the crisis with such
sympathy "that it would seem as if there were no quarrel between them and the
Greeks."271 The Porte concerned that insurrection might also break out in Bulgaria
promised the leaders of the Church movement that the independent Church question
would be settled to the satisfaction of the Bulgarians. Russia followed these events
closerly and considered that "now the decisive moment has come to sustain the
efforts of the Christian populations in Turkey in their efforts to free themselves."272
Russian ambassador Ignatiev believed that the time had arrived for St.Petersburg to
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denounce the Treaty of Paris and in the view of the Cretan Uprising, to favour
national insurgency among the Balkan peoples, predicting that if Russia acted the
Ottoman empire would quickly fall.
In light of Greek conciliatory machinations toward the Bulgarian question Patriarch
Sophronios III, the ardent anti-Bulgarian, resigned from office. In his place and with
Russian approval former Patriarch Gregory VI (1835-1840) was re-elected to the
Patriarchal throne (1867-1871 ).274 The new Patriarch, responsive to the political
climate, was immediately set the task of formulating a settlement agreeable to all
sides (I say all sides because Russian ambassador Ignatiev intricately involved
himself in the whole process). So involved were the Russians that Gregory VI
presented his proposal firstly to Ignatiev for Russian approval. The proposal accepted
for the first time the creation of an independent Bulgarian Exarchate within the
borders of the Danube Vilayet. The magnitude of this proposal and the involvement
of the Russians suggest that it had not been widely circulated within the Patriarchate,
if at all. If authentic it signalled a remarkable change in the attitude of the
Patriarchate as until this moment the Constantinople Patriarchate had argued from
Canon law that any separation would have been contrary to the laws of Orthodoxy.
From the personal records of Ignatiev we discern that the proposal was formulated
without Synodal approval. The Patriarch and the Russian ambassador hoped through
time to convince the Holy Synod of its benefits and when the time was favourable
they would officially present the proposal before the Patriarchate and the Porte for
approval.275
Nevertheless, there were still a number of problems within the proposal. Firstly, it
had to be approved by the Greek authorities; secondly, even though it presented a
major concession on behalf of the Greeks it still might not be acceptable to the
Bulgarians. For although granting a level independence within the borders of the
Danube Vilayet the plan completely ignored the needs and desires of Bulgarians in
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Bulgarian Church in Constantinople. Even so ambassador Ignatiev believed that "if
they [the Bulgarians] have retained any grain of political sense and the slightest true
devotion to the cause ofOrthodoxy, they must accept this unexpected chance, which
appears finally to prepare the way for a solution to a question long considered
unsolvable."276
As soon as details of Gregory's proposal leaked out Greek nationalists responded
negatively calling the Patriarch "a traitor to the Great Idea," believing that the plan
would compromise future Greek glory.277 A number of Bulgarian Church leaders
also refused to accept Gregory's proposal demanding that Ohrid (in Macedonia) be
established as the centre of any new Bulgarian Church. Ignoring the Patriarchate
completely they petitioned the Porte directly for an autonomous Church province
combining the Danube Vilayet, Macedonia, Thrace and the Bulgarian Constantinople
Church.278 By ignoring the concessions of the Patriarchate the Bulgarians again
placed all their hopes upon the Porte. Thus through 1867-1868 we witness the leader
of the Bulgarian 'extremists' Stoyan Chomakov making a number of declarations of
loyalty before the Sultan, which the Russian ambassador regarded as an act of
treason before Russia, Bulgaria and Orthodoxy.279
4.2.2 TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1868-1870)
When the promises of the Porte failed to reach fruition an inner conflict broke out in
the Church movement between the 'extremist' and 'moderate' factions.280 The focus
of the dispute centred on the Porte's 'double-dealing' tactics that had resulted in
Bulgarian disillusionment and distrust of the Ottoman government. Ambassador
Ignatiev took advantage of this predicament to support the moderate faction and their
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figurehead Bishop Paisii who sought reconciliation with the Patriarchate.281 In this
spirit Paisii and Patriarch Gregory VI held a series of consultations between May-
June 1868 during which they tried to reach a mutually acceptable compromise.282
In an effort to scupper the reconciliation process the Porte announced a six-point
programme that met Bulgarian demands in full, allowing them to have their own
churches, bishops, an independent Bulgarian Synod and a primate based in
Constantinople.283 The consequences of this action soon became evident. By
accepting the Porte's plan the Bulgarians saw an immediate end to their struggle. The
Patriarchate, however, saw this action as an infringement and threat upon their
position as the defender of Orthodox Church rights. The Russian ambassador said of
the announcement: "It is essentially machiavellian and if it was adopted, dissension,
instead of being lessened, could only increase. The presence of the Bulgarian Synod
at Constantinople, where the Ecumenical Synod already sits, would obviously
perpetuate the rivalry and the discord between the two groups."284
The leaders of the Bulgarian Church movement, anxious to bring their dreams to
fruition, proceeded to prepare for an independent Church in line with the Porte's
promises and an executive committee was elected to set up the new Church. They
sought to maintain relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate but stated that if
Gregory VI refused to resume negotiations they would seek the support of the
Russian Synod. In November 1868 Gregory VI did refuse categorically rejecting
Ottoman and Bulgarian actions, declaring them to be in violation of Canon law. In
response the Bulgarian executive committee declared publicly that they were no
longer interested in a bilateral agreement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.285
Responding to the Patriarchal repudiation Grand Vizier Ali Pasha called on all
Bulgarian bishops to convene in Constantinople to prepare the statutes of the new
Church. Upon their arrival, without the permission of the Patriarchate, Gregory VI
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accused them of committing "an unprecedented act of subordination."286 Nikolai
Ignatiev blamed Patriarch Gregory VI directly for the direction the Bulgarians had
taken as his refusal to negotiate with the executive committee, in Ignatiev's mind,
had left Bulgaria with no choice but to break with the Patriarchate.287
As the Bulgarians waited impatiently in Constantinople for the final settlement on
the Church question political events yet again altered the course of the movement's
progress. With the unstable situation on Crete flaring up once again (1868-69) the
focus of the Porte diverted from Bulgaria. Graeco-Russian political relations
deteriorated as Greek nationalists blamed Russia for their lack of support in this
latest uprising. By early 1870 it became clear that the Porte was in no hurry to settle
the Bulgarian question. Several Bulgarian bishops then asked the Russian
ambassador for advice on how to secure a firman quickly. He advised them to
emphasise that growing unrest in Bulgaria, motivated by similar agitations in Crete
and Montenegro, could break out at any time if a firman was not granted for the
Bulgarian Church.288
Ignatiev's advice and willingness to be involved after the Cretan Uprising introduces
yet another change of direction in Russian-Bulgarian policy which now supported the
immediate establishment of a totally independent Bulgarian Church. This policy
change, spurred on by anti-Greek overtones, can be witnessed in Ignatiev's appeal to
the Grand Vizier to officially acknowledge an independent Bulgarian Church before
another Patriarchal Assembly could be convened, thus presenting the Patriarchate
with a fait accompli. This policy change is further supported by an encoded message
directed to Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov in which Ignatiev informs his
superior that Ali Pasha accepted "full well the expediency ofmy advice."289
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4.2.3 THE BULGARIAN EXARCHATE
On 12 March 1870 the Ottoman government issued a firman authorising the
establishment of a separate Bulgarian Church.290 However, the new Church would
not be completely autocephalous, rather it would be recognised as an Exarchate,
spiritually subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarch but in regard to matters of
internal administration fully independent. The Church movement had achieved its
ultimate aim the recognition of Bulgaria as a distinct ethnos and the establishment of
religious and cultural self-determination for her people. Having won the war of
attrition Bulgaria's Church leaders were now satisfied with their position within the
Ottoman empire. History constitutes this moment merely as a stepping stone towards
further national development ultimately leading to the political liberation of Bulgaria
from Ottoman rule.
After the firman's proclamation the Church movement's activities advanced towards
the practical construction of the Exarchate. Foremost it was necessary to draw up the
statutes that would govern the new Church as required by section 3 of the firman. To
this end the bishops, who were already present in Constantinople, elected a
temporary administrative body that would prepare draft statutes, guide the Bulgarian
Church through the separation and final establishment of the Exarchate and organise
a Church Synod and Council.291 On 13 March 1870 the bishops and thirty-nine of the
most eminent Bulgarians from Constantinople gathered for this purpose and by
means of a secret ballot elected ten lay people and five bishops to the Temporary
Council.
The deliberations of the Temporary Council raised new issues for the Bulgarian
people. No longer hindered by the predominance of Greek clergy debate arose
around the hierarchical organisation of the new church. The roots of this dispute can
be traced to a letter, dated 24 February 1870, in which Dr. Chomakov the leader of
the extremist faction comments that the new church should have a Synod and
290 See appendix two for a translation of the firman announcing the establishment of the Bulgarian
Exarchate (1870)
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Council composed with a broad participation of laymen rather than traditional
"aristocratic despotism." His opinion precised one of two opposing streams of
thought. Petko Slaveikov and Todor Ikonomov championed Chomakov's progressive
attitude on the Council arguing that there could be no division between ecclesiastical
and lay authority in the Church because there was no actual barrier between secular
and spiritual work: "The Church is not only the spiritual; the Church is every
• 90^
gathering of the faithful, all people." They continued by arguing that the new
Church would be beneficial to the nation only if it was democratic, established in the
spirit of the new times, rather than maintaining the stratified dogmatic and
complicated Church hierarchal structure of the past. In line with this thought process
they also promoted the necessity of regularly changing those in the Exarchate's
leading positions, as neglecting to do so would lead to the ideal condition for
t • 294
despotism.
Opposing the progressive element was Peter Odjakov who argued not on the basis of
modernity but from tradition and Church Canon. He commented that the leading
Church position of Exarch should not even be elected but determined solely by terms
of seniority.295 He emphasised that the Metropolitan of the oldest Bulgarian eparchy,
Turnovo, rightly should be placed on the Exarchal throne. His views gave total
priority to the clergy, ignoring the secular element, as he viewed the role of the
90f\
Church as being purely representative of Bulgaria's spiritual life. As he continued,
in his attempt to prove that the Church had neither civic nor political aspects, it
became clear that his predilection was the product of ambition to prove that Turnovo
should be the seat of the Bulgarian Exarchate, rather than Constantinople. Hidden
deeper behind Odjakov's contentions, however, lay the interests of the ultra-
conservative element of the Council who were intent on securing the nomination of
Ilarion Makariopolski as Exarch. Makariopolski had been a leading figurehead of the
Bulgarian Church movement since its inception, he had argued on behalf of his
people, been exiled and imprisoned for their benefit and he was one of the men who
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had made independence possible. Now he offered his services to the Bulgarian
nation.
It appears, however, that personal ambition rather than ideology had taken
precedence in Makariopolski's actions. Archival materials collated during this period
reveal that he promised the leaders of the Turnovo eparchy a four thousand-groshta
'reward' if they elected him as Exarch.297 To further ensure his selection his
supporters chose a representative, N.Minchoglu, from the Turnovo eparchy to
"control and guide" the people towards this decision.298 Therefore as the Temporary
Council worked on the draft statutes in Constantinople Minchoglu visited every
community in the Turnovo eparchy reporting in November 1870 that every town and
village of the eparchy would nominate Makariopolski.299 Although Odjakov's anti-
progressive contentions were undoubtedly argued from Church Canon, his assertions
were somewhat blackened by subordinating them to meet the specific interests of one
man, Ilarion Makariopolski. Despite the political manoeuvring of Makariopolski the
selection process did not go smoothly and when he saw that even within the
Temporary Council his election was not guaranteed he left the conference.300
The Council finalised drafting the statutes for the Exarchate in September 1870 after
which they called on every Bulgarian community to elect a representative to sit on
the National Church Council. The National Council opened for business on 23
February 1871 under the chairmanship of Bishop Ilarion of Lovech composed of
fifty people (eleven clergy and thirty-nine laity).301 On 27 February 1872 the first
Exarch of the Bulgarian Church was elected by the National Council. Exarch Antim
I, the former Metropolitan of Vidin, then travelled to Constantinople to receive
official recognition from Sultan Abdulaziz on 15 April 1872. Thereafter the
Bulgarian delegation presented itself before the Patriarchate to recieve the
conformation ofAntim I. However, rather than pronounce his conformation Patriarch
Anthimus implored Antim I to denounce his position and return to Vidin. Ignoring
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this request Antim read a proclamation declaring the independence of the Bulgarian
Church. This led to the Ecumenical Patriarch pronouncing the Exarchate to be
schismatic on 16 September 1872, citing the basis for the schism as philetism.302
The Bulgarians viewed this pronouncement positively convinced of the justice of
their cause and the legitimacy of their actions. Indeed, the schism brought the
Bulgarian people together in even greater national unity. Russian ambassador
Ignatiev commented that the schism had "excited among them dreams of political
independence."303 Rather than dampening enthusiasm the schism actively
encouraged Bulgarian revolutionary elements to take up arms and fight for political
independence.
4.2.4 THE EXARCHATE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY LIBERATION
MOVEMENT
The Exarchate was the ultimate prize for the National Church movement, giving self-
determination to and recognition of the Bulgarian nation. It was now a legal
institution recognised as the official representative of the Bulgarian people before the
Ottoman government. This position defined both its role and activities; it had legal
resources to protect the Christian population, it could be involved in the cultural and
educational advancement of Bulgaria and it had the possibility to extend the
Exarchate's borders by seeking the unification ofBulgarians in disputed eparchies.
The ability of the Exarchate to implement this power, however, was hampered by the
Porte. Born within the world of Ottoman politics and validated only by means of a
governmental act the Exarchate was completely dependent on and subordinate to her
political master, her existence dependent on the will of government officials. Thus
302 The Constantinople Council on the Bulgarian question proclaimed: We reject and condemn racial
division, that is, racial differences, national quarrels and disagreements in the Church of Christ, as
being contrary to the teaching of the Gospel and the holy canons of our blessed fathers, on which the
holy Church is established and which adorn human society and lead it to divine piety.
In accordance with the holy canons, we proclaim that those who accept such division according to
race and who dare to base on it hitherto unheard of racial assemblies are foreign to the One, Holy,
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the Bulgarian Church existed by establishing its loyalty to the Porte. The Exarchate
was "shackled like a horse and bound by its leg," hindering its true political voice.304
The lack of actual power and the perpetuation of political bondage led many to
believe that, whilst the Church movement had been advantageous to the nation, it no
longer had any positive role to play. So as the Exarchate struggled to secure its
position other groups sought complete national autonomy from the Ottoman empire
through revolutionary means. Although these activities reached their height during
the second half of the nineteenth century random incidents had occurred previously.
During the Russo-Turkish Wars thousands of Bulgarian volunteers had joined the
Russian army hoping that tsarist victory would bring them a better life. Many more
fought with the Serbs (1804-1814) and again with the Greeks in their War of
Independence in the 1820s. Emboldened by experience many volunteers sought to
instil the concept of attaining independence through armed uprising in Bulgaria.
One of the most significant revolutionary events occurred in 1841 when Bulgarian
emigres in Greece and Romania formed a loosely connected revolutionary union that
planned to organise and equip armed detachments (cheta) that would enter Bulgaria
and incite revolt. The first of these cheta detachments was organised in Braila,
Romania, led by Vasil Hadjivulkov and a Serbian, Vladislav Tatic.305 In 1841 they
crossed the Danube and landed on Bulgarian soil hoping to precipitate general
rebellion. The attempt failed miserably. Nevertheless the characteristics of the cheta
movement became the model for all future Bulgarian revolutionary activity.
Georgi Rakovski (1821-1867) was hugely influential in Bulgaria's revolutionary
development. He evolved these activities from spontaneous risings to become an
organised ideological revolutionary movement. He was convinced that liberation
could only be achieved through cheta tactics. Thus he began to organise and train
volunteers to join his 'Bulgarian Legion' to organise revolutionary activities in
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Bulgaria. In 1861 he founded the newspaper the Danube Swan through which he
promoted his ideology:
Let no one imagine that freedom can be won without blood and costly
sacrifice! Let no one wait for some one else to free him. Our freedom depends
on us! Let each one inscribe deep in his heart as a holy thing the thrilling words
'freedom and death', and with a flaming sword let him march to the field of
battle, under the banner of the invincible Bulgarian lion.306
His greatest achievement, however, lay in the creation of the Bulgarian Secret
Central Committee founded in 1866. This committee brought together many who
would become Bulgarian national heroes, Karavelov, Levski and Botev. His
combination of military action, inspirational writing and political intrigue disturbed
the Ottoman Porte and played a large part in bringing a conclusion to the Church
question. The Porte had hoped that the creation of the Exarchate would extinguish
the fiery rhetoric of the insurgents.
Rakovski's protege Vasil Levski (1837-1873) best fits the romantic revolutionary
tradition in that he wished to achieve Bulgarian independence through mass peasant
revolt. Born in Karlovo on 6 July 1837 his family wanted him to enter the priesthood.
Thus in 1858 he entered the monastery of St. Spas in Sopot and the following year
was ordained as a deacon in the Church. His interest was never fully on the divine
but rather focussed on the mortal hardships of his fellow countrymen. So much so
that by 1861 he had reached a personal dilemma, whether to serve the Church or the
Bulgarian people. He revealed his decision in a letter: "... in 1861 I dedicated myself
^07
to my country, to serve her till death and to do the will of the people." In 1862 he
abandoned his ecclesiastical duties and joined Rakovski's 'Bulgarian Legion' in
Serbia. From 1868 on, after establishing himself as one of the leaders of the
revolutionary movement, he travelled around Bulgaria promoting the revolutionary
message which for him was not only national but also socially inspired. The initial
years of the Exarchate's existence therefore coincided with the time of Levski's
306




revolutionary awakening and his travels around Bulgaria when he sought to construct
a network of revolutionary committees.
These activities did not go unnoticed; indeed many insurgent actions dismally failed
due to the vigorous underground surveillance network of the Ottoman authorities.
However, it would be a mistake to consider that all Bulgarians were united in this
anti-Ottoman struggle as the majority of the population opposed these actions. The
creation of the Danube Vilayet had made many Bulgarians content with their lot.
They were experiencing for the first time an element of prosperity and tranquillity
and saw no need to stir up trouble with the Ottoman authorities. The desire not to
rock the boat can be witnessed in the abject failure of the April Uprising of 1876.
This uprising has taken on mythical proportions in Bulgarian history, emphasising
the brutality of the Muslim barbarian and the stalwart, honest and heroic character of
the Bulgarian Christian.308 It was meant to be the crowning achievement of the
revolutionary movement, with uprisings occurring simultaneously throughout the
country removing the Ottoman tyrant from Bulgarian territory after five centuries of
domination. Hastily conceived, poorly planned and ultimately because of lack of
popular support from within the country it met the same fate as its predecessors. For
example, the revolutionary committee had expected three hundred armed volunteers
to gather in the town of Chirpan, only twenty-four appeared. Similarly throughout
the country only handfuls ofmen turned out in support of revolution.
The Bulgarian Exarchate had been vehemently opposed to the activities of the
revolutionary committee. Church archival records prove beyond doubt that the
Exarchate gathered information on anti-Ottoman activities which they passed directly
to the Porte, information that helped capture influential revolutionary leaders and
ultimately led to the failure of their activities. This is somewhat disturbing as the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Bulgarian national history claim that the Exarchate
was at the centre of the movement supporting Bulgarian liberation:
308 This is exemplified clearly in I.Vazov's., Under the Yoke, (Sofia: Foreign Language Press, 1960).
One of Bulgaria's most acclaimed author's, this work of fiction is road almost as a work of history
rather than of fiction based on historical events.
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The Bulgarian exarchate emerged as the one church and political entity
which sublimated the quintessence of the religious and patriotic in the
embattled Bulgarian people, inspiring it with the bravery and courage to
strive for national freedom. The role of the exarchate is in this respect
widely recognized and duly appreciated.309
Despite this pro-Exarchate nationalistic rhetoric the church's anti-revolutionary
policy had been openly reported in the Bulgarian press during 1872 as the official
310*
stance of the Exarchate. This was not a new policy as we know that the Church
had been acting on it some years previously. The Eparchial Church Board ofPlovdiv
removed Vasil Levski from the priesthood because of his activities against the state
in 1864.311 The Church hierarchy continued to follow Levski's activities particularly
closely as they were concerned that his revolutionary activities could sacrifice their
own newly won freedom. In connection with their ongoing investigations the
National Church Council ordered the detention and flogging of the Metropolitan of
Samokov in November 1872 to find out more about Levski's plots against the
state.312 Their investigation led to Levski's arrest for conspiracy against the Ottoman
government and his death by hanging in Sofia in February 1873.
Insurrections in Bulgaria and the surrounding Balkan states reflected the instability
of the Exarchate as they increased the suspicion of the Porte towards the Church. On
4 August 1875 at the height of growing unrest Exarch Antim sent a confidential letter
to all his Metropolitans urging them to "continue in your work whatever the
circumstance" and to encourage their flocks to stay calm and show their loyalty to
31 3
the Sultan. This letter was one ofmany censuring rebellious activities and urging
demonstrations of loyalty toward the Porte. These censures originated after Grand
Vizier, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, ordered Antim I to meet with him to discuss the
loyalty of the Bulgarian people.314 In response the Exarch stated that the Bulgarian
Church was not involved in any rebellious activity against the Ottoman state and that
309
T.Koev, An Overview ofthe Bulgarian Orthodox Church; available from
hltp://www.bok.at/en/geschichte.htm: accessed 18 May 2004.
315
Ilpaeo, No.28, 21 September, 1872
311
O.Mazhdrakova-Chavdarova, 'Deacon Ignatius (Vasil Levski) in Plovdiv, 1863-1864', MfJp
3(1997)
312 EMA HEKM, II A 6957
3,3
AlfHAM, Letters of the Exarch, 1874-1875,1.389-390
314
ALfHAH, Reports of the Mixed Council, 1875-1878,1.83
154
every eparchy in Bulgaria would defend against "troublemakers". The Grand Vizier
expressed the satisfaction of the sultan and thanked the Exarch for his assurance of
loyalty from the Bulgarian people.315
In line with this policy Metropolitan Gregory of Ruse worked closely with the
regional Ottoman authorities. He despised those who sought to violate "order and
tranquillity," and insisted that "these madmen" be delivered into the hands of the
authorities.316 In this respect he commented:
Dedicated to the interests ofOrthodoxy, of the Church and the people,
we need to display dignity, perseverance and energy to reveal fully the
•3 1 n
falseness of these scoundrels, who do much harm in the people.
The French Consul in Ruse wrote of Metropolitan Gregory that he was a most
intelligent and capable man "whose conduct from a Turkish perspective was
correct," but in the eyes of the Bulgarian revolutionaries "he was completely
■310
compromised."
In December 1875 the National Church Council sent a circular letter to the
Metropolitans, reminding them once again that they were obliged to help the Porte in
the gathering of information regarding "any mischief or violence." Furthermore they
■3 1 Q
were to send weekly reports to Constantinople of all activities in their region. In
doing so the Exarchate aimed to show the Porte that the condition of the Christian
community was improving, but also sought to protect themselves from any future
rebellious acts. In February 1876 church reports began to filter through notifying the
government of growing unrest amongst "Bulgarian agents" who were planning an
uprising in the spring. Therefore it was the Bulgarian clergy who spearheaded the
drive to gain the Christian community's loyalty to the Ottoman government at the
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April Uprising of 1876 the Exarchate appealed for people to "seize the
troublemakers" and turn them over to the authorities.320
4.2.5 AFTER THE APRIL UPRISING (1876)
With the assistance of the Exarchate the April Uprising was thwarted. As a rebellious
action it had been nothing less than a disastrous shambles, but it would have an
irreversible affect on Bulgarian history. The Ottoman authorities were able to crush
the rebellion, however, this was accompanied by months of violent retribution as
regular Turkish troops and bands of bashibazouks scoured the countryside fearful
that fresh insurgency would break out. The British government, through their envoy
in Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, encouraged this Ottoman action: "About five
thousand troops have been dispatched from here [Constantinople] and I believe no
exertion should be spared for assuring the immediate suppression of a movement
which, if allowed to spread, will become extremely serious."321 As reports of the
retribution began to circulate it became apparent that the uprising had not only been
thwarted it had been eradicated and a massacre had ensued.
The Daily News's Constantinople correspondent, James MacGahan, was one of the
first international reporters to write on the awful consequences of the April Uprising:
I have just seen the town of Batak with Mr. Schuyler, the American Consul.
Here is what 1 saw. On approaching the town on a hill there were some dogs.
They ran away and we found on this spot a heap of skeletons with clothing. I
counted from the saddle a hundred skulls, picked and licked clean, all women
and children. We entered the town. On every side were skulls and skeletons
charred among the ruins. There were skeletons of girls and women with long
hair. We approached the church. Here the remains were more frequent, until
the ground was literally covered with skeletons and putrefying bodies in
clothing. Between the church and the school there were heaps. The stench was
fearful. We entered the churchyard. The sight was more dreadful. The whole
churchyard was deep with festering bodies partly covered - hands, legs, arms,
and heads projected in ghastly confusion... The church was still worse. The
floor was covered with rotting bodies. I never imagined anything so fearful.
There were three thousand bodies in the churchyard and church... In the school
two hundred women and children had been burnt alive. All over the town there




were the same scenes... The town had nine thousand inhabitants. There now
322
remain one thousand two hundred.
The American Consul in Constantinople, Eugene Schuyler, after investigating these
events also wrote: "Old men had there eyes torn out and their limbs cut off, and were
then left to die, unless some more charitably disposed gave them the final thrust.
Pregnant women were ripped open and the unborn babies carried triumphantly on the
point of bayonet and sabre, while little children were made to bear the dripping heads
of their victims."323 A tide of opposition arose around the world in response to what
became known as the 'Bulgarian horrors'. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli
dismissed reports of the atrocities as "inventions" which prompted William
Gladstone to denounce Turkey and Disraeli:
An old servant of the Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon
whom far more than perhaps any other people it depends to require and to insist
that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in
the other, and shall apply all its vigour to concur with the other States of Europe
in obtaining extinction of the Turkish executive powers in Bulgaria. Let the
Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by
carrying off themselves... This thorough riddance, this most blessed
deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory of those heaps
on heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike ofmatron, ofmaiden and of child;
to the civilisation which has been affronted and shamed, to the laws of God, or,
if you like, of Allah; to the moral sense of mankind at large... No Government
ever has so sinned, none has so proved itself incorrigible in sin, or which is the
same, so impotent for reformation. If it be allowable that the executive power in
Turkey should renew at this great crisis, by permission of authority of Europe,
the charter of existence in Bulgaria, then there is not on record, since the
beginnings of political society, a protest that man has lodged against intolerable
misgovemment, or a stroke he has dealt at loathsome tyranny, that ought not
henceforward to be branded as a crime.324
The atrocities also caused major disagreement between the Exarchate and the
Bulgarian people. The brutal retribution had made it abundantly clear that the nation
could no longer live under the present conditions within the Ottoman empire. Thus
under pressure to survive Antim I and the Holy Synod had no choice but to change
their sympathies, from supporting the Ottoman government to advocating the
Bulgarian national cause. The National Church Council proposed that a Bishop's
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Commission be formed to lead an investigation in the regions where the atrocities
had occurred. Their plea was ignored.325 Thereafter an unofficial Bulgarian enquiry
was undertaken led by a student from the Bulgarian Royal Medical School, Atanas
Shopov. Through the summer of 1876 Shopov visited the regions affected by these
events. His final report included information on the scale of the destruction and the
number of lives lost in Bulgaria, which according to differing accounts fluctuated
between thirty-to-fifty thousand. Complete with Shopov's report the Exarchate
established a 'National Commission', which gathered and systematised all the
information, translated it into English and French and then disseminated it through
diplomatic representatives in Constantinople.326 After collating the information the
urgent need of the victims was recognised and it was decided that the Exarchate
should develop humanitarian activities "for the material and moral relief of those
affected."327
The activities of the Exarchate between the April Uprising (1876) and the War of
Liberation (1878) reveal a major change of direction. The general unrest, which
resulted from Ottoman retribution in conjunction with the anger of the Bulgarian
people, forced the Exarchate to rethink their strategy. It was only after some
hesitation that Antim decided to support the ground swell of anti-Ottoman opinion,
knowing what the consequences could have been for the Exarchate. However, he
came to the conclusion that to rely on the Porte to improve the situation in Bulgaria
would have been a waste of time: "We will wait for nothing, I have waited for an
answer to our requests before the Turkish government long enough."328 Seeking
protection from further retribution, the Exarch wrote to the Russian Synod, begging
the Tsar for his protection and deliverance, emphasising that the uprising had been
the result of the intolerable situation arising from fanatical Muslims' implementing a
plan to exterminate all Bulgarian Christians.329
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In December 1876 the ambassadors of the European powers in Constantinople met to
press the institution of reforms by the Porte. The Exarchate dispatched a Bulgarian
legation to appear before this gathering, further influencing Europe in favour of the
Bulgarian national cause. The Russian and American ambassadors, Ignatiev and
Schuyler, prepared a series of draft proposals for establishing an autonomous
Bulgarian state: a major problem being whether to create a large entity embracing all
the lands of the Bulgarian Exarchate, or to divide them into two separate units, which
would overcome a number of objections. The Porte rejected both proposals. The
Ecumenical Patriarchate took advantage of the circumstances and the Exarchates
new anti-Ottoman policy, calling the Bulgarians and Exarch Antim disturbers of the
peace. Under the circumstances the Porte forced Antim I to resign: The deposed
Exarch responded: "Once a Greek Patriarch was hanged and the result was the
liberation of Greece. I will gladly give my life ifmy people may by this act become
free."330
Simultaneous with events in Bulgaria there had been a Conference in Berlin, in May
1876, which had discussed the issue of Serbian independence from the Ottoman
empire. The European powers dismissed the suggestion. Weary of the fruitless
deliberations Serbia and Montenegro formed an alliance and began to prepare for
war with Turkey. On 19 June 1876 war broke out but by October the Serbian army
was defeated. Another catastrophe was prevented when Russia intervened
demanding an immediate cessation to military activity. For a short time it looked as
though stability had been achieved, but Russia, enthused by Ottoman disarray and
angered at the failure of the Porte to accept their Bulgarian proposals, declared war
on the Ottoman empire on 24 April 1877.
The political machinations of the Bulgarian Exarchate have been dealt with during
the period 1875-76. However, after Antim's removal from office the Holy Synod
again reiterated their support for the Ottoman government when, on 1 May 1877,
new Exarch, Josef I, sent a circular letter calling for the loyalty of the Christian




to the Bulgarian people to support the liberating Russian army, but in response the
new Exarch ordered the people "to take immediate action against the ill-intended
aims of the malevolent scoundrels."331 On 15 June 1877 the Russian army crossed
the Danube and set foot on Bulgarian soil near Svishtov. The liberation of Bulgaria
had begun. With this action the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Savfet Pasha,
informed the Exarchate that a 'Commission for Military Assistance' would be set up
in Constantinople to which the Synod elected Parteni Velichki as their
representative.332 At the climax of Bulgaria's national struggle we witness the
Exarchate again fully supporting the aims of the Ottoman government over the
desires of their own people.
4.2.6 SAN STEFANO AND BERLIN
After eight months of fighting the Russian army marched through the small town of
San Stefano, less than seven miles from Constantinople. At the imminent collapse of
Turkey in Europe the Porte sued for peace before Constantinople fell into Russian
hands and on 19 February 1878 the San Stefano peace treaty was signed. The
Ottoman government was compelled to sign a treaty which fulfilled Russia's
territorial dreams. Primarily through the establishment of a vast new Bulgarian state
the treaty gave Russia strategic domination over the Balkan region. 'Greater
Bulgaria', as it became known, comprised of around 176,000 sq.km., stretching from
the Danube to the Rhodopes in the south and from the Black Sea in the east to
Macedonia; as far west a Ohrid and as far south as Kostur. It even had access to the
Aegean Sea. The treaty's territorial terms were greater than any Bulgarian could have
hoped for. Its signing was regarded by Bulgarians as the official end of five centuries
ofOttoman rule and is still celebrated annually as Liberation Day.
Bulgarian nationalists had achieved their goal. With an independent Church and
State the nation was free. A letter of gratitude was sent to Tsar Alexander II complete
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with 230,000 Bulgarian signatures, including Exarch Josefs.333 However, Bulgaria's
hour of triumph was brief. A major weakness within the San Stefano Treaty lay in
the fact that it was exclusively a Russian creation. The European Powers feared the
potential influence Russia could exert through Greater Bulgaria and insisted that its
boundaries be redrawn. All interested parties gathered at the Congress of Berlin (13
June - 13 July 1878) to redress the balance of power in the region.334 Russia had
already accepted that San Stefano Bulgaria would be dismembered. This had been
accounted for in their plans - Russian ambassador Ignatiev had prepared draft
proposals for establishing an autonomous Bulgarian state, one large, the other small
in 1876. Therefore, the reduction of Bulgarian territory from 176,000 sq.km. to
96,000 sq.km. was acceptable to Russia, being part of a calculated long-term
strategy. For Bulgaria, however, the Berlin settlement was a traumatic experience, in
the space of four months the national mood had moved from jubilant triumph to
humiliating defeat. They realised that external forces had dismembered their country
to satisfy their own interests. Stefan Stambulov, the future Prime minister of
Bulgaria, remarked that as Russia had not been willing to defend the integrity of the
Bulgarian nation she should never have undertaken to liberate it.335 Greater Bulgaria
was divided into five separate regions. Ultimately the Bulgarian nation, as with the
Exarchate, although the goal of Bulgarian nationalism, was the creation of external
events.
333 Text of the letter can be found in The Liberation ofBulgaria from the Turkish Yoke: Documents,
Vol.11, (Moscow, 1964), pp.564-568
334
W.N.Medlicott, A Diplomatic History ofthe Near Eastern Settlement, 1878-1880, (London, 1938),
pp.39-57
3 51.Ormandzhiev, The New andMost Recent History ofthe Bulgarian Nation, (Sofia, 1945), p.410
Fig.3 Bulgaria according to the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin
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4.3 CONCLUSION
Through this chapter we have advanced from a time when Bulgarian national
awareness and religious self-confidence was only developing, to the conclusive stage
of realising their dream of an autonomous Church and independent nation. After
almost five centuries under the double-yoke of Ottoman and Greek subjugation
Bulgarians had taken action to promote and safeguard their history, culture,
language, and ecclesiastical heritage.
The chapter has demonstrated that the dream of an autonomous Bulgarian church did
not emerge until 1844, a desire instigated by French/Polish intrigue. The
ecclesiastical dispute originated with the economic burden caused by Patriarchal
over-taxation. Local town leaders came to the conclusion that by replacing Greek
Church hierarchy with Bulgarians their hardships would end. Thus the first phase of
the Church movement was to decrease the economic burden and the second the
appointment of Bulgarian bishops. These local disputes coalesced into a national
movement only when the struggle moved to Constantinople. In the Ottoman capital
Bulgaria's most influential businessmen gave the movement new impetus and raised
its awareness within the Porte. However, it was only after the involvement of foreign
political agents, working to achieve the national aims and objectives of their own
governments that the possibility of recreating an independent national church
germinated in the Bulgar psyche.
This fact does not negate the work of the Bulgarian Church movement. However, it
does ultimately question the desire of Bulgarian ecclesiastical hierarchy to escape the
confines of the Ottoman empire. Even after the establishment of the Exarchate in
1872 and in the midst of growing nationalistic fervour that emanated from Bulgarian
emigres in Greece, Serbia and Romania, Church leaders continued to encourage
loyalty toward the sultan. The Exarchate clearly never accepted the principle of
armed struggle and therefore stood against the activities of revolutionary elements.
This position resulted not only from their obligations towards the Ottoman
authorities but also from the spiritual irreconcilability of violence against 'God's
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authority'. As a whole the Exarchate championed the idea of evolutionism.
According to this stream of political thought church efforts needed to be directed
towards the spiritual, economic and social prosperity of Bulgaria from within the
Ottoman empire, seeking its reformation and restoration with the aim of expanding
the spiritual, cultural and political rights of the Sultan's Bulgarian Christian subjects.
They believed that the question of Bulgaria's political independence would be
realised eventually, but only after the wider Eastern Question had been resolved.
Thus the Exarchate dismissed revolutionary thinking. However, the brutal retribution
of the Ottoman authorities upon the Bulgarian population after the April Uprising
completely amended their mindset. Nevertheless, at perhaps the greatest moment in
Bulgarian history when she reclaimed national independence, in 1878, the Exarchate
yet again struggled to maintain the loyalty of the people towards the sultan.
The combination of these factors: the absence of a Bulgarian Church movement until
the nineteenth century, the concept of an independent national Church appearing
only after foreign instigation, the Exarchate's constant desire to remain within the
Ottoman empire; its struggle against revolutionary elements and even at the moment
of liberation the Exarchate's proclamation of loyalty towards the sultan, must bring
into question the claim of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church that it was central to the
success of Bulgaria's National Revival. By the evidence of this research it would be
appear that the role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church during this vitally important
national period has been embellished, so much so that every Bulgarian connects the
Church to the liberation of the nation. National Revival romanticism has given birth
to the affirmation that the Bulgarian nation survived through the centuries of
Ottoman domination owing to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church - the evidence of this
and preceding chapters suggests this is not historical fact. On the basis of the
evidence presented in this chapter it would be more correct to assert that the
ecclesiastical struggle of the Bulgarian Church movement played a defining role in
the revival of Bulgarian national self-consciousness and helped accelerate the
process of national consolidation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS: THE CHURCH, STATE
CONSOLIDATION, NATIONAL UNIFICATION & WAR (1878-1945)
After five centuries of Ottoman domination an autonomous Bulgarian state was
established in 1878. Following the euphoria of 'San Stefano' and the dejection of the
'Berlin' treaties, the nation was placed under Russian provisional administration. The
Congress of Berlin stipulated that the Russian administration, under the leadership of
Prince Alexander Dondukov-Korsakov, would require handing over power to the
Principality after nine months. As a result two main objectives demanded the
attention of the Russians and Bulgarians: a Bulgarian national constitution had to be
drafted and a suitable prince elected. To achieve these ends a constitutional assembly
was convened in Tumovo in February 1879 composed of 231 Bulgarian
representatives that included members of the clergy.
Fig.4 The First Bulgarian Constituent Assembly (1879)
The San Stefano Treaty, signed on 3 March 1878, should have created the basis for a
new relationship between two national institutions, the Bulgarian State and the
Exarchate. From its inception, however, this association proved awkward. The
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dramatic events of 1878 had brought chaos to the work of the Exarchate. Having
attempted to rally the people to remain within the Ottoman empire, whereby the
Exarchate would have been the sole political, legal and spiritual representative of the
Bulgarian people, the ecclesiastical hierarchy now found itself subservient to the
secular national authority which it had once opposed. The burden of responsibility
fell on the shoulders of Exarch Josef 1 (1840-1915) to reconstruct the work of the
Exarchate, to renew the peoples trust in the work of the Church and to re-establish
the Exarchate to a place of pre-eminence within Bulgarian society. This task was
exacerbated by the decision of the Congress of Berlin to revise the territorial
allotment of 'San Stefano', dividing the eparchies of 'Greater Bulgaria' over five
regions: the political independence secured by 'San Stefano' was preserved only in
the Principality of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia received a level of internal autonomy
but remained under the authority of the Sultan's government, Macedonia and Eastern
Thrace were returned to the Ottoman empire, a number of Bulgarian eparchies such
as Nis and Pirotska were annexed by Serbia and Southern Dobrudja was placed
under the authority of the Romanian Church.336 In the diversity of this geopolitical
quagmire the Exarchate was recognised as the only national institution which could
connect the dispersed Bulgarian population to the Bulgarian nation.
This chapter will examine the relationship that developed between Church and State
from the establishment of the Bulgarian State (1878) to the end of the Second World
War (1945). Through an investigation of contemporary scholarship, Bulgarian
Central State, Military and Church archives it will seek to comprehend the role of the
Church through this seminal period of Bulgarian national evolution. Within a
framework of political, ecclesiastical, national and international events the chapter
will attempt to express the boundless changeability in interrelationships between
Church, State and society during the period investigated.
336 H.Temelski, 'Exarch Josef as a Politician and Diplomat', Rodina 3(1996)32
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5.1 STATE ESTABLISHMENT AND CHURCH RELATIONSHIP
From the onset of the parliamentary process a strained relationship developed
between State and Church. While the State desired to establish itself as the main
authority in Bulgaria, it realised that the Exarchate would be a necessary medium in
achieving any future aspiration toward national unification. A major section within
the first Bulgarian Constitution (Turnovo, 1879) therefore dealt solely with the issue
of Church and State. A problem immediately arose, however, around the generally
accepted formula within Eastern Orthodoxy, 'One Church - One State'. If this were
applied to Bulgaria's present predicament their Exarch would have required leaving
Constantinople and relocating within the Principality. If this had occurred the
Exarchate would have lost ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Bulgarian Christian
population remaining in the confiscated territories. This would have been an
immense blow to Bulgaria especially after the tragedy of the Berlin settlement, as by
1879 the number of Bulgarians outside of the Principality outnumbered those within.
After heated debates the National Assembly voted to accept Article 39 into the
Constitution, which stated:
The Principality of Bulgaria constitutes an inseparable part of the
jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church, subject to the Holy Synod - the
supreme spiritual authority of the Bulgarian Church, wherever it may
exist.337
Directed by patriotic enthusiasm and political aspiration to re-unify the nation on the
basis of the San Stefano Treaty the National Assembly made what many considered
to be an ill-founded decision, guaranteeing not only its solidarity with the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church, but its subordination to the Holy Synod.338 In doing so the
Assembly ignored the warnings of the Liberal Party who claimed that by accepting
article 39 they would create an obstacle for the future development of Bulgarian
337 The Constitution ofthe Principality ofBulgaria (16 April 1879), Section 9, Article 39; See
appendix three for a translation of Section IX in the first constitution dealing with religion
338 The map of San Stefano 'Greater Bulgaria' followed the borders of the Bulgarian Exarchate's
territory. The Church therefore became central to the rationale behind the State's territorial claims.
166
339
independent government. After consideration Exarch Josef assessed that in the
interests of the Bulgarian people and for the integrity of the nation the seat of the
Exarch required to remain in Constantinople. Only from there would he be in a
position to support the "enslaved populations and protect them from the high-handed
manner of the Turkish authorities and from any foreign attempt [Greek, Romanian
and Serbian] to spread religious propaganda."340 Thus, on 9 January 1880, Exarch
Josef departed for Constantinople to rebuild the dishevelled Exarchate. Despite
receiving support from the National Assembly the Sublime Porte was unhappy with
this political/religious arrangement. The Ottoman authorities warned Exarch Josef
that they did not acknowledge and would not take into consideration any
constitutional laws of the Bulgarian Principality, particularly relating to the
Bulgarian Church. In a letter to the Metropolitan of Plovdiv, Exarch Josef
commented:
The Porte claims that Bulgarians from the Principality do not have the
right to participate in the government of the Exarchate in Constantinople
or to control the Church as if it is totally independent... The Porte will
not permit the application of Church laws decided by the Principality, or
the Principality's Metropolitans to participate or affect the election of any
future Exarch or the statutes of the Holy Synod.341
In response the National Assembly voted that the Holy Synod should be based in the
new Bulgarian capital of Sofia342 while the Exarch would remain in
Constantinople.343 In practise this meant that the Exarchate and the Holy Synod
would operate as two separate entities. As the Exarchate remained an integral part of
the Ottoman establishment, subordinate to the sultan and his government, Exarch
Josef comprehended that the Holy Synod would not have the jurisdiction to exercise
339 P.Petkov, 'The Development of the Attitude Between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the State
Authorities (1878-1896)', in ed. G.Bakalov (1999), p.193
340 H.Temelski, p.32
341
ALfMAM, Records of the Exarchate 1883-1886,1.3
342 Sofia was designated the new capital of Bulgaria, replacing Turnovo, as it symbolised the centre of
'Greater Bulgaria' where developments in Thrace and Macedonia could be more effectively
influenced
343 H.Temelski, 'The Bulgarian Exarchate - Defender of the Bulgarian National Spirit in Macedonia
and Odrinska Thrace', in ed. G.Bakalov (1999), p.224
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power over the Church outwith the Principality.344 He therefore considered that it
would be impossible to apply Article 39 of the Constitution. In his diary he recorded:
The Porte has decided not to give me authority in the Macedonia and
Odrin Thrace vilayets as their administration would not be run solely by
the Exarchate in Constantinople, but also by the Synodal members from
the Principality. Article 39 of the Turnovo Constitution is therefore
impracticable for the Bulgarian Church in the Principality.345
Hence one of the fundamental problems for the Orthodox Church within the
Principality was the impossibility to govern itself whilst remaining part of the
Exarchate. Likewise the Exarchate would never be allowed to operate freely whilst it
remained connected to the independent government of Bulgaria.
Necessity required that the Bulgarian Church in the Principality become a self-
governing body separate from the Bulgarian Exarchate. This Church would be
administered by a Holy Synod, consisting of Metropolitans whose eparchies lay
within the independent state's borders and who would be appointed by the Bulgarian
National Assembly. Their activities would come to be regulated on the basis of the
Adapted Exarchal Statute (1883). The remaining Church territories would be
governed by the Exarch and a separate Synod of Metropolitans from Rumelia,
Macedonia and Thrace, appointed by the Porte. Its activity would be based on the old
Exarchal Statute (1872) in accordance with Ottoman law. Consequently the
leadership of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was divided working with two sets of
laws in two very different politically controlled regions with divergent national
interests. The ecclesiastical hierarchy did attempt to synchronise the work of the
Sofia Synod and Exarchate. This entailed representatives from Sofia working closely
with the Exarchate and special Exarchal delegates being resident in Sofia to work as
an intermediary with the Principality's Synod.346 By means of these representatives
the ecclesiastical hierarchy attempted to bring unity to the two halves of the
Bulgarian Church. However, this enabled the Exarch to intervene on administrative
questions within the Principality, at times without the agreement of the Principality's
344
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Bulgarian Exarch .JosefI, Diary, (Sofia, 1992), pp. 103-104(1 April 1881)
346 HA EAH, f.54k, a.e.228,1.233
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Synod, which began to raise problems between the Holy Synod, the National
Assembly and the Exarchate.
These difficulties did not endear the Church to the increasingly powerful political
elite who were resentful of the prevailing influence of the Church in the running of
the Principality.347 This reflected negatively upon their relationship and found
expression in an intensified anti-ecclesiastical attitude, which aimed to restrict the
authority of the Church in the running of the Bulgarian state, minimising their social
significance and public role. By amending the Bulgarian Constitution the
government began to regulate on the rights of the Bulgarian Church, making it
increasingly dependent on the state and restricting the rights of its employees to
participate in the political life of the Principality.348
In the initial years after the establishment of the Bulgarian State all Bulgarian
Orthodox clergy had been eligible for election to parliament and thus actively
participate at every level of national political decision making. In 1880, however,
Peter Karavelov's Liberal government included within the National Assembly's
electoral statutes an amendment to Article 27 which stated that the powerful and
influential 'black' clergy would not be eligible for election to the national forum.349
A subsequent alteration to the electoral law permitted the election of bishops to the
National Assembly, but denied the rights of the parish clergy. Finally in 1883 the
government of Dragan Tsankov introduced an addition to the article on election
according to which, "persons, who receive a salary, pensions or assistance from the
state treasury with the exception of MP's and elected civil representatives of the
regions, town councils and judicial delegates... may not be elected as national
representatives."351 This addendum denied the rights of bishops to be elected to
Bulgaria's national forum as according to Article 99 of the Exarchal Statute, also
347
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adopted in 1883, every bishop now received a salary directly from the state. The anti¬
clerical faction within Bulgarian politics had succeeded in removing all vestiges of
ecclesiastical power from the National Assembly. These decisions were made
absolute by the government of Stefan Stambulov who voted that in the interest of
national liberty and for the restoration of the Bulgarian state all clergy would be
denied access to any national political forum.
A further development in this strained Church and State relationship can be traced to
the National Assembly debate on budget considerations for the Bulgarian Church and
the introduction of salaries for the clergy. Although the Exarchate in Constantinople
functioned as an official Ottoman institution it was financed by the Principality of
Bulgaria. This created a practical contradiction - it was the Porte who allowed the
Principality to finance the Exarchate but not to participate in its daily functioning.
The Second Bulgarian National Assembly (1881) chose to limit the finances of the
clergy within the Principality. Emboldened by the anti-clerical attitude of the liberal
government they announced that Metropolitans from all the major eparchies would
receive an annual salary of 8,000 francs, somewhat less than the 14,400 proposed by
the Holy Synod. In response the Metropolitan of Turnovo commented: "The clergy
are not herdsmen, neither are they hired labourers of the community, you cannot
change their material condition at the convenience of the national
representatives..." In contrast the very same National Assembly increased the
salaries of the Metropolitans working outwith the Principality to 14,400 francs. In
reply to a question regarding the unbalanced increase in salaries for the Exarchate's
staff Exarch Josef replied that if the Bulgarian government had not provided
sufficient funds the clergy would have returned to the Principality.354 It would appear
that the National Assembly were willing to pay the Exarchate's clergy an increased
salary to remain in those territories deemed politically important to the nation's
future plans.
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This reveals another factor which disrupted the unity of the Bulgarian Church, not
merely the difference in salary, but the distinctive working conditions and activities
of the clergy engaged in Bulgaria and in European Turkey. The Bulgarian clergy in
the two sections of the Church were faced with divergent problems. In the
Principality priestly functions were limited to clearly defined religious and charitable
activities, but in Rumelia, Macedonia and Thrace the accent of the clergy's work was
on the preservation of Bulgarian national self-consciousness, particularly through the
strengthening and consolidation of Bulgarian school networks, in which they
encouraged emotional, spiritual and political connection with the Principality with a
view to their eventual integration.355
That the Church's budget considerations were politically motivated can be supported
by the government's lack of interest in the education of its Orthodox clergy. The
question of poorly educated Bulgarian clergy had been a concern both during and
after the National Revival. Having desired to replace the Greeks with their own
national clergy the Exarchate faced the dilemma of not having sufficient qualified
Bulgarian priests to fill those posts. Russian Prince Alexander Dondukov-Korsakov,
leader of the provisional administration, had been so concerned by this deficiency
that he personally provided funds toward the establishment of a Divinity School in
Samokov.356 This seminary was the only specialist school preparing clergy for the
needs of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church through the first half of the 1880s. Despite
this the school was closed in September 1886 by decision of the National Assembly,
without asking for the advice or consent of the Holy Synod. Church-State attitude in
the Principality was being defined by factors of foreign policy. Having Bulgarian
clergy present in strategic territorial positions was clearly of importance for future
advancement toward national unification, while seminary education was not. At this
preliminary stage of autonomous national development this research would consider
that the Exarchate was being used as a strategic pawn in Bulgarian geopolitics.
355
D.Kalakandjieva, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church andNationalDemocracy, (Silistra, 2002), p.29
356 LmA, f.166, op.l, a.e.58,1.21
5.1.1 CHURCH & MONARCH
171
Following the drafting of the Bulgarian Constitution the second major concern of the
State was the selection of a prince. The successful candidate, suggested by the
Russian tsar, was the German Protestant, Prince of Hesse, Alexander von Battenberg.
He was a nephew of the tsar and related through marriage to the British royal family.
From an international perspective he was an excellent choice appeasing both the
European and Russian governments. The Bulgarians also approved of Alexander as
he had served with the Russian army during Bulgaria's War of Liberation (1878), as
a liaison officer under General Gurko. In July 1879 the National Assembly conferred
the title Prince ofBulgaria on Alexander I.
Despite receiving a rapturous welcome in Bulgaria Alexander faced immediate
difficulties with the Principality's liberal political establishment particularly over the
issue of his lack of power. He fully comprehended the importance of future
unification with the disputed territories, but in doing so he equally understood the
need to establish a disciplined and well-equipped army. He therefore desired to
transform Bulgaria into a strong militaristic state. However, his powers were severely
restricted leading him to comment that the Tumovo Constitution was "ridiculously
liberal," which led to heated debates with the government who stated, "the National
Assembly makes the laws, the Prince proclaims them."357 Thus the Prince found it
practicably impossible to work with the Liberal government or the Turnovo
Constitution and sought to abolish both those obstacles which stood between him and
358
absolute power.
When the National Assembly re-convened on 5 July 1879 it did so under the new
leadership of Conservative Todor Burmov. The Prince had appointed a new Prime
Minister by royal decree, overriding constitutional law. By so doing Burmov's
government proved compliant and voted unanimously to accept all of the Prince's
357
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constitutional demands/59 Only a few months later, however, the Liberals once again
were voted into government. Alexander I refused to acknowledge this electoral result
and by another decree appointed a second Conservative government, this time
presided over by the Metropolitan of Turnovo, Vasil Drumev. In the midst of
political and constitutional chaos the Holy Synod convened a special council
following Alexander's 'constitutional coup' to discuss the question, how and by what
right should the Church in the Principality be governed? This resulted in the
production of a draft-bill entitled 'The Exarchate's Statutes - Changes in the
Principality.' On 4 February 1883 Prince Alexander approved this Church bill,
generally known as the Adapted Exarchal Statute, in which he was given an element
of power in Church government.360
Prince Alexander now believed he could govern the Principality effectively and
without hindrance. He was immediately confronted, however, by Tsar Alexander III
who demanded that Bulgaria defer to Russian political ambitions. Subsequent
relations between the two countries deteriorated, especially when the Russian
officers within the Bulgarian army declared publicly that they took their orders from
the tsar and not from the Bulgarian Prince.361 Russian relations declined so much that
even the Liberals who had opposed the Prince now considered that Bulgaria had
merely exchanged Ottoman for Russian tyranny. A unified political national front
developed to oppose Russia's autocratic demands culminating in the formation of a
new coalition Liberal-Conservative government. Thus, for the first time there was a
semblance of political unity in the Principality, the common basis of which was the
"prodigious hatred that developed of the Russian yoke which had become
increasingly intolerable."362 However, this anti-Russian sentiment was not
unanimous. The Church challenged the government's attitude towards Russia once
again fuelling its conflict with the State. Church hierarchy and especially the 'black
clergy' pleaded for political and spiritual adherence to Orthodox Russia, who they
359 C.E.Black, p.210
360 rcyE0, 6(1939)134-138
361 All ranks in the Bulgarian Army upwards of lieutenant were held by Russians.
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considered to be the natural protector of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Bulgarian
Church.363
5.1.1.1 Russophile Ideology
Considering the history of the National Revival and the work of the Russian
government in helping establish the Exarchate the presence of strong Russophile
tendencies within the Bulgarian Church is unsurprising. While Russia had succeeded
in enhancing the Slavic element of Bulgarian identity it equally had not neglected to
emphasise its Orthodox component. Thus the rhetoric of 'common faith' with
'Mother Russia' had important place in Bulgarian ecclesiastical circles and was
commonly encapsulated in pro-Russian, pro-Slavic, anti-Western and anti-Turkish
language; so much so that the conviction began to circulate that during the five
centuries of the Ottoman yoke the Bulgarian people would have been eradicated if it
had not been for the Church and "every real Bulgarian owed that preservation... only
to Russia".364 Those who opposed Russia were therefore considered to be against the
Church and represented as "enemies of our Orthodox faith and our Slavic nation."
Hence when government reporter D.Petkova commented that "Orthodoxy and
Slavism" were "idiotic naiveties" she was lambasted for ignoring her "faith and
origin," for Orthodoxy and Slavism, it was suggested, had been for Bulgaria, "two
anchors to which it owed the redemption of its life and its resurrection as a
nation".366
5.1.1.2 Russophobe Ideology
Despite the Church's pro-Russian predilection the Principality's government and her
national press depicted the Church and Russian Orthodoxy as backward, associating
them with "colonialism", "ignorance" and "parasitism."367 The state newspaper
Nezavisimost presented the Church and Russia as reactionary, often using the
religious metaphor of 'the bell' as a substitute for the 'yataghan', the curved sword
363 P.Nikov, 'Relationships Between the Bulgarian State and the Bulgarian Church,' Records ofthe
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which had been used as a symbol of Ottoman subjugation.368 Even terms such as
'Orthodoxy' and 'Orthodox Russia' acquired disparaging connotations, so much so
that Russia was considered to have taken the place of the Phanar in her attitude
towards Bulgaria.369 At its worst the press said of Russia that it offered a "raped and
debauched Orthodoxy."370 These designations were first and foremost an attack on
Russia's autocratic policies towards Bulgaria. However, they became inseparable
from criticisms of the Bulgarian Church in their sympathy and support of Russia. At
every level of society 'Orthodoxy' was being challenged as to whether it was a
crucial component in Bulgarian identity. Attempting to differentiate between the
terms 'faith' and 'nation' Z.Stoyanov wrote:
All these nations Russia liberated not as Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians
but as Orthodox. But as soon as they announced that their nationality was
dearer and higher to them, we see what has happened in our country
today. It is a pity that the Russian diplomats cannot understand the simple
• 371
truth, that our national desires were planted long before Orthodoxy.
On 24 March 1884 six parliamentary representatives introduced a proposal before the
National Assembly that encapsulated the religious/national issue. They asked for a
new article to be added to the section on religion which clearly stated: Proselytism is
prohibited.372 The proposal was based on an 1879 report composed by a fifteen
member parliamentary commission for inclusion in the first Bulgarian Constitution.
The original proposal referred not to foreign missionary activity but specifically to
the proselytising activities of the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Orthodox Churches.
However, it had been rejected after the Liberal Party's ecclesiastical purge.
Nevertheless the proposal was reintroduced and justified in the following manner:
The Commission, while recognising the tolerance and liberty of the
Assembly, cannot allow these two principles to be exploited and
directed against the interests of the State and of social order... Everyone
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is free in his or her religious conviction, but with the zeal of those who
promote the systematic and public changing of these convictions, the
Commission considers this as impudence, in which it is necessary to
373restrict the liberty of conscience...
The proposal was consistent with the spiritual and nationalistic characteristics of
Orthodoxy which required to defend itself against the activities of foreign religious
propaganda. Proceeding from this understanding the proposal stressed that the State
needed to be conscientious of the fact that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was the
central pillar of Bulgarian national identity and unity.374 After debating the issue,
however, the need to prohibit Proselytism was deemed unnecessary by the National
Assembly. The opposing argument of P.R.Slaveikov was accepted by the Assembly,
to reject the proposal "not because Proselytism is dreaded by the faithful, but simply
because it is an anachronism, indecent to the faith; for her it is degrading and
according to our original Constitution this prohibition... has nothing to defend
against."375
The significance of this rejection can be witnessed some years later when in 1892-93
Article.38 of the Constitution was amended to allow the government of Stefan
Stambulov to provide jurisdictional basis for the establishment of a Roman Catholic
monarchy in Bulgaria. Due to the primacy given to the Orthodox Church within the
first Constitution it was accepted that the monarch should confess the Orthodox faith.
It was agreed, however, that the first prince, Alexander I, would be exempt from this
ruling, but any future monarch and their family would require to profess Orthodox
Christianity.376 The principal ideal behind this demand was that the Prince and his
subjects be united in one faith - Orthodoxy. Therefore any future monarch would
have three important obligations: to be/or become an Orthodox believer, to have an
Orthodox marriage and to produce an Orthodox heir. Stambulov's government
wanted to ignore these requirements as they created an obstacle to Bulgaria's new
Catholic Prince Ferdinand.
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The Holy Synod had ascertained from government sources that the second Bulgarian
Prince would not be expected to respect the doctrines and statutes of the Orthodox
Church. In response the Synod announced that if Prince Ferdinand and his wife
Klementina remained loyal to Catholicism they would not be recognised or blessed
by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.377 Following this declaration Stambulov's
government sought to amend Article 38. The Church opposed these alterations,
Metropolitan Kliment and the Sofia Synod denouncing the actions of the government
as traitorous. Exarch Josef equally opposed the government by publishing a number
of acrimonious articles in the Church's press.378 A maddened Stambulov, in return,
publicly criticised and slandered the Exarch, accusing him of living a licentious and
debauched life. The Principality's government went even further, threatening to
discontinue subsidies to the clergy in Macedonia and Thrace and even to separate
from the Church in the Principality if they did not agree with the Constitutional
amendmnets. The government warned that if the Church did not stop its campaign
against government and Prince they would ban the Church's newspaper, Novini. In
his diary Exarch Josef recorded:
They [the government] have threatened me, that they will take action
against Novini, if it writes again on this subject and I answered that even
if they imprison me in a monastery, I will continue to write. I have one
question, if the faith of the nation is in serious danger, am I not allowed
to express an opinion? Who then in Bulgaria can express an opinion or
T7Q
vote against the government?
Threatened with financial ruin, separation from the state and the removal of their
public voice the Bulgarian ecclesiastical hierarchy had no alternative but to restrain
their monarchical objections.
Fundamentally the selection of Prince Ferdinand had been unconstitutional as it
clearly violated Section 38 of the Turnovo constitution. It would be accurate to state
that Ferdinand himself had no intention or desire of becoming Orthodox. The
Austrian diplomat Stefan von Buran wrote in 1893: "The Prince often comments that
377
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he is considering joining the Orthodox Church, but only as an outward gesture, not in
veneration or sympathy of their historical outlook." This subterfuge is further
testified by Ferdinand's personal secretary:
He [the Duke of Parma] helped us to contact the Holy Father, who
showed an interest in Bulgaria and her Church, through a union of the
Bulgarian Prince with a Catholic Princess, this union may even lead to
lifting the schism of Photius setting the country under the supremacy of
the True Church... But for this aim to be achieved we need to alter
Article 38 of the Constitution of Bulgaria... with a view and in the
interest of the good, that this may be accomplished through some future
project whereby the royal heir is secretly baptised into the Catholic faith,
but publicly follows Orthodoxy, thus ripening the question of a union
between Rome and the Bulgarian Church?381
The premarital agreement of the Bulgarian Prince confirmed his desire to establish a
Catholic dynasty at the expense of the Bulgarian Constitution and the Orthodox
Church. It contained a special clause stipulating that the children from the marriage
of Ferdinand and Maria-Louisa of Parma would be raised in the Catholic faith, a
pledge made before Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903). The promise is attested by the
baptism of the Prince's first two children into the Roman Catholic Church. Only
three years after the making of this solemn pledge, on 2 February 1896, Ferdinand's
first son Boris was re-baptised into the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The reason for
this compromise was obvious: Firstly, the Orthodox baptism of his son was the only
way for Ferdinand's monarchy to be acknowledged by Russia and the other
European states and secondly, Ferdinand was aware that if he were ever to abdicate
Boris may not automatically be given the throne as he was a Roman Catholic.
After this public demonstration of loyalty to Bulgaria and Orthodoxy Ferdinand's
personal secretary recorded a meeting between the Prince and Prime Minister
Stoilov: "We allowed our son to be baptised only after Russian demands.
Nevertheless according to my agreement [with the Pope] we are obliged never to mix
his religious upbringing. I therefore give you fair warning that his upbringing shall
38° G.Todorov, Bulgaria, Orthodoxy, History, (Sofia, 2003), p.94
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continue to be fully Catholic."382 The Prince's allegiance to Catholicism is proven
beyond doubt in a personal letter from Ferdinand to Pope Pius X (1903-1914) where
he confesses:
The Bulgarian people are separated from Rome only temporarily. They
will soon by political, rather than by religious means, see how their
sovereign and his royal heir's faith differs from their religion. Russia, the
liberator and protector of the Bulgarians, will share in this knowledge
and will decline to pardon or support this nation. I continue to promise to
raise my son in the bosom of the Roman Church... But this needs to
remain completely secret, in view of the fact that this declaration and my
pledge could compromise forever the future ofmy dynasty.383
Apart from snippets of information it is difficult to follow closely the correspondence
between the Saxe-Coburg dynasty and the Vatican. Nevertheless from the
information presented it is clear that private agreements were made without
consultation with the Orthodox Church and contrary to the Bulgarian national
constitution. It is also certain that to the present day not one member of this dynasty
has entered into marriage with a Bulgarian or with an Orthodox believer. Regarding
this predicament it is interesting to read the reflections of Dr. K.Stoilov, an
influential member of Stambulov's government and future Prime Minister who
voiced his concerns in his diary:
Orthodoxy is our dominant faith. At this moment it is acknowledged
that the State by necessity has to have an Orthodox dynasty. Orthodoxy
is a national institution, not only religious; our existence is connected
with the Orthodox faith. Our National Revival is connected to her.
Freedom of religion does not adapt to the voice of the State, the voice of
the State therefore needs to be Orthodox. "Freedom of religion" here is a
superficial argument. In this essential question the Prince is not even with
the people... The Prince or his heirs from another faith will never be
united with the people, they will always remain foreign.
The Exarchate supports the unity of the Bulgarian nation. But unity
with her is impossible if ruled by a Prince from a different religion. It is
not correct that the Prince marry without changing religion. The parents
of the royal heirs need also to have an interest and insight into the future
of their children. A prince or princess who comes under these
382 G.Todorov, (2003), p.97
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circumstances shall be from the beginning against our nation; they will
despise our history and our tradition... The dynasty will remain foreign,
like an exotic plant. My ideal for the Bulgarian State is that it is an
Orthodox State... because I want an Orthodox dynasty... We should be
against foreign religious propaganda in our courts.
After the fall of Stefan Stambulov from power the Church did not call for retribution,
but rather asked for loyalty towards the Prince, considering "should another dynastic
crisis occur, we are all lost."385 Responding to Kliment's act of loyalty the
Metropolitan was invited by Dr.Stoilov's new government to lead a Bulgarian
Parliamentary delegation to Russia in July 1895. In dialogue with Tsar Nicholas II he
succeeded in persuading him of the necessity to acknowledge the Bulgarian Prince
and renew diplomatic relations between Russia and Bulgaria. Russia set as a
precondition for reconciliation that the Bulgarian heir to the throne, Prince Boris, be
baptised into the Orthodox faith, which occurred on February 1896. After this
condition was met Russia acknowledged Ferdinand I as the legitimate Prince of
Bulgaria.386 Russia and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church had attained their desire the
monarchy's public show of loyalty. The weight of historical evidence, however,
proves beyond doubt that no member of the Bulgarian monarchy has ever actively
adhered to Eastern Orthodoxy.
5.1.2 THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND UNION WITH EASTERN
RUMELIA
By June 1884 the political situation within the Principality had changed significantly.
The constitutional crisis generated by Prince Alexander had been settled and the
Turnovo Constitution restored ending the era of rule by monarchical decree. Petko
Karavelov's Liberal party was re-elected to government and once again the political
focus centred on the issue of national unity.387 On this occasion Church and State
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were in full agreement that the confiscated territories had to be returned to Bulgaria.
To this end both national institutions actively promoted the unification of Eastern
Rumelia with the Principality.
When San Stefano Bulgaria was dismembered and the two autonomous states of the
Principality and Eastern Rumelia formed it created a hindrance to the economic
development of the region. Custom controls were established between the two States
creating the irritant that Bulgarians had to pay taxes on locally produced goods
transferred between north and south. This created major economic complications for
the Sofia government, which cannot be ignored, as during this period industry was
better developed in the south, particularly in the area of tobacco and wine production,
while the Principality was predominantly a cereal producer. Add to this the annual
tribute of 80 million gold groschen which Rumelia had to pay to the Porte and
Bulgaria's heavy financial burden becomes clear.388 Many business projects which
could have aided economic prosperity in both States were frustrated by the Ottoman
389
government. Demonstrations were common in the Principality and Rumelia,
staged by politicians, tradesmen and academic's calling for a union of the two states,
as this was the only way for the country to advance economically.390 Unification was
therefore considered by both Bulgarian states as a remedy to their dire economic
predicament. It may be argued therefore that the unification of Eastern Rumelia with
the Principality was a decision based on economic necessity, rather than on the
romantic idea of national and religious unity.
Economic and political factors served to strengthen the conviction of the population
that unity was absolutely essential. Prince Alexander I also realised the tremendous
significance to his monarchy if unification succeeded. He therefore encouraged the
Rumelian activists in their struggle for unification and supported the military in their
plans to instigate a coup. Social, economic and political conditions thus favoured
388 Article 194 of the Constitution ofEastern Rumelia stated, "Eastern Rumelia contributes a share in
meeting the expenses of the Empire."
389 See for example Georgi Pashev's book, Om Lfapuzpad do Eenoeo, (From Constantinople to
Belovo), (Sofia,1965), pp.138-280, which refers to the Porte's opposition to the building of a major
railway line in Rumelia which would have been vital to the development of the economy.
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unification. The only foreign power to support the unification movement was Russia.
This can be attested by their insistence that a special clause be inserted within the
Dreikaiserbund treaty (1881) which secured the non-intervention of Russia,
Germany and Austria-Hungary if and when unification occurred.391 It is evident that
the Russian government was not only in favour of unification but also desired to take
a lead in achieving this end. Thus from the onset of Prince Alexander's reign the
Russian government had supported him believing that Bulgaria's unification should
take place under his patronage. By 1884, however, Russia not only refrained from
supporting the candidature of Prince Alexander as the future ruler of a united
Bulgaria but was of the opinion that he should no longer occupy the throne of the
Principality. Thus the situation arose that Russia, the only foreign power who had
declared the necessity ofunification, now urged its postponement.
Despite this prevarication preparation towards unification intensified. The Bulgarian
Central Revolutionary Committee reformed with the objective of uniting every
Bulgarian under foreign rule in one state.392 Rallies and demonstrations were
organised nationally. Although Prince Alexander had been informed of the
possibility of a revolutionary coup in Rumelia he was unsure if and when this would
actually occur. Therefore when the activists announced, on 18 September 1885, that
the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality had been accomplished he
was undecided whether to accept or denounce the act. If he were to accept the
leadership of a united Bulgaria he would violate the Berlin Treaty and possibly anger
the European powers. However, if he rejected the act of union he would lose the
support of his own people. He was persuaded to accept and later announced "behold
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in me the ruler of a united north and south Bulgaria." Accompanied by his Prime
Minister, Prince Alexander departed for Plovdiv to legitimise the union. On 21
September 1885 the Prince entered Rumelia to rapturous welcome from the
population. The Rumelian Governor-General resigned gracefully declaring "I am a
Bulgarian and shall not call in the Turks. I wish happiness to the Bulgarian
391 A Collection ofRussian Treaties with Other States, 1856-1917, (Moscow. 1952), pp228-233
392 With Macedonia and Thrace returned under Ottoman power the BCRC decided to concentrate their
unification activities on Eastern Rumelia
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people."394 The Sofia government took over the administration of Eastern Rumelia
while Church administration within the united state fell under the remit of the Sofia
Synod leaving the Exarchate to tend Macedonia and Thrace.
The Russians were infuriated by Alexander's action as they had wanted to lead the
way taking, once again, the role of Bulgaria's national saviour. They did not oppose
the union per se, but rather the Prince's duplicity in stealing their glory. In response
Tsar Alexander III ordered all Russian military personnel to leave Bulgaria making it
vulnerable to attack. Accordingly the Bulgarian army were given orders to enter
Southern Bulgaria and take up positions along the Turkish border to repel any
Turkish backlash.
5.1.3 SERBIAN-BULGARIAN WAR (1885)
Bulgaria's vulnerability to attack became evident, but not from the expectant route,
when the Serbian government presented Bulgaria with an ultimatum - Grant us
territorial concessions, or war! The Serbian army deployed along the frontier with
Bulgaria and King Milan announced that he would not withdraw his army until his
claims for territorial compensation were satisfied. The Serbs realised that the
unification now gave Bulgaria an important strategic advantage in the territorial
struggle for Macedonia. Thus by conquering western Bulgaria the Serbs intended to
sever the government from her Macedonian aspirations. This was no fantasy as
Prince Alexander's personal secretary had previously commented: "We must succeed
with the unification of north and south Bulgaria... We must bring down the
Rumelian government and unite in the interest of Macedonia."395 With this in mind
Serbia declared war on Bulgaria on 13 November 1885 and thereafter her troops
entered the Principality. With a larger and better equipped army the Serbian High
Command expected to win the war quickly and easily, declaring that in a few days
they would take Sofia and the war would be over.
394
G.C.Logio, Bulgaria: Past and Present, (Manchester, 1936), p.331
395 A.F.Golowine, Furst Alexander I von Bulgarien, (Vienna, 1896), p.279
183
The Bulgarian population were alarmed because their western border lay
unprotected, the majority of their army being deployed along the Turkish border.
Bulgarian military command decided to leave one-third of their troops at the Turkish
border and dispatched all others to defend against the Serb aggressor. The order was
given to amass the Bulgarian troops near the town of Slivnitsa - on the road from
Belgrade to Sofia. On 17 November the Serbs appeared in front of the Slivnitsa
defences and the decisive battle commenced. The battle was concluded on 19
November 1885 with the Serb army being utterly routed. Following the intervention
ofAustro-Hungary and Russia the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on 3 March 1886
restoring the pre-war status quo. Russian historian S.Tatishchev comments: "the
question of Bulgarian unification, so long and futilely discussed by diplomats, was
•3Q/:
now resolved irrevocably and in spite of them."
On 15 January 1886 Prince Alexander sent a telegram to Sultan Abdulhamit II
(1876-1909) requesting that he be officially recognised and appointed ruler of
Eastern Rumelia. At the conclusion of the armistice with Serbia the Great Powers
accepted that to restore the status quo ante in Rumelia would have been impossible
and therefore deemed that the unification should be recognised. Thus Alexander was
appointed ruler of Eastern Rumelia, not as Prince over a united Bulgaria but as
Governor-General of Rumelia, thereby bypassing any violations to and resolving the
•5Q7
need to amend the Berlin Treaty. Thereafter a Bulgarian delegation travelled to
Russia to request Russian recognition of the unification. This delegation was led
again by Metropolitan Kliment of Turnovo, the ardent pro-Russian, who was assured
that Russia had not objected to the unification, but rather to the manner in which it
had been proclaimed, without the consent of Russia. German chancellor Bismark had
warned the Bulgarian Prince before the act of union that if he acted independently of
Russia he would eventually be forced to abdicate: "...but if you wish to remain in
Bulgaria, then give yourself up to Russia unconditionally... I advise you to restore
good relations with Russia."398 Despite this warning Alexander acted independently
of Russia who indeed never forgave the Prince and in August 1886 St. Petersburg
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successfully conspired with its agents and military supporters to forcibly depose the
Prince replacing him with Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg.
5.1.4 THE BULGARIAN EXARCHATE IN MACEDONIA AND ODRIN
THRACE
The union of north and south Bulgaria consolidated Bulgaria as a nation. It failed,
however, to resolve completely Bulgarian national aspirations that would only be
appeased by re-creating 'Greater Bulgaria' through the integration of Macedonia and
Odrin Thrace. According to statistical data from the end of the nineteenth century
approximately 2.26 million people occupied Macedonia of which 52.31% were
Bulgarians and in Odrin Thrace the population numbered almost one million of
which 42.37% were Bulgarian.399 Those Bulgarians remaining in Ottoman territory
were inclined towards union with their motherland, their aspirations fed by the fact
that the Porte had not yet implemented Section 23 of the Berlin Treaty, which
promised to introduce sweeping reforms within the region.
Rather than provoke another war in the region the Bulgarian government preferred to
support the work of the Exarchate in their efforts to unite these regions. Thus, Exarch
Josef I expressed to the Chairman of the Holy Synod in Sofia that it was time to gain
control and gather under their administration every Bulgarian in the remaining
vilayets of European Turkey. The Exarchate's objective was to engender within the
estranged population awareness and love for the fatherland and to cultivate in them
the idea that every Bulgarian had one national spirit and faith united under the wings
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. To achieve this end they concocted, with the
government, a plan to affect a 'cultural evolution' through the Exarchate's
educational work. The conviction was that they first needed to prepare the spirit of
the people before taking political steps to gain their liberation. Exarch Josef defined
this mission as a debt to the entire Bulgarian race.400
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One major problem obstructed their way. After the Liberation all Bulgarian schools
in Macedonia and Thrace had been transferred to the supervision of a Turkish
educational commission, in an attempt to bring Christian education more closely
under the control of the Ottoman state. However, in the summer of 1890, with the
assistance of Prime Minister Stambulov, the Exarchate obtained from Sultan
Abdulhamit II, under the rubric of the 1870 firman, permission to appointment
Bulgarian metropolitans in Ohrid and Skopje. Four years later Veles and Nevrokop
also received metropolitans and in 1897 the same privilege was granted to the
eparchies of Bitolya, Strumnitsa and Debur. By the end of 1912 the Exarchate had
established another eight eparchies in Macedonia: Kosturska, Lerinska, Vodenska,
Solunska, Poleninska, Serska, Melnik, Dramska and another in Thrace. In this region
alone the Bulgarian Church operated 1600 churches, 73 monasteries and 1310 clergy.
The lifting of religious restrictions benefited the Exarchate's educational plans as, in
1891, the Grand Vizier announced that Bulgarian religious schools could be re¬
opened under the direction and responsibility of their own clergy. Later, in 1893, the
Porte declared that Bulgarian schools would now be completely independent of the
Turkish Commission. Following this announcement the educational work of the
Exarchate increased in strength and by 1912 administered some 1373 schools and
2261 teachers within the eparchies ofMacedonia and Thrace.401
The religious, educational and nationalistic activities of the Exarchate created a
barrier opposing the equally active propaganda of the Serbs and Greeks. Despite
being paid significantly more than their fellow clergymen within the Principality the
working conditions of the Exarchate's clergy were not comfortable. The regions
remaining under Ottoman control were becoming increasingly insecure as Bulgars,
Greeks, Serbs and Turks sought to establish territorial claims on the land. So
distraught were the Bulgarian clergy in the midst of this turmoil that many fled to the
safety of the Principality abandoning their parishes. In response Exarch Josef issued
a circular letter prohibiting metropolitans from allowing their clergy to abandon their
401
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parishes, "the offenders should be pursued and punished according to the regulations
of the Holy Church."402
5.1.5 ILINDEN UPRISING: MACEDONIA (1903)
Ecclesiastical unhappiness highlighted the increase of nationalistic tension in the
region. As the situation deteriorated insurgent detachments were dispatched by the
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) in order to prepare the
ground for an expected full-scale military intervention by the Bulgarian army in
Macedonia and Thrace. As before these revolutionary actions were at variance with
the evolutionary policies of the Exarchate. Worried by the increasing intensity of
revolutionary rhetoric Exarch Josef warned Prince Ferdinand not to push Bulgaria
into war with Turkey because "war would be a catastrophe for the entire Bulgarian
race. This moment will be fateful and because of this we need to be resolute and
efficacious." However, events came to a head on 2 August 1903, during the
Celebration of St.Elijah (Ilinden), when the insurgents roused the people to stand
against Ottoman domination in Macedonia. Even the local priests blessed banners
emblazoned with slogans 'Freedom or Death' which were carried by the Bulgarian
inhabitants as they set fire to hundreds of homes in an effort to drive Muslim families
from Macedonia. Bridges were destroyed, roads blocked and major social disruption
ensued.403
Exarch Josef had to use his influence to intercede before the Porte to save as many
towns and villages as possible from retribution. Nevertheless this did not stop a total
of 119 villages being burned, 8,400 homes destroyed and thousands of Bulgarians
fleeing to safety. Consequently Bulgarian influence in many regions of Macedonia
decreased enabling the Greek and Serbian Patriarchates to take ecclesiastical control
of the Exarchate's vacated eparchies. In the end Exarch Josef could only grieve as
the work of the Exarchate, which had been established over ten difficult years, was
decimated. In the midst of the ensuing chaos he reiterated: "Revolution will not
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rescue Macedonia, only evolution and education."404 Five years later, in a letter to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, General S. Paprikov, Exarch Josef confirmed his
conviction that "the policies of the revolutionary committee put our objectives in
chains."405
Exarch Josef I was so adamant in his arguments against the activities of IMRO that
many of its activists called for the government to sentence him to death for treachery
against the Bulgarian state. It is recorded that the Exarch had asked the Macedonian
Bulgarians to remain calm and loyal subjects of the sultan and in so doing had
followed exactly the same course of action as his predecessor during the War of
Liberation (1878). In this situation the impossible predicament of the Bulgarian
Exarch becomes evident. Fie was in a religio-political office created by the Ottoman
government, he was a subject and employee of the sultan and had he not remained
loyal to the sultan the Exarchate would not have survived and a far worse retribution
would have fallen upon the local Bulgarian population. However, in remaining loyal
to the sultan and preserving the work of the Exarchate Josef was ridiculed as being
disloyal to the Bulgarian nation, state and society.
5.1.6 THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION (1908)
From the political debacle which followed the Ilinden Uprising and the devastation
of the Exarchate's work the opinion emerged that Bulgaria's Macedonian aspirations
would be best served through developing diplomatic relationships with her
neighbours. The government therefore sought accommodation with Turkey agreeing
to withdraw support of any future insurgent movement.
The Ottoman government itself was undergoing a lengthy period of dramatic change.
Continued weakening of its empire had led to increased opposition against the
incumbent Hamidian regime. Opposition coalesced around the 'Young Turk'
movement, a group who had been forced underground after the suspension of the
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Ottoman constitution in 1877 406 They formed the Committee for Union and Progress
(CUP) with the objective of removing Sultan Abdulhamit and restoring the
Constitution. A major commitment of the CUP was to lessen foreign interference in
the running of the empire. This aim was justified again when, after the Porte's harsh
repression of the Ilinden rising, Austrian and Russian governments met in Murzsteg
to discuss intervention to avert another crisis in European Turkey. The Ottoman army
had been unable to eradicate the guerrilla threat completely or protect the civilian
population due to a very practical problem - the army had not been paid. To prevent
further bloodshed foreign interference had once again forced the Porte to accept an
international commitment which it could not fulfil. This proved both humiliating and
frustrating to Mahmut Sevket Pasha, commander of the Ottoman Third Army, who
threatened that should the situation continue the Hamidian regime would fall.407 The
CUP seized the opportunity and supported the military in their predicament calling at
the same time for the reinstitution of the Constitution.
Displaying political acumen Sultan Abdulhamit temporarily preserved his position
by restoring the Constitution and announced democratic elections. The CUP were
voted into power and after a brief political struggle succeeded in deposing
Abdulhamit replacing him with his brother Mehmet V (1844-1918). The government
of the CUP immediately convened a parliament to represent all the Ottoman
provinces, including Eastern Rumelia. Included in the parliamentary agenda was
Midhat Pasha's now famous and impassioned call to create an increased sense of
Osmanlili citizenship to counter the threat of nationalist and religious unrest. By
reminding Bulgarians of Rumelia's vassal status the Turkish government stirred up
nationalist disquiet. Rather than provoking hope within Bulgaria the 'Young Turk'
revolution and the call to engender Ottoman citizenship, re-galvanised Bulgaria's
national ambitions - from a Bulgarian perspective the revolution had emphasised
Ottoman weakness. Exploiting the ensuing political chaos Bulgarian Prime Minister
Alexander Malinov (1867-1938) declared Bulgaria's complete independence from
the Ottoman empire in October 1908. Prince Ferdinand simultaneously accepted the
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title 'Tsar of Bulgaria'. Presented with faits accomplis the new Ottoman regime
grudgingly accepted the situation. Bulgaria and what remained of Ottoman Europe
had taken their first steps along the road which would end in the Balkan Wars of
1912 and 1913.
5.2 THE WAR YEARS (1912-1945)
5.2.1 BALKAN WARS (1912-1913)
In the twenty-seven years that separated the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 and the
outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912 Bulgaria underwent a staggering
transformation becoming one of the most militarised states in Europe.408 After
experiencing extreme vulnerability after the unification and the Ilinden fiasco the
Bulgarian National Assembly decided to create a modern army with strong offensive
capabilities, spending almost a third of its budget annually on arms accruement.409
Conscription was also introduced for men up to forty-six years of age and so on the
eve of the Balkan Wars Bulgaria could field some 350,000 men.
On 13 March 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed a diplomatic treaty agreeing that any
future division of Macedonia would be three-fold: Bulgarian, Serbian, and a third
disputed zone whose control would be mediated by Russia.410 A few months later a
Greek and Montenegrin alliance followed.411 The formation of this Balkan League
united the former antagonists against Turkey. The goal of uniting all Bulgarians in
one territory had been an indispensable part of the Church's ideal for the nation.
Therefore as the Balkan League pushed for the expulsion of the Ottoman government
from Balkan territory and war mongering intensified so did the voice of the Church,
408 E.Skatula, Valka na Balkane: Valecne tazeni Bulharska, Srbska, Recka a Cerne Horyproti
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offering its support stating they would welcome a war as it would be a 'just
retribution' for all that had went before.412
On 8 October 1912 when Montenegro, invoking a long-standing border dispute,
declared war on the Ottoman empire they were supported not only by their Balkan
neighbours but also by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Amongst the multitude of
documents preserved in the Central Military Archive and in the Library of the
Institute ofWar History lie some which reflect the presence of the clergy in the war.
These documents portray mass ecclesiastical support for the military campaign, not
only from the hierarchy but also from among the parish clergy, many of whom
embarked with the first wave of soldiers to war. The significance and dimension of
their activity has largely been ignored in modern Bulgarian literature. Wherever
present the clergy were at the centre of the military action. It is recorded that priests
carried ammunition to the battlefront, drove transport, assisted in medical duties on
the frontline, worked in the typhoid hospitals and followed on the heels of the army
persuading Islamic survivors of the conflict to convert.413 One British diplomat
recorded an incident in a village at the battlefront when after the fighting had moved
on "the priests, with threats and blows endeavoured to force the people to renounce
their religion."414
Fig.5 Preparing to baptise Muslims during the First Balkan War
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Fig.6 The Muslim who is bent over bares his head to receive baptism
performed by a Bulgarian Orthodox priest
Sultan Abdulhamit had not been particularly concerned at the declaration of war
assuming that his empire could not be defeated. German field marshal, Colmar von
der Goltz, regarded the Ottoman European defences as "one of the best in the
world..., there is no need to strengthen it as it is as unassailable as Gibraltar."415
However, the nationalistic fervour and desire for vengeance indwelling the
Bulgarians were not taken into consideration. This war had been the first real
opportunity for the Bulgarian people to avenge the five centuries of Ottoman
domination and prove to the world that, although they had received their liberation
through foreign intervention, it was their destiny by right. Within two weeks
Turkey's unassailable defences had crumbled and the capture of Constantinople by
Bulgarian troops appeared imminent. The Bulgarian National Assembly were not in
favour of entering Constantinople but Ferdinand and his military commanders were
intent on celebrating their victory in the imperial city.416 The lure of Constantinople
momentarily deflected their attention from a troublesome situation which was
developing in Macedonia.
When the Bulgarian troops arrived in Macedonia, after their success on the eastern
front, the Serbs and Greeks were already there and refused to concede the previously
agreed territories to Bulgaria. Thus when the Ottoman government sued for peace
and according to the Treaty of London (30 May 1913) ceded all its territories in
Europe (except Albania), the Balkan allies found themselves with a multitude of
415 E.Skatula, p.446
416 H.R.Madol, Ferdinand ofBulgaria: The Dream ofByzantium, (London, 1933), pp. 170-176
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problems arising from the division of territorial gains. When the National Assembly
learned that Serbia and Greece had concluded an alliance against Bulgaria the
military high command immediately planned to attack their former allies. However,
when Romania and Turkey also became involved, taking the opportunity to regain
lost territory, the Bulgarian army was simply too stretched to fight on four fronts and
had no alternative but to sue for peace. History had repeated itself, as within the span
of only a few months Bulgaria's supreme triumph had descended to embarrassing
defeat. The ensuing agreement in the Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913) carved
up Macedonia in three pieces the smallest of which was given to Bulgaria. Romania
was given Southern Dobrudja and Eastern Thrace was returned to Turkey.
This course of events was heralded as a national catastrophe and from a diplomatic
and ecclesiastical perspective it certainly was. Nevertheless the Bucharest settlement
presented a mixture of losses and gains. There remains a general feeling that
Bulgaria had been robbed of Macedonia, yet the Pirin region of Macedonia was
incorporated into the country. The western part of Thrace remained Bulgarian
territory, the only major loss was the Dobrudja to Romania. All in all Bulgaria came
out of Bucharest intact and indeed enlarged. But even sober retrospective calculation
of these events cannot assuage the solemn mood of the nation. That mood was
embodied in a letter sent to all Bulgarian clergy by Metropolitan Josef of Turnovo:
Rivers of blood, tens of thousands of homes desolated, left by young
widows, thousands of miserable orphans wandered the country...
onerous sacrifices, massive efforts were made by our people to secure
our freedom, but beautiful Bulgaria was once again nailed to the cross -
bloodstained like a wingless bird or an eyeless corpse. Macedonia,
Dobrudja, Seres and Kavala - those wings and eyes of young Bulgaria -
robbed from our body... that is why Bulgaria must begin a holy war, sent
from God, because she is led by the name of truth, against injustice.417
The Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest destroyed what was left of the already
decimated work of the Exarchate in Macedonia and Thrace. Metropolitans and
priests fled their eparchies as the Serbian and Greek Patriarchates forcibly gained
417
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193
418control and Exarch Josef was ordered to move the seat of the Exarchate to Sofia.
On 28 November 1913 Exarch Josef, failing in health, arrived in Sofia where he was
met by Tsar Ferdinand and representatives from the government. Stepping from the
train Bulgaria's ecclesiastical leader openly lambasted his monarch blaming him for
this national catastrophe:
Your Majesty, end the search for the perpetrator of the Bulgarian
catastrophe outside of Bulgaria, because they are here inside Bulgaria.
They are in the person of Your Majesty, in your former and present
advisers... They are in the regime of Your Majesty... From this difficult
position today I have a way out: Your Majesty, for you to abdicate and to
leave your Orthodox successor to the throne to unite around him the
parties and people and with God's help, and with the assistance of our
Holy Church to return the gloriousness and majesticness to Bulgaria...
To remain on the Bulgarian throne would be fatal for Your Majesty and
for Bulgaria, for the simple reason, that you Your Majesty shall never
have the faith, consequently we cannot support your politics. Even I, a
simple, humble, national church worker, do not have faith in you because
my faith in your diplomatic ability and skills bring me inexpressible grief
and disappointment. I am prepared to be candid today... I am a witness
to the ruin and destruction of Macedonia, to the breaking off of the
Dobrudja, of a bloodstained Thrace, and witness to the rape of Bulgaria.
A witness to the tragic death of the most idyllic Bulgarian product - the
Exarchate... I cannot, Your Majesty, remain composed and exemplary
with the fact, that after your political disasters you still claim the
Bulgarian throne. 419
The Balkan Wars had not ended favourably for Bulgaria, indeed they had initiated a
period of conflict in Europe which would last until 1945. This era encapsulates,
however, the nationalistic and territorial aspirations of the Church that had evolved to
be the foundational principle of its relationship with the Bulgarian nation.
418 See the report of British Vice-Consul C.A.Grieg writing from Monastir, Public Records Office,
Great Britain, Unpublished Documents, Foreign Office 371/1830
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Fig.7 Territorial changes after Balkan Wars
5.2.2 BULGARIA AND THE GREAT WAR
When World War I commenced one year later one country more than any hungered
for revenge. So much so that on the eve ofwar Tsar Ferdinand stated "the purpose of
my life is the destruction of Serbia."420 As a result of their former allies duplicity
Bulgaria was prepared to take whichever side enabled them to avenge her
embarrassment. German diplomats sought to persuade Bulgaria to side with the
Central Powers of Austria and Germany promising the government control not only
of Serbian Macedonia, but also Southern Dobrudja, Eastern Thrace and Adrianople.
Having agreed on the spoils ofwar over 800 000 Bulgarian men took their positions
on the Eastern Front.
Bulgarian interests in the consequences of the 'greater war' were non-existent. The
country's entry into the war must be understood solely in conjunction with its own
420 S.Constant, Foxy Ferdinand: 1861-1948, Tsar ofBulgaria, (London, 1979), p.290
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specific objectives - the restoration of 'Greater Bulgaria' - it may be judicious then
to recognise this Eastern conflict as a Third Balkan War. The First World War in the
Balkans served only to underline the animosity which had developed following the
Congress of Berlin. Therefore once Bulgarian troops occupied Macedonia and
Thrace the national commitment to the greater war effort faded.421
In the midst of this militaristic situation the Bulgarian Orthodox Church sought to re¬
establish their presence in Serbian controlled Macedonia. To achieve this end an
ecclesiastical commission was dispatched, under the leadership ofMetropolitan Josef
of Turnovo, with a mission to "instil spiritual desire for the Bulgarian Church."422
According to data from the reports of the Bulgarian High Command there were
around 147 clergy working in the region. The Holy Synod collaborated with military
High Command to develop regulations for the ecclesiastical commission whose work
was divided into three areas: an educational and cultural character with the aim of
supporting Bulgarian troops; to help direct charitable donations to the frontline; and
finally to advance the faith in the recently liberated territories by 'leading' the
populations to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. For his role in assisting the
military and national effort Metropolitan Josefwas elected to the Holy Synod and for
his services to the German Fatherland was presented by the German High Command
with the Iron Cross II Class.424
However, as German hopes of victory faded the Bulgarians placed their expectations
on America. The USA had not declared war on Bulgaria and in President Wilson's
1918 announcement regarding national self-determination that:
All well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost
satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or
perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely
in time to break the peace of Europe.
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the Bulgarian nation saw opportunity to retain their territorial gains.425 Wilson's
Commission of Inquiry although sympathetic towards Bulgarian aspirations,
concluded that the needs of the three Balkan states that had supported the Allied
cause, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, should take precedence over Bulgaria.
Therefore at the conclusion of the Great War Bulgaria experienced yet another
national catastrophe. According to the terms of the Treaty ofNeuilly, which Bulgaria
signed on 27 November 1919, the newly gained territories were once again taken
from them. This was a heavy blow for the political, spiritual and economic life of
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Church once again lost their eparchies in Macedonia and
Thrace, what is more the Treaty ofNeuilly no longer protected the minority rights of
the Bulgarian population under foreign rule. After another humiliating defeat the
country's infrastructure began to disintegrate. As hundreds of thousands of angry and
disillusioned troops returned from the war demonstrations opposing monarchy and
government became prevalent, taking on a more volatile character as rioting and
looting proliferated. Calls for the removal of Tsar Ferdinand deteriorated into
rebellion and on 27 September 1918, BANU leader Alexander Stamboliski was
proclaimed President of the breakaway Radomir Republic:
Today the Bulgarian people break the chains of slavery, throw down
the despotic regime of Ferdinand and his henchmen, proclaim them
enemies of the people, proclaim themselves a free people with a republic
form of government, and hold out the hand of peace and understanding to
the peoples of Europe. From this day Tsar Ferdinand and his dynasty and
the former government are fallen.426
Although the rebellion was crushed two days later it achieved two ends. Tsar
Ferdinand, realising his future was untenable, abdicated in favour of his son Tsar
Boris III (1918-1943) on 3 October 1918 and secondly, it marked a profound shift in
the country's political direction with the communist and socialist parties becoming
increasingly powerful. The weakening of Church authority coincided with a further
diminution in Church-State relationships during the inter-war period.
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5.2.3 THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE SECOND
WORLD WAR
The work of the Bulgarian Exarchate, for the first time since its establishment, was
limited within the borders of the Principality. Consequent defeats in the Balkan and
Great Wars resulted in drastic territorial concessions restricting the Church's
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, leading to a temporary cessation of its aspiration toward
the restoration of Greater Bulgaria. In surrendering its wider parameters the Church
was able, during the inter-war period, to concentrate its efforts on strengthening the
Bulgarian Church within the Principality.
In November 1940 Metropolitan Paisii of Vratsa was invited to meet with the
director of the Board for Civil Mobilisation, General Sava Bakurdjiev, at the
Ministry of War. General Bakurdjiev praised the productive role of the Orthodox
Church in Bulgaria's history and expressed the positive role he felt the Church could
play in influencing the nation's future. He particularly enthused Paisii regarding the
Church's role in changing the prevalent national negativity connected with the
possible disruption of yet another war, to inspire the confidence of the people
towards the government, to remove the spirit of defeatism after the catastrophes of
the Balkan and Great Wars, to encourage the economy and to prepare the nation for
war. Metropolitan Paisii replied that the Church was willing to assist the Board in
their request, adding that the most important need was for the spiritual mobilisation
of the nation.427
The General was surprised at the enthusiasm and readiness displayed by
Metropolitan Paisii. However, the Holy Synod had already debated these issues,
convening the previous year to discuss the Church's future. In November 1939 the
Holy Synod had assembled to discuss the ailing condition of the Church, its
relationship with the State and the role it played in the spiritual life of the nation.
During heated discussions Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia raised the question "can we
claim that our Church is in good order and that our liturgical life is manifest with joy
427
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and piety? The truth is that the hierarchy of our Church is far removed from the
people, which is not beneficial. Let us confess that in many cases we are only a
shadow of what we should be."428 The statement succinctly underlined the fact that
the BOC had reached a nadir in its relationship with Bulgarian nation, state and
society.
This can be construed as a conclusive moment in what had been a continuous slow,
self destruction and social marginalisation of the Church that had occurred since the
establishment of the Bulgarian State. Perceiving this to be true members of the
Synod listened carefully to Metropolitan Stefan. Following his statement three
turbulent meetings took place on 23, 24 and 27 November 1939, where the Holy
Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church took full inventory of their situation, of
relationships between the high clergy, parish priest and the laity and in problems of
communication with the civil authorities. These contained such awful revelations that
a nameless Metropolitan commented: "We cannot enter into the records everything
which is inadequate in our Church life, ifwe do there is not other choice but to cover
our heads with ashes and abandon our position."429
This act of self-deprecation did not materialise as their discussions resulted in the
general conviction that the Church could not desert its divine mission. To fulfil this
mission the Synod agreed that they needed to develop in two general directions: to
restore the Bulgarian Church's canonical status as a Patriarchate and to return to 'our
glorious past' to that moment of glory at the establishment of the Exarchate and to
the harmony of Social-Church relationships at that time. One may forgive the Synod
of wearing rose-tinted spectacles as this research has shown that relationship to be
illusory from its inception. Metropolitan Stefan emphasised that the Church needed
to assert its ties with and its love for the nation and in doing so the divine mission of
the Church would be fulfilled. This comment surreptitiously divulged the perception
that the Church was the nation, not the State and her strength resulted from the
support of the nation rather than from the benevolence of the State and for this reason
428
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the Church needed to be present at every level and aspect of society and could not
watch indifferently as the State moved purposefully forward in power. With political
insight Metropolitan Boris of Nevrokop continued:
Today we have a State which has absolute authority, which tells us
that everything is subordinate to the State. This spirit will penetrate into
our nation and will continue to create obstacles for the Church. But if the
Church is aware of the spirit of the new times it can still be of beneficial
influence... We need to be ready, even though it may not be our desire
that the state will want to separate from the Church.430
For the first time, since the crisis of the monarchy in 1879, the Church voiced its
most fearful thought - separation of Church and State - but now the Holy Synod
considered that this was not some vain threat but rather future inevitability. With this
in mind the Holy Synod commissioned a special programme to secure the church's
future and strengthen her social relationships with the nation. The Synod appointed
two commissions to investigate and develop these matters further. The first was
entrusted to report on the church's social, educational and relational character and the
i • 431
second to comment on its economic situation.
The findings of the first commission on education and disciplinary matters are more
pertinent to this research as they comment on the relational character of the Church
with the Bulgarian nation. One of the first points the commission proposed, as
necessary toward the Church's survival, was the introduction of religious instruction
in the secular school network, suggesting that a minimum of four hours per week be
set aside for participation in a religious educational programme. It also proposed the
creation of a Theological Faculty within the University of Sofia to further
opportunities for religious education at a higher level. In line with these educational
proposals it was decided to create a 'Child and Student Orthodox Christian Society'
aimed purposefully at stimulating an interest in the Church within Bulgaria's youth.
Every Metropolitan was encouraged to organise children's clubs and choirs which
would follow a centrally produced programme of events. Child friendly literature
S.Eldurov, (1999), p.252
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was published that included liturgy, poems and songs. Special attention was given to
families, who the commission reported had been neglected and even alienated from
the life of the Church. The Synod sent out an "imperative obligation" to all parishes
to embrace families in the mission of the Church. New Christian societies were
formed to organise creches, after-school groups, children's summer camps and day
homes for the elderly, to assist working families. Soup kitchens and night shelters
were to be established for poorer members of society.432
The reports of both commissions established the foundation for the practical
application of a substantial, long-term programme of activities aimed at affecting
every level ofBulgarian society restoring the Church to a place of prominence within
the nation. General Bakurdjiev's request to the Church, to assist in alleviating the
mood of the nation and to prepare them for a war which was advancing inevitably
towards Bulgaria, arrived at the conclusion of the commission's findings. This
meeting of interests provoked the discussion between the General and Metropolitan
Paisii in November 1940. The commission reports were accepted by the Supreme
Council on 29 November 1940. Alongside the results of the 1939 consultation arose
the general consensus that the Church needed to support the nation particularly
during periods of war: "In the days of world conflict the Church's duty in this is
immense, thus as the protector of freedom and independence in Bulgaria we seek a
new spiritual and moral revival in Bulgaria."433
The ecclesiastical hierarchy's willingness to prepare the nation for war began to filter
through to parish level. Local priests were given guidance enabling them to combine
teaching on Christian doctrine with the militarism of the political situation,
promoting the idea of a 'just war' 434 In doing so the Exarchate sought a compromise
from the government, for as well as supporting the nation they were striving to
strengthen the Church. Therefore the government agreed to assist the BOC in seven
concrete directions. Firstly, every statesman, municipal worker and soldier would be
432 The reports ofboth commissions were published in L(^pKoeen aecmirux during Nov. 1939 - July
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obliged to attend regular public worship; the Exarchate would be able to take a
prominent role in state youth organisations such as, 'The Young Defenders'; Eastern
Orthodoxy would be given preferential place within State legislation, whilst all other
'sects' and 'religious propagandists' would require legal approval; the Exarchate
would receive financial assistance from the State to build a church in every town and
village; they gained permission to establish chaplaincies in every hospital, prison and
military barracks; full-time military chaplains would be appointed who could prepare
the troops spiritually and morally for war and finally they received permission to
produce a range of religious educational textbooks to instil, "a complete spiritual-
moral ideology in the heart of the reader."435
As this agreement was being finalised the Bulgarian government made a military
pact with Germany, allowing Hitler's army full access to Bulgarian territory. The
German invasion of the Balkans in the summer of 1941 offered, in the light of past
events, a somewhat risky resolution to Bulgaria's unfinished programme of national
unification. Nevertheless with German approval the Bulgarian army re-entered
Macedonia and Western Thrace declaring that "all former Serbian and Greek
subjects shall become Bulgarian, unless they expressly request otherwise".436 The
Holy Synod reacted quickly to the changing situation. Having predicted this outcome
they had prepared a secret project in April 1941 to incorporate its Balkan neighbours
within the Exarchate: "to embrace the Bulgarian Orthodox population in every
territory of the Balkan Peninsula...."437 The Church proclaimed that the project to
liberate Bulgarian soil was historically justifiable and expressed God's supreme
will.438 In the ensuing euphoria following their territorial gains the Synod sent a
message to the German and Italian governments thanking them for their help in
completing Bulgaria's national union.439 The Exarchates newspaper even glorified
Adolf Hitler as the "liberator of a long-suffering Macedonia and restorer of the
borders of San Stefano Bulgaria."440
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The Exarchates praise of Germany has led Macedonian authors to comment that the
Bulgarian Church was working "in the service of the fascist invaders," destroying
Macedonia's national structure.441 Greek historians also claim that the Bulgarian
Church was implicit in national discrimination and terrorism of the Greek-
Macedonian population.442 This criticism equates with Bulgarian records from the
time which comment that one of the most difficult problems in governing the new
Bulgarian eparchies was to do with the presence of Serbian and Greek clergy. The
Bulgarian Interior Minister, Ivan Popov, explicitly recommended that the Exarchate
should not become involved in any work which would harm its prestige.443 In
debating this issue with the Interior Minister the Church hierarchy judged that "it was
a question of prestige for our [Bulgarian] Church to abandon the Greek clergy and to
icduce lliein to beggars."444 Later the Exarchate introduced a programme of enforced
deportation of 'alien populations' from Macedonia and Thrace. In contradicting the
wishes of the Bulgarian government we perceive a very different Bulgarian Church
hierarchy from the one which was eager to cooperate with the government during the
Balkan and Great Wars. The hierarchy now followed its own objectives and in so
doing claimed it was, "protecting the unity of the Bulgarian nation."445
The growing confidence of the Church can be witnessed again in its stand against the
government in opposition to the deportation of Bulgarian Jews to Katowice,
Auschwitz and Treblinka. The number of Bulgarian Jews was small compared with
other European states, numbering 48 400 according to the 1934 census. Bulgaria's
anti-Jewish policies can be traced directly to its alliance with Germany during the
Second World War, beginning with the introduction into her legislature of the Law
for the Defence of the Nation in October 1940. This was aimed generally at
preventing any action against the State but specifically targeted the Jewish
population. The deportation issue entered a critical phase with the arrival in Sofia of
SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Theodor Dannecker in January 1943. The deportation of Jews
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from Thrace and Macedonia began in March 1943 and by the end of the month
11,343 people had been murdered. However, when the deportation of Jews within
Bulgaria was proposed opposition arose. The Metropolitan of Plovdiv contacted the
Bulgarian government to intercede on behalf of the Jewish inhabitants of Plovdiv
vowing to lie across the rails in the path of any train which attempted to deport Jews
from his eparchy.446 Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia warned his king: "Know Boris, that
God watches your actions from heaven."447 The Church even organised a mass
demonstration against the government's anti-Jewish policies on the traditional
Christian holiday of Sts. Kiril and Methodius (24 May 1943). Statements from the
Holy Synod, such as the one directed at the Bulgarian government on 15 November
1940, spoke against the new Law for the Defence of the Nation. It can be proven
therefore that the intervention of the Church certainly assisted the Jewish cause in
Bulgaria saving many thousands from certain death. There is ambiguity, however, in
this stance. The BOC continues to take the moral high ground for their role in
protecting its Jews, a role which was praised once again at the 60th anniversary of the
liberation of Auschwitz, but what of the Jews and Gypsies who perished in
Macedonia and Thrace, after all these lands at this moment in time were under the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church. Despite this there has never been
any mention of remorse from the Bulgarian Church hierarchy for the deaths of over
20,000 Jews and Gypsies from those territories which were deemed by the BOC to
be theirs by holy right.448
The Exarchates programme for the spiritual mobilisation of the Bulgarian nation had
proven successful. So much so that by 26 June 1944 the Holy Synod could state that
the Church acted as a mediator between nation and state and as an interpreter of the
national will before the executive powers and in this role voiced its opposition
against the politics of the Bulgarian government.449 This testified not only to an
evolution in political understanding within the ecclesiastical hierarchy at the end of
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the Second World War but also to the success of the Church in raising its prominence
within Bulgarian society.
5.3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has uncovered an important but generally untouched aspect in the
development of Bulgarian State-Church relations. Although the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church continues to proclaim its central and crucial role in Bulgarian history and an
equitable relationship with Bulgarian State the years from 1878-1945 unveil a
somewhat different story. The Church, far from being raised on a pedestal for its role
during the National Revival period, was increasingly distanced and then restricted
completely from having a voice in national politics. The National Constitution
regulated on the rights of the Bulgarian Church making it dependent on the state.
Therefore, the period from the establishment of the Bulgarian state (1878) to the end
of the Second World War (1944) was extremely difficult for the Church. The
ecclesiastical hierarchy were forced to construct a new model of interrelationship
between Church and State to ensure its survival. Although the State did not desire
close ties with the Church, the Church was clearly indispensable to the State
particularly for fulfilling its aspirations toward national unification and the recreation
of 'Greater Bulgaria'. Being the only national institution which represented the
Bulgarian people outwith the Principality the Orthodox Church became an important
mechanism of Bulgarian geopolitics. Thus, after the separation of the Exarchate and
the Sofia Synod we witness the Exarchate's clergy receiving preferential treatment
from the Bulgarian government to remain in those territories deemed important by
the State. The Bulgarian Church willingly accepted its role as spiritual and national
enlightener, in so doing attempting to strengthen its troubled bond with the Bulgarian
government. The Church fully supported the government in its unification attempts
and even accompanied the military to the battlefront in order to protect and expand
the nation. The desire of the Church to be a central part of the nation cannot be
doubted.
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Bulgaria's Church hierarchy, however, found it increasingly difficult to operate in
the modern world of secular politics. The Exarchate's former position as sole
Bulgarian arbiter on all things spiritual, political and judicial had been taken away
and now the Church found itself powerless in society. When the Church did speak
out against injustice, as in the monarchical crisis of the 1890s, the government
simply threatened complete separation of Church and State. The ecclesiastical
hierarchy therefore had no choice but to be compliant to the desires of the
government in order to survive. However, as a result of subsequent defeats in the
Balkan and Great Wars territorial concessions ensued restricting the Church's
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, enabling the hierarchy to concentrate their efforts on
strengthening the Bulgarian Church within the Principality. In so doing they realised
that to survive as a national institution they had to re-assert their influence upon
Bulgarian society. During the inter-war period, before Second World War, the
Church introduced a new successful strategy permitting them to fully support the
aspirations of the nation, while not entirely conforming to the appeals of State,
therefore increasing their own general popularity within society. Despite the
animosity which existed throughout the period the Bulgarian State remained
protective towards the work of the Bulgarian Church as it continued to be a useful
instrument in Bulgarian foreign affairs. Therefore, at the end of the period
investigated through this chapter the Bulgarian Orthodox Church found itself in an
improved situation from that in 1879. Although remaining voiceless in the national
political forum the Church could now claim to be a true mediator between society
and State. This proves beyond doubt the success of the ecclesiastical commission's
special programme to secure the church's future and re-assert her social significance
in and relationship with the nation. Recognising the improved position of the Church
within society the government acquiesced to the desires of the Church, as seen in
their seven-point concession of 1940. Unfortunately this newly placed confidence in
the Church dissipated when the Soviet Army entered Bulgaria in September 1945.
When the Fatherland Front assumed power later that year fate determined that the
relationship between Church and State would develop very differently.
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CHAPTER SIX
6. THE CHURCH & THE COMMUNIST REGIME (1944-1989)
This chapter will examine the development of Orthodox Church-State relations under
communist administration, from the coup of 9 September 1944 to the regime's fall in
1989. It will focus on the years 1944-1953, a period in which the government
developed policies towards the BOC that would dictate Church-State relations until
1989. This will be achieved by consulting Bulgarian Central State and Central Party
Archives as well as the records of the BOC. The aim of this research is not to analyse
all government policy relating to religion but rather to investigate those policies
which led to the deteriorating situation in which the Church was placed in the
employ of the State. The Communists controlled Bulgaria from 1944-1989, a forty-
five year period in which the Bulgarian Orthodox Church became increasingly
overwhelmed by the materialistic and atheistic policies of the Soviet inspired
government. Even so there remained a discernable Church-State relationship
throughout the period, a relationship which ranged from toleration to cooperation.
This chapter will consider whether the BOC's chosen modus vivendi, was
inescapable or if there was an alternative to the symbiosis of the cross and the
hammer and the sickle.
The Red Army crossed the Danube and entered Bulgaria on 8 September 1944
seizing control of the country the following day. Having supported the Axis Powers
the incumbent Bulgarian government was removed and replaced by the Fatherland
Front (FF), a coalition of four anti-fascist political parties: the Zveno Party, the
Communists, the Agrarians and the Social Democrats. The FF government has
generally been associated with the communist regime. However, it must be
recognised that from the point of view of contemporary society many Bulgarians
considered there to have been a real opportunity for the country to have developed
democratically along a western pattern. An integral part of the new political structure
was the creation of local FF committees, which by the end of 1944 numbered over
seven thousand. Amongst wide ranging powers committees were given the authority
to appoint provincial governors, mayors, police officials and teachers. During the
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first year of FF control a nationwide anti-fascist purge was organised and
coordinated through these local committees. One of the major targets of this purge
was the BOC, accused of collaborating with the Nazi regime. The coup of 9
September fundamentally altered the foundational position of the BOC in the new
Bulgarian State. Although the relationship of the Holy Synod with the previous
government had been strained it had not opposed the introduction of Bulgarian
military in Macedonia and Thrace as this had increased BOC authority. Thus the
Church and its clergy were accused of being fascist sympathisers and enemies of the
new State. Consequently many Orthodox clergy were liquidated during the blood¬
letting which accompanied the anti-fascist purge.450 This purge is commonly
portrayed as being instigated by the communists, however, the Soviet military
authorities had not welcomed violence and insisted on the establishment of People's
Courts to try those accused of collaboration with the previous authorities. In the first
six months following the establishment of courts official statistics record that a large
number of clergy were tried and imprisoned for anti-State activities, while others
were sent to labour camps without sentence.451
The example of the anti-fascist purge highlights one of the initial problems tracing
the political line regarding Church-State relations in Bulgaria under communism
immediately after the war. The terror unleashed against the clergy was not solely the
450 S. Georgiev - Politsa, P.S. Kiselkov - Tryavna, D.G. Rublev - Kustendil, N.Tasev - Kazanluk,
E.P. Vitoshki - Sofia, V.V. Vulkov- Gorna Dubnik, (died 9 September 1944); P.P. Ivanov-
Novoselsko (12 September 1944); N.V. Georgiev - Chirpan (27 September 1944); R. Raev - Gorna
Oryahovo, H.N. Stoimenov - Kustendil, D.Vulkov - Panagurishte (October 1944); S.T.Marinov -
Trun (1 October 1944); G. Atanasov- Pazardjik, P. Davidov- Razlog, I.A. Ivanov- Lovech, S.K.
Rrivoshiev - Sevlievo, S.M. Tafrov - Plovdiv (6 October 1944); I.K Popov - Mudrets (10 October
1944); I.Kabakchiev - Pleven (14 October 1944); A.I. Stamenov - Goma Malina (18 October 1944);
G. Velichkov - Sofia (24 October 1944); N.P. Milenkov - Podgore (January 1945); K.G. Dudevski -
Sopot (20 January 1945); A.V. Andonov - Haskovo, S. Hristov - Nova Zagora (February 1945);
T.P.Hristov - Gorno Oryahovo (15 February 1945); B. Delev - Batak (21 February 1945); P. Kiselov
- Dryanovsko (24 February 1945); I.N. Yotov - Gorna Dubnik (March 1945); M.M Danov - Vidin (4
March 1945); I. Angelov - Lovech (10 March 1945); N.T.Kaladjiev - Chirpan (14 March 1945);
K.M. Dimitrov — Radomir (16 March 1945); V. Dochev - Shumen, D.I. Petrov - Kustendil, I.N.
Tsankov - Popovsko (23 March 1945); L.R. Yurokov - Panagurishte (30 March 1945); A. Kamberov
- Novoselsko (April 1945); A. Yanev - Elhovo (10 April 1945); I. Todorov - Stara Zagora, B.
Vulkanov — Stara Zagora (14 April 1945); P. Vulkanov - Pleven (16 April 1945); I.V. Drenovski -
Bresnitsa (9 September 1945); A. Martinov - Novoselsko (6 October 1945); V. Vulkov - Pleven (9
November 1945): From a Report on the deaths ofOrthodox clergy by the Communist regime -
presented to the Senate Legislation Committee - Subcommittee for Domestic Security, 29 August
1965
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prerogative of the communists but was condoned by all four coalition parties, three
of which had no particular love of communism. Thus although the communists
dominated the FF government under the leadership of Georgi Dimitrov, a one-party
communist system was not imposed until the end of 1947 after the signing of the
Paris Peace Treaty. In retrospect Church-State relations during the period researched
in this chapter fall into three distinct phases, rather than one prolonged period of
unchanging communist rule: the period of coalition rule (1944-1947); the Stalinist
inspired regime (1948-1952); and finally the post-Stalinist phase (1953-1989).
6.1 COALITION RULE (1944-1947)
During this initial phase the communists faced the primary task of converting the FF
coalition into a one-party communist system, whilst simultaneously securing
international recognition of that regime. Imitating Soviet policy Bulgarian
communist leaders, having witnessed Moscow's attitude towards the Russian
Patriarchate, discerned the usefulness and role of the national Church in its regime
legitimising campaign. This inhibited the communists from taking any drastic action
against the BOC during this coalition period. Nevertheless their aims can still be
defined as steering towards separation of church and state. This initial pro-church
position presented opportunity for the Holy Synod and the FF coalition to deal with a
number of major unsolved problems within the BOC - above all the election of an
Exarch and the lifting of the schism.452
6.1.1 THE ELECTION OF EXARCH STEFAN (21 January 1945)
Stoyan Georgiev Shokov was born in 1878 in the Rhodope village of Shiroka Luka.
From 1893 he studied in the Samokov Seminary later attending the Kiev Theological
Academy. In 1904 he took the monastic pledge and accepted the name Stefan. Later
that year he was appointed as Exarchal Protosingel in Constantinople and from that
moment accompanied Exarch Josef everywhere until his death in 1915. Following
Exarch Josefs death Stefan left to further his theological education in Switzerland.
452 The BOC had been without an Exarch since the death of Exarch Josef in 1915. The schism was
proclaimed by the Constantinople Patriarchate in September 1872
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Whilst studying there Stefan was brought to the attention of Bulgarian diplomatic
staff in Berne to assist them in making contacts with western churches. The
following year Stefan was asked to join the Bulgarian political delegation which
signed the Neuilly Peace Treaty.453 In 1921 he was promoted to the position of
Metropolitan ofMartsianopol and the following year was elected as Metropolitan of
Sofia.
He had rapidly emerged as one of the most prominent figures in the BOC.
Undoubtedly contacts with western diplomats contributed to the speed of his
advancement after 9 September 1944 and as one of the founders of the Bulgarian
ecumenical movement he was in regular contact with international Church leaders.
He also had a level of political acumen and was not afraid to express his opinions.
For example, when Tsar Boris was married according to Roman Catholic rite Stefan
insisted that his monarch also receive an Orthodox service of blessing which he
personally performed in Sofia's Nevski Cathedral. Stefan had also been openly
opposed to the militarastic union of Bulgaria with Nazi Germany and had played a
central role in protecting Bulgaria's Jewry. He was close political friends with the
leadership of the FF government, including Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev
Stoyanov and Minister of Defence Damyan Velchev. Apart from politics Stefan had
been a long standing member of the Bulgarian Holy Synod both as Exarch
Protosingel and Metropolitan. All of these factors contributed to the prominence of
Stefan and as one of the most appropriate figures to lead the BOC.
His first recorded public statement was heard on Radio Sofia in 1944. In an address
entitled, 'The Spirit is not Extinguished' he expressed his desire for the development
and progress, not only of the new Bulgarian State, but of the BOC. He shared the
belief that from that moment the two institutions should work together for the
happiness and future prosperity of the Bulgarian nation. He considered that the FF
government should serve, not wield power, and was categorical that the BOC
"cannot and should not be outside the purview of the loyalty, needs and love which
the FF government have shown as the ideal for tomorrow's Bulgaria." The main part
453 WJA, f.791k, op.l, a.e.29, Report of the Holy Synod, No.l 1 from 20 April 1918
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of his address was given over to the changing international situation of Bulgaria and
stated that the nation, "should receive from the Soviet Union and her allies a real
possibility to work in peace to progress in their work and demonstrate their
recognition, loyalty and love toward their greatest benefactor... who first offered
them an olive branch." For this reason he declared that Bulgaria should be strongly
united with Mother Russia.454
Simultaneously the church newspaper Tsurkoven vestnik published a series of articles
entitled, 'The Message of Stefan Metropolitan of Sofia to the Russian People.'455 He
emphasised that the years during which Bulgaria was an ally of Nazi Germany were
"years of heavy and ruinous slavery in our land, that have devastated and corrupted
our morals!" He concluded by proclaiming that Nazism had been the enemy of the
entire Slavonic race and should be crushed by Russia, America and Great Britain.
However two statements should draw special attention to this message. Firstly where
he writes:
Bulgaria saw a lucky omen in this, that in Moscow, at the heart of our
liberators and not elsewhere, should be achieved justice for our nation...,
and secondly where Stefan comments:
Our nation hopes that the illustrious and great Russian nation from
today will rule over the family of Slavonic nations as a genuine elder
brother, and under its wise and mighty influence the smaller Slavonic
nations will not lose their identity or their national ideals, but should
unite together in family unity to strengthen their awareness of their
Slavonic unity.
He was categorical that the fate of the Bulgarian people should be decided in
Moscow. The question is frequently asked of these statements, how much did Stefan
accommodate to the wishes of the coalition government, or where these comments
completely his own inspiration? Although rising quickly through the ranks of
Orthodox hierarchy Stefan was subordinate to the presiding chairman of the Holy
454
Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia, 'The Spirit is not Extinguished', Radio Sofia, broadcast 19
September 1944
455
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Synod, Metropolitan Neofit of Vidin (during the period when the position of Exatch
was vacant Chairman of the Holy Synod was the highest position in the BOC). Thus
it would have been expected that Neofit's would have been the prominent voice
within the Church. His activities never received the publicity of Stefan's. Take for
example a letter ofNeofit's dated 20 September 1944 in which he welcomed the new
authorities and expressed the full support of the BOC for the government. This letter
was disregarded and has remained neglected within Church archives.456 Why were
Stefan's words, basically the remarks of a deputy, promoted as the voice of the BOC
over and above those of its leader? Later events may explain this enigma.
On 3 October 1944, Neofit Metropolitan of Vidin resigned as Chairman of the Holy
Synod and also as a member of the Synod. On 14 October the Synod communicated
this situation to Prime Minister Stoyanov and on 16 October they elected Stefan as
the new Chairman of the Bulgarian Holy Synod.457 On 20 October 1944 the new
Chairman visited the Soviet legation in Sofia where he received a letter from the
Russian Patriarch (dated 5 October 1944), which was addressed personally to
'Metropolitan Stefan, Chairman of the Holy Synod'. However, on 5 October 1944
Stefan still remained an ordinary Synodal member. The Patriarchal message suggests
that the appointment of Stefan had been agreed in advance by Moscow.
On 18 December 1944 the FF permitted the Holy Synod to conduct elections for a
new Exarch and a Church-Electoral Council. The government, however, took the
unprecedented action of amending the laws connected with the election of an Exarch,
allowing not only ecclesiastical delegates but also governmental delegates on to the
electoral council (the Foreign Minister, the Chairman of the Treasury, a
representative from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the Director of Religious
Affairs and three other representatives from the FF). According to official procedure,
seven days before the election the Holy Synod in a private vote would choose three
Metropolitans as candidates to the Exarchal throne. These names would be passed on
to the Foreign Minister for governmental approval, after which the Synod would
456
IIJIA, f.791k, op.2, a.e.40, Letter addressed to Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev on behalf of the
Holy Synod.
457 Statutes ofthe Holy Synod, No.22, 17 October 1944
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convene a National Church Council. 75% of the National Council would have to be
in attendance for any vote to take place and a 66% majority would be required to be
elected as Exarch. After the vote was completed the Synod would notify the Foreign
Minister again who would sanction the induction of the new Exarch. The electoral
procedure would be finalised when the Exarch declared an oath of allegiance to the
Bulgarian State.
The significance of the new regulations are realised only after considering a
document from the archives of the Bulgarian Communist Party. This is in the form of
a telegram sent by T.Kostov (Chairman of the Party in Bulgaria) to G.Dimitrov
(leader of the Bulgarian Communists resident in Moscow) on 25 December 1944:
"The decision has been taken to elect Metropolitan Stefan as Exarch and for him to
attend the Church Council in Moscow as head of the Bulgarian Church."458 This
decision of State preceded the Church election by almost a month. Therefore the
announcement of those standing for election, the convocation of a National Church
Council and the election itself were merely scenery for the clandestine activities of
the communists. Thus when the National Church Council met for the election on 21
January 1945 it comes as no surprise to find that Stefan was approved by an 84/90
majority.
In his acceptance speech Exarch Stefan pointed to the cause which had made his
election possible, the political changes of 9 September 1944. For him the FF was not
only political doctrine but "a kiss of life for the Bulgarian nation," which had created
the conditions for the restoration of harmonious relationships between Church and
State. He then turned his attention to the government declaring "We are with you,
our faith will not be an obstacle to your work."459 It would appear that the
endorsement and election of Exarch Stefan had been engineered not only by the
Bulgarian government but also from Moscow.
L(17A, f. 1, op.7, a.e.180
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6.1.2 THE LIFTING OF THE SCHISM (22 February 1945)
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Alongside the BOC the FF government inherited an ecclesiastical schism which had
remained unresolved for over 70 years. Less than a year after coming to power,
however, the proclamation of schism upon the BOC had been revoked. On 28
February 1870 an Ottoman firman had restored the BOC under the form of an
Exarchate. The resulting document had raised questions regarding which eparchies
came under the jurisdiction of the new Church creating contradictions between the
Exarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as both claimed jurisdiction over the
eparchies of Macedonia and Thrace. The ensuing disagreement led to the
proclamation that the BOC was schismatic on the grounds of philetism.
Initially schism had not troubled the Bulgarian Church, as it had allowed its leaders
opportunity to organise the Church without outside interference. Flowever, after the
Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) and particularly following the Unification of the
Principality with Eastern Rumelia (1885) the schism began to weigh heavily on
Bulgarian church life. All attempts to remove it were unsuccessful, the fundamental
reason being the problem of transferring the headquarters of the Exarchate from
Istanbul to Sofia. The Bulgarians had been adamant that the Seat of the Exarchate
must remain in Istanbul because only from there had the Exarchate been successful
in defending the interests of the Bulgarian population which remained outwith
Bulgaria's independent borders. In this way Orthodox Bulgarians from the
Principality, Eastern Rumelia, Macedonia and Thrace remained under the jurisdiction
of the Bulgarian Exarchate, despite the fact that its citizens resided in different
national States. That is why the BOC became the figurehead for the movement to
restore Greater Bulgaria.
At the end ofWWII the re-allotment of the Balkans into zones of influence between
the USSR and her allies changed that situation. For the new Bulgarian authorities the
solving of this ecclesiastical problem became politically important, necessitating the
merger of church eparchies within Bulgaria's national borders. This would cease
opportunity for interference from external factors, such as the Ecumenical
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Patriarchate and at the same time would make the BOC increasingly dependent upon
the State. Therefore at the end of WWII the loss of Macedonia and Thrace was
deemed an acceptable sacrifice and a final resolution to the question of the schism a
real possibility.
The minutes of the Holy Synod and its correspondence with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate reveal the mechanisms used to achieve resolution of this problem. On 21
November 1944 the Synod took the first step by sending a letter to the Russian
Patriarchate requesting it to mediate between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the
Ecumenical Patriarchate in their attempt to lift the schism.460 It was no accident that
on the very day of the election of the Bulgarian Exarch the Synod announced the
momentous decision to transfer the seat of the Exarchate from Istanbul to Sofia,
removing the fundamental obstacle for the removal of the schism.461 Thus when the
Ecumenical Patriarch was informed of the election of Exarch Stefan he was also
presented with an official request for a restoration of 'fraternal and canonical
relations' between the Holy Ecumenical Patriarchate and the BOC. To accept this
request the Constantinople Patriarchate would have to recognise and accept the
Bulgarian Church as being fully autocephalous and would therefore require revoking
the schism. Therefore after receiving the request a BOC delegation was invited to
Istanbul to undertake negotiations for the removal of the schism.
The Patriarchate was represented by four delegates and the negotiations were chaired
by Maxim Metropolitan of Halkidiki. After an initial synopsis of the history of the
schism Sofroni Metropolitan ofTumovo spoke:
I want to emphasise that the Bulgarian Holy Synod, clergy and nation
on 21 January in Sofia elected a new head of the BOC, His Beatitude
Exarch Stefan with his residence in the capital of the Bulgarian kingdom
- Sofia, not in Istanbul, as was the case with previous Bulgarian
Exarch's. This fact I believe is significant as it gives assurance to the
Ecumenical Patriarchate of the good spirit and new direction of the BOC,
460 nC, No.5 from 21 January 1945
461 FIC, No.6 from 22 January 1945
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to open the way to facilitate the restoration of canonical relations
between the two churches.462
With the main obstacle removed a special sitting of the Patriarchal Holy Synod was
convened on 22 February 1945 which resolved to reverse the condemnation of
schism pronounced on the BOC in 1872, to restore canonical relations between the
two churches and finally to declare the autocephaly of the BOC.463
6.1.3 CONSOLIDATION AND COOPERATION
Following the election of Stefan as Bulgarian Exarch and the revoking of the schism
relations between Church and State developed in two directions: consolidating
connections between Church and State and drawing closer to the Russian Orthodox
Church. In the first few months of the FF government there are no records of any
particular contradictions or conflicts between the BOC and the new authorities, apart
from the fascist element which the government maintained remained within the
BOC. This is illustrated in a letter from Georgi Dimitrov (Moscow) to Traicho
Kostov (Sofia) dated 21 October 1944:
For now it is unnecessary to raise the question of separating Church
and State. Now we need to prepare by means of the FF Committee's to
tactfully eliminate the churches pro-German and Nazi orientated Church
workers.464
Following this correspondence the FF implemented a judicial policy directed against
clergy with fascist connections. The People's Court accordingly sentenced over 90
clergy finding them guilty of criminal connections which had led to conflict between
Church and State.
During this initial period the BOC openly supported the initiatives of the coalition








whether they deviated from the government's political plan. This is testified in
another communique between Dimitrov and Kostov from 13 November 1944:
Comrade Traicho, our neighbours have information from Sofia that
the head of the Bulgarian militia Glavinchev is a Macedonian
nationalist, and a former terrorist. Begin the work for his arrest, but use
discretion in this task, and ignore the instructions of the Central
Committee of our Party. At this present time Glavinchev is preparing to
arrest every member of the Holy Synod, with the exception of
Metropolitan Stefan, for this reason, the Synod in 1944, in their appeal to
the government on questions of domestic and foreign politics, expressed
their opposition to the partisan movement... The arrest of members of
the Synod will no doubt produce a negative impression from amongst the
members of the coalition parties against our own Party... Therefore be
aware of the treacherous provocateurs who desire to discredit our
Communist Party.465
Dimitrov's mention of 'neighbours' refers to the intelligence activities of the KGB in
Bulgaria who were of the same opinion as the BCP that the BOC were central to
achieving their political goals in Bulgaria. This communication reveals the power
struggle which was occurring during this initial period between the Communists and
the other FF Parties. It is interesting that the communists did not allow the arrest of
the Holy Synod, as it would be seen to harm their image, while the other party's
sought to undertake the judicial anti-fascist purge of the clergy. Dimitrov continued
sending orders from Moscow regarding the Church and on 18 December 1944
dispatched the following instruction:
We do not have any interest in forcing the question of separating
Church and State. Our efforts at this moment need only to be directed
towards putting the BOC in the service of the FF authorities. And this is
perfectly attainable... 466
In an effort to achieve this goal a special Communist Party committee was
established. By the end ofMay 1945, however, a problem between Church and State
emerged. Traicho Kostov reported that the Church Committee had decided to take a
more direct approach in the running of the Church as they wanted to democratise the
l(IJA, f.l, op.7, a.e.l 17
466
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Church and limit the rights of the Exarch who was beginning to exhibit the
tendencies of an anti-communist and anglophile political agitator.467
This allegation reveals some important truths about Exarch Stefan, particularly as the
implication behind his election victory had been that he was a communist plant. It
appears that although his election was engineered, it was not because of his
communist sympathies but because Stefan was generally a most useful and
acceptable figure to head the BOC. Indeed, Georgi Dimitrov himself commented on
Stefan "I consider him a sly person, but at this moment to be a useful person."468 No
admirer of communism perhaps, Stefan was still eager to create strong connections
between Bulgarian and Russian Churches. Stefan saw in the Russian Church a model
for the BOC's relations with the Bulgarian government and believed it to be a
potential protector. Hence on his visit to Moscow in June 1945 to attend the
installation of the new Patriarch, Exarch Stefan raised the theme of Orthodox unity,
expressing his hope that the Russian Orthodox Church would rescue the East, calling
the new Moscow Patriarch "leader of all Slavonic Orthodox Churches."469 On his
return from Russia Stefan addressed a personal letter to the leader of the Bulgarian
communists reporting not only on his visit but also on the decision of a recent
Bulgarian Church conference to "support the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria." He
continued: "We completed this work unanimously and enthusiastically for the glory
ofRussia and with fervent loyalty to the new state of the FF.. ,"47
From this document we see the Exarch having direct contract with Dimitrov
promising the support of the BOC. He comprehended that Dimitrov was the key
figure behind the FF government who determined domestic and international
political questions concerning the destiny of Bulgaria. Although no admirer of
communism he accepted that his role and future of the Church meant involvement
with the communists. These documents prove invaluable as they reveal the aims of
the Communist Party leadership and the hopes of the BOC. They show the delicate
IJIIA, f. 1, op.7, a.e.346
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condition of relations between Church and State in the first months of the FF
government, attempting to survive the anti-fascist purge whilst being fully supportive
of government initiatives. Under Soviet military control, however, could the
direction of Bulgarian politics ever have been in doubt? As the communists garnered
power the policies of the coalition fell into line with Soviet politics. In this situation
the FF government took its first steps to curtail the role of the Church in Bulgaria by
infiltrating the parish clergy, instigating a power struggle between the lower and
higher clergy and by removing religious education from schools.
6.1.4 THE PRIEST'S UNION
In their efforts to curtail the Church the communist's realised that by altering the
balance of power, by increasing the authority of the lower clergy and laity and
correspondingly decreasing the influence of the Holy Synod, the ensuing power
struggle could fulfil their concept of creating a truly democratic 'people's church'.
To achieve this they had to infiltrate and instigate change within the parish clergy.
The organ of the Church chosen for this purpose was the Priest's Union (PU). The
PU had been established in the summer of 1903 as a professional and charitable
organisation of the Bulgarian clergy. However, after the coup of 9 September 1944
the raison d'etre of the Union changed.
At the time of the coup the Secretary of the PU had been Father Dimitar Andreev.
Due to the allied bombing campaign of Sofia the Board of the PU had been unable to
meet for nine months. Therefore by the time they convened on 7 October 1944 the
political coup had already occurred. The meeting turned out to be lengthy and
turbulent lasting two days. In his initial address Andreev emphasised that the coup
d'etat should be considered as a revolutionary act and explained to his compatriots
that the FF government was already talking about reforms within the Church.471 The
main topic discussed over the two days was, what should the attitude of the PU be to
the new political situation. After examining the government's proposals for Church
471 IMA, f.509, op. 1, a.e.25,1.135-136
219
reform the Board issued a statement declaring that although the PU was an apolitical
472
organisation it would support the new authorities.
Despite offering their support a second meeting of clergy convened in Sofia (12
October) which concluded:
We need to immediately seize from their hands, the administration,
accounts, and work of the Union and pass them into the hands of others,
more contemporary and imbued with the spirit of the new time.473
Accordingly a Temporary Committee was elected to govern and lead the PU's
activities in this new political era. On 17 October 1944 the FF government approved
the reports and actions of this reactionary gathering and officially appointed the
Temporary Committee to govern the PU led by Dimitar Kotsaliev.474 On 24 October
it was announced that the former Secretary Dimitar Andreev would be transferred to
i 475
another post.
In the months following the takeover the new PU Board produced a programme of
activities for the Union encompassing two basic goals: to support the principle of
'people's rule' in Bulgaria and to implement reforms within the BOC. The XXVII
Congress (4-6 June 1945) was the first national convocation of the newly established
PU. Although representatives from the Holy Synod had attended previous
Congresses they declined from attending this one. Exarch Stefan commented that the
emergence of serious differences and contradictions between the hierarchy of the
BOC and the leadership of the PU made their attendance impossible. The
introductory speech of D.Kotsaliev set the tone for the Congress:
On 9 September our nation was removed from the chains of long years
of oppression - political, economical and spiritual. From this date we
begin to build a new freedom, an independent and democratic Bulgaria.
m(A, op.cit., 1.138
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He then appealed for:
Commitment to the historical and epoch-making changes... we are
ready to understand correctly the spirit of the new time... we are capable
of active participation in the construction of FF Bulgaria. Only then will
we receive a place in the societal life of the new State.476
At its conclusion the Congress delegates sent a telegram to the National Committee
of the FF assuring them that the Bulgarian clergy would support every effort of the
government in the building of a new liberated and prosperous people's Bulgaria.477
The central question during the Congress, however, had not been whether or not to
support the State, but rather to debate the future direction and actions of the PU. The
question was raised by Georgi Bogdanov, Chairman of the Committee for
Recommendations on Control and Reform of the BOC. He proposed that Board
members of the PU be granted the same constitutional rights as bishops and that the
lower clergy be granted a greater voice in the administration of the BOC, thus
realising the demands of the FF that the BOC truly become "the people's church". It
was explained that if accepted the changes meant that the BOC would be ordered and
governed only by the lower clergy. The Holy Synod refused to enter into
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negotiations with the PU on this matter. In agreement with these proposals the
Congress elected a nine member governing council under new chairman, Georgi
Bogdanov, who incidentally had been a member of the Communist Party since 1923.
Through early 1946 Bogdanov and the Board of the PU clarified their project to
establish the BOC as a "democratic and progressive institute". To achieve this goal
they proposed the creation of a Supreme Church Council, composed of parish clergy
and laity, who would take away a large part of the functions of the Holy Synod.479
The XXVIII Congress of the PU (26-27 July 1946) sanctioned these proposals by re¬
electing Bogdanov and his Board. By the end of 1946 the relationship between the
PU and the Holy Synod had reached a critical point. In a report to the Central
476








Committee of the Communist Party the PU charged the Holy Synod of holding
"reactionary opinions" and of having negative attitudes towards the more progressive
clergy who they considered to be members of the Communist Party. The most
prominent report, however, concerned Exarch Stefan, who was assessed by
Bogdanov as a "pronounced reactionary, antagonistic to every reform in the Church
and hostile to every good, democratic and progressive church employee."480 The
following year the PU tried unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with the Holy
Synod on the democratisation of the BOC. During its XXIX Congress the PU
delegates once again supported the demand for "complete democratisation of the
BOC," in which the parish clergy and laity would be given "equal share in the
A Q 1
government, organisation and life of the Church.'
However, after the Paris Peace Conference in 1947 Bulgaria's international and
domestic political situation altered significantly, permitting the BCP freedom to
construct a new Constitution which would permit the construction of a socialist
society separating Church and State. In this evolving situation the Holy Synod agreed
to work in cooperation with the State authorities.482 Therefore, although the PU
continued to demonstrate complete loyalty to the policies of the government its
raison d'etre became defunct and thus became an organisation superfluous to
requirement.
By decision of the Politburo the XXXII Congress of the PU in 1950 did not take
place. The reason provided for its non-event was continued conflict between the PU
40-5
and the Holy Synod. In light of the new political situation the continuation of
conflict succeeded in bringing about the removal of Georgi Bogdanov as the
Chairman of the Union in 1951. His replacement, Ivan Yuliev, was elected with full
agreement of the Holy Synod.484 It is obvious that during his period in office Georgi
Bogdanov had performed his assigned tasks to the letter but in the new political
climate his leadership became unnecessary. From 1944 the PU had actively fought
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for the Communist Party within the structures of the BOC, to subject the Church to
the new regime. When this problem was resolved in 1947 the need for the PU
dissolved. The Priest's Union continued but deprived of its political raison d'etre had
to reinvent itself as a socialist cultural-educational organisation within the Church
publishing reports, lectures and essays under the direction of the State authorities.
6.1.5 THE REMOVAL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION FROM SCHOOLS
One of the major steps the FF government took to precipitate the separation of
Church and State was the removal of religious instruction from Bulgaria's school
network. Ecclesiastical involvement in education, which had once been considered
vital in establishing national awareness, particularly after the Liberation (1878) was
now considered an anachronism opposed to the cultural development of a socialist
Bulgaria and was therefore maligned by the communists. Immediately after the coup
of 9 September 1944 the Ministry for People's Education (MPE) released a memo
stating that religious instruction would be withdrawn from the school programme, as
would the reading of prayers before and after school, arguing that "religious
instruction is strongly divisive due to its reactionary aims and in the view of the FF
authorities it appears to be an obstacle to the implementation of education."485
Although disapproving of these actions the Holy Synod did not react hastily to
political manoeuvring. One of the reasons for their restraint was the guarantee given
them within the Bulgarian Constitution, particularly article 80, which insured the
Holy Synod special rights in the area of religious education in Bulgaria.
Constitutionally the government could not prohibit religious instruction. Thus in
response the MPE issued another memo in May 1945 entitled, 'Concerning the
Optional Teaching of Religious Instruction in Primary Schools and Junior High
Schools.' On paper this appeared to answer the concerns of the Church, as
guaranteed in the Constitution. In practice, however, the new provisions continued to
hinder the BOC. The Church was still deprived of teaching in secondary schools, the
hours they could teach elsewhere were reduced, but the important word in the memo
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was 'optional' as this created a loophole for local school authorities, appointed by the
FF. The word 'optional' enabled them to frustrate the implementation of religious
education under the pretext of having other obligations to the students, therefore by¬
passing constitutional requirements.486
Despite this setback the Floly Synod received an unexpected bonus at the beginning
of the following school year (1945/46) when they were informed that the BOC could
use vacant school rooms for the purposes of religious education.487 This resulted
from the tolerant position towards the Church held by the newly appointed Minister
of Education, Stoyan Kosturkov (29 September 1945 - 31 March 1945). He was a
leading member of the Social Democratic Party and although a member of the FF
coalition opposed the growing influence of the communists. The power struggle
within the coalition government enabled the BOC to persevere with religious
education during that school year. Unfortunatley Stoyan Kosturkov was soon
replaced as Minister of Education, under the pretence of failing health, by Dr. R.
Angelov, a member of the Communist Party. With his induction communist policy
was reinstated and religious instruction brought to an end with the proclamation of
Edict No. 151 from 15 January 1946:
Every Bulgarian citizen is free to confess any religion. To secure this
freedom and to remove unavoidable conflict and disturbances in
connection with religion and religious education I ORDER that schools
are to remain completely neutral towards religion. Religious instruction,
433under whatever form shall not be permitted....
Exarch Stefan voiced his opposition in a letter to Prime Minister Georgiev,
demanding that Edict No. 151 be repealed. He also expressed hope that the
government would respond to "the wishes of the Bulgarian people... to educate their
children in religion."489 Petko Stainov, Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of
the Zveno Party (9 September 1944 - 31 March 1946) supported the BOC in this
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undertakings of the MPE to be wrong and harmful and must be revoked or
modified."490
In an attempt to silence the growing voice of opposition the State security services
characterised Church education and clergy before the National Committee of the FF
in this manner:
They actively work for the conversion of school age children... The
pulpit is used as a platform to address their criticisms against the FF and
their policies, reinforcing this with God's words and stating that the
authorities are acting against God. They speak against our Young Pioneer
Organisation. They are turning Christian society into a reactionary
force....491
Thus when the National Committee of the FF convened to consider matters
surrounding Edict No.151 they came to the conclusion that religion was totally
incompatible with education and agreed that it had no place in Bulgarian schools.492
The opposition of the BOC, the Education Minister and the Foreign Minister were
either ignored, or the person in question removed from the equation. Thus when
Exarch Stefan met with Prime Minister Georgiev in July 1946 he reported back to
the Synod that the Church had no option but to accept the decision of the government
on the removal of religious education from the Bulgarian school network 493
In their increased efforts to separate religion from societal life the FF government
also introduced a new law on marriage. This made civil marriage ceremonies the
only legally recognised method of union, at the expense of the Church service
(March 1946). It appears that as the Communist Party consolidated power within the
coalition the process to separate Church and State increased. Thereafter the
government took control of church buildings which were used for charitable
purposes and then removed every aspect of charitable work from the jurisdiction of
the church. In this manner the FF authorities, dominated by the Communist Party,
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applied pressure on the BOC to subordinate it to the greater aims of the Party. It is
important to emphasise that the aim was not to destroy but to transform the BOC.
6.1.6 GEORGI DIMITROV AND THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
The importance of the BOC for the Communist Party was explained in a speech
given by BCP leader Georgi Dimitrov from 1946 in which he laid the foundations for
the socialist State's acceptance and even support of the Church as a national
institution. On 26 May 1946 the millennial commemoration of the death of St. Ivan
Rilski was celebrated in Rila Monastery. The Bulgarian Communist Party leader and
Chairman of the Central Committee of the FF, Georgi Dimitrov, participated in this
event by giving a speech entitled, 'The Bulgarian Church's Role and Tasks.'494 After
the initial political machinations of the coalition authorities Dimitrov's speech set the
agenda for future relations between the State and the BOC. In view of the length of
his speech, which bore the mark of his time in the Soviet Union where he served as
General Secretary of the Comintern (1935-1943), this section will concentrate on the
significance of the speech for the BOC's relationship with socialism. It is here for the
first time that we comprehend the State's distinction between the Church as a
historical and a national institution.
A major section of Dimitrov's speech concentrated on the significance of the BOC
within Bulgarian history. He honoured the Church for its historical efforts in
preserving national self-awareness in the Bulgarian people during the era of
Ottomanization and Hellenization, stressing that there would be no democratic
Bulgaria if the BOC had not protected the nation from oblivion. For this reason he
expressed the gratitude of both the FF and the Communists to the national Church of
Bulgaria.495 After praising the BOC's historical mission he turned to the
contemporary situation and its demands on the Church and discussed the long-term
expectations regarding the relationship between Church and State. He demanded
total obedience from the Church in following the new political direction stating that
by doing so the Church would live up to its patriotic past. He challenged the Church
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to support the government's plan to abolish the monarchy and establish a republican
constitution. For this reason he ordered the ecclesiastical hierarchy to desist from
praying for the monarchy during the liturgy.496 Moving on from this point Dimitrov
delivered his expectation that the BOC would become the true church of the people,
accepting the republican and progressive policies of the State. He stated that he did
not want only declarations of loyalty from the BOC but action.497
The Communist Party leader's congenial tone then faltered as he criticised the
members of the Holy Synod for being people with 'ossified minds and deeply
conservative views,' who needed to move forward with the times. To make himself
unambiguously clear he alluded to the fate of the Russian Church at the time of the
October Revolution, suggesting that if the leaders of the Church had supported the
people rather than the counterrevolution the Russian Church would not have had to
endure its unfortunate fate. To emphasise the point further Dimitrov concluded his
speech by addressing himself directly to the hierarchy of the Bulgarian Church,
encouraging them to learn from the Russian experience for only by doing so would
there be unity between Church and State.498
Dimitrov's praise and acknowledgement of the BOC's national significance
determined a pattern of acceptance and even support for the BOC in comparison with
other religious institutions. He also clearly stated, however, the limitations which the
Church hierarchy would have to operate under or face disastrous consequences. The
speech revealed that as a religious institution the BOC was presently not in harmony
with the aims of the new government and particularly the communist's who held
power within the coalition. Within this seminal discourse the BOC would find its
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Throughout the period of coalition rule the government had worked in accordance
with the National Constitution (Turnovo, 1879). In preserving the Constitution they
required to adhere to Article 39, according to which the State in its relationship to the
Church was subordinate to the Holy Synod. Consequently the BCP avoided raising
the question of separation of Church and State favouring to conduct its policies
toward "putting the BOC in the employ of the FF authorities."499 Nevertheless,
following the referendum on the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment
of republican government (September 1946) the FF government was able to candidly
place on their agenda the constitutional separation of Church and State.500
The Holy Synod attempted to impede separation by seeking guarantees which would
regulate relations between Church and State in any constitutional review. The Synod
saw no objective reason to separate Church and State, however, as this was a
probability they wanted the new Constitution to preserve the rights and freedoms of
the Church.501 In connection with this the Holy Synod convened an extraordinary
Church Assembly in Rila Monastery (1 November 1946) to discuss the draft bill of
the new Constitution. The delegates accepted a report to be sent on behalf of the
BOC to the Bulgarian National Assembly. It emphasised the historical service of the
BOC to the Bulgarian nation and State and pointed to the words of Prime Minister
Georgiev who had defined the BOC as "the true national Church," and to the
comments of Georgi Dimitrov when he expressed the gratitude of both the FF and
the Communist Party to the patriotic clergy of the BOC.502 The report proposed
making textual alterations to the draft bill: To amend Article 63, the article of
separation, by adding to it that the BOC was still acknowledged by the State to be a
legal entity in public law503; secondly, the Synod proposed that "the BOC should
benefit from the liberty of internal self-government, in cult, in doctrine and in
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finance," and then contradicted this by suggesting that the State should assist in
subsidising the Church.504
The report was signed by every Bulgarian bishop and delivered to Georgi Dimitrov.
Afterwards Foreign Minister Georgi Kulishov promised that the Church report would
be examined by the Parliamentary Commission editing the Constitution. On 11
March 1947 the chairman of the Parliamentary Commission stated that any attempt
to preserve the old Constitution, according to which the dominant faith in Bulgaria
was Eastern Orthodoxy, would contradict the new Constitution concerning its
guarantees of freedom of conscience and religious liberty. Therefore every proposal
put forward by the BOC was rejected and on 4 December 1947 the new 'Dimitrov
Constitution' was unanimously accepted officially separating Church and State.
By the end of this first phase of communist control the government had secured the
internal autonomy of the BOC, not for the benefit of the Church but rather to allow
the State free hand to intervene in Church matters without external interference.
Manipulating people loyal to the government into positions of ecclesiastical authority
the communists were able to pass laws on education and marriage facilitating the
move towards full separation. The most important development for Church-State
relations was the introduction of the 'Dimitrov' Constitution whereby the Bulgarian
Communist Party gained complete control of the FF and freedom to implement
Stalinist inspired policy in Bulgaria.
6.2 THE STALINIST REGIME (1947-1953)
The new Constitution launched the second era of the communist regime. After
receiving international recognition of its one-party State a series of tough measures
against the BOC were designed not only to press home its separation but to make it
completely subordinate to the State. The fresh wave of repression which surged
against the clergy, ending with the removal of Stefan from the Exarchal throne,




compliant cadaver. Two documents from the Party archives illustrate the State's
intentions towards the BOC during this period and explain the decision of the Holy
Synod to support the communist regime. The first is a Report from General Yonko
Panov, Deputy Minister of the Interior in charge of State Security from 1949; the
second is the Report of Anton Yugov, Minister of the Interior, to the Central
Committee of the BCP. The Reports discussed the political state of affairs in the
BOC, specifically the attitudes of the Holy Synod towards the communist
government and proposed how to deal with the situation.
6.2.1 REPRESSION OF THE CLERGY
From 1944 to 1953 three separate waves of repression rose against the clergy. The
first had been the anti-fascist purge which occurred over the first twelve months of
coalition rule. Apart from the many priests who were murdered during the chaos of
that period, a further one hundred and fifty-two were sentenced by the People's
Court, thirteen sentenced to death and another thirteen to life imprisonment. During
the same period forty-five members of the Holy Synod were arrested, twenty-five
disappearing without trace.505
A second and very different wave of repression hit the clergy from 1948 onwards.
This took the form of infiltrating people loyal to the government into senior positions
of Church administration. For example, an edict from the Directorate of Religious
Affairs (DRA) withdrew authority from Bishops to appoint their own deputies,
making it compulsory for those deputies to be appointed by the government.506 The
Synod's attempts to reach a compromise over these appointments, "to combine with
the DRA" failed because the State wanted prerogative on who be appointed to these
influential Church administrative positions. D.Iliev, Director of the DRA,
commented that these structures had in the past concealed hardened enemies of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria and for this reason the Ministry of the Interior viewed
the question of deputies as one of the issues which would determine either a good or
505
D.Kalkandjieva, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church andNationalDemocracy, (Silistra, 2002), p. 184
506
UJJA, f.791k, op.l, a.e.176, Letter from the Director ofReligious Affairs to the Holy Synod, 2
December 1948
230
bad relationship between the BOC and the National Council. Iliev cited, as an
example of a good working relationship between Church and State, the words of
Russian Patriarch Sergi from 16 July 1927:
Church workers who do not approve of the relationship between
Church and State, should abandon ecclesiastical life, and not be an
obstacle to the life of the Russian Orthodox Church.507
The DRA informed the Synod that the appointment of deputy's would be executed
through State administrative channels as the Church had previously refused to accept
their decision. This obstructive stance resulted in over 200 members of the clergy
being accused of opposition activities against the People's Republic of Bulgaria. One
of those accused, Father Ilia Lupanov responded:
I have forty-two years of service as a teacher, parish priest and
Bishop's Deputy. Throughout that time I have been an active leader with
the responsibility to instruct other Church leaders. From then until now I
have not belonged to any political organisation. I have always been loyal
to the ruling authorities. Until 9 September 1944 I served, as did every
citizen, as an employee of the fascist powers, I never spoke against it, but
neither did I insult the partisan movement.
Father Lupanov concluded by saying that from September 1944 on he had been
totally loyal to the People's Republic.508 Many of those accused during this wave of
repression, such as Father Lupanov, were later released without charge. The stigma
of accusation, however, was never forgotten as those clergy were branded anti-
communist and pro-fascist. In consequence they were denied the opportunity to work
and were thus fated to a life of poverty and isolation.
A third wave of political repression commenced in 1950 affecting every level of
clergy but targeted the ecclesiastical hierarchy. This was applied by placing the
administrative services of the Church under governmental control, including the
allocation of pensions. As a consequence not every member of the clergy who
reached the age of retirement automatically received their pension. Individual cases
507




were brought before a Pension Commission (1950-1953), part of the Regional
People's Council ofWorkers. The archives show that during this period thirty-three
Archpriests, eleven eparchy Treasurers, ten Archimandrites, eight Abbots and five
Protosingels were denied their pensions.509
Investigation of the archives also revealed documents testifying to judicial forms of
repression against individual Metropolitans. Take the predicament of Philaret,
Metropolitan of Lovech who was arrested in April 1948 after a financial audit of his
eparchy discovered a number of discrepancies. The archival evidence reveals,
however, that his arrest and imprisonment were no more than a subterfuge to secure
his vote in an attempt to remove Exarch Stefan.510 This research also uncovered
twenty-four instances of fabricated criminal charges of black marketeering against
members of the clergy, for purchasing the likes of flour, wax and other items
connected with the preparation of the Eucharist or the making of candles. The
records do not explain that the State allowance granted to the parish clergy was
simply not sufficient to purchase materials necessary to exercise the church's most
fundamental acts - the Liturgy and the Eucharist. In this predicament priests were
forced to solve the problem by purchasing the necessary goods on the black market.
An example of this was the arrest of Father Ivan Hadjiev from Stara Zagora who was
sentenced to ten years imprisonment and fined 100,000 leva for purchasing materials
to manufacture Church candles.
These acts of repression were intended to undermine the confidence of the church
and its clergy. It became abundantly clear that if clergy did rrot toe the communist
line they would become like pariah in society. The subjugation of the Church to the
desires of the State clearly took place on many different social and political levels -
Church and State separation, the degradation of Christian ceremonies, such as
marriage and the humiliation of its clergy.
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6.2.2 THE EXPULSION OF EXARCH STEFAN (6 September 1948)
The coup to remove Exarch Stefan represents one of the most important acts of
repression in the history of the BOC. The Bulgarian public were first notified of
Stefan's 'retirement' in an announcement published in Tsurkoven vestnik on 21
September 1948 which stated:
The Holy Synod of the BOC announces that on the 6th of this
month, His Beatitude Exarch Stefan by word of mouth and in writing
handed in his retirement to the Holy Synod... after considering the
condition of his health he has retired from his heavy load and after giving
important consideration to his spotless character, we unanimously
decided to accept his retirement and release him from his duties as
Exarch ofBulgaria and Metropolitan of Sofia.511
Until the opening of the BCP archives this event had engendered differing
explanations, but today the archival documents provide us the opportunity to
investigate the event thoroughly. Although Stefan's appointment as Exarch appears
to have been engineered by the FF authorities, criticism of him arose soon after his
election. Georgi Bogdanov, Chairman of the Priest's Union, regularly reported on the
Exarch's activities to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. For example,
only three months after Stefan's inauguration Bogdanov reported:
Towards the end of the month a delegation of the BOC will depart for
the Soviet Union. The delegation will be led by His Beatitude Exarch
Stefan, who will be accompanied by a number of ecclesiastical
personnel. The personnel who the Exarch has chosen to accompany him
are well known in the Church community, as being people with anti-
communist and pro-fascist sympathies who hold negative attitudes
towards the Soviet Union... I reckon that those selected are not only
unsuitable, but their departure for the Soviet Union is a provocation to
the government of the Fatherland Front, and thus towards the Soviet
Union.512
In a later report from 12 December 1946 G.Bogdanov commented:
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Recently I reported that Church leaders were not giving the more
progressive clergy any opportunity to advance, thus giving evidence of
and demonstrating their reactionary opinions and hostile attitude towards
those they know are members of our Party. In this situation the head of
the BOC Exarch Stefan has been revealed as a pronounced reactionary
opponent of every reform in the Church and is hostile in every respect to
democratic and progressive Church employees... His conduct was
particularly aggressive during a session of the Holy Synod, when before
every bishop he declared that we should purge, not the good bishops and
clergy, but the progressive and left-wing clergy who have lessened
discipline in the Church and for this need to be judged. Here he is
meddling with the message of our beloved leader and teacher, Chairman
of the Party, Dr. Georgi Dimitrov.513
As a result of these reports Exarch Stefan was put under close surveillance by the
security services who quickly assessed that the Exarch was an enemy of the Party.514
Despite the incriminatory accusations of the reports they were never acted upon
during the period 1944-1947, probably due to the unsettled domestic and
international position of Bulgaria. However, following the signing of the Paris Peace
Treaty and the introduction of the new Constitution surveillance on Stefan was
intensified. Another report from the Chairman of the Priest's Union exemplifies the
intrusiveness of the surveillance: "According to reliable information the Exarch is
suffering from an incurable disease. It has advanced so quickly that it is creating a lot
of confusion within his staff."515 It is reported that Exarch Stefan departed for
Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia in July 1947 where he remained for over two
months. There is no information to suggest that this trip was in any way connected to
illness. On the contrary it is recorded that during his journey he met with Church
leaders from Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to discuss a forthcoming Pan-
Orthodox Consultation in Moscow.
Intensified government pressure upon members of the Holy Synod created a division
among the Metropolitans of the Church. The most influential of the Metropolitans
were members of the 'God and Bulgaria' group, known for their devotion towards
Bulgaria and their uncompromising attitude towards the faith; they included Exarch
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Stefan, Mihail of Russe, Boris of Nevrokop, Sofroni of Turnovo, Kliment of Star
Zagora and Neofit of Vidin. The progressive Metropolitans influenced by the
Communist Party were Paisii of Vratsa, Kiril of Plovdiv, Josef of Vama, Philaret of
Lovech and Nikodim of Sliven.516 Archival sources suggest that there was also a
division of attitude towards Stefan at governmental level. Documentation reveals that
Prime Minister G.Dimitrov was inclined to support the head of the BOC whereas
Foreign Minister V.Kolarov was insistent that Stefan be removed immediately.517
As the politicians deliberated Stefan's fate the Orthodox Churches prepared for a
Pan-Orthodox Conference to be held in Moscow (8-18 July 1948). Among the
important topics to be discussed at the conference was the attitude of the Orthodox
Church towards the Orthodox Ecumenical movement. Exarch Stefan was one of its
founding members and actively promoted the view that the Slavonic Orthodox
Churches needed to be more involved in the movement worldwide, particularly in the
work of the WCC in Geneva. As preparations commenced Stefan was criticised by
Russian Patriarch Aleksi for the BOC's position on ecumenism. The Bulgarian
political authorities extracted a promise from Stefan that he would support the
position of the Moscow Patriarchate (Moscow against - Constantinople for WCC
involvement). However, upon his arrival in Moscow, in conversation with
Metropolitan Krutitski, Stefan shared that he had prepared a report in defence of the
ecumenical cause.519
Stefan's change of heart provoked a panicked response at Church and government
levels. Stefan was immediately subjected to pressure by the Russians to oppose
ecumenism.520 Unable to alter his position Bulgarian Foreign Minister V.Kolarov
sent Stefan a telegram stating that the Bulgarian government would restore the BOC
to the status of Patriarchate if he refrained from supporting the ecumenical cause.
Prime Minister Dimitrov, who was undergoing medical treatment in Moscow, also
met with Stefan and by enticing him with the title of Patriarch succeeded in changing
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Stefan's position. Nevertheless, it would appear that this was the final act which
cost Stefan his position as Exarch.
While Stefan was being offered the Patriarchate in Moscow, D.Iliev director of the
DRA met with Synodal members Paisii of Yratsa, Boris of Nevrokop, Sofroni of
Turnovo and Mihail of Russe, all of whom objected to this proposal. D.Iliev
commented on this meeting: "It was interesting to observe the leaders of the Holy
Synod as one stand against the declaration of Exarch Stefan for Patriarch. Their
statements reveal quite clearly the discord at Stefan being offered this position, in
view of the trouble which he has caused in Moscow." Iliev skilfully manoeuvred
the heated discussions on Stefan onto reasons why he should be removed from
office. Therefore when Exarch Stefan returned to Bulgaria he was faced with a fait
accompli.
A few days after his return from Moscow the Holy Synod emerged with a decision
on the 'retirement' of Stefan on the grounds of his poor health. Following this on 10
September 1948 the Politburo accepted decision No.52 which stated: "We accept the
retirement of the Exarch, his deputy the Metropolitan of Ruse will remain in charge
for the time being."523 In this manner the Communist Party found a means of
removing Stefan without the evident engagement of the State. Investigation of the
archival sources reveals, however, that pressed by the government and betrayed by
his colleagues, Stefan was forced to step down.
In another historical and political era Stefan may have been recognised as one of the
great Bulgarian Church leaders. He had been a true patriot, desirous to see Bulgaria
play a political role in Europe, as a leading ecumenist he wanted the Bulgarian
Church to be internationally involved, as a faithful Orthodox believer he had
supported both the Russian and Constantinople Patriarchates while at the same time
fighting to secure the autonomy of his own Church. He had been the main obstacle
hindering the infiltration of people loyal to the communist government into positions
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of influence in the BOC and he had been the figurehead defending the Church's right
to self-government. Now that obstacle had been removed the Communist Party
seized the opportunity to assert its influence fully upon the Holy Synod therefore
enabling the government to control the BOC from within.
6.2.3 YONKO PANOV & ANTON YUGOV'S REPORT (August 1949)
The following section presents two documents which remained confidential until the
fall of Todor Zhivkov's government on 10 November 1989. They are crucial in
comprehending fully this second period of communist rule as they discuss in detail
the political state of affairs with the BOC and propose how to deal with the Church.
They were authored by Yonko Panov, Deputy Minister of the Interior in charge of
State Security and his superior Anton Yugov, Minister of the Interior. Both
documents were later combined to form one report which was presented to the
Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Politburo (BCP).
After the successes of previous purges on the Church and with the removal of its
"strong man" [Exarch Stefan], the report suggested that there should be a further
purge directed against the Holy Synod, removing the strongest opponents of the
regime from Church leadership, particularly Mikhail of Russe, Sofroni of Turnovo
and Neofit of Vidin. This was intended to frighten the remainder of the Synod into
submitting wholly to the demands of the State. After this initial purge of Church
hierarchy it was proposed that the eparchy's of the BOC be reduced from eleven to
three in number. This was by far the most radical part of the proposed plan intended
to make the remaining Metropolitans totally compliant to the wishes of the State. It is
unclear from the sources investigated whether these proposals were leaked to the
Holy Synod or not, it is clear that they were never fully acted upon. Perhaps they
were only intended to instil fear because soon after important changes did occur
within the Synod. Mikhail of Russe, who had been pro tem President of the Synod
'resigned' and was replaced by Paisii of Vratsa. However, he also proved to be
uncooperative and was ousted in December 1950. Kiril, Metropolitan of Plovdiv then
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took control of the BOC and was rewarded for his obedience by becoming the first
Patriarch of the Bulgarian Church since the Ottoman conquest in 1393.
Secondly, it was proposed that stricter judicial measures be taken against the Church
in order to transform the BOC into a truly socialist Church. In conjunction with this
the Law of Confessions was introduced on 24 September 1949. The introduction of
this law was yet another stage of separation and subjugation, isolating the Church not
only from Bulgarian society but from every international religious institution as well.
The law re-emphasised the State monopoly on education and forbade the BOC from
organising any activities which involved children (art. 20). The publishing activities
of the Church were put under the strictest controls of the State with every sermon,
speech or parish letter having to be approved (art. 15). Every appointment and
dismissal to and from the Church was dependent upon the decision of the Directorate
ofReligious Affairs (DRA) (art. 12). The Church was prohibited from sending any of
its students abroad to further their education and every domestic theological student
had to be vetted by the DRA (art. 14). Any contact between the BOC and foreign
religious institutions also required to pass through the DRA (art. 22) and finally no
donations would be accepted from abroad without the permission of the DRA (art.
24).
The Law of Confessions enabled the DRA to carry out State directives, to place
clergymen loyal to the regime into key positions in the Church; for example, the
General Secretary of the Holy Synod, Director of Culture and Education, Director of
Finance, Director of Publications, Editor of Tsurkoven vestnik, the Rectors of the
Seminaries and Theological Institute and the Abbots of Rila, Bachkovo and Troyan
Monasteries.524 As well as infiltrating people loyal to the State into the Church the
report also recommended that the Party "strongly persuade" some of the
Metropolitans at the top level to work for them. The author uses the Bulgarian words
obraboti (o6pa6o™) and podraboti (no;ipa6oTn), suggesting the cultivation of
chosen individuals to become agents of the State. These agents would then be able to
manipulate those loyal and progressive Church workers into positions of authority.
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In the light of these proposals did the Holy Synod have any option but to "join in the
525
hymnology of the Communist Party?" Whether they condoned, tolerated or
compromised is of no real consequence, the truth of matter is that the Synod were
faced with their ultimate dilemma, either accept being an instrument of the
communist government or watch the Church be destroyed. The proposed purges
would have taken place and the eparchy's would have been reduced and placed under
the control of communist sycophants. The ultimatum which faced Kiril as he guided
the BOC was to accept the brutal conditions but keep an Orthodox believer at its
head, or resign the Church into the hands of the atheistic State. The Panov-Yugov
report discloses the harsh reality of life for the BOC during this second period of
Communist Party rule in Bulgaria - a period where the Church hierarchy accepted
that they had no choice.
6.2.4 THE RESTORATION OF THE PATRIARCHATE (10 May 1953)
The restoration of patriarchal dignity to the BOC was a peculiar end to the evolution
of Church-State relationships following the sternness of this second phase of
communist rule. However, there had been raised expectations within the BOC,
especially after the election of a new Exarch and the lifting of the schism that the
restoration of the Church's Patriarchal title would ensue. As early as 1946 the
government had explored the advantages and disadvantages which would have
followed the restoration of the Patriarchate. The DRA were divided in opinion. Some
considered it necessary, in accordance with Canon Law, to seek the approval of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and others such as Alexander Chuchulain said there was
neither historical nor canonical obstacle which would require the involvement of
foreign interference in accomplishing this act. He reckoned that the Church should
not make any independent decision on this question because it was a purely political
526
question which needed only the consent of the government.
Before any decision was taken on the question of restoration G.Bogdanov, Chairman
of the Priest's Union, suggested that it would be prudent to introduce new Exarchal
525




Statutes, produced in conjunction with and acceptable to the new political regime.527
Towards the end of 1946 the Holy Synod sought the approval of the government to
convene a National Church Council as this would be the only means of altering the
Exarchal Statutes to accord with the spirit of the new times. The request was refused,
however, on the grounds that the introduction of the new Bulgarian Constitution was
imminent and would affect the Statutes of the Church. For this reason they suggested
that it would be better to await its legislation.528
The Holy Synod published a statement in Tsurkoven vestnik (15 February 1947) that
immediately after the new Constitution had been accepted they would convene a
National-Church Council to approve any alterations to their Statutes. This statement
raised alarm bells in the communist ranks. Thus, on 25 February a special session of
the National Council of the FF was convened where I.Harizanov responded to the
statement of the BOC. His comments concentrated on the forthcoming Church
Council and any eventual changes they would make to the Exarchal Statutes.
According to Harizanov, the decisions of the Church Council would be provoked by
the conviction of the Metropolitans that "the present time was opportune for the
reorganisation of the Church and Statutes, but obviously in their own way and for
their own advantage." He therefore suggested that it was necessary to prepare for this
eventuality.529 In Harizanov's opinion an accumulation of power in the hands of the
Synod was dangerous due to the fact that at the beginning of 1947 there was less then
a fifth of Orthodox clergy under the influence of the FF and another fifth were
considered to be 'active reactionaries' against the FF, the great danger being that the
FF had no direct control over the majority of the clergy. For this reason he suggested
that the National Church Council be set for a later date and organised by the FF not
by the Holy Synod.
Thus for reasons of State security the decision to restore the Patriarchate was
postponed until the BOC was completely under the control of the State. Edict No.29
of the Council of Ministers passed on 17 September 1948 charged the Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs with completing any necessary alterations to the Exarchal Statutes
with a view to democratising the BOC.530 It was the retirement of Exarch Stefan,
however, that signified the beginning of a new stage in the development of relations
between the State and the BOC. After securing control of the Church and its
hierarchy the Politburo agreed to re-commence talks on Patriarchal restoration.531
However, now Moscow and the Russian Orthodox Church also supported this action,
in an effort to raise the authority of the BOC thereby enabling it to fight alongside
other Orthodox Churches against the Vatican and the World Council of Churches in
Geneva.532
When Foreign Minister, Mincho Neichev, reported considerable progress in the
democratisation of the BOC, at the beginning of 1951, the government considered
that the time was auspicious for restoring the Patriarchal title to the BOC. It is
significant that the date of the restoration's approval by the Bulgarian Politburo on 3
January 1951 preceded the decision of the Third People's Church Congress by two
years (10 May 1953). The decision fulfilled the heartfelt aspirations of the Holy
Synod restoring the church's Patriarchal title after 560. However, the restoration had
serious consequences for the Church. The reinstatement of its Patriarchal title had
been a purely political decision and although the decision was supported by the
Orthodox Churches of other socialist countries it was rejected by the Ecumenical
Patriarchate, a situation which lasted until 22 July 1961 when the Bulgarian
Patriarchate was universally accepted. For this reason the BOC actually became a
subsidiary organ of the State, recruited into the communist structure, despite its
constitutional separation. Thus, by the end of the second period of communist rule,
with its separation and subordination secured, if the BOC had a role to play in
Bulgarian society it would be dictated by the Communist Party.
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The induction of Kiril to the patriarchal throne on 10 May 1953 coincided with the
death of Stalin and marked the third and final phase in Church-State relations during
communism. Although there was a moderation of Stalin's model of socialism during
this period, this had no bearing upon relations with the Church. The persecution of
church personnel and the judicial and constitutional acts separating Church from
State during the first two periods of communist rule had achieved their purpose and
now under its complete authority Church and State developed an equilibrium, the
State administering and the BOC obeying the rules. Patriarch Kiril commented on
this relationship: "We render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the
things that are God's, that is rendering to God faith and to the State complete
loyalty."533
In this spirit of cooperation the BOC, for the remainder of the era, became an
instrument of communist propaganda. One of the major questions to arise during this
period was how the BOC should carry out its propagandist functions for the State.
The Directorate of Religious Affairs defined these functions as: being fully
supportive of the State; for all clergy to be members of the FF or the Communist
Party; to support the nationalisation of private industries and encourage
collectivisation534; to acknowledge from the pulpit that the State is above the Church;
to oppose anti-communist and anti-Russian propaganda from the pulpit and finally to
place portraits of government officials in the Church as well as icons and promote
loyalty and affection towards Bulgarian State leaders. These responsibilities became
the modus vivendi for the BOC under Kiril. In particular the Patriarch promoted "the
way of tolerance" and highlighted "patriotic service" as a common ground where
Church and State could join forces to cultivate patriotism and pride in Bulgaria's
535
history, heroes and achievements. However, Kiril's modus vivendi signified an
elementary variation in the BOC's reason for being and also revealed a major
difference in the principles of Kiril and Exarch Stefan. For Stefan the Church first
533
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and foremost was in service to God within the confines of the State; for Kiril the
Church's patriotic service to the State was faith in God.
Following the death of Kiril on 7 March 1971, Maxim Metropolitan of Lovech was
appointed to the patriarchal throne. His position had been approved by the
Communist Party leadership before the death of Patriarch Kiril and following a
period of political machination the Holy Synod was coerced into accepting the
government choice.536 It appears that the BCP preferred the compromising attitude of
Maxim and the fact that he was younger than any other candidate could promote
longer term stability within the Church. Maxim therefore brought nothing new to the
Church, indeed his ingratiating leadership followed the course plotted by Kiril,
echoing the political proclamations of the socialists.
6.3.1 RE-INTERPRETING NATIONAL HISTORY
Throughout the communist era the BOC was held in a position which distinguished it
from other religious confessions within Bulgarian society. The differentiating factor
was the overlap of identity between church and nation through Bulgarian history.
This determined the Church's discriminatory treatment under communism but was
also reflected in the politically and ideologically controlled academic research of the
period. An example of this can be observed in the re-interpretation of the BOC's
historical role, particularly during the period ofOttoman domination, which was used
as a justifying principle in government policy relating to its contemporary Turkish-
Muslim population. The conception of the BOC as the preserver of Bulgarian
religious-national identity, which prevented total assimilation into Ottoman society
became a key theme of politically biased academic research. Emerging from this
interpretation the continuity theory developed which considered that the BOC under
Ottoman rule was the creator of Bulgarian national and cultural continuity.
Fundamental to this concept was the communist researcher's acceptance and
536 In 1997 a document was released from the communist archive labelled "Decision 'A' No. 145 of the
Politburo ofthe BCP," dated 8 March 1971, which stated that Maxim had been chosen to lead the
BOC and that, "Comrade Mihail Kuchukovwill do the preparatory work to insure the election of
Metropolitan Maxim."
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accentuation of the nineteenth century catastrophe theory, which depicted the
centuries under Ottoman control as years of Islamic despotism when they allegedly
committed genocide, persecuted Christians and coerced their conversion to Islam.
Common to both the continuity and catastrophe theories was the understanding that
the Ottoman Conquest resulted in a dramatic reduction in Bulgarian national
identity.537
Political control of the religious and historical sciences in Bulgaria made history an
ideological discipline under the Communist Party, designed to defend and promote
socialist principles.538 An example of how this operated can be found in the fourteen-
volume work History of Bulgaria which first appeared in 1979. This project was
initiated by the Tenth Bulgarian Party Congress (May 1968) and authored by only
the most trusted scholars who had the confidence of the Party and who agreed to
follow its ideological guidelines: to characterise Bulgaria's history as a heroic
sequence of events from ancient times to today, marked by the struggle against
on
slavery and oppression and by social progress. For the purposes of this research
we shall concentrate on Volume Four ofHistory ofBulgaria (1983) entitled Ottoman
Rule 15-18 centuries edited by Hristo Gandev, Svetana Georgieva and Bistra
Svetkova.
The influence of the continuity and catastrophe theories were clearly portrayed in
this volume as even from the introduction the patriotic and heroic character of the
Bulgarian people are contrasted with the violence and brutality of Ottoman rule.
Indeed from the outset the editors rejected any view which described the Ottomans as
benign to their Christian subjects as being due to a poor reading of original
sources.540 Negativity towards Islam proceeded through the volume, characterising it
as a fanatical, aggressive and repressive regime with a systematic ongoing policy of
forced conversion.541 Bulgaria's demographic disaster is described in detail and
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attempts to prove the assimilation process.542 From the ashes of destruction the
researchers emphasise the bravery of the Bulgarian Church in maintaining and
developing Bulgarian language, culture and history. Flowever, the political research
which controlled History of Bulgaria was blighted by two fundamental
shortcomings. The interpretation of five continuous centuries of violently enforced
Islamic conversion did not explain why the Ottomans abjectly failed in their
assimilation policy; secondly, the distorted depiction of Ottoman rule in Bulgaria
which painted a black and white picture of hostility between Christianity and Islam
was simply erroneous. The evidence gathered during the compiling of this research
would suggest that the archival evidence presented in Chapter Two of this thesis
proposes a more accurate interpretation of history, that being, although periods of
violence did occur the five hundred years of Ottoman rule in Bulgaria were
distinguished not by violence but rather by toleration towards the Christian
community which allowed Bulgarian society to develop and prosper through the
Ottoman period into the era ofNational Revival.
It would be a mistake to consider all Bulgarian historiography from this period to be
being politically misinterpreted. Take for example the work of Svetana Georgieva
from 1979 where she presents three variations on the character of Ottoman rule in
Bulgaria: the first view derived from Turkish research views the Ottomans as
liberators of the Balkan peoples, freeing them from feudal oppression enabling them
to live in order and social harmony; secondly she delivered the interpretation
exhorted by the continuity and catastrophe theories', and thirdly she proposed a
compromise that views the moment of conquest as violent, drastically altering
Bulgaria's historical and cultural direction, but also in time bringing stability and
prosperity to Bulgarian society.543 Another example of critical analysis from this
period can be found in the work of Antonina Zhelyazkova. She concluded that
Islamisation during the Ottoman period was the result of a progressively slow
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as her conclusion went against the view of the Party as promulgated in History of
Bulgaria Zhelyazkova's work remained unpublished until after the fall of the
communist regime. Therefore those who were critical of the Party's historical-
political paradigm were simply ignored and remained unpublished until after the
communist era.
Historical analysis based on the principles of Marxist-Leninism therefore faced no
criticism or opposition in creating a generally false interpretation of Bulgarian
Church history. This re-interpretation was the perception which the communist
government wanted to instil within Bulgarian 'Christian' society.545 The key to
understanding that perception lay in the State's national ideological interpretation of
religion and nation, connecting Bulgarian national history and the BOC, to form and
justify its confrontational religious policy to separate Muslim religious and national
identity. Although the BOC does not seem to have been intricately involved in
drawing up these historical conclusions, they did not oppose them. Quite the
opposite, the Church in its role of 'patriotic service' embraced them and in its efforts
to survive the communist era adopted them within its modus vivendi. Its role as faith
provider, educator and enabler had been denied them within society and now the
Orthodox Church readily took on and evangelised its role as Bulgarian national and
cultural saviour in an attempt to preserve a prominent role within society.
6.3.2 THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL REBIRTH 546
Responding to socialist inspired misinterpretations of history the late 1970s and early
1980s witnessed Bulgaria's Muslim population become the object of a massive
assimilation campaign that focussed on changing their names from Arabic-Turkish to
Slavic-Bulgarian. In this manner the authorities attempted to obliterate any remaining
545
Although the government promulgated its atheistic policies upon Bulgaria society it still required
to use the Church to affect the prominently Christian orientated population.
546 B bspo^HTCJieu upouec (The Process ofNational Rebirth - commonly known as the Muslim name-
changing campaign)
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vestige ofOttoman rule in Bulgaria. During this period almost one million people, an
eighth of the Bulgarian population were forced to change their names.547
By the end of the Ottoman era there had remained within the independent Bulgarian
State a sizeable Muslim minority amounting to between a fifth and a quarter of the
population.548 Bulgarian governments conducted a policy of hegemonic control in an
attempt to maintain the supremacy of the ethnic Bulgarian Christian population, thus
keeping the 'Turkish' Muslim minority in an inferior position. This control did not
attempt to integrate or assimilate the minority into the majority. In the long term it
appears that the future of the Muslim population was envisaged mainly in terms of
emigration to Turkey.549 When the communists came to power in 1944 similar
policies ensued. They attempted to divest themselves of as much of the Muslim
population as possible forcing 150,000 across the Turkish border between 1949-1950
and the remainder of the population were given a level of cultural autonomy,
foreseeing this as a step towards integrating the Muslim minority into a transnational
communist society.550 This was expected to come about through gradual cultural and
economic fusion over an indeterminate period. By the late 1970s these policies had
failed to fulfil the expectations of the communist leadership. These factors lead
Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of the Communist Party, to adopt an enforced renaming
policy. This campaign included more than simply changing names: Turkish language
media, press, radio and television were banned; speaking Turkish in public places
was forbidden; mosques were closed down and celebration of Ramadan was
outlawed.551 This resulted in a massive wave of emigration during 1989 when a
further 300,000 Bulgarian Muslims fled to Turkey.
One of the most important forces behind this process derived from the findings of the
research for History of Bulgaria. G.Filipov, President of the Council of Ministers
referred to this fact in a speech where he cited History of Bulgaria to describe
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Bulgaria's tragic fate under Ottoman slavery, which he stated was a period when the
people were violently and systematically Turkified and Islamicised. This fact was
intended to signify the governmental belief that the majority of the Bulgarian State's
contemporary Muslim population were actually ancestors of those forcibly converted
Christians. He continued to argue that the Islamic community would only find their
true destiny by returning to their Bulgarian roots, accepting the name changing
policy and liberating themselves from their religion.552 This argument was
accentuated when the catastrophe theory was advanced by Petur Petrov, one of the
Bulgarian historians directly implicated in the re-naming campaign of the 1980s. He
re-popularised the Chronicle of Metodi Draginov (see Chapter 2), using it to
categorically demonstrate the enforced conversion of the predecessors of Bulgaria's
Islamicised population thus proving they belonged to the Bulgarian and not the
Turkish race.553 However, the justification behind Filipov's impassioned speech and
Petrov's misinterpretation was eliminated on 10 January 1990 when the Bulgarian
News Bureau published a declaration undersigned by sixty historians who were/or
had been associated with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The declaration stated
that these historians had been forced by the Communist Party to participate in the
name changing campaign, particularly in providing proof of forced religious and
cultural assimilation and in doing so had overemphasised the role of the BOC in
Bulgaria's Ottoman history.554
Despite the statement from the historians associated with the Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences the BOC remained silent. Throughout the period of the rebirth process the
BOC was mute. Almost sixteen years since the collapse of the communist regime
and the Orthodox Church continues to zealously promote its role as Bulgarian
national and cultural saviour, as promulgated in History ofBulgaria. Nevertheless,
the role of the BOC within Bulgarian society has been irrevocably damaged by these
events, no more so than in the area of Christian-Muslim dialogue. This research has
uncovered evidence that discussions did occur between the BOC and the Directorate
552
H.Hoppe, 'Bulgarien und seine Turken. Zur Minderheitenpolitik Sofias', Osteuropa-Archiv
(Stuttgart), A467-A489
553
P.Petrov, More Traces of Violence, (Sofia, 1987), pp.150-151
554 G.Yankov, Aspects ofthe Development ofthe Bulgarian Nation, (Sofia,1989), pp.5-10
248
of Religious Affairs on events surrounding the rebirth process. During an interview
with a former archivist from the Church History Institute she graphically recalled
two meetings which occurred in the mid-1980s in the former Ecclesiastical
Academy. Representatives from the DRA and the State Security services discussed
with leading clergy the BOC's attitude towards the renaming campaign. The Church
leaders candidly stated that it would be better to link the National Rebirth process
firstly with the Christianization of the Muslim population and then secondly to
discuss their true nationality.555 The religious dimension in this atheistic political
campaign cannot be ignored because for the Muslim minority name changing meant
more than simply a name: their name was a primary indicator of their ethno-religious
identity.556 This is exactly what the Orthodox representatives understood and why
they considered conversion to be a primary factor in this political process and by all
indications the Muslim population associated renaming as Christian conversion.
As a result of these findings we have to recognise the implicit involvement and
support of the BOC in this campaign particularly as this has been refuted until now,
C CO
not only in the silence of the BOC but also in avenues of academic research.
6.4 CONCLUSION
During the period 1944-1953 the institutional problems which had plagued the BOC
for many years were solved: an Exarch was appointed, the schism removed, its full
autocephaly recognised and finally its Patriarchal rank was restored. However,
analysing the fate of the Church during the first few years of communism reveals that
its old problems were simply replaced by new ones - this time the very nature of the
BOC was endangered as it struggled to stand against the determined and ruthless
policy of the State to control the Church. It was unable to carry out its evangelical,
educational or charitable duties - the very duties which had secured its relationship
with Bulgarian society during the War Years. Without that security and after the
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official declaration separating Church and State the BOC became subordinate to the
will of the Communist Party.
The three phases of communist controlled government were designed to gradually
achieve this goal of containment, subordination and cooperation. The first two stages
from 1944-1953 were years of preparation, developing the BOC for its role in service
to the State. From 1953 onwards the Church as an organ of the State, was at times
coerced and at others, willingly cooperated with the communist regime. Thus the
Church once again became a political tool this time used in the interests of the
Bulgarian Communist Party.
This chapter began by claiming that throughout the period of communist rule there
remained a discernable Church-State relationship that ranged from toleration to
collaboration. This relationship clearly deteriorated as the phases of communist
control upon the Church intensified. This was graphically illustrated in the differing
leadership styles of Exarch Stefan and Patriarch Kiril. Although Stefan is commonly
portrayed as a communist sympathiser the findings of this research would oppose
that characterisation: He was an ardent Bulgarian patriot who wanted to secure the
authoritative place of the Church within the nation, but in so doing realised that the
BOC would have to cooperate with the new regime. As communist measures against
the Church increased, however, Stefan's tolerance toward government policy
decreased, a dilemma witnessed during the Moscow Pan-Orthodox Conference. In
the end his efforts to protect the Church, to maintain its independence and promote
ecumenism against the desires of the Sofia and Moscow governments made him a
dangerous and undependable figurehead to lead the BOC:
The leadership of Patriarch Kiril was very different deciding that collaboration was
the best policy. Kiril and the BOC have been lambasted for their policy of
accommodation during his reign, but unlike Stefan he had no choice but to accept the
government line. The Church by now had been fully recruited into the apparatus of
the regime and the role of the BOC was presented to Kiril as a fait accomplis. In his
efforts to protect the integrity of the Church he had to willingly subordinate himself
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to the desires of the State. Nevertheless, in the midst of one of the most brutal
assimilation campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s his decision to slavishly follow the
Party line and support the suggestion that the Church play a leading role in the
government name-changing campaign suggest his motivations were somewhat
different than Stefan's. He willingly accepted the new political role given to the BOC
by the State, that ofBulgarian national saviour and protector. However, in promoting
this role it may be suggested that the integrity of the BOC was critically damaged
The fact remains that the Church hierarchy had little choice but to work within the
constraints of the regime. As with most totalitarian regimes the border between
collaboration, toleration and resistance ceased to exist. The accepted modus vivendi
of the Bulgarian Holy Synod prevented the implementation of the Panov-Yugov plan
allowing the BOC to survive the communist years emerging wounded but alive.
Perhaps the better question to ask then is 'would the BOC survive in a democratic
society after the fall of communism?' The truth is the price of survival has been very
high. Maxim, the former Metropolitan of Lovech succeeded Patriarch Kiril after his
death in 1971. He extolled the leadership of Kiril and stressed that the BOC would be
guided by his great example. Thus, for the remainder of the communist period and
some may argue to the present day the Church has followed the Party line espousing
the cause of Bulgarian nationalism. No doubt in an effort to ensure its continued
existence the BOC accepted the role the communist regime had gifted to it: a role
engineered by politically reinterpreting history to reveal the brutality of the Ottoman
period and proclaiming the BOC as the saviour of Bulgarian culture, language,
religion and national awareness.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7. POST-GLASNOST, CONTEMPORARY BULGARIA AND THE
ORTHODOX CHURCH (1989-2005)
The communist regime collapsed on 10 November 1989 after reigning supreme in
Bulgaria for forty-five years. During one of its final public acts Peter Mladenov,
Head of State of the Republic of Bulgaria and Chairman of the BCP, appeared on the
occasion of the traditional celebrations at the monument of national hero Vasil
Levski accompanied by two official representatives - Dobri Jurov, Minister of
Defence and Maxim, Patriarch of the BOC.559 This public gesture was intended to
emphasise the restoration of the Church to its former position as an official
representative of the Bulgarian State. Political gesturing did not succeed in gaining
the BOC a position of respect in democratic Bulgarian society.
This chapter will examine why the BOC has failed to reassert itself as a dominant
force in Bulgarian society by tracing the convoluted progression of church leadership
as they entered into the new democratic era upto the present day. The hierarchy of
the Church has generally been considered to be a corrupt instrument of the former
communist State. Therefore, as Bulgaria sought to break from its communist past the
BOC suffered as a consequence of its previous association. This dichotomy between
past and future has threatened to divide the BOC. Insecurity within the Orthodox
Church, created by public criticism and bitter internal dispute, has hindered my
research into contemporary issues in Bulgaria. Access to contemporary
documentation from Church archival sources was denied. Thus the information
collated toward completion of this chapter comes from a variety of sources
including: personal interviews, survey questionnaires, group discussions,
contemporary Bulgarian press and inter-church debate.
559 15 February 1990
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7.1 A NEW ERA
7.1.1 COMPLICATIONS POST-GLASNOST
Since 1989 Bulgarian society has been in a condition of radical transformation and
the State is presently in a process of rapid modernisation, as it seeks entry into the
European Community on 1 January 2007.560 In the midst of fifteen years of upheaval
the Bulgarian public have sought a stable factor in societal life. As the self-
proclaimed creator of 'national and cultural continuity' the BOC would have been
expected to have been that stabilising force for the nation. However, rooted in the
past and contaminated by allegations of communist infidelity, the Church has
struggled to be that anchor. Indeed, in the days following the former regimes collapse
on 10 November 1989, the involvement of Church leadership with the socialists had
been so complete that, the BOC could not even join in the jubilant nationwide
celebrations. As one religious commentator voiced:
One would have expected that the Church would have been on the
front line leading the nation with crosses and holy banners, with tears and
exaltations of joy. Instead, it was nowhere to be seen. The Church hid,
and it is still in hiding from the faithful."561
A significant problem has been the BOC's inability to adapt towards the new
conditions. Its ability to apply adequate strategies in the face of radical change seems
to have been seriously impaired. This dilemma stands contrary to what in the past
had been the Bulgarian Church's forte - that ability to modify externally whilst
maintaining its unchangeable doctrinal nucleus. This contemporary problem can be
traced directly to the BOC's interrelationship with the former communist regime.
Under that regime the Church had a place in society by which it was able to maintain
its ritualistic independence, but in everything else was subject to and dependent upon
the State. Consequently the Church had no autonomy or voice within society
remaining a passive observer. As a result the BOC is presently set up in such a way
560
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that, at least for the time being, it appears incapable of undertaking adequate steps to
respond to the current needs of society and continues, by habit or inertia, to be
passive.
Caught up in such rapid and thoroughgoing change many Bulgarians have sought to
rationalise their existence. The BOC has failed to ease their predicament. The
message of the Holy Synod to contemporary Bulgarian society has been negligible
and therefore connections between the Church and local communities are
disintegrating. While other Christian Churches and various faith groups seek to
attract Bulgarian society through various measures, particularly by means of
charitable activity, the BOC looks to answer its problems by means of the State -
through its apparatus and power. Nevertheless, Bulgarian society is very different
now, it is less accepting and is unwilling to remain mute whilst the church does
nothing to assist the people. Thus a Bulgarian sociologist has commented that as
society continues to be modernised, the State can no longer safeguard the Church,
whether it is historically important or not. Therefore if the BOC want to remain an
active force within contemporary democratic Bulgaria the Church "must adapt or
die." Despite this dramatic ultimatum it must be clarified that the author referred
not to Orthodox dogma, but rather to the Church's way of existence in the
community and its attitude towards society. This is the key element essential to the
preservation and future of Orthodoxy in Bulgaria. As this chapter will reveal,
however, the BOC no longer possesses the means to be forceful in contemporary
society. Its marriage to the State, that ancient formula which proved successful in the
past, today has been damaged and proves ineffective. Despite this and regardless of
the inactivity and weakness of the Holy Synod this has not deprived the BOC, at the
level of public opinion and societal consciousness, of having an influence and a
certain role in society.
This 'religious' role is not one connected to the doctrinal institutions of the Church,
but is united rather to its historical and cultural experience which has determined the
religious self-definition of Bulgarians. Thus in the face of mounting problems the
562 I.Katsarki, 'The Bulgarian Orthodox and the Imperative of Modernisation', in G.Bakalov (ed.),
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BOC champions its historic/cultural role before society. Attempting to maintain a
prominent place in the nation Church leaders proclaim the Church as the 'saviour of
the Bulgarian nation'. It is no surprise then that the majority of Bulgarians consider
themselves to be Eastern Orthodox.563 During the gathering of research data when
individuals were asked about their Christian affiliation, 86% defined themselves as
Eastern Orthodox. Only 9% of those questioned considered themselves deeply
religious. Added to this when asked, "When you face a difficult personal problem,
where do you look for help?" Only 0.7% responded that they would go to their local
priest or Orthodox Church. The comparison between these figures reveals the
distance between peoples declared religious affiliation and the real presence of
religion and the Church in people's everyday circumstances.564





Table 2 - Depth of Religious Feeling
Deeply religious 9%
Slightly religious 48%
Not really religious 30%
Completely unreligious 11%
Unsure 2%








Never have problems 3.7%
563 The 1992 census showed that 85.7% of the population identified themselves with Orthodoxy
564 Between March-June 2003 thirty-five Bulgarian research assistants, in ten centres (Sofia, Plovdiv,
Veliko Turnovo, Varna, Burgas, Stara Zagora, Sliven, Shumen, Blagoevgrad, Ruse) asked 7,203
people these questions.
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After analysing the collated information regarding the BOC, this research would
conclude that: the contradiction between 'religiousness' and affiliation to Christianity
is due to Orthodoxy being comprehended, not as religion, but as a national and
cultural identification. Therefore declarations of affiliation are not based on doctrinal
belief, formal bonds ofmembership or attendance of the Orthodox Church but rather
refer to individual and corporate socio-cultural comprehensions ofBulgarian history.
During a number of group discussions undertaken as part of this research the
question was asked, "What practical steps can the BOC take to resolve this negative
situation and become a dynamic force in Bulgaria once again?" From the ensuing
deliberations four suggestions emerged: It was expressed forcefully that the BOC
was not meeting the needs of individuals, or society. For the Church to satisfy these
needs it was agreed that the Holy Synod required to shed light upon what had
happened in the past, in its dealings with the communist State and secondly give an
opinion regarding what was occurring in Bulgaria now, to prove that it cared for
every level of life in the nation. It was considered that the Church should prepare a
'social charter' and present a systematic plan of action that would enable it to meet
the needs of contemporary Bulgarian society. Thirdly, it was argued that the BOC
must work with the disenfranchised, the elderly, the poor, the hungry and the
suffering - an area which presently it is almost completely absent from. Lastly, it
became obvious that many difficulties in the Church had arisen due to the character
of communications between Church hierarchy and society, therefore the style of
language and form of communication must change to free itself of archaic
formalism.565 The major emotion which emerged from every group discussion was
this, "if the Church will not lead and comfort us, then who will?" Bulgarian society is
ardently seeking a strong shepherd and loving pastor to provide a unifying and
calming voice amid the tumult of change. The majority opinion is that the BOC is
not providing that succour.
565 These group discussions took the form of an introductory overview of the situation followed by an
open session of debate directed by a chairperson. The groups involved where: Students Associations
in Turnovo, Varna and Sofia (23,24,27 March 2003); Meeting with artists and actors (Sofia, 13 July
2003); Orthodox Lay conference (Shumen, 3 September 2003).
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7.2 INTERNAL SCHISM AND THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
The crisis in the Church, what is generally regarded as a deeply compromised,
corrupt and procrastinating Church leadership, unwilling or powerless to react to the
changes occurring in Bulgarian society and incapable of responding to its critics, has
been exasperated by internal schism which has brought the BOC to its knees.
Throughout its history the BOC has suffered many vicissitudes but never until 1992
had it faced internal schism. This division was not based on doctrinal conflict but
rather had its origins, at face value, in concerns to break free from its links with the
communist past.
7.2.1 THE COMMUNIST REGIME FALLS (1989-1991)
Although the communist regime collapsed in 1989 Bulgaria continued to be haunted
by its spectre until 1991. The first democratic elections, in June 1990, were won by
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the renamed Communist Party. This in part may
explain why the leadership of the BOC remained silent during the celebrations of
communism's downfall, as it awaited the nation's future direction after the political
fallout. If the Synod had spoken out against the former regime its image would no
doubt have risen admirably in public opinion, but that would definitely have had a
detrimental affect on its relationship with the socialist State, on which the BOC
would rely for its economic existence.
Fig.8 Patriarch Maxim
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In an effort to allay public criticism Patriarch Maxim announced that he would
convene a National Church Council sometime later in 1990, which would respond to
the nations questions and fears regarding the Church.566 A young renegade priest,
Christopher Subev, was elected on to the Council's preparatory commission, a man
who would come to play a major role in fomenting future schism. Born in 1946
Subev had graduated in atomic physics from Sofia University. As a student he led a
group called the Che Guevara sympathisers. His strong communist leanings opened
the way for him to further his career in Moscow. However, after two failed marriages
he returned to Sofia and took his monastic vows in 1980. In 1988 he formed the
'Independent Committee for the Defence of Religious Rights, Freedom of
Conscience and Spiritual Values,' a dissident movement which called not only for
Church renewal and reform but also for the removal of Maxim from the Patriarchal
567throne. The Synod must surely have been aware of Subev's background before
appointing him? Perhaps fearing an embarrassing backlash the Church decided to
postpone the National Council until further notice. A wise move considering that
soon after Subev became one of the leading political characters in the opposition
party, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). In his political role but clad in priestly
vestments Subev publicly called for the hierarchy of the BOC to repent of its
sinfulness during the communist era to "exorcise the demons which still prevailed in
the Church."568
Simultaneously plans to remove Patriarch Maxim were afoot within the Church.
Radko Poptodorov, a professor in canon law from Sofia Theological Academy,
attacked the Holy Synod, condemning them for their subservience to the former
regime. He pointed out that the Synod had not been appointed in accordance with
Canon law, but rather by the authority of an atheistic regime. He contended that the
Synod's incompetence had fostered religious apathy and moral decay in Bulgaria and
for these reasons the Holy Synod should be replaced. These denouncements came to
566 The National Church Council did not convene until July 1997
567 M.Kumanov & T.Nikolova, Political Parties, Movements and Organisations in Bulgaria and their
Leaders, (Sofia, 1999), p.51
568 S.Raikin, 'The Schism in the BOC, 1992-1997,' in J.D.Bell, Bulgaria in Transition, (Boulder,
1998), p.211
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form the argumentation on which the forthcoming schism would base itself.569 In
May 1990 Poptodorov resuscitated the defunct Priest's Union in effort to stimulate
reform. Responding to pressure from the PU the Holy Synod agreed once again to
form a preparatory committee to organise a National Church Council, the only body
which could canonically replace Patriarch and Synod. The committee disintegrated in
chaos during its first meeting. Pressure upon the Synod did not abate as another
movement for renewal in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church demanded that a National
Council be convoked immediately to answer to the families of those priests who had
been martyred during communism, particularly as the facts implicated the Holy
Synod in their deaths.570
7.2.2 BREAKING WITH THE PAST (1991-1993)
In October 1991 Bulgaria's second free elections were won by the UDF with a 67%
share of the vote. In the minds of the people this truly was the end of communism.
The new democratic government agreed and without hesitation introduced plans to
break with Bulgaria's communist past. Father Christofer Subev was appointed
chairman to a Commission for Religious Affairs and immediately set to work
opposing the incumbent Orthodox establishment who had been closely connected to
that communist past. On 9 March 1992 the government released a statement
declaring that the election of Patriarch Maxim in 1971 had been conducted in
violation of the statutes of the BOC and the Law of Confessions and therefore he
required to be removed from his position.571 When Maxim refused to respond the
Holy Synod was ordered to apply for formal registration, reducing the Orthodox
Church in Bulgarian law to the same rank as any other religious denomination,
Christian or non-Christian. At this point four Metropolitans - Pimen of Nevrokop,
Pankrati of Stara Zagora, Kalinik of Vratsa and Stefan of Veliko Turnovo issued
their own statement: "We testily that the violation of the statutes in Maxim's election
569
R.Poptodorov, 'CbcnefcmpaneTO Ha ycTaBa Ha BtJirapcKaTa npaBocnaBHa utpiiBa h ^etjiopMaHHxe
b hehhoto yctpohctbo h ynpaBJieHHe' ('The Suspension of the Statutes of the BOC and the
Deformation of its Structure and Government'), Omenecmeo (Fatherland) No.3, 1990, pp. 18-20
570
MeMOKpaifun, 22 March 1991
571
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for the Patriarchate in 1971 renders his service illegitimate and must be terminated."
They concluded by calling for the election of a new Patriarch.572
A few days later three of the Metropolitans met with Prime Minister Dimitrov, who
assured them that the government would support them in their stance against Maxim.
With this guarantee on 19 May 1992 Pimen, Pankrati and Kalanik announced
themselves to be the new and legitimate Holy Synod of the BOC, along with
Metropolitan Sofroni of Ruse and another five bishops - Antoni, Hilarion, Nestor,
Nahum, Galaktion and one Christofer Subev. On 25 May, recognised as the date
when the schism commenced, the UDF government declared that Maxim and his
Synod no longer represented the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, in their place the
Bulgarian State officially recognised the new Synod with Metropolitan Pimen as its
chairman pro tem (from this point on the schismatic Synod shall be referred to as the
'Provisional Synod').
Reproach and animosity between supporters of the rival synods deteriorated into
violence when on the evening of 31 May the newly promoted Bishop Subev, along
with an escort of armed minders, occupied the headquarters of the Holy Synod in
Sofia. The State Prosecutor and the police refused to intervene in the affair, which
led to the accusation from the BSP that the UDF government were implicated in this
criminal action.573 A few days later, the leaders of the schism, Pimen, Subev and
Poptodorov attempted to take control of Alexander Nevski Cathedral, the spiritual
heart of the BOC. Pimen intended to conduct the Ascension Day Liturgy, however,
priests loyal to the Holy Synod refused the intruders access to the altar. Pimen was
forced to begin the service from the floor of the Church but had to stop when
Maxim's call to worship was heard from behind the iconostasis.574 Following this
embarrassment the Provisional Synod turned their attention toward an alternative
Church property, Sofia Theological Seminary, appointing Radko Poptodorov as its
new Rector. While the seminary was vacant during its summer break armed
572 The statement is recorded in the Synodal Journal as No. 1234-A, 19 March 1992. Stefan of Veliko
Tumovo who was in his nineties had retired from ministry and was suffering from acute Alzheimer's.
His name was added to the statement without his knowledge or approval.
573
ffyMa, 6 June 1992
574 'Fighting in God's Church,' 3eMedencKo 3HOMe 5 June 1992
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supporters of the Provisional Synod seized the property. Responding to this action
Bishop Gregori, the displaced rector, students and concerned families, gathered at the
gates of the Seminary in an attempt to voice their disapproval. During the
demonstration a number of the students managed to enter the building, overpower
and expel its occupiers regaining it on behalf of the Holy Synod.575
While supporters of both Synods traded blows, striving to gain control of Church
property, the UDF government pursued its own relentless policy to remove the Holy
Synod from power. On 3 June 1992 it ordered that funds within the bank accounts of
the Synod be transferred into a new account in the name of Pimen and his
Provisional Synod.576 State interference appalled many, whatever their reservations
regarding Maxim, some even suggested that these intrusive actions amounted to
caeseropapism. What strained the credibility of all level-headed Bulgarians was how
the Provisional Synod could be promoted as any less compromised than the other.
The three leading Metropolitans of the Provisional Synod had generally been
regarded as the most compromised during the communist era. The choice for the
Bulgarian public therefore was between two groups of compromised Metropolitans
who had been elected during the communist regime, the arguments used to discredit
the one could equally be used against the other. Krasimir Kunev of the Bulgarian
Helsinki Committee succinctly commented "unfortunately the people who organised
the split were not the right people in terms of moral qualities."577 Therefore, as the
dispute progressed the public began to treat the situation with indifference.
President Zhelyu Zhelev asked the Constitutional Court to address the matter of the
schism and in particular the role of the government's Board of Religious Affairs
(BRA). On 11 June 1992 the Court ruled that provisions under which the BRA had
acted against the Holy Synod were themselves unconstitutional, however, it was left
to the Supreme Court to make a decision on which was the legitimate Synod.578 On 2
575 'Maxim's People Attack and Seize the Seminary,' JJeMOKpaijUM 16 September 1992
576 Metodi Spasov to the Commercial Bank, Council ofMinisters, Department ofEcclesiastical
Matters, No.96, 3 June 1992
577 K.Kunev quoted in J.Broun, 'The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Part 2', Religion,
State & Society (Vol.23, No.3:264, 2000)
578 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria. Decision No, 11/1992 from 11 June 1992,
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July the Supreme Court rejected the constitutional ruling and continued to support
the Provisional Synod.
On 22 July the Holy Synod retaliated by accusing the Provisional Synod of setting up
a schismatic Synod in violation of Holy Canon. They proceeded to convene a
Council of Prelates, to function as a Church Court whose sentence declared that the
members of the schismatic Synod should be defrocked, and Bishop Subev
excommunicated.579 The Provisional Synod rejected these rulings on the grounds that
Maxim and his Synod were not legitimate and convened a Court of their own. On 18
August the rival court proclaimed that Maxim was deposed and the remainder of his
Synod were ordered to retire to monastic life.580
On 6 November 1992 the Constitutional Court ruled that both Synods were invalid.
The expectation was that the schism would now collapse and the Provisional Synod
would return to the bosom of the Holy Synod. Instead the dispute continued to drag
on as mutual recrimination and denunciation steadily eroded Bulgarian church life.
7.2.3 UNDER SOCIALIST PROTECTION (1993-1997)
The UDF's policy and strategy toward the religious dispute antagonised many.
Nevertheless, its desire to break with Bulgaria's communist past was widely
welcomed. The government's intervention in Church affairs must be considered a
serious error of judgement, however, for in doing so its arguments against
communist State involvement in the Church were rendered invalid. Dismayed by
these events the government's coalition partner switched their support to the BSP,
subsequently the government of the UDF collapsed. We can conclude therefore that
despite the low membership of Bulgarian public in the Orthodox Church, Orthodox
sentiment and tradition continue to play a powerful role in society and State. From
579 Address ofthe Prelates Council of the BOC to our clergy, monks and Orthodox Christians,
circular letter issued by the Council of Prelates on 22 July 1992
580 'The Provisional Church Council takes action against Maxim, Neofit, Natanial and Kiril',
IJeMOKpaifufi 25 July 1992
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the information presented it would appear that a government's supportive or hostile
attitude towards the BOC was sufficient to keep it in power or not.
Table 4 - Membership of Orthodox Church
Active membership 0.5%
Non-active membership 2.5%
Consider themselves Orthodox but not
members
97%
Hence, after the Socialist Party were returned to government it determined to support
the canonical Holy Synod, assuming a role as defender of the faith - a faith which its
communist predecessor had attempted to ruin. The BSP immediately reversed the
decision of the previous government restoring the status of the Maxim, his Synod
and the Church to the consternation of the Provisional Synod. This section will
chronicle the actions of both branches of the BOC during this second period of
socialist control until February 1997 when the BSP was forced to resign from
government.
For Maxim and the Holy Synod the return of the BSP offered a welcome period of
consolidation and restoration as they sought to convince the Orthodox world of their
validity. The political change favoured them and in realisation of this fact the
schismatics sought reconciliation with Maxim. In the ensuing negotiations the
dissident Metropolitans even offered to take responsibility for the schism if they
were restored to their previous positions.581 In an act of good will the Provisional
Synod returned the Synodal headquarters in Sofia into Maxim's hands. Despite this
conciliatory move a number of complications continued to hinder negotiations which
resulted in the Bulgarian government asking Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeus to
mediate between the two parties.
The Ecumenical Patriarch arrived in September 1993 to find the dispute as heated as
ever. Each Synod refused to concede to the other, but the main issue of contention
581 24 Haca, 18 December 1993
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was Maxim's refusal to reinstate the schismatic Metropolitans to their former
eparchies. Bartholomeus disapproved ofMaxim's intransigent approach but could do
nothing to alter it. Thus, on 15 December the Holy Synod, against Bartholomeus'
better judgement, announced that it would elect new Metropolitans to replace the
wayward bishops, who had now been officially demoted, but not excommunicated.582
Unwilling to accept this decision the schismatics walked away from the negotiations.
This development concerned many, as it appeared that the State was interfering in
Church affairs yet again. Indeed some have suggested that the socialists were
responsible for the failure of the negotiations, pressing Maxim to take sterner
measures against the Provisional Synod, thus continuing and even widening the
schism.583
The question of who was the power behind the Holy Synod was clear in the minds of
the Bulgarian people, the BSP. The same question asked of the schismatics, however,
created confusion. This was exacerbated in July 1994 when Pimen stipulated that no
order of his could be implemented without prior approval of a special board.584 This
led to the conclusion that the schism itself was being prompted by businessmen,
hiding behind the ecclesiastics, manipulating them in order to prevent the Church
from reclaiming any of the property which had been appropriated during the
communist era.585
By 1995 pressure upon the schismatics intensified. On 17 April the Holy Synod
convened a second Prelates Council to approve of the excommunication of
Metropolitans Pimen, Pankrati and Kalanik and accept the repentance and welcome
Metropolitan Stefan back into the Church. Stefan had been one of the original
signatories at the withdrawal of the dissenters, however, his signature was found to
have been either forged or obtained under false pretences as Stefan had been in the
latter stages of Alzheimer's. The original nucleus of the Provisional Synod split on
582
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16 December when Pankrati and Kalanik having sought forgiveness for their actions
were also received back into the patriarchal fold.586
In an effort to restore lost ground, reignite interest within Bulgarian society and
ultimately raise the profile of the Provisional Synod Pimen announced the
convocation of a National Church Council to elect a new Patriarch in place of
Maxim, to occur in Sofia on 2-3 July 1996. He applied for a three million leva
subsidy to pay for the National Council from Deputy Prime Minister Svetoslav
Shivarov. His request was refused on the grounds that the BSP recognised only one
Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, led by Maxim and his Holy Synod. Shivarov added
that any attempt to create a second Orthodox Church would be considered a threat to
the stability of society and therefore national security and thus would violate Article
37(2) of the Bulgarian Constitution.587
Despite government objections the schismatic National Church Council assembled
with 150 delegates in attendance. However, there was no representation from the
canonically recognised international Orthodox Churches, only the non-canonical
Orthodox Church of Macedonia, the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Church
were represented. Nevertheless the Council continued to elect Pimen Patriarch of the
Bulgarian Church, despite the fact that 55/150 delegates abstained from voting. New
statutes were also introduced creating a 37 member Synod, two thirds of which
would be clergy and one third laypeople. Participation of the laity at Synodal level
• 588
was unprecedented in Bulgarian history.
The enthronement of a second Patriarch plummeted the schism and the BOC in
general, to new depths of despair within society. While the government refused to
recognise any of the decisions of the Provisional Council the Bulgarian press dubbed
the schismatics as the "Church of the UDF."589 The Holy Synod reacted strongly
condemning the actions as sterile acts of darkness, they continued:
586 24 Waca, 18 December 1995
587 Article 37(2) "Freedom of conscience and religion may not be detrimental to national security,
public order, public health or morality, or to the rights and freedoms of other citizens."
AyMa, 2 July 1996; 24 Waca, 2 July 1996; Tpyd, 5 July 1996
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Those who have seceded from the unity of the Church convened an
uncanonical, anti-church and anti-national Council. This irresponsible
gathering dared to adopt statutes contrary to the canons and traditions of
Holy Orthodoxy. They instituted some kind of Synod for themselves and
elected a pseudo-patriarch - the excommunicated former Metropolitan
Pimen... The act committed by the schismatics is an event of absurdity
and shame in the centuries-long history of our Church and our State.
Regrettably, prominent public figures, with their attendance and
irresponsible statements at this pseudo-council, proved its anti-Church
character.590
Later Maxim's Holy Synod pronounced an anathema on Pimen, the direst
ecclesiastical punishment possible.591 These antics reduced the BOC to a ludicrous
level in public life even being lampooned in the national press.
Fig.9 Cartoon by Georgi Chaushov from 1992 showing
the loss of Public respect for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church
By the close of 1996, however, another more serious problem confronted the nation.
Bulgaria plunged into economic crisis, inflation topped 300 per cent, banks collapsed,
the public faced starvation and civil war became an imminent possibility. The crisis
was explained by an economist in this fashion:
590 Patriarchal andSynodal Appeal to all Clergy and Orthodox Christians in the Diocese of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Records of the Holy Synod, No.686, 12 July 1996
591 Anathema - not only excommunicated but cursed for their denunciation of Christian doctrine
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The BSP had adroitly harnessed the old unaccountable methods of
administrative control [from the communist era] to new links with
western partners and produced a society where money haemorrhaged out
of the system into the shadowy black economy which existed beside and
fed off it.592
As the BSP government faced its toughest political crisis since the fall of communism
Patriarch Maxim blessed their presidential candidate Georgi Pirinski, endorsing the
Holy Synod's support of the socialists.593 On the other hand the growing street
demonstrations against the government were blessed by Patriarch Pimen. The two
branches of the schismatic church clearly displayed their political colours before the
nation. On 3 November 1996 UDF candidate Petur Stoyanov was elected President.
As the economic crisis worsened the Holy Synod retreated in silence as Pimen's
Synod seized the initiative. By January 1997 those involved in daily demonstrations
had risen from tens of thousands to over one hundred thousand. Pimen called on the
Bulgarian people not to submit to the "godless ruling politicians" and he and his
Synod expressed solidarity with the "long suffering people in their just protest."5 4
On 4 February 1997, in the face of national opposition, the BSP government was
dissolved to make way for new elections. The UDF swept to power, the political
transfer from the BSP to the UDF signifying yet another transfer of power within the
religious realm of the nation, from Maxim to Pimen, as the Provisional Synod gained
yet another lease of life.
7.2.4 A NEW RELIGIOUS POLICY (1997-2001)
At his presidential inauguration Petur Stoyanov voiced his desire to unite the BOC,
thus both Patriarchs were invited to his swearing-in ceremony on 22 January 1997. In
an effort not to cause embarrassment protocol insisted that the Patriarchs attended
dressed in priestly attire, rather than their patriarchal vestments. Maxim observed
protocol and was cordially greeted by Stoyanov. Pimen, in what we can only surmise
was a choreographed act, arrived in full patriarchal garb. Maxim and his party swiftly
592
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departed, leaving Pimen to administer the presidential oath.395 The following year
Stoyanov admitted in an interview that he had wanted to receive the presidential
blessing from both patriarchs, a rather ludicrous and unrealistic suggestion.596
Whether this act was choreographed with Presidential approval or purely an act of
opportunism by Pimen it undoubtedly delivered the message that the UDF supported
the Provisional Synod.
The Bulgarian people were by now truly disillusioned with the continuing fracas
between Maxim and Pimen. Having lost sympathy for either side Dimitrina
Merdjanova succinctly expressed public opinion when she explained that Bulgarians
wanted a new patriarch from another generation, someone who was not tainted,
someone who cared for people and who would attract people back into the
community life of the Church.597 UDF policy towards the schism may well have
been intended to fulfil these desires, nevertheless, by reinstituting their 1991-1993
policy, to purge key institutions [including the BOC] of corruption from their
communist past, they could only succeed in digging up old ground. Therefore instead
of searching for new avenues of reconciliation the new government reiterated that
Pimen was the only legitimate Patriarch and Maxim and his Holy Synod were again
CQO
denied official recognition.
Indignant Maxim protested before the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg after which the government noticeably became less confrontational.599
Indeed, Maxim was even chosen to bless the Bulgarian Army on Armed Forces Day
(6 May). However, when Prime Minister Ivan Kostov assumed office on 21 May the
traditional blessing of the waters was celebrated by Metropolitan Innokenti from the
Provisional Synod.600 Efforts to appease both sides of the schism increased when the
government suggested that a National Church Council be convened to end the
dispute by ecclesiastical means, the deputy Prime Minister even promised that the
595 'Patriarch Maxim offended by Stoyanov', flyMa, 24 January 1997
596
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government would not intervene in the process.601 The conciliatory tone of the
government lasted all of two weeks when Veselin Metodiev, Director of the BRA,
attempted to scupper the National Council by rejecting the BOC's request for 15
million leva to finance the event and vowed to do everything in his power to prevent
it being held.602
In spite of government attempts to hinder it, only the fourth National Church Council
in the history of the BOC assembled from 2-4 July 1997. The expectations of the
nation rested on this Council hoping that the schism would finally be resolved, that
Maxim would retire and a new younger Patriarch would take the reins of the
canonical Church. The Council achieved one major objective before it commenced,
with representatives from every canonical Orthodox Church present, the legitimacy
and canonicity ofMaxim, the Holy Synod and the BOC were affirmed.
In a report dealing with the state of the BOC the Holy Synod strongly denounced the
schism and those who had brought it about, the Provisional Synod and UDF:
Absolutely without justification the Holy Synod was declared to be a
'Communist tool,' the prelates — 'red bishops' and 'servants of the
former totalitarian communist administration.' A campaign with evil
designs for 'renewal' and 'decommunisation' of the Church was
organised, which led to an intolerable schism... There began manoeuvres
based on the so-called absence of registration of the Holy Synod, placing
the Church in humiliating conditions caused by administrative
603interference with its constitutional and legally recognised rights.
This was by no means a public apology for past associations with communists, but it
did offer comment which the Bulgarian people had been waiting for. It talked about
the consequences of wounds inflicted by materialistic atheism and infiltration and
control by State organs. It suggested that laws implemented by the communists to
control the Church had been exploited by the UDF to instigate and support the
schism. A second document contained another important sentence: "We [the Holy
Synod] beg the Bulgarian people for indulgence and forgiveness for all that which
601
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clergy and laity failed to do in their defence." A public apology, which by implication
suggested possible ecclesiastical involvement with the communist State, but still
refused to openly admit any direct relationship with the authorities.
The Council to an extent appeased the Bulgarian people but in other areas infuriated
them. When proposals from the floor suggested alterations to Church statutes
regarding the retirement age ofpatriarchs and metropolitans Patriarch Maxim refused
to allow any debate on the suggestion, perhaps because he was beyond the age put
forward for retirement. Also when it was suggested that the personal files of all senior
clergy be opened to the public to put an end to bitter allegations against the Holy
Synod, Maxim again refused to put the issue to a vote.604 Finally, when no definitive
action was declared surrounding the schism it was realised that the Council had
achieved very little, no end to the schism, no resignation from Maxim or Pimen and
no announcement on the election of a new Patriarch.
Pressure again fell on the government to find a solution to the dispute. Diplomatic
and ecclesiastic methods having failed the government employed intimidation, threats
and verbal abuse in an attempt to force the two sides into arbitration. Pimen, realising
that opportunities for his Synod were dissipating, consented to arbitration, whereas
the Holy Synod, in an act which can only be described as political blackmail,
declared that it would be a pity if the pressure which had compelled it to defend its
rights before the European Court of Human Rights proved to be a hindrance toward
political efforts to join the nation with the European Community.605 Realising that
supporting Pimen and opposing Maxim had achieved nothing the UDF government
decided to implement a policy of non-involvement. The exasperation of the
government was graphically displayed during the 150th anniversary celebrations of
national hero Hristo Botev, when President Stoyanov publicly appealed to both
Maxim and Pimen to provide proof of their responsibility and humility and have the
courage to bow out to allow a generation of clergy uncorrupted by the old regime to
take their place: "Under the Ottoman yoke our clergy were prepared to face chains
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Weary of the infighting amongst the ecclesiastical hierarchy lower clergy from both
sides attempted to forge some unity. Moved by their efforts Pimen even offered to
retire if the BOC convened an extraordinary Council to settle the dispute. However,
secretary to the Holy Synod, Metropolitan Gelasi replied:
Who are we supposed to be negotiating with? This is not a dispute
between two sides on an equal basis. With Pimen? Pimen is a renegade,
an apostate. We have nothing whatsoever to say to him. A Council? Yes,
but only after they crawl back to us on bended knees, and not to discuss
disputes about church hierarchy but to talk about millennium related
issues.607
The intransigent attitude of the Holy Synod frustrated everyone within the BOC. The
government's policy of non-involvement with church hierarchy was, however,
producing a dividend. Without contact between leaders of Church and State, without
a move toward unification, there could be no formal agreement between Church and
State on much needed cash subsidies to pay priests wages. This resulted in priests
from both sides remaining unpaid for up to six months, many ofwhom went on strike
demanding reunification. Priests from the Vratsa eparchy threatened that if an
agreement on unification was not reached they would transfer from the BOC to
Russian jurisdiction.608
Discontent and frustration amongst the clergy spread to the hierarchy, many of whom
called for the resignation of the Holy Synod. Exasperated clergy gathered around
Pimen's call to convene an extraordinary Council and representatives from both sides
agreed to convene a Council to dismiss both patriarchs and metropolitans and elect
new ones agreeable to everyone.609 The Holy Synod, neglecting the practical issues
606 'Sofia: le President Bulgare demande la demission du patriarche Maxime', Service Orthodoxe de
Presse, (225:8-9, February 1998)
607 I.Bell, 'Bulgariens Kirche und die Politik', Glaube in der Zweiten Welt, No.7/8, 1998, p.23
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and mood of the parish clergy, hid behind the safety of canon law and commented
that such a council would have no canonical validity.610
Unable to heal itself, Patriarch Petros VII of Alexandria arrived in an effort to
familiarise himself with the history of the schism. A few days later Metropolitans
Meletios and Meliton from the Ecumenical Patriarchate joined Petros to sound out the
possibility of a Pan-Orthodox Council to meet in Sofia to finally bring the schism to a
canonical end.611 The Pan-Orthodox Council convened soon after this initial
consultation meeting from 30 September - 1 October 1998. It was chaired by
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeus and was attended by the Patriarchs of
Alexandria, Antioch, Russia, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, a representative of the
Patriarch of Jerusalem, the Archbishops of Cyprus, Albania and Athens and all
Greece, the Metropolitan of the Church in Poland, a representative of the Czech and
Slovak Church and twenty-two other bishops.
Following accustomed vitriolic attacks from either side negotiations ensued.
Encountering the full canonical force of the Orthodox Church upon them the
schismatics promptly and publicly repented and expressed their desire to return to the
canonical Bulgarian Church under the headship of Maxim. The anathema against
Pimen was annulled, but in view of his age [93 years old] he was not reinstated as
metropolitan. Thus on 1 October 1998 the end of the schism was proclaimed.
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeus very wisely declared before the Bulgarian nation
that neither side could claim victory or defeat, emphasising that only the devil had
lost.
Stoked by press speculation Bulgarians awaited Maxim's resignation. When this was
not forthcoming the UDF leadership shocked everyone by announcing that they did
not recognise the ruling of the Pan-Orthodox Council and encouraged dissenters to
press for patriarchal elections. Maria Dimitrova, from Kliment Ohridski University in
Sofia, comments that talk of reconciliation had been premature because none of the
inner church conflicts had been resolved, only the canonicity of the Bulgarian Church
610
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had been ascertained.612 As the events of the Pan-Orthodox Council receded it
became clear that it had done little to allay the discontent of those who sought
renewal within the BOC.
Faced with continued government criticism Patriarch Maxim complained to visiting
members of the European Union's parliamentary assembly monitoring Bulgaria's
human rights situation. He claimed that the State was intent on destabilising the
Church and refused to conform to the decisions of the Pan-Orthodox Council.613 The
death of Pimen on 10 April 1999 did little to appease the situation, even though it was
decided that it would be unwise to elect another 'schismatic' patriarch. Instead
Metropolitan Innokenti, widely considered to be the power behind the schismatics,
was chosen to be locum tenens.
Thus, at the beginning of the new millennium the BOC was considered to be one
unified Church without schism. In reality practise spoke very differently. Many of the
bishops who had been reinstated during the Pan-Orthodox conference defected
creating chaos over diocesan jurisdictions. In practice the hierarchy within the BOC
worked as two separate synods each working to outdo the other, the schismatics
refusing to do anything which could be deemed tantamount to recognising Maxim's
primacy. On 1 January 2001 the Holy Synod ordered the schismatics to fully
implement the decisions of the Pan-Orthodox council and acknowledge the authority
of Maxim. To bolster this instruction a delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate
arrived in Sofia to reiterate the council's 1998 condemnation of schism and affirm
Maxim as the "only legitimate patriarch." 1
7.2.5 AN END TO THE SCHISM (2001-2005)
By 2001 the two leading political parties, BSP and UDF, had been largely discredited
by the Bulgarian public. The appearance onto the Bulgarian political scene of the
regal and charismatic figure of Tsar Simeon II, deposed as a child in 1946, ignited
612 Personal interview, 23 April 2003
613
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Bulgarian hope for the future. Unlikely to revoke its republican ethos and be
reinstated as monarch, Simeon established a new Bulgarian political party, the
National Movement for Simeon II (NMS) which enticed the Bulgarian electorate
with the promise of prosperity in 800 days, through the introduction of reduced
taxation, extended social welfare provision and easily obtained low interest loans.615
On 17 June 2001 his broad based coalition party, won the national election with
almost 50% of the vote. Tsar Simeon or more correctly Simeon Saxocoburg duly
became prime minister, despite the fact that he had not lived in the country since
1946 and had visited Bulgaria on only a handful of occasions in twelve years.
Baptised into the Orthodox Church as a child he had throughout his life worshipped
as a Roman Catholic. Would these predominantly western and catholic traits affect
State attitudes toward the apparently insoluble schism? Until the present it appears
that Simeon's 'unorthodox' background has had bearing on his attitude towards the
problems in the BOC, in that he has left it to its own devices, the dispute has in other
words been swept under the political carpet.
Despite Simeon's personal lack of interest in the schism his coalition partners have
striven to reach a compromise. The dispute continues but has centred once again on
ownership of property. Property provides money and money is power. Whilst the two
sides literally fight over that property which is presently owned by the Church, the
greatest struggle is to gain control of property confiscated by the communists. It has
been suspected that the church property scandal has persisted and restitution of
property delayed because of financial misappropriation by every Bulgarian
government since the fall of the communists.616 Each government in power has,
however, absolved itself on the pretext that if restitution was granted to which side of
the church divide should it be given? Criticism of government aside the hierarchy of
the BOC also appear to be implicated in claims of financial abuse. Key documents
pertaining to ownership of Church property have disappeared from the Church
Archive department and recent documents have been neglected, misplaced or
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destroyed.617 Others have claimed that Church hierarchy, from both sides, have been
involved in sharp practice, even of having links with the Bulgarian mafia.618
The most traumatic event in the recent development of the schism happened in the
city of Blagoevgrad. In a city church, the legal ownership of which had been
disputed since 2000, Stefan Kamberov a parish priest belonging to the schismatic
branch of the BOC was brutally murdered. The fact that it was a priest, slain within
the church, horrified the Bulgarian people. When information was released that a
priest from the canonical Synod had been arrested for his murder the whole nation
took notice. When the priest in question, although admitting to the murder, was
released without charge, the public were dismayed. What was more worrying was the
reason provided for the committing of this terrible act by the Metropolitan of
Nevrokop. Firstly, he considered that "nothing wrong" had been committed, as the
murder was the "objective conclusion" of the escalation of conflict, the most
important aspect of which was that it was provoked by "the other." In this way guilt
even for such an extreme act, although unacceptable, should be attributed to "the
other." For this reason the Metropolitan refused to accept or place any responsibility
on the killer as he had been provoked by the schismatic 'other'.619
As result of this awful event the schismatic element retreated from the forefront of
church life. As they contemplated the immediate future, in light of judicial and
ecclesiastical proclamations, the schismatic clergy feared that they could no longer
presume any protection or justice from Bulgarian law. One priest commented that
tlirough this atrocity the canonicity of the Church had been transformed from
something which was once charged with responsibility and truth into something
which vindicates absolutely anything that the Holy Synod opposes and therefore
stops providing assurance because of its dogmatic infallibility.620 The predicament of
the schismatics was dealt a further blow when a nationwide police action raided all
property belonging to the schismatic clergy. During the night of 20 July 2004 police
617 Personal interview with informant within BOC archive department, 25 August 2003
618
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entered over 90 churches and related properties belonging to Metropolitan
Innokenti's alternative synod, ejected all the schismatic clergy and sealed off the
churches until new priests were appointed by Maxim. A number of clergy were
arrested during the action, but perhaps more threating were the reports of priests and
laypersons being beaten. This brutal attempt to unite the divided BOC was
coordinated and approved by the Supreme Prosecutor's Office who protested that
they were restoring what belonged to the rightful Church. In doing so, however, it
was claimed that a number of human rights were violated, facts distorted, laws
interpreted erroneously and outdated laws enforced.621 This remains the
contemporary situation with the schism, the declaration of the Pan-Orthodox Council
of 1998, that the schism was healed, remains the official statement of the BOC. In
reality the schismatics in fear, for the time being, have gone into hiding. However,
resentment over recent events and disrespect for Maxim's leadership continue
unabated.
7.3 POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE
7.3.1 LAW ON RELIGIONS
As a consequence of internal schism the BOC has struggled to maintain a position of
respect in Bulgarian public life. This resulted in the Holy Synod lobbying State to
politically and legally reconfirm its privileged status within society. This was no easy
task as the functioning Law on Religions (1949) had been the product of the
communist era and thus favoured anti-religious, secular and materialistic policy and
had been created to emphasise the separation of Church and State, removing the
privileged status of the BOC. However, after a period of intense campaigning by
Orthodox hierarchy, concerned politicians and business people the government
agreed to review the Law on Religions. As a result of judicial re-assessment and
despite its often precarious legal status during the schism the BOC has been able
once again to rely on the support of the State. Indeed, the new Law on Religions
which was adopted on 20 December 2002 unequivocally supports the canonical
621 Tolerance Foundation, Annual Report ofthe Bulgarian Tolerance Foundation on the State of
Religious Human Rights in Bulgaria, Sofia, September 2004
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BOC, recognising only one Orthodox Church under Patriarch Maxim and the Holy
Synod.622 The Law was welcomed by the majority of Bulgarians as it not only
brought the schism to logical conclusion but also took firm measures to defend
Bulgaria and Orthodoxy from foreign 'sectarian invasion'.
Widespread protest against the 'unjustness' of the new Law, however, has shaken the
Bulgarian political establishment. Eighteen legally registered religious organisations
voiced their concern, the basic premise behind their protests being that all religious
bodies in Bulgaria were to be subject to restrictions which did not apply to any other
non-government organisation. They were particularly grieved because the BOC had
AO-}
been granted complete immunity from these State restrictions. Whilst accepting
the Bulgarian Constitution's affirmation describing the BOC as the nation's
traditional religion, the protesters objected to its being granted extra judicial rights
which discriminated against other religious organisations.624 They condemned these
as being completely unjust, contravening not only the Bulgarian Constitution but also
the Constitution of the European Court of Human Rights which the Bulgarian
government had already signed as a prior requisite to its joining the European
Community in 2007.
Article 13(3) of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution, although defining Orthodoxy as the
"traditional religion of the Republic of Bulgaria," does not provide the BOC any
legal preference vis-a-vis other religious denominations. It does not even define the
BOC as an established church, a majority church or any other such term, which could
have been interpreted as giving it privileged status. At the height of the schism such
statements were problematical, but after the Pan-Orthodox conference of 1998 the
canonicity of the Holy Synod and the BOC could no longer be questioned. As it
stood, the Constitution did not give clear guidance on how to handle the BOC, being
described neither as an established Church or disestablished religious organisation.
Therefore when disputed issues came before the judiciary the decision making
622 Law on Religions, Article 10(1). The stipulation of the Canonical Orthodox Church in this Article
therefore is fully supportive ofPatriarch Maxim and his Synod, although it does not mention Maxim
by name.
623 Law on Religions, Article 11(2)
624 Constitution ofthe Republic ofBulgaria, /IB, No.56 from 13 July 1991
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process was left to the interpretation and discretion of the legislator or judge. It
became clear that Bulgarian law needed to be amended to recognise the established
nature of the BOC, as well as the developing relationship between Church and State
in Bulgaria. As part of this ongoing process amendments were made to the Persons
and Family Act which dealt with the changing position of the BOC within the nation.
Although assisting the predicament of the Orthodox Church it was widely considered
to be a major blow to religious freedom in Bulgaria as the amendment stipulated that
all religious organisations, apart from those which had been present in Bulgaria for
over 100 years, would require re-registering for approval by the Council of
Ministers.625
It was not only Bulgaria's religious minorities who criticised the new Law on
Religions, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also
raised its concerns.626 In a report published in 2003 the OSCE voiced alarm that
Bulgaria's commitments to religious freedom were out of step with the provisions it
required to meet to satisfy entry into the European Community. For example, in its
haste to pass the Law on Religions the Bulgarian government had neglected to
consult with religious communities other than the Orthodox during the drafting
process. Also during the review stage of the bill it refused to respond to complaints
brought by fifty parliamentary representatives regarding this issue. The OSCE also
criticised the Sofia City Court, mandated to deal with all religious re-registration, as
it had stalled on issuing registrations since the Persons and Family Act was amended
in 1994.627
The major concern raised by religious minorities and the OSCE regarded the
Bulgarian governments recognition of the BOC as the 'traditional church of
Bulgaria'. All complainants recognised that the wording of the Law acknowledged
the role of the BOC in the nation's history and was also an attempt to settle the saga
of schism. Nevertheless, the apprehension was that the positive assessment given by
625 Persons andFamily Act - Amendments and Introduction ofArticle 133A, ,Q,B, 3 February 1994.
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the State to one religion and one creed would explicitly influence the choice of
public religious opinion and also automatically give the BOC legal advantage over
other religious groups, which had already created conflict over matters of religious
registration. The registration system clearly favoured Orthodox organisations and
disapproved of non-Orthodox religious bodies. As a result if a religious group was
refused official registration it could not legally exist. It was apparent that this system
was open to arbitrary and non-transparent decision making by pro-Orthodox civil
fi98
servants. The OSCE report concluded by stating that the Bulgarian Law on
Religions curtailed fundamental freedoms of religious minorities in Bulgaria and
should therefore be amended and brought into line with decisions of the Constitution
of the European Court ofHuman Rights.
Other national bodies, such as the European Law Centre in Sofia, appealed to the
Bulgarian Courts on the anti-constitutional nature of the new Law on Religions. They
argued that reinstating the BOC to a privileged national position, because of what it
had achieved during a previous era, meant that Bulgarian history was being re¬
written purely to equate with the new law. In debating their case they compared this
approach to Bulgaria's 1971 Constitution which recognised the historical victory of
the Socialist Revolution in 1944 and the wonderful leadership of the Communist
Party. Few people would now agree with that assessment and similarly many would
disagree with the "indisputable fact" that the BOC merits a privileged place in
Bulgarian society today. In arguing this they attempted to explain, that alongside
every historical fact rests various differences of opinion, which by necessity excludes
imposing historical fact by virtue of law. By adopting the law they claimed that the
State had negated the basis for freedom of thought and religion and individual liberty
to interpret history. Therefore those who are not Orthodox, or agree to a specific
reading of Bulgarian history, may be considered to be political agitators or even a
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The desire to re-assert Orthodoxy's privileged status illustrates that the BOC and the
Bulgarian State have reverted to 19th century nationalist ideology. Rather than being
theocentric the BOC has become religio-ethnocentric, while the State appears to
identify its very existence with its intimate relationship with the established religion
of the land. This has created a religious agenda full of canonical and theological
inconsistency. The desire to be the sole representative of the nation has become so
pervasive within the Church that it is somehow forgotten that it does not have any
theological foundation. Rather it was born of a legal concept from within Ottoman
law, that of the millet. The establishment of the millet led to ethnic emancipation
within the Christian communities of the Balkans and led to the concept of the
national Church. The desire of contemporary Church and State appears to be to
construct a cultural/bulgaro-national/orthodox millet which has declared war on
minority Christian denominations and other non-Christian religions within Bulgarian
territory. This millet mentality has outworked itself in the form of restrictive and
unjust religious/political practice. As a number of international organisations have
stated, the BOC must reject this quasi-orthodox theology, which not only deflects
from the rich heritage of Eastern Orthodoxy, but may hinder Bulgaria's entry into the
expanding European Community.
7.3.2 THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
While securing its privileged position under the law the BOC has also endeavoured
to re-assert its authority within society by re-introducing religious education into the
secular classroom. One of the major programmes implemented by the communist
regime, to subjugate the Church and distance it from society, was the removal of
religious instruction from the State educational system. Therefore, after the collapse
of communism debates immediately arose regarding the re-introduction of religion as
a subject into the Bulgarian school curriculum. Constitutionally schools remained
secular but politicians were willing to consider amending this policy. Discussion
focussed around two options: a complete renewal of the previous religious
programme, which would study different world religions and introduce subjects such
as law, politics and philosophy; or to reinstate the tradition of religious instruction
280
present in schools before the socialist era, a tradition which included subjects such
as: Sacred History, Public Worship, Catechism, History of the Orthodox Church,
History of the BOC, Moral Consciousness and Moral Admonition. The second
option was clearly not intended to be a general religious education but a specific
upbringing within the domain ofEastern Orthodox Christianity.
In 1993 The Ministry of Education issued a statement announcing that their policy
would adhere to the existing laws enshrined in the Bulgarian Constitution, which
defined schools as secular institutions and therefore should remain independent of
any religious beliefs. The issue remained in abeyance until 1997 as the socialist
government realised that if it guaranteed access to the Orthodox, it would require
guaranteeing equal privileges to other Christian denominations and faith groups. The
statement contradicted itself, however, by adding: "The upbringing in Bulgarian
schools is connected with the national united norms of Orthodox Christian ethics and
morality..."630
By 1997 the UDF's Education Ministry had dropped the language of 'religious
upbringing' and talked instead about 'religious education', which intended to
introduce the major world religions and equip children to cope morally with the new
challenges and dangers of the modern world. The new curriculum aimed to
contribute to a mutual understanding and respect between different faith groups in
Bulgaria, it would provide a balanced religious world view and the historical role of
631
Orthodoxy would be explained, emphasising its role as national saviour. These
newly formulated objectives were intended to conform to the new amendments in the
United Nations Human Rights Charter encouraging tolerance toward differing
faiths.632 Thereafter a curriculum was designed to introduce this new agenda and a
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new M.A programme in Religion was established to provide staff with additional
qualifications to teach it.633
Despite these efforts teachers and manuals used for religious instruction continue to
favour Orthodox upbringing. The most recent approved school text book, published
in 2003, contains sections on Orthodox history, catechism and liturgy. It also
proclaims the evils of Islamic rule in Ottoman Bulgaria as encapsulated by the
catastrophe and continuity theories,634 Therefore the present generation of Bulgarian
children are still being instructed in Orthodox superiority over other religious
minorities and its biased reading of history has the danger of instilling an inbred fear
of 'the other' particularly the Turkish-Muslim. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
raised the objection that this programme violated the national Constitution, which
does not permit any restriction of rights or privileges based on race, nationality,
religion or conviction, and accused advocates of Orthodoxy of pushing their faith
635into a dominant position at the expense of other churches and faiths. A
repercussion of this biased approach has been a rise in anti-sectarian hysteria.636
Regardless of the efforts of the Church to influence the religious upbringing of
Bulgaria's children a survey undertaken during this research revealed that only 2% of
those questioned considered that school education had any bearing on their attitude
toward religion. It must be recognised, however, that the majority of those
interviewed would have been taught under the atheistic socialist system.
Nevertheless, it does appear that contemporary schoolchildren's interest in religious
education continues to be very low, but this may have more to do with the lack of
religious instruction available in schools, due to the continued shortage of suitably
qualified teachers. A 2000/01 survey of schools exposed the reality that only 3% of
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children had any religious classes in their school. From this survey it was
discovered that there were only two hundred and sixty-eight qualified persons able to
teach religion in Bulgaria's schools, a number clearly incapable of providing an
638
adequate response to the renewed call for Christian education.








7.3.3 NEW HOPE EMERGES FROM BELOW
On a cold September lunchtime (2004) seventy people line up in front of a ground
floor window in an apartment block next to an Orthodox Church in central Sofia. The
queue is made up mostly of elderly women, interspersed with neatly dressed younger
men and women accompanied by their children. As they reach the window each
person receives a small bag containing oil, rice, butter and half a loaf of bread. Each
person also carries a container which is filled with hot soup. This scene provides a
microcosm ofBulgarian society and represents the widespread economic hardship of
young and old alike. This picture is copied in many places throughout the city, but
what makes this one significant is that it is organised by a local Orthodox Parish
Church. However, it was not established by decree from above, or financed from the
Synod's coffers. It was founded and run by the Pokrov Foundation, a movement of
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Orthodox laity which is trying to restore genuine parish life and diaconal service to
the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria.639
The Foundation was established in 1994, originally as a publishing and educational
organisation to promote Orthodoxy in Bulgaria. However, after evaluating its
mission the Pokrov Foundation came to the realisation that social work was being
neglected by the hierarchy of the Church and therefore sought to constitute a
programme of work, undertaken by the laity, to meet the pressing social needs of
their communities. The presence of the Church in the social life of the local
community is considered by them to be one of the best opportunities for Orthodox
Christian witness.640 Despite this fact the hierarchy of the Church remains inactive.
Almost sixteen years after the fall of communism the Holy Synod is still unprepared
to meet the public demand for a practical and comprehensible outworking of the
Christian message in society. Current tendencies reveal that apart from the BOC's
'national' nomenclature Orthodox Christianity is becoming increasingly
marginalised as the Church fails to meet the spiritual and practical needs of
Bulgarian society.
Today there is a growing conviction that if any change is to occur in the BOC, it can
only come from below, from the laity. Alongside this conviction rises an exciting
new hope for the Church in Bulgaria. At the heart of this movement the Pokrov
Foundation is intricately involved in analysing Bulgarian society, involving people in
dialogue and outlining reforms required to renew the BOC. In this way fundamental
issues are being tackled which have never before been discussed in the Church:
Where are the roots of the Bulgarian Church crisis to be found? Is a radical and more
spiritual approach to Bulgarian history and cultural heritage possible? What is the
real religious identity of the nation? The Foundation has progressed to become a
catalyst for a number of new lay initiatives including the National Orthodox
Women's Committee, the Orthodox Education Fund and the Bulgarian National
Christian Committee (encompassing leaders from all the major Christian
639 Information on the Pokrov Foundation is available from www.pokrov-foundation.QTC
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denominations in the country). Most importantly the Foundation has engendered the
belief that the BOC must have a vision for ecumenical cooperation, not form above,
but promoted by these new lay movements.641
It is from these models of contemporary lay ministry which the BOC must take
encouragement for the future. Whilst the hierarchy of the church has found it
impossible to extricate itself from its communist past, or cope with the demands of
pluralistic society and whilst the lower clergy generally remain poorly educated and
unmotivated to become involved in parish social life, it is the laity who has taken the
lead. Unburdened by canon law or political rivalry the laity has shown the ability to
escape from Bulgaria's socialist quagmire. Subsequently the work of the Pokrov
Foundation has been perceived by the Holy Synod as being both a strong and
positive factor in church life, but also a dangerous and hostile body which reveals the
weakness of the BOC and its leadership.
In the face of mounting public criticism, which has called for the dismissal of the
entire Holy Synod, it is interesting to find that the Pokrov Foundation oppose this
sentiment and support the hierarchy of the Church. In a statement from 1997 the
Foundation declared: "The Church crisis is a matter of personal responsibility for
everyone baptised Orthodox. Replacing the old bishops through revolutionary or
anti-canonical methods cannot be a solution to any problem in the Church, therefore,
the role of the lay movements should be actively supported as the only peaceful way
to overcome this crisis."642
7.4 CONCLUSION
The social and political transition from communism to democracy in Bulgaria has
proven problematical. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church in its self proclaimed role as
national saviour would have been expected to be in a leading position to sustain the
needs of society through this turmoil. As events unfolded, however, the BOC was
nowhere to be seen, its leadership deigned not to be involved in celebrating
641 P.Sivov, (2000), p.5
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communism's downfall. This lack of enthusiasm, the failure of the BOC to lead the
Bulgarian nation into a new age and the Holy Synod's political manoeuvrings with
the former regime amalgamated to become a major focus of Bulgarian public
resentment and hostility toward the Church and its leadership. Bulgarians desired to
break completely with their communist past and wanted church leadership to do
likewise. Silence and inaction from the Synod, however, were deemed by the public
to be a sign of guilt and disinterest.
As the socialists and democrats struggled for political superiority they voiced their
approval or disapproval of the Holy Synod's inaction. Those desiring a fresh start in
a new era coalesced around the UDF's call for church reform and demanded
Patriarch Maxim's removal from office, accusing him of collaboration and
uncanonical election. Thus politicians and the State became embroiled in the affairs
of the Church. Throughout its history the BOC had suffered many vicissitudes, but
never until 1992 had it experienced internal schism. This division was not created by
doctrinal conflict, but had its origins in concerns to break free from its links with the
former regime. Nevertheless, it would appear that underlying every event
surrounding the schism has been a struggle for ownership of Church property, a
substantial multi-million source of income in which unscrupulous and malevolent
characters have played an important part. At parish level all the public have
witnessed is bitter infighting amongst the clergy. A consequence of over ten years of
schism in the church has been a reduction in moral and spiritual values, graphically
displayed by Orthodox clergy and synod alike, particularly surrounding the events of
the murder of schismatic priest Stefan Kamberov.
Ultimately an impotent leadership and a struggling church have encouraged a weak
religiousness amongst the population. Qualitative research completed during this
investigation revealed that Orthodox Christianity in contemporary Bulgaria is
employed as a method of national identification rather than a matter of personal
religious belief. Indeed, the BOC as an institution in contemporary Bulgaria does not
primarily present itself as a religious body at all but as an integral factor in Bulgarian
national history and therefore to be a vital part in national characterisation and
286
identification. Thus the religiousness of the Bulgarian people reveals itself as a
nationalist trait.
In an effort to survive, to maintain a dominant role in contemporary society the BOC
promotes its salvific historical/cultural role. Unable to extricate itself from past
communist associations, or cope with pluralistic democratic society, church
leadership has reverted back to a 19th century monolithic model of church-state
relationship. The Bulgarian government has reciprocated by raising the BOC to a
legally privileged position in the nation, above all other Christian and non-Christian
religions. Despite the pride which many Bulgarians have in their national church
there are those who wish to be spiritually revitalised and practically supported by
their ecclesiastical leaders. However, every act of social work and spiritual renewal
which is emerging from the church comes from below. It is the work of lay
movements such as the Pokrov Foundation that are renewing the living communal
sense of being in the Church, without any supporting initiatives from above.
However, the laity want the Church and its hierarchy to be an active and reactive part
of society.
To reassert itself as a dominant spiritual force within society the BOC requires
obtaining a level of organisational autonomy which does not rely solely on special
statutes of State. As Bulgaria prepares to enter the European Community the Church
will be compelled to reject its pretensions for singular special treatment - as the
unique carrier of Bulgarian spiritual values. By necessity it will have to respect the
rights of individuals to choose values different from their own and not enforce
Orthodoxy upon Bulgarian society. Through the international requirement to amend
the Law on Religion the Bulgarian Orthodox Church will have the opportunity not
only to achieve this but also to free itself from its nationalist narrative.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8. NATION, NATIONALISM AND THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church has served Bulgarian nationalism for a
thousand years in conditions of infinite diversity... It is not the gospel
that the patriarch and bishops in Sofia hold high for the Bulgarian
people... It is the national cause in its church wrappings that they
i 643
propagate today.
Spas Raikin's comment on the relationship between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church
and nationalism serves to portray the passion which the Bulgarian church holds for
the nation. Preceding chapters of this thesis have highlighted that Bulgaria's socio¬
political environment has been forged by the dominant themes of religion and nation.
However, Raikin's comment regarding the BOC serving Bulgarian nationalism for a
thousand years will send modem commentators on nationalism into a state of
apoplexy. It runs counter to western theories of nationalism as a secular phenomenon
that, many claim, only developed with the birth of nation-states in the nineteenth
century. This chapter will argue that there is indeed a direct connection between
modem nationalism and pre-nineteenth century pro-Bulgar sentiment, bringing
together the themes of church and nationalism in Bulgaria that have been discussed
previously from a socio-historical perspective. It will also contend, however, that
modem Bulgarian nationalism has succeeded in recmiting the BOC as an instrument
of its own political purpose, and thus clarify the issues that underlie Raikin's
statement. Through an analysis of the development of the relationship between
church and nation in Bulgaria this chapter will move towards a clear understanding of
this argument in conjunction with contemporary research in the area of religion,
nation and nationalism.
643 S.Raikin, 'Nationalism and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church', in P.Ramet (ed.) Religion &
Nationalism in Soviet andEast European Politics, (Durham, 1984), p.371
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8.1 DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS
8.1.1 ECCLESIASTICAL NATIONALISM
Peter Kuzmic in a 1992 article argued that nationalism has been one of the major
challenges facing the traditional Balkan Churches during the process of replacing
communist ideology: "The major problem for the Christian Church and its mission
may be the temptation to return to a quasi-Constantinian model of Church-State co¬
operation. In this process... there is an intense and valid rediscovery of national-
religious identity."644 The weakness of Kuzmic's theory is its situational generality,
for in the Bulgarian context, as Raikin has previously implied, the 'quasi-
Constantinian model' has never been terminated by the Bulgarian Church. That
intimate relationship between church, state and nation is a service which Bulgaria's
Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy has performed throughout the centuries with
enthusiasm and without reservation. For example, after the collapse of communism in
1989 the Holy Synod wrote in support of Bulgaria's new government:
The Holy Orthodox Church is the traditional confession of the
Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is linked with the
history and the development of our nation. It is a Church of the people, a
democratic church.
For more than 1100 years now our church has been educating and
cultivating unflinchingly and with zeal the believing fellow countrymen
of the mother country and outside it in loyalty to Holy Orthodoxy, which
is the history of the nation over the centuries. The Bulgarian Orthodox
Church has made an exceptional contribution in keeping alive national
self-consciousness, and in creating a rich spiritual culture within our
borders... it has helped during the years of slavery to preserve the mother
tongue, the morality and the religious and moral traditions of the
Bulgarian people. It is with good reason that out Orthodox Church is
called a Church of the people.
Our Church has lived and will continue to live with the successes and
hardships of the mother country. That is why it welcomes with complete
approval the nation-wide striving for a renovating process of the
Fatherland's government... With good conscience the church will in
644 P.Kuzmic, 'Christian Mission in Europe', Themelios, 18(1992)23
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every way contribute towards achieving national unity... and will teach
the people to labour diligently where their duty requires it.645
Such public utterances are evidence that for the BOC religion and nationhood are
identical realities, dependent on one another, the nation providing the body and the
church the soul to Bulgaria.646 One of the recurrent themes in the Bulgarian Orthodox
press today is the parallel continuity between church and nation, linking that
progression historically to the Patriarchates of the First and Second Bulgarian
empires. This doctrine is not new. As this thesis has shown, the close identity of
church, state and nation has been advanced by every Bulgarian historian from Paisii
to the present day and by every leader of the BOC past and present.647 The church's
strength, it appears, is founded more in Bulgaria's particularity and unity with
political and national history, than in the ecumenism and mission of universal
Orthodoxy. In electing to walk along the path of traditional Bulgarian nationalism the
present leaders of the BOC have given the impression that they are seeking to regain
a place of dignity and respectability in the hearts of the nation after the problematical
years of communism, during which they were accused of compromise and
accommodation with the former regime.
8.1.2 HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALISM
The foremost difficulty in attempting to define nation and nationalism is to find any
agreement within the diverse formulae encompassing the subject. Nevertheless, it is
vital to comprehend the historical foundation behind these theories as this will enable
us to analyse and interpret them in relation to the subject of this particular research.
Within the context of this research the term 'nationalism' is used to convey devotion
to a cultural-linguistic collectivity which has manifested itself in its respect toward
the history, culture, traditions and religion of a particular nation and seeks to promote
a specific culture and way of life identified as that of the nation.648
645 Letter from Patrairch Maxim and the Holy Synod addressed to Mr. Stanko Todorov, Chairman of
the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (18 December 1989)
646 S.Raikin, (1984), p.201
647 P.Nikov, Revival of the Bulgarian Nation, (Sofia, 1929), p.41
648
P.Ramet, 'Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity',
Eastern Christianity andPolitics in the 20th Century, (Durham, 1988), p.6
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Balkan nationalism was initially affected by the German nationalist movement,
particularly the eighteenth century work of philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder
(1744-1803).649 At the height of the German nationalist period von Herder
emphasised the importance of respecting, preserving and advancing national
groupings. He argued that nations were not defined by imperial dynastic power
structures, but were differentiated by linguistic and historical-cultural factors. This
theory coincided with the situation in South-Eastern Europe where religion had been
the dominating cultural differentiation in people's lives for a number of centuries. By
the nineteenth century Bulgarian nationalism had developed into what has been
termed 'Christoslavism', the theory that all Slavs are Christian by nature and
therefore are racially Christian.650 Although few scholars have attempted to argue this
from an academic or theological perspective, the belief continues to be implicit in the
contemporary religio-cultural debate over the issue 'to be Bulgarian is to be
Orthodox'. Eugene Lemberg rejects the theory that common qualities such as
religion, language and culture are what make a nation. He prefers to talk of
nationalism as a "system of notions, values and norms... an ideology," which
demarcate a group from its environment.651 In Bulgaria's social predicament during
the nineteenth century, however, that defining 'system' was religion. Indeed,
sociologists have pointed out that the intimate relationship between nationalist and
religious movements in the nineteenth century both had inspirational and revivalist
characteristics.652 Opposing the unifying cultural and ideological theories of nation,
and thus contradicting the ecclesiastical Bulgarian definition of nationalism, Eric
Hobsbawn suggests that the political and modern nature of nationality were born
653
purely of nineteenth century political machinations.
Both these concepts are based on an original differentiation promoted by Friedrich
Meinecke between Staatnation (nation-state) and Kulturalnation (cultural nation):
"We can divide nations into cultural and state-nations: into those which rest basically
649 J.G.von Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte der Bildung der Menschheit, (Riga, 1774)
650
M.Velikonja, 'Historical Roots of Slovenian Christoslavic Mythology', Religion in Eastern
Europe, 19(1999)17
651
E.Lemberg, Nationalismus, (Hamburg, 1964), p.52
652 R.E.Park & E.W.Burgess, Introduction to the Science ofSociology, (Chicago, 1924), p.931
653 E.Hobsbawn, Nations andNationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge,
1992), pp9-ll
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on a certain commonly experienced cultural possession and those which rest basically
on the unifying power of a shared political history and constitution. Shared language,
shared literature and shared religion are the most important and effective cultural
goods that create and hold a cultural nation together."654 This differentiation has taken
many forms including its most recent articulation between 'modernist' and
'traditionalist' approaches. Every theory, however, follows Meinecke's basic model
of separation: modern-political nation or traditional-cultural/religious nation.
Although theorists would prefer to promote one or another of these concepts, this
research asks if such a strict demarcation is really possible in the Bulgarian case?
Both theories have there place in the context of the Bulgarian nation: the modernist
theory explains clearly the progression and development of nineteenth century
political machinations, while the traditionalist theory retains significance for what
happened prior to and to an extent simultaneously with the modern era. Therefore
although contemporary nationalist debate surrounding 'nation-state' versus 'cultural
nation' retains significance, in the context of this research it would be profitable to
speak of 'cultural nation' and 'nation-state' in parallel, such as the 'cultural nation-
state'.
Nationalism has political and cultural preconditions often rooted in the history of a
nation. Hence, this research proposes that both the idea and first forms of nationalism
in Bulgaria appeared before the nineteenth century and the so-called 'age of
nationalism'. Although political nation-states began to manifest themselves
simultaneous with the break up of the Ottoman empire, they still continued to be
dominated by religious issues. In the Bulgarian situation the demise of Ottoman
administration enabled the creation of a Bulgarian millet. However, this cannot be
deemed to have been as a result of Bulgarian nationalism per se, because a nation did
not exist. It is therefore a problem of the language and terminology used. In
Bulgaria's nineteenth century struggle for church autonomy it may be better to speak,
not of nationalism but of milletism. Whichever term is preferred the concept of
distinctiveness and separation from the 'other' remains the same. Undoubtedly the
654
F.Meinecke, Weltburgertum undNationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen
Nationalstaates, (Munich,1919), pp.2-3
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modern concept of nation-state has imposed itself as the dominant paradigm but it is
not the only one: "The paradox of the nation state epoch lies exactly in the fact that,
by ever more intensifying national differentiation, the unity of the same, or similar,
historical principles is still preserved."655
It is clear that Balkan and particularly Bulgarian nationalism have followed quite a
different path from their West European counterparts. The precise geographical
territory on which Balkan nations were to exist was unclear, unlike that of the western
nations. Therefore those first modem Balkan nationalists had to deal initially with the
creation of a national identity within unspecified territorial borders. Religion and the
specifics of local ecclesiastical eparchial borders lent themselves to the formation of
Bulgarian identity as a nation. Each Balkan group in attempting to produce a history
of its own pointed to the ecclesiastical traditions of its national church to emphasise
its cultural and territorial difference from its neighbour. Also as the importance of
language as a carrier of national consciousness was recognised and consequently the
centrality of Bulgaria's role in the birth of the Slavic vernacular strengthened.
However, to comprehend the foundational links between church and nation we must
look back further still.
8.1.3 FORMATIVE LINKS BETWEEN CHURCH AND NATION/STATE
Georges Florovsky noted that Christianity is essentially a social religion whose
reference point is society. Christianity by necessity requires to express itself in
relation to society and state.656 That association was reciprocated by the state for the
first time in the Edict of Milan, pronounced by Constantine Augustus and Licinius
Augustus in 313A.D. This established Christianity as a religio licita thereby giving
the Christian religion legal status and making the persecution of its followers
illegal.657 Subsequently, it became the favoured religion of the Roman Empire and
later in 380 A.D. the official religion of the Empire, when Theodosius I (379-395)
announced Christianity Cunctos populos in the Edict of Thessalonica. This created a
655
T.Schieder, Nationalismus undNationalstaat, (Gottingen, 1991), p.87
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G.Florovsky, Christianity and Culture, (Belmont, 1974), p. 132
657 For the fall text of the Edict ofMilan in English see: http.V/gbgm-umc.om/umw/bible/milan.stm
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radically new situation which set the tone for the church's relationship with the state
for the next thousand years: the church would serve the empire and the empire would
protect the church. As the administrative centre of the Roman empire moved
eastwards it inclined toward Greek culture and language and Latin was discarded as
the administrative language of Church and State. Consequently religion and state
became increasingly linked.658 As a result of the Great Schism of 1054 and later the
sacking and occupation of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in the thirteenth
century, Byzantine citizens identified the west as their enemy. Consequently bonds
between Eastern Orthodoxy and the Byzantine State reinforced so that Orthodoxy and
Byzantine nationhood became intricately intertwined.659 With the Ottoman conquest
in the fourteenth century and the establishment of the millet system religion
metamorphosed to become the sole determiner of cultural identity. The historical
equation of religious and political unity equalling national identity was even accepted
by 19th century nationalist movements as the framework in which they sought to develop
more secular concepts of the nation state.
The tension between the universal and the particular has been ever present within
Orthodoxy. This can be identified clearly in the church's practical struggle to express
itself as part of the wider catholic Church while simultaneously being part of an
independent national or local church. All Orthodox churches belong to the one
universal Church, having the same liturgy, creed and canon; at the same time each
local church requires to express its own cultural attributes, its historical peculiarities,
its independence. Nevertheless, this expression of independence requires to be held in
balance with the universality of the Church and in an effort to achieve this equanimity
the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople denounced nationalism within
Orthodoxy in 1904.660
Despite this denunciation contemporary Orthodox theologians have expressed their
dismay that every local Orthodox Church now exhibits nationalistic tendencies.
658
D.J.Geanakoplos, 'Religion and Nationalism in the ByzantineEmpire and After: Conformity and
Pluralism', GOTR, 22(1977)98-116
659 D.J.Geanakoplos, p. 100
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According to John Meyendorff the Church became absorbed in nationalism during
the nineteenth century.661 As a consequence the Balkan Orthodox churches became
deeply disunited, affirming their national identities at the expense of Orthodoxy's
universal mission. Individual churches treated each other with suspicion and hostility
and submitted to what Vladimir Solovyov termed the "provincialism of local
traditions."662 This resulted in the sowing of unwanted division within the churches of
the Balkans which affects the region to the present day. Research undertaken during
the spring of 1994 revealed that people from every Balkan nation confessed an
aversion to their neighbour, Christian or otherwise. For this reason Maros Mpegzos
663has called nationalism the enemy of the people. The research further suggested that
the educational system within the Balkans may be at fault, as it has the propensity to
instil a sense of national, cultural and spiritual superiority over its neighbours.664
The Bulgarian educational system has been heavily influenced by Paisii Hilendarski's
Slavo-Bulgarian History. His was the first national revival attempt to single out the
Bulgarian national community from other Balkan communities by restoring the
memory of a common past. In so doing he sought to implant in his reader's minds the
concept that the Bulgarian nation was a fact of history, an existing reality within its
own justifiable borders and not something to be created but rather re-established. In
order to achieve the emancipation of the Bulgarian nation, through its separation and
opposition to others, he set a number of goals before the Bulgarian people: firstly, he
emphasised its religious distinction as an Orthodox Christian community; then as a
Slavic community he emphasised its distinctive language and culture; and lastly, as a
separate ethnic group within the greater Slav community, he advanced the theory of
its racial distinction, thereby maintaining the uniqueness of Bulgarians among the
Slavic peoples.665 In this way he established a foundation for future national
emancipation by creating a history which emphasised Bulgaria's uniqueness and
superiority. Paisii's History also created within the Bulgarian educational system a
661 See J.Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and its Role in the World Today, (Crestwood,
1996), pp.131-132; T.Ware, The Orthodox Church, (Harmondsworth, 1993), pp.173-174
662
A.Schmemann, The Historical Road ofEastern Orthodoxy, (London, 1963), p.281
663
M.Mpegzos, 'Ethnikismos: ho echthros tou ethnous', Kath'Hodon, 1(1992)18-26
664 The Greek Helsinki Committee, Ratsismos, antisemitismos, xenophobia kai misallodoxia sten
hellenike koine gnome, sent to various newspapers in June 1995
665 See Chapter II for a detailed analysis of Paisii Hilendarski
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model for proclaiming national superiority: "There are many historical facts and
phenomena which may help strengthen our sense of national dignity by bringing to
the fore the advantages of our people over other peoples.. ,"666
National segregation, although influenced by Paisii, was moulded in the struggle to
establish modern secular education in Bulgaria.667 The struggle centred on the use of
Bulgarian language in schools. Indeed, the efforts to restore the Bulgarian vernacular
became one in the same as the effort for political emancipation. Thus, during the
nineteenth century and in the birth of many of the Balkan nation-states language
became a politicised tool. One of the entitlements for becoming a nation-state was
justified by the existence of a culture's independent vernacular language.668 For this
reason the struggle for affirmation of the Bulgarian national vernacular became an
important step in the struggle for national state sovereignty.
8.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF BULGARIAN NATIONALISM
8.2.1 PRE-OTTOMAN BULGARIA
The territory comprising of modern Bulgaria was first settled by the Slavs in the sixth
and seventh centuries. However, it was not until the seventh century that the area was
invaded by the Proto-Bulgars and remained a loosely organised medieval kingdom
until the ninth century. Following the ascension of Khan Boris I (852-889) the
Bulgarian kingdom progressed from being a somewhat irrelevant and unorganised
'pagan' kingdom to become and independent sovereign Christian empire. Under the
rule of Boris an independent Bulgarian national and Christian identity was born,
some ten centuries before the birth of the secular Bulgarian nation-state. The evidence
provided in the first chapter of this dissertation would suggest that from the ninth
century 'nationalism' or 'strong independent cultural identity' has been an integral
part of the Bulgarian Church and nation.
666
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In the eleventh century Bulgaria fell under the sway of the Byzantine empire and in
the fourteenth century was invaded by the Ottoman empire, remaining under its
administration until the late nineteenth century. Therefore, for the greater part of its
existence Bulgaria has been under the jurisdiction of a foreign power and during this
lengthy period of alien domination Bulgarian national and cultural consciousness
almost disappeared. For this reason the year 1762 is cited as a definitive moment in
Bulgarian history, for it was then that Paisii Hilendarski completed his Slavo-
Bulgarian History. Driven by fervent national consciousness and by his fellow
Bulgarians abject lack of national awareness Paisii wrote his History to prevent the
total disappearance of Bulgarian national territory, people, culture and history, which
had almost been accomplished by means of the Islamicisation and Hellenisation of
the Bulgarian people over five centuries. Through time Paisii's History succeeded to
spark national consciousness in the Bulgarian people which in turn gave rise to the
advent of the Bulgarian National Revival.
8.2.2 ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY & NATION-BUILDING IN OTTOMAN
BULGARIA
For Byzantine Christendom the fall of Constantinople was a decisive turning point. In
the article entitled '"Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National
Question in the Balkans", by the Greek historian P.M.Kitromilides,669 the author uses
modern theories of nationalism to reassess the traditional comprehension of Balkan
scholars regarding the function of the Orthodox Church under Ottoman rule.
Kitromilides argues that Balkan nationalist mythology has obscured a correct
understanding of the relation between Orthodoxy and nationalism.670 Therefore ifwe
are to reassess this relationship, particularly in regard to Bulgaria, we must see
through stereotypical nationalist interpretations which promote the view that the BOC
played a major role in preserving the ethnic identity of Bulgarians under Ottoman rule
and in guiding their national awakening. An explicit claim of this interpretation is the
669
P.M.Kitromilides, 'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the
Balkans', European History Quarterly, 19(1989)149-192
670 P.M.Kitromilides, (1989), p. 149
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identification of Orthodoxy with nationality and the ensuing recognition of the BOC
as a vanguard of Bulgarian nationalism. Kitromilides proffers general criticism of
Eastern Orthodoxy as the preserver of collective identity under the Ottomans,
however, his criticism is pertinent to Bulgarian historiography's continuity theory,
which promotes the view that as preserver of Bulgarian collective identity the BOC
created the basis for future nation-building and political independence.671
First and foremost Kitromilides draws attention to the contradiction between religious
and national communities. Basing his criticism on the biblical exhortation of
Galatians 3:28 that in Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor
female, for you are all one in Christ", he argues that Christianity's demand for
universalism established the basis for Orthodox ecumenism, which in turn prevented
the Patriarchate of Constantinople from being affected by nineteenth century
enlightenment ideals which called for national identity and the establishment of
t
separate nation-states. By this interpretation the nationalisation of Balkan church
organisation required a radical break from Orthodox canon and tradition that
condemned nationalism as phyletism.672
Theological reasoning brings to the fore the fundamental and inescapable antimony
between Orthodoxy and nationalism, between the incompatibility of the communities
of religion and nation. Indeed, when nationalism raised its head the Church met the
challenge with open hostility. Remember, for example, the Bulgarian Exarchates
response to the nationalist rebels. The Bulgarian ecclesiastical hierarchy refused to
support the nationalist cause, which threatened to ruin their relationship with the
Ottoman Porte. Instead they handed the rebels, which included some of Bulgaria's
greatest national heroes, over to the Ottoman authorities. Kitromilides claims
therefore that one of the greatest anachronisms in Balkan historiography consists in
its presentation of the Ottoman religious political system as being based on national
difference; the difference he argues was based not on national but religious
distinction. The only way in which the Orthodox Church could maintain a collective
sense of identity among Christians in the Balkans was by emphasising their religious
671 P.M.Kitromilides, (1989), p. 178
672 P.M.Kitromilides, (1989), p,177f.
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unity. But under the Ottoman millet system the mixing of Orthodoxy and nationality
implied a radical renunciation of biblical principle and Orthodox ecumenism. For this
reason Kitromilides criticises the way that Balkan historiography has uncritically
accepted the link between Orthodoxy and national identity, a link which has been
traced throughout this research. Bulgarian national historiographical tradition has
been premised on the assumption that the BOC played a major role in nation building
by preserving collective identity under the Ottomans. The BOC in short is supposed
to have created Bulgarian national identity through the years of captivity. According
to Kitromilides' assessment, however, we must conclude that if the BOC did indeed
contribute to the preservation of Bulgarian collective identity, this distinction was
religious not national in content.
Despite Kitromilides' thought-provoking analysis, his article requires additional
comment particularly in relation to the specifics of the Bulgarian situation. His
presentation of the contradiction between Christian biblical foundations and the birth
of national communities, although not incorrect, is Utopian. It fails to recognise the
complex interrelation between political and ecclesiastical powers prior to the
emergence of nation-states. Failure to do so creates a problematic historical vacuum,
for since its recognition by the Roman Empire in the fourth century the Christian
church has maintained an intensely close relationship to the political powers of the
day, a relationship articulated by the classic edict of Emperor Justinian (527-565) in
535: "The greatest blessings of mankind are the gifts ofGod which have been granted
us by the mercy on high: the priesthood and the imperial authority. The priesthood
ministers to the things divine; the imperial authority is set over, and shows diligence
in, things human; but both proceed from one and the same source, and both adorn the
life ofman.. ,"673 There can be no doubt that in Byzantine understanding the emperor
and the church were intricately connected in a glorious concept of symphony: a
sovereign empire required an autocephalous church. The Bulgars demonstrated that
they had successfully adopted the Byzantine model by establishing the Bulgarian
kingdom as a fully independent political power with its own self-governing church
673
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organisation, albeit in theological and liturgical unity with the Constantinople
Patriarchate.
This model entailed a major weakness; if political power collapsed so would the
independence of the church. Therefore after the conquest of Bulgaria in 1393 its
independent church structure disintegrated and after the fall of Constantinople in
1453 all Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the sultan were incorporated into a single
church organisation, under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The
Ottoman millet system did not, however, create a radical break from former imperial
religious tradition, rather it flowed in logical consequence for the Byzantine imperial
church, as it unified in 'symphony' with its new political master. Indeed, the situation
was viewed as providential, as the millet protected the purity of the Orthodox faith
from the danger of Latin Christianity.
From his historical analysis Kitromilides claims that Orthodox churches in the
Balkans were neither ethnically nor nationally defined: "The medieval churches were
not national churches because their empires were not national; such an assertion in
anachronistic."674 The findings of this research would disagree with that rejection of
Orthodoxy as a synonym for national identification in the period prior to the
nineteenth century. Kitromilides' anachronism lies again in the technical form of
language used. The historical preview of the BOC, in Chapter One revealed that Tsar
Boris' goal for his church was to be an instrument unifying Slav and Proto-Bulgar
elements in the Bulgarian population resulting in the strengthening of his kingdom.
Therefore the Bulgarian medieval church was founded and developed precisely on
ethnic and nationalist foundations. History's generalised assumption that this
relationship changed only with the advent of modern nationalism is clearly
misconceived in the Bulgarian context.
Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the Orthodox millet in Ottoman Europe into
smaller national units during the nineteenth century did occur as the result of radical
western national ideological ideals which transformed the millet system and Orthodox
674 P.M.Kitromilides, (1989), p.178
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tradition into the idea that nation-building must be accompanied by church
institutional independence. However, Chapter One of this research suggests that this
was not a novel idea, but an ancient one which had been lost in the midst of centuries
of foreign domination and re-established by Paisii Hilendarski's Slavo-Bulgarian
History and the advent of nineteenth century nationalism. As a consequence of the
nation-state ideal, the Orthodox millet divided into smaller ethnic segments, a
situation theologically rejected by the Constantinople Patriarchate. Although
Kitromilides strongly argues his position, another question arises concerning Greek-
Bulgar ecclesiastical enmity, a religio-cultural struggle which commenced in the
fifteenth century. From the evidence presented it is clear that this ethnic dispute was
not solely defended on theological grounds, there were also cultural factors present.
Therefore what was legally and canonically permitted for the Greeks was seen as
sinful when the Bulgarians attempted to protect their religio-cultural legacy.
This critique of Kitromilides' reassessment raises that most contentious question in
the ongoing debate on the concept of nation and nationalism: do nations have their
origins in the modem political, social and economic conditions of the nineteenth
century, or should these roots be sought in more ancient times? Kitromilides asks the
same question in another manner: did Orthodoxy become politically instrumentalised
in the nineteenth century nation-building movement, or was the Church always an
indicator of collective identity, before, during and after the Ottomans? Although the
latter view is generally closer to the relationship between church and nation in
Bulgaria, as outlined in the continuity theory, it would appear to be a matter of
degree: to what degree were national characteristics learned or acquired in the
modem national construction process, or were they continuations of medieval
kingdoms? The modem debate on nationalism may assist us to understand these
questions and contribute to our comprehension of the relationship between the
Church and national movements in Bulgaria.
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8.2.3 BULGARIA DURING THE PERIOD OF STATE NATIONALISM
The nineteenth century marked a new chapter in church-state relations for Orthodoxy
in the Bulgaria. Disparate medieval Balkan societies had been politically unified by
the Ottoman conquest and with the establishment of the millet system, they were
ecclesiastically, culturally and psychologically bound together by the traditions of
Eastern Orthodoxy. However, with the import ofWestern Enlightenment ideals in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries modem concepts of secular statehood
threatened to subvert both Ottoman mle and Orthodox unity. The work of national
awakeners, such as Paisii Hilendarski, although emphasising Bulgaria's Orthodox
history, actually succeeded in loosening that ancient concept of Orthodox unity,
which in turn gave impetus to the gradual articulation of a secular historical
interpretation of Bulgarian identity. Those secular inspired patriots aimed to
subordinate religion to state power, therefore by accepting the autocephaly of the
Bulgarian Church the politicians hoped to control it. Thereafter the church was
stripped of its authority and became, in imitation of the western model, an agency of
the state.
Through the ensuing Bulgarian national revival period the socio-political process
toward independence passed through a number of stages. The first affirmed the
cultural and religious character ofBulgarian national identity, then organisations were
formed which championed the national cause and lastly elite concepts of nationalism
were espoused by the masses in the formation of the secular Bulgarian state in 1878.
After the "first great victory of Bulgarian Nationalism", the establishment of the
Bulgarian Exarchate (1870), Bulgarians turned their attention to agitating for their
separation from the Ottoman empire.675 Thus towards the end of the nineteenth
century the concept of 'nation' became tantamount to Bulgaria. The national revival
era spawned a new class of Bulgarians; merchants, intelligentsia and priests, who
guided the Bulgarian people, informing them of who they were and perhaps more
importantly who they were not. National awareness served to differentiate ethnic
Bulgarians from ethnic Turks. National consciousness rose to such levels that many
675 L.S.Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, (New York, 1958), p.371
302
Bulgarians were willing to defend the sovereignty of their land. Thus alongside the
struggle for and introduction of an independent national state, including church
institutions, army, schools and a state constitution, arose a spontaneous wave of
violence against former symbols and reminders of Ottoman-Muslim power. Muslim
families were forced to flee, houses were burned and mosques destroyed as the
Orthodox Christian population sought to obliterate the characteristics of previous
domination.
Once the San Stefano borders of Bulgaria had been reversed by the Berlin Treaty the
re-incorporation of lost-territories became the goal of the nationalists. Bulgarian
nationalism therefore did not only express a pride in the borders agreed by European
politicians, but demanded the recognition of lands that historically belonged to
Bulgaria and were now, it was argued, populated by 'ethnic' Bulgarians. Therefore as
early as 1878 during debates within the Constituent Assembly it was proclaimed that
"... we who are part of this nation shall never be calm... We shall always support the
wishes and attempts, of those, who are flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood.. ,"676
In this sense the Balkan Wars and to an extent the two World Wars, demonstrated the
people's commitment to Bulgarian nationalist cause. For those wars were not fought
to fulfil someone else's greater European or global objectives but were undertaken to
accomplish the national unification of Bulgaria's dispersed ethnic population within
her historically justifiable borders: "Bulgaria has always united in a single entity only
the Bulgarian people; the waged wars, in general, are aimed at the unification of the
people."677 However, the liberation of Bulgarians outside Bulgaria's recognised
borders was not the only goal of the nationalists; they called for the enlargement of
the state to include regions that belonged to Bulgaria in the past: "The place where
the substantial portion of our people is left under foreign rule should point to the
direction of the country's development in order to assemble all its compatriots under
a single culture and statehood."678 Thus the development of the nation and the
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longing for the establishment of a Greater Bulgaria were presented as the finest
Bulgarian virtues, as the ultimate justice crowning the people's movement towards
happiness.679 Only by achieving this goal would the Bulgarian people be enabled to
"grow and improve on the basis of the values which incorporate them into spiritual
entities."680 By this interpretation anything which stood against national unification
and the expansionist efforts of the Bulgarian state was deemed unfair and unjust.
Hence, the findings of the Berlin Congress were 'unfair' because they lacerated parts
of the nation, but war on the other hand, especially the First Balkan War (1912-13),
was viewed as being "liberating and legitimate".681 This value system was structured
around two teleological theories: progress is compulsory for humanity and
humanity's progress is conditioned upon the progress of nations, which in Bulgaria's
situation was feasible only under national unification. Symbolically then 1870
marked the transition from church-nationalism to state-building nationalism and 1878
the passing from state-building to irredentist nationalism, a stage which would last
until 1944.
8.2.4 NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM AND COMMUNIST
BULGARIA
The communists initially considered Bulgaria's xenophobic concentration on
nationalist issues to be a debilitating obstacle in the establishment of their global and
domestic policies. Steered by Moscow the authorities of the Fatherland Front sought
to remove the hindrance through the creation of a Balkan Federal Republic. This
would be built upon the principles of internationalism rather than on the right of the
nation. One of the first indicators of this new direction appeared in a school textbook
from 1946, which talked about the "emancipation of the people" and the "possibility
to realise people's interests". The realisation of people's happiness, it was stated,
could be achieved only at an international level and therefore the historical narration
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sense of Balkan detente. The textbook implied that continuing on a path of inward
national self-absorption and by claiming superiority over fellow communist
neighbours would lead to 'catastrophe'; whereas internationalism was linked with the
concept of 'salvation': "The new path [communism] which Bulgaria takes on - the
path of the people's welfare, Slavic brotherhood and unification - is a path traced by
our history, by our historical development. Each deviation from this path has led to
national calamity."682 Through this historical materialistic interpretative lens of
Stanev's view of Bulgarian history, the praise of war and struggle for unification,
were understood to be "aggressive and catastrophic". Nationalist ideals were to be
replaced with an internationalist identity based no longer on universal orthodoxy but
communist internationalism.
From the 1970s, however, the communist credo changed substantially. The emphasis
became nationally focussed once again with the authorities claiming that all citizens
of Bulgaria were Bulgarian. The socio-political reasoning behind this emphasis was
to affirm the ethnic identity of Bulgarians, to the exclusion of any religious reference.
Bulgarians were treated as one non-religious ethnos.683 Nevertheless, the xenophobic
nationalism of previous Bulgarian generations continued within this appeal to
international communism. As shown in Chapter Six of this thesis the Bulgarian
Communist Party followed its own nationalist programme which aimed at
assimilating every Bulgarian Pomak and Turkic Muslim into one homogeneous
Bulgarian population.684 The BCP used every means at their power, including
educational and ecclesiastical resources, to prove that there were no Turks in Bulgaria.
Even Bulgarian Orthodox Church history was reinterpreted to justify the
government's confrontational policy to separate Muslim religious and national
identity.
So why did the BCP undertake the assimilation process? The Bulgarian press
suggested that the government had been attempting to defuse virulent Islamic
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separatist movements. However, a contemporary report on Bulgarian ethnic
groupings appears to provide an answer closer to reality. The study reported that
Bulgaria's Turkish Muslim population had grown alarmingly, whilst 'Christian'
Bulgarian numbers were on the decrease.686 The Politburo suggested that in this
Muslim-growth lay the possibility of an eventual Ottoman-cum-Turkish revanchism,
which if unchecked would lead to the Muslims outnumbering the Orthodox Slav
population. In this manner the communist authorities showed their national policies to
be on par with both post-Ottoman and wartime Bulgarian governments, particularly
in their attempts to obliterate any remaining vestige ofOttoman rule in Bulgaria.
8.2.5 RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-
COMMUNIST BULGARIA
The preceding chapters have revealed that during the eras of Byzantine, Ottoman, and
even to an extent Communist control, the Orthodox Church has been recognised and
protected as the traditional religion of the Bulgarian people. However, whenever
Bulgaria has entered into periods of independence, democracy, cultural pluralism
and/or religious diversity, the discourse on religion, or more precisely the place of the
BOC in society, has become increasingly prominent. This agrees with Gunter
Rohrmoser's 1989 opinion that "when the question of an alternative to Marxism-
Leninism is seriously put... then the symbiosis between religion and nationalism
could gain attractive power."687
This discourse, prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria, has articulated itself through
the introduction of new religious statutes. Immediately after the fall of communism
one of the first steps of the new government was to introduce revised laws on
religion. As Paul Mojzes remarks: "Throughout the region, constitutions and laws
were written that contained guarantees for human rights and religious liberties,
bringing Eastern European states in line with the Western democratic civil rights
685 Hoea CeerruiuHa, 5 April 1990
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tradition."688 Initially these new laws guaranteed freedom of conscience and religious
liberty, replacing former restrictive laws. In 2002, however, a new bill was introduced
favouring the traditional role of the BOC as an "inseparable part of Bulgaria's
historical, spiritual and cultural heritage."689 This decision met with sharp criticism
from human activists, politicians, minority religious groups and the European Union.
Its adoption has been considered retrogressive, particularly for the development of
democratic civil society.690
By taking this decision Eastern Orthodoxy, once again, has been advanced as the
'traditional' and 'national' religion in Bulgaria, and all others religions have been
deemed alien to the prevailing national ethos. As a result of political and
ecclesiastical activity they have been accused of betraying national interests and have
become objects of societal intolerance.691 However, this development is not specific
to Bulgaria; it has been a general repercussion which has arisen across post-
communist Europe where nations have searched for symbols and myths to provide
orientation and identity during a decade of radically changing circumstance. There
has been a return to the values of an 'imagined community' that existed in the past. In
this sense nationalism has worked as an anti-modern factor in which the nation
692becomes a transformation of traditional pre-modern realities. Whilst accepting the
need to maintain stability in the midst of socio-political chaos, genuine religious
freedom can never be achieved through abstract legal and governmental provision for
the traditional church:
Experience shows that the framers of the post-communist constitutional provisions
for religious liberty generally tended to interpret the notion of religion in Christian
terms and even in the terms of the Christian churches traditions for a particular
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country. This trend nurtured by the common lack of religious culture, not to say
ignorance in religious matters... is hardly justifiable at the level of state policy.693
Father Innokenti Pavlov, in analysing the preferential treatment of the Orthodox
Church, has suggested that these actions are attempts to endorse a new state ideology
to replace the spiritual void after the collapse of communism. In addition, however,
he identifies an ambition within particular political circles that attempts to promote
the Orthodox Church as the new compulsory 'national' ideology in the place of the
old.694 For this reason other religious movements are considered to be an alien threat
to the state, and restrictions can therefore be legitimately place on them. Father Pavlov's
argument is open to the criticism that it fails to consider the constitutional provisions
which explicitly favour a model of separation between church and state. Yet the
Bulgarian church-state separation has clearly articulated itself within the terms of the
'accommodationist' approach, or to quote Mark Howe the "liberal principle of
tolerance" as opposed to the "radical principle of religious liberty."695 This explains
why Bulgarian governmental preference is still given to the traditional church of the
state. In other words, constitutionally defined separation signifies neither neutrality,
indifference, or neglect.
Roman Herzog contends that there is nothing improper in this position. In his
interpretation the 'accommodationist' approach is proof that the democratic state is
developing along acceptable lines, for by acknowledging constitutionally the
fundamental principle of human dignity one cannot be indifferent to, or simply reject,
the churches or religious communities which have been important to the religious
orientation of the nation.696 According to this view it is only right and proper that the
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A contradiction now arises, however, in that post-communist Bulgaria's support of
the BOC does not equate with her leanings toward Europe. The Bulgarian Ministry of
Education's 1993 textbook set the nation on a new European-geopolitical perspective.
This new perspective layed stress not so much on 'national' identification as on
'universal' citizenship in which: "... shared human values and the goal of a united
Europe does not in any way contradict national identity."697 However, it does
contradict Orthodoxy's tacit parity with Bulgarian national identity, a contradiction
that will require to be voiced within the religious pluralism of multi-cultural
European existence.
8.2.6 THE 'FORTRESS MENTALITY' WITHIN ORTHODOXY
This research has exposed the central preoccupation of 'nation' and 'religious
tradition' in Bulgaria, both of which have succeeded in creating a powerful unifying
effect within society. Ecclesiastical nationalism has been underpinned by the
conviction that the church is deeply rooted in the national ethos, so much so that it
considers Bulgarian national culture to be unsustainable without the church: "It is not
the Church which should fear separation from the state, but the state which should
zqo
fear separation from the state, as this would separate Bulgaria from her soul."
However, as modem civil society has evolved and particularly as Bulgaria
manoeuvres to become a full member of the European Union, society has come to
oppose this traditional stance. The re-invention of South-East European civil society,
mirroring patterns ofwestern democracy and society, is no longer based on principles
of ethnic and religious uniformity, but rather is founded on notions such as
democracy, pluralism and tolerance. Therefore the Orthodox Church in South-Eastern
Europe finds itself in a complex situation. On the one hand it has to recover from the
spiritual stagnation it experienced under communism, while on the other it has to
come to terms with new social realities, the greatest ofwhich is religious pluralism.
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This is a major reason why the BOC has found it difficult to function in
contemporary Bulgaria and why it struggles to maintain the patterns of the past and
reinterpret its history towards a future in which the Church will once again takes its
place at the head of nation and society. This ultimate desire is best expressed in the
words of Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov: "The Church is not to be
transformed into the State... On the contrary the State is transformed into the Church,
it will ascend and become a church over the whole world - which is the glorious
destiny ordained for the Orthodox Church."699 In this vision the Orthodox Church
attempts to supplant the State altogether, reflecting the true orthos project of the
Church, not to exist with the State as a necessary evil, but to strive to reconstruct the
world on Christian Orthodox principles. Dostoyevsky articulates an implicit vision
shared by Orthodox hierarchy, which explains the intense struggle to maintain the
BOC's traditional role within society.
This 'fortress mentality' is stereotypical of the behaviour of a church seeking to
protect itself after enduring the oppression of totalitarianism. It is the reaction of a
church which cooperated with the communist regime, initially in order to survive
repression and later because it was assured particular privileges. It must be stressed,
however, that despite 'survival' the BOC has been systematically and politically
used, on many occasions willingly, not only by communism but also by Byzantine
and Ottoman powers, so much so that the BOC now perpetuates a model of
'functional religion'. The BOC has never experienced another model and therefore
follows this modus operandi as its benchmark. For this reason the BOC continues to
cooperate with the powers of the day, seeking to survive by promoting a symphonic
unity between Church and state in inharmonious times. As a safety feature, this
'fortress mentality' has tended to express itself socially in negative terms, exposing the
BOC's unwillingness or inability to interact with contemporary society. Although this
situation is largely due to the BOC's refusal to accept cultural plurality and religious
diversity, it is also strongly based on Orthodox theology which focuses on the
soteriological role of the Church in terms of eschatology. David Martin forewarned
that any Church incorporated within a political power structure would eventually be
699
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involved in the ruins of that structure.700 Ina Merdjanova fears that the BOC has
become a visible illustration of that omen and has declared that the church must
develop relevant theological understandings, practical social explanations and modus
operandi for a new democratic, pluralistic and diverse European era. The failure to do
so, she argues, could have grave consequences for the Orthodox Church.701
8.3 NATION & NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
Research encompassing the concepts of nation and nationalism has attracted attention
from a wide range of academic fields. However, in the context of this investigative
research Ernest Gellner's social anthropological views and Anthony D.Smith's
contribution to ethnicity research have been given special consideration.702 In this
context, Smith's theory will explicate the importance of the national idea, linking
together history, religion and politics during the decline of the Ottoman empire,
whereas Gellner will put forward the opposing modernist viewpoint.
Gellner is an advocate of the modern hypothesis for the origins of nations and
nationalism. He argues that it was from the ashes of agrarian society and the advent
of nineteenth century industrial society that modern states were born, unifying
populations in common national structures. This national identity connected disparate
peoples who, due to the radical change in society, have lost their connection to one
another; nationalism was thus the glue which held people together. He accentuates the
modernity of nation-states by completely rejecting any attempt to connect his theory
to myths surrounding the antiquity of nations: "Nationalism sometimes takes pre¬
existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates pre-existing cultures... But nationalism is not the awakening and assertion
of ... mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the
crystallisation of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing..."703
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Therefore, according to Gellner, nationalism is a modern ideology and the nation-
state a modern political entity, both of which emerged entirely due to social
conditions in the western world during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. His specific use of the phrase 'the western world' is an important insertion
which lays much of his socio-political theory in relation to the 'non-western'
experience ofBulgaria open to question.
However, there are elements in Gellner's 'modernist' theory which remain important
in explaining the development of the relationship between religion and nationalism in
Bulgaria. It explains, for example, that the construction of a nation and that nation's
history coalesce to form the notion that the nation in question has always existed.704
By this interpretation national ideology retrieves from Bulgarian history the myths
and cultural values that characterise contemporary society. It is in this sense that
Benedict Anderson uses the term 'imagined communities' to express the phenomenon
of modem nations being built on ideas and expectations provided by historians and
folklorists.705
Critics of the 'modernist' theory reject the supposition that pre-existing cultures are
used arbitrarily to support modem national development. Paul James criticises
Gellner's approach and proposes a more conciliatory theory which considers a pattern
of continuity between medieval and modem nations.706 He suggests a theory which
allows us to say that "while nations do not come into being until they are lived as
such (or at least abstractly recognised as such, usually in the first instance by
intellectuals or persons lifted out of the face-to face) the social forms which ground
national formation are already lived prior to the generalisation of the new sense of
historicity."707
However, one must consider that the 'modernist' position is generally poorly
qualified to analyse nation-building in South-Eastern Europe, as the theory is based
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on Western European perspectives. The typology of Hans Kohn, whom we could
perhaps describe as a contemporary of German nationalist school, is better suited in
this context as he differentiates between a West and East European concept of
nation.708 According to Kohn the modern concept of nation emerged as the result of
specific western historical and territorial determinants during the eighteenth century.
As the concept of nation progressed eastwards those historical and territorial factors
differed. The further east the theory ventured, the more mystical and historically
fixated its construction became, linking itself to socio-cultural factors such as
language, religion and ethnicity.709
Kohn's influence upon the more recent work of Anthony Smith is clearly observed in
Smith's distinction between a western 'civic' national concept and an eastern 'ethnic'
concept.710 Central to this Eastern European historical interpretation of national
development is the vitality of historical myth in construction of national collective
identity. Smith maintains that there are clearly identifiable connections between pre-
national ethnic groups and modem national communities.711 The major difference
between the continuing existence ofWestern and South-East European nations is that
the existence of the Balkan nations is conditioned by myths based on historical
memories. These memories are especially relevant in connection with the Bulgarian
national movement's linking of religion and national identity. Smith comments that
within these myths the organised religion of a nation often played a prominent role,
but with the transformation into the modem era the bureaucratic state took on this
role. In the case of Bulgaria the BOC functioned as the head of the millet during
Ottoman times, as the practical expression of the Bulgarian ethnic community; but as
the country developed into a modem bureaucratic state the BOC lost its place and
position within society. Therefore, one could propose that the existence of the BOC is
equally dependent and conditioned by national myth. Smith postulates further that
these 'national myths' normally contain a number of common motifs including: a
myth of origin in time; a myth of ancestry; a myth of migration; a myth of liberation;
708
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a myth of a golden age (with national heroes and cultural greatness); a myth of
decline; and finally a myth of rebirth (or national revival).712 The majority of these
myths are present within Bulgaria's national historical narrative.
The presence of myth in the development and continuation of Balkan nations is not in
question here. The debate is rather over its relevance in connection with the linkage of
Bulgarian national identity and religion that is advocated by the Bulgarian national
movement and the state. From the evidence of this thesis we know that national
identity in Bulgaria was shaped during the nineteenth century within the framework
of the millet system. Bulgarian national myth was therefore created in interaction with
an Ottoman social organisation based upon religious criteria, but was undermined by
the influence of the western nationalist categories. The development from millet to
nation-state required the transformation from religious affiliation into national
identity. The BOC became instrumentalised in the Bulgarian nation-building process
as the historic institution that promoted the national, political and territorial goals of the
modern state. The BOC continues to operate as this vanguard of Bulgarian
nationalism because the national myth permits the church to be the institution of
continuity that connects the Bulgarian religio-ethnic community to the modern
nation.
8.4 CONCLUSION
Bulgaria's national consciousness, built upon historical, cultural and religious kinship
has steered the Bulgarian nation throughout the centuries. In the nineteenth century
Bulgarian nationalism achieved three important and positive goals: the creation of an
independent church in the form of the Bulgarian Exarchate; the establishment of the
Bulgarian Principality and the union of the Principality with Eastern Rumelia. Once
these goals had been accomplished Bulgarian nationalism took on negative
xenophobic and irredentist qualities, features which the BOC has promoted and in
which they have participated to the present day.
7,2 A.D.Smith, (1986), p.l92f.
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The preceding chapters have revealed how Bulgarian myths regarding the origin of
the nation have unfolded within the theoretical framework of contemporary
scholarship, corresponding in particular to the work of the German nationalists,
particularly von Herder, Meinecke and Kohn and to the contemporary findings of
Anthony Smith. Smith's model of ethnic communities transforming into modem
nations corresponds to the situation of Balkan people's under the Ottomans as Eastern
Orthodoxy acted as the chief mechanism of ethnic persistence among communities:
"Religion then may preserve a sense of common ethnicity as if in a chrysalis."713 His
model supports what has been termed in Bulgaria as the continuity theory, a
supplementary hypothesis to the research paradigm behind the catastrophe theory,
both ofwhich are integral to the Bulgarian historiographical tradition.
However, Smith's model does not take into account the fact that the Rum millet
included a number of distinct ethnic identities. Therefore, how could religion, as
Smith proposed, provide a sense of ethnic identity when the millet was not based on
ethnic criteria? For this reason we must modify Smith's interpretation to emphasise
that the Orthodox Church under the Ottomans was not an ethnic church, but became
so under the political motivation and influence of the modem movement for national
self-determination. In the progress toward national independence each ethnic group
within the millet expressed its own cultural, linguistic and historical peculiarities to
distance themselves from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This tradition was emphasised
via the continuity theory which invokes a connection between the political and
ecclesiastical structures of the Bulgarian medieval kingdoms and the nineteenth
century national revival movement.
In the national stmggle for an independent and sovereign Bulgarian state, religion and
church became political instmments used in order to achieve the national goal. Thus
the nineteenth century development of independent nation-states represented not
'continuity' but a radical break with Orthodox tradition and the non-ethnic character
of the Ottoman millet system. The movement for Bulgarian national independence
defined Bulgarian national characteristics by denying millet tradition and emphasising
713 A.D.Smith, (1991), p.62
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the cultural, linguistic and historical differences between both Muslim Turks and
Orthodox Greeks. It is interesting that the very same principles were applied by Tsar
Boris and his advisors in the ninth century to legitimate early Bulgarian efforts to
secede from Byzantium and the Constantinople Patriarchate. Therefore the national
idea transformed both Bulgarian medieval religious history and Ottoman political
domination. In so doing proof is established that 'nationalism' in Bulgaria is very
much an ancient tradition related to Bulgarian ecclesiastical history.
The xenophobic features of Bulgarian nationalism have cloaked ethnic and religious
discrimination in patriotic wrappings, placing membership in the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church and devotion to the Fatherland above all. This brand of nationalism in
Bulgaria is grounded, as was witnessed in previous chapters relating to the National
Revival period in a national inferiority complex, which continues to view the
Ottoman era as a catastrophic period in Bulgarian history. Xenophobic nationalism
also masqueraded behind the Bulgarian communist credo of 'internationalism', as it
sought to enforce an ethno-political homogenisation programme in an attempt to
submerge the Turkish-Muslim minority into the Bulgarian-Christian majority.714 The
paradox is that the atheistic communist regime used the heritage of the BOC to their
advantage, to argue that there were no ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, only Bulgarians
whose forebears had converted to Islam under pressure. A representative of the
former communist regime candidly expressed:
Although the Bulgarian national consciousness of some of them may
still be blurred, they are the same Bulgarian flesh and blood; they are the
children of the Bulgarian nation; they were forcibly torn away and now
• 71 S
they are coming back home. There are no Turks in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria's plan to join the European Union in 2007 is ultimately tied up with its
struggle for international approval and national dignity. However, the absence of
either a democratic image or history suggests that nationalism will continue to
maintain Bulgaria's cultural and religious links with history, indicating that
Bulgarians are unwilling to put their mythological past behind them. In its quest for
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relevance and survival the BOC has actively promoted the nationalist cause and in
doing so seeks to cement historical links between church and state. In the twenty-first
century the church has discovered in nationalism its latest refuge for survival. This is
the reason why Raikin, with whom this chapter began claims that nationalism has
become a deeper faith for the BOC than the Gospel. By espousing this philosophy
and actively working for the Bulgarian national cause, the BOC believes it can
continue to stand with dignity.
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CONCLUSIONS
The research reported in this thesis has endeavoured to contribute a new perspective
to ecclesiastical history by investigating the evolving relationship of a church and
nation in Bulgaria, a country that has claimed insufficient attention among Western
scholars. The research was promoted by the observation that the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church, celebrated as the cultural liberator and spiritual saviour of the nation,
embraces the indefatigable allegiance of 85% of the Bulgarian population, whilst
only 0.5% actually attends church on any regular basis. To understand this
apparently contradictory situation, the research set out to examine the historical
relationship between the Bulgarian church and the Bulgarian nation, with particular
attention to the international political turmoil that convulsed Bulgarian history during
the Byzantine, Ottoman, World Wars, Communist and Post-Communist eras. By
giving priority to Bulgarian language sources it is hoped that an authentically
Orthodox and Balkan perspective has been presented, and that this has been analysed
in ways that differentiate between nationalistic bias and dispassionate historical
reconstruction.
The thesis revealed that the preservation of Bulgarian society throughout its
traumatic historical journey has been premised on a direct connection between
national and religious identity. The present Holy Synod of the BOC claims that this
correlation has preserved the nation through the vicissitudes of Bulgarian history.
The thesis has demonstrated, however, that the roles that the BOC has played in this
history, and society's national identification with it has been embellished through the
creation of a national myth, based upon uncritical advocacy of the catastrophe and
continuity theories established in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
predicament facing the contemporary Bulgarian Orthodox Church, therefore, is one
precipitated by context and time. As the Holy Synod continues to look to the past to
justify the church's future existence, it fails to deal with the present in a constructive
way. It thus neglects the spiritual and practical needs ofBulgaria's Orthodox faithful.
The BOC's ability to harmonise with its cultural context has historically been its
strongpoint. Chapter One revealed the transformational quality of the Bulgarian
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church, taking on many different popular national traits, which helped establish the
link between church and nation. The radical change that was forced upon Bulgaria
when it fell to Ottoman conquest in the fourteenth century confronted the church
with a new situation with which it struggled to adapt. However, with the
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, the hierarchy of the church
succeeded in re-establishing itself in its historical leadership role, executing its
service, both willingly and under coersion before the Ottoman Porte. With the rise of
the Bulgarian National Revival, however, the church's evolutionary approach to
achieving national independence was opposed by the revolutionary methods of the
separatists. By denouncing the latter the Holy Synod found it difficult to reassert the
church's authority after the liberation. Although the BOC succeeded in fulfilling an
important role, as the only national body which could unite the dispersed Bulgarian
population, it never again regained the authority that it held during the last few years
of the Ottoman era. From 1878 to the end of the Second World War in 1945 BOC
relations with the secular Bulgarian government became sharply polorised, with
clergy being denied the right to stand for any governmental position, and from 1945-
1989 the church by necessity had to acquiesce to the demands of the atheistic
communist authorities. This brief synopsis of the history of church-state relations in
Bulgaria underscores one of the main conclusions of the thesis: that the relationship
between church and state has varied during the main periods into which Bulgarian
history can be divided, and that claims of unfading and indestructible relations with
Bulgaria's ruling authorities are therefore exaggerated.
The scientific historian of church-state relations in Bulgaria is therefore confronted
with the need to distinguish between imagined and empirical history. James Payton,
Professor of History at Redeemer University College, in Ancaster, Ontario, Canada
has commented that the role of religion has been neglected as a factor in the history
of Eastern Europe.716 This observation may apply, as was intended, to Western
scholarship of the Balkans, but it is not true in respect of indigenous historiography.
In the case of Bulgaria religion has been considered a major factor in the history of
716 James R. Payton, 'Religion and the Historiography of Eastern Europe', Religion in Eastern
Europe-, available from http://www.georaefox.edu/acadetmcs/undergrad/departmeirts/soc-
swk/ree/pavton rati) 1 01.html; accessed 30/01/2003
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the nation since the ninth century. As this thesis has argued, however, this religious
factor has been steered and interpreted less by the church than by national,
international, political and economic agendas. Thus, the relationship which has
developed between church, nation, state and society over the centuries has been
embellished by various myths that serve national political goals. The task of this
thesis has been to offer a reinterpretation of the role of the church in Bulgaria's
history based not on nationalistic bias, political machination, or national myth, but on
verifiable archival, literary and oral evidence.
From its inception the Bulgarian church was imbued with nationalist tendencies as it
struggled to disassociate itself and the Bulgarian kingdom from foreign interference.
Even so, it has been demonstrated that after the conquest of Bulgaria in 1396 and the
dissolution of the Bulgarian Church, Eastern Orthodox Christians were not
distinguished by ethnicity or nationality under the Ottoman millet system. The
church became a political tool, separating along ethnic lines in the nineteenth
century, when the leaders of the national revival saw the restoration of the Bulgarian
Church as a necessary precondition for national emancipation. In the process toward
independence Bulgarian Orthodoxy was dressed in national garb: Bulgaria's cultural,
linguistic and ecclesiastical distinctions were emphasised while Christian canon was
disregarded in order to link the national church struggle to the secular political goals
of the insurgents. This resulted in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church being described as
an attribute ofBulgarian nationality and an instrument of national state politics.717
The connection between the BOC and the establishment of the nation-state can be
seen to have negatively effected its development. The influence of national revival
romanticism gave birth to the view that Bulgaria survived through centuries of
Ottoman slavery, oppression and enforced conversion solely because of the bravery
of the BOC. This interpretation of history instilled hatred towards the ruling Ottoman
and Greek authorities, but it does not stand up to historical scrutiny. Archival
evidence, Ottoman and Bulgarian, demonstrates that the prolonged period of Islamic
rule in Bulgaria was strict but generally tolerant toward the Christian population.
717
S.Tsankov, 'The Bulgarian Orthodox Church from the Liberation to the Present Day', rCY-EO,
(Sofia 1938/39), XVI, p.8
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Regional ecclesiastical struggles for tax alleviation, the introduction of Bulgarian
clergy, Slavonic worship and separate Bulgarian ecclesiastical institutions were all
pivotal in the process of national awakening during the later Ottoman period. To this
degree it is fair to assert that the church was instrumental in awakening Bulgarian
self-consciousness and accelerating the national independence movement. But the
pressure for political autonomy and independence owed as much to secular
enlightenment influence, the decline of the Ottoman empire, foreign intrigue, and
nineteenth century nationalism.
However, in the campaign of the separatist movement for a sovereign Bulgarian state
religion and the church became political instruments that were used in order to attain
their national goal. This represented not continuity but an elemental break with both
Orthodoxy's Byzantine legacy and the non-ethnic character of the Ottoman millet
system. The national movement therefore defined Bulgarian national characteristics
by transforming millet thinking and emphasising the cultural, linguistic and
ecclesiastical difference between Bulgarians on the one hand and both Muslim
Ottomans and Christian Greeks on the other. The idea of Bulgaria's distinct national
roots and unique cultural features, highlighted by Paisii of Hilendar and Yuri
Venelin, thus marginalised Muslims and other Orthodox Christians and justified the
desire to pursue a singular national and religious identity.
The nineteenth century national idea transformed Balkan history, firstly by
transforming the traditional millet into the concept of nation, and secondly by placing
the people (the nation) at the political centre. Nevertheless, the connection between
national identity and religious affiliation in Bulgaria cannot be claimed to have been
the result of this nineteenth century phenomenon. This was already established
earlier during the ninth century when Tsar Boris' political acumen, his craving for
international acceptance, national autonomy and socio-ethnic unity persuaded him to
introduce Christianity to Bulgaria. Rather than accepting Latin or Byzantine
autocracy, however, he established an autocephalous church within a strongly
independent nation, and inaugurated the link between church and nation. This gave
rise to the so-called continuity theory that played an important part in the ideology of
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Bulgarian socialism. Socialist historians attempted to portray a direct correlation
between twentieth century political and ecclesiastical structures and those of
Bulgaria's medieval kingdoms. In support this theory they elaborated another, the so-
called catastrophe theory that painted the era of Ottoman domination as one of
unmitigated disaster for the Bulgarian people. The communist authorities used the
results from Volume Four of the History ofBulgaria to promote socialist initiatives
and introduce discriminatory policies against Bulgaria's Muslim population. Thus
the re-embellishment of a nineteenth century interpretation of Bulgarian church
history created the foundation for the contemporary national self-understanding
about the Bulgarian nation's continuity and identity.
The BOC remains an important instrument of state, as witnessed by the latest
Religious Act (2002/3), in which the church has once again been granted a privileged
and protected position in society. However, throughout Bulgarian history the
granting of this position has expressed itself as an unequal partnership between
church and state, the church being politically subservient to the state, despite being at
the same time the repository of Bulgarian historical identity. In order to
accommodate this situation, the Holy Synod seeks to bolster its legitimacy and
acceptance by invoking history to justify its case before the Bulgarian people: "The
history of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the history of Bulgarian culture."718 But
as this research has shown, this claim expresses only a partial truth, a mixture of
history, myth and deliberate falsification.
For contemporary Bulgarian society the BOC is growing increasingly marginal to
their everyday life of the people - its main point of reference before society is its
national nomenclature. The church has become what it claims to be, a historical
national monument. It is however a monolith that has little to do with practical life.
This thesis has shown that the Bulgarian people believe the BOC has failed to
provide pastoral guidance through the intricacies of modern life. We must conclude
therefore that the BOC needs to re-assess its future role in society, particularly as
Bulgaria heads towards European integration, either as an instrument of state or as a
718
HtpKoneti eecmnuK, November 1981, pp.2-7
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pastor to the nation. The church must stop looking back and move forward into the
twenty-first century and discover once again its greatest strength, contextualised
ministry in service to the people. A return to November 1939 is suggested, when the
church leadership sought means to reconcile and strengthen relations with society
through the introduction of practical social programmes to help families, support the
sick and old and to develop education. This task is today being fulfilled by foreign
missions agencies and by the laity of the Orthodox Church who refuse to condemn,
but do not condone the inactivity of their leadership. Today the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church must decide whether to remain a historical monument or reaffirm its true




Firman issued by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) protecting the rights of Rila
Monastery, issued 7 Dhu-al-Hijjah 1215 (1801)
(Translated from the original held in the archives of Rila Monastery in 2003)
To my learned, worthy and renowned judge in Dupnitsa. May Almighty Allah reveal
to you the glory of his power.
From the text of this my royal decree, adorned with the proper Sultan's seal, you will
learn that I have received from the Greek Patriarch and the Holy Synod, which met
in session in my glorious city of Constantinople, the authority relative to Rila
Monastery now added to my Royal Empire.
It states, as in the provision of the old law, which was and is in force, that no one can
confront without imperial authorisation, or raise a hand against the church or
monastery, which is under the Orthodox supervision of the Metropolitan, who is
subordinate to the Greek Patriarchate. It also states that no one from my civil or
military authority has the right to use force or cruelty within the Christian church or
monastery without my explicit permission.
Proclaim this before everyone; make every effort to intervene and to settle divisions
and violent disturbances. In line with the old laws regarding the church and
monastery, no one from my authority, no influential person, may raise taxes within
the monastery estates that they call St. Ivan Rilski which lies in the Rila mountains,
which is in your jurisdiction. I reiterate this as this Christians are constantly moaning
about this before my throne.
Finally, as I have notified you, tell also my citizens, military authorities and
bureaucratic departments to report details of illegal acts and atrocities which occur
within the precinct of the monastery.
Let this be favourably received and referred to for verification within the government
and episcopal departments whose records are preserved within my imperial treasury.
It is thereby established that no one may confront without my imperial permission, or
may lay hands on the church and monastery, which from ancient times has found
itself under the unique authority of the Metropolitan. No one from my civil or
military authority has the right to use force or violence in the church and monastery.
In the presence of everyone and everything I announce my Imperial Royal Firman,
which from this day is included in my acts and should be followed exactly according
to its contents and my wishes.
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You are obliged not to violate the rights and privileges bestowed upon the
Metropolitan, and to the church and monastery, which are in his eparchy, and more,
you are not to violate the rights and privileges which are preserved in my imperial
treasury according to the regulations and instructions in this Imperial Royal berat.
You are also obliged not to let anyone from my civil or military authority enter Rila
monastery, or any other church or monastery, for their own material benefit, or on
the pretext that facing resistance they committed violence within the monastery.
As you know, so you will act!
This Firman is issued in my glorious city of Constantinople, according to the holy
tradition and fdled with faith and heart felt respect for the Imperial Royal position




Firman issued by Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) announcing the establishment
of the Bulgarian Exarchate, issued 12 March 1870
Translated from the original text of the document available in S.Protic, The
Aspirations ofBulgaria, (London: Simpkin Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1915),
pp.245-249
It has been my imperial desire that all faithful peoples and subjects dwelling in my
empire should enjoy to the full extent such order and security as are necessary for the
professing of their religions, as also in their social relations, that they should live in
peace, in order that they may by doing so aid us to the utmost of their ability in our
incessant efforts for the furtherance of our empire and of civilisation.
But inasmuch as there have of late arisen - contrary to our imperial wish - certain
misunderstandings and misinterpretations as to how far the Bulgarian metropolitans,
bishops, priests ands churches be dependent upon the Patriarchate - which have
greatly grieved us - it has been found necessary to institute an investigation into the
causes which have led up to the said misunderstandings and misinterpretations and to
submit them to a thorough examination. The results of this investigation are
embodied in the following articles, which have been adopted and approved as being
the definite solution to the controversy.
ARTICLE I
A separate ecclesiastic district shall be established under the official name of 'the
Bulgarian Exarchate', the same will include certain districts over and above the
metropolitanates and bishoprics to be mentioned hereafter. The administration of the
spiritual and religious matters in these districts is entirely vested in the Exarchate.
ARTICLE II
The chief Metropolitan of these districts shall bear the title of 'Exarch'. He shall be
the canonical president of the Bulgarian Holy Synod.
ARTICLE III
The internal spiritual administration of the Exarchate will be established by a
supplementary law, which must be in accordance with the fundamental canon and
religious regulations of the Orthodox Church and which must be previously
subjected for the approval ofmy imperial government.
This supplementary law precludes the possibility of any interference, either direct or
indirect, on the part of the Patriarchate, with religious matters, or with the election of
bishops and exarchs. As soon as the Exarch is elected the Bulgarian Synod will
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inform the Patriarchate of the fact, and the Patriarch, on his part, shall immediately
grant his approval in accordance with religious law.
ARTICLE IV
The Exarch, having been appointed through our sublime Firman will mention the
name of the Patriarch in the prayers in accordance with the rubric of the churc; but
previous to his election the person considered worthy of the office ofExarch must be
personally presented to my government.
ARTICLE V
In matters pertaining to his jurisdiction, the Exarch will have the right to negotiate
directly with the local authorities and, if need be, even with our Sublime Porte. His
approval must be sought before investiture and may be granted to such persons in
holy orders as come under his jurisdiction.
ARTICLE VI
All matters concerning the Orthodox faith and necessitating mutual consultation
must be referred by the Bulgarian Holy Synod to the Vasselenski Patriarchate and
Synod; and these shall be bound to render assistance without delay and to answer
without hesitation such questions as may be put to them.
ARTICLE VII
The Bulgarian Holy Synod shall receive Holy Oil from the Patriarch of
Constantinople.
ARTICLE VIII
Such bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans as are subject to the Vesselenski
Patriarchate shall be at liberty to approach the Bulgarian Exarchate, in the same
manner as the Bulgarian also be permitted to sojourn to the capitals of the vilayets
and other centres of administration; but they must not convoke synods outside the
limits of their own diocese, not officiate without the permission of the bishop of the
diocese in which they happen to be.
ARTICLE IX
Even as the metoch of Jerusalem, which is situated in the Phanar, is dependent upon
the Patriarch of Jerusalem, so the Bulgarian metoch and church situated in the same
suburb shall belong to the Bulgarian Exarchate. And whenever the Exarch requires to
come to Constantinople, he shall be allowed to reside in his metoch.
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ARTICLE X
The jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate shall extend over the eparchies of Sofia,
Vratsa, Tulcea, Vidin, Nis, Pirot, Kustendil, Samakov, Veles, Plovdiv and Sozopol,
with the exception of about twelve villages on the shores of the Black Sea, between
Varna and Constanta, which are inhabited by non-Bulgarians. The following towns
will also be outside Bulgarian Exarchak jurisdiction: Varna, Mesembria, Plovdiv and
Stanimaka, together with the villages of Kuklen, Voden and Panaggia, Novo-Selo,
Leskov, Batchovo, Belasitsa and the monastries of St. anargirius, St. Paraskeva and
St. George. The monastery of St. Panaggia and the interior of Plovdiv shall belong to
the Exarchate, but such inhabitants of the eparchy who do not wish to be under the
Exarchate shall be free. The details of this matter shall be arranged between the
Patriarchate and the Exarchate in accordance with canon and ecclesiastic law.
If the population of any other place besides those enumerated above, professing the
Orthodox faith, should wish to unanimously, or at least two-thirds of them wish to be
subject to the Bulgarian Exarchate, their desire ought to be granted
ARTICLE XI
Such monasteries as are situated in the Exarchate and which are, by canon law




The Constitution of the Principality of Bulgaria, issued 16 April 1879
Accessed from http://www.ncf.ca/bg-ottowa/Tirnovoconstitution.html on 12 August
2002
SECTION IX- Religion
Article 37. The state religion of the principality of Bulgaria is the Eastern
Orthodox confession.
Article 38. The prince of Bulgaria and his descendants are restricted to the
exclusive profession of the Orthodox religion, but the first prince of Bulgaria may,
exceptionally, profess his original religion.
Article 39. The principality of Bulgaria, from an ecclesiastical point of view,
forms an inseparable part of the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church, which is
subject to the Holy Synod, the highest spiritual authority in the Bulgarian Church,
wherever that may exist. By the same authority, the principality remains united with
the ecumenical Eastern Church in matters regarding dogma and faith.
Article 40. Christians of other than Orthodox faith, and those professing any
other religion whatever, whether Bulgarian born subjects or naturalised, as well as
foreigners permanently or temporarily domiciled in Bulgaria, have full liberty to
profess their religion so long as the performance of their rites does not violate
existing laws.
Article 41. No one can, under the pretext of religious scruples, exempt himself
from conformity with the general laws, which are binding on all in common.
Article 42. The ecclesiastical affairs of non-Orthodox Christians, and of non-
Christians generally, are managed by their own ecclesiastical administration, subject
however, to the ultimate superintendence of the competent minister, according to the
special laws to be promulgated in his regard.
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APPENDIX FOUR
Questions and Results (March-June 2003)
7,203 questionnaires were returned for analysis. The first question presents a
percentage breakdown of Christian affiliation, further questions relate solely to those
who considered themselves Orthodox. However, it should be noted that 8% of those
stopped classed themselves Muslim:





Would you describe yourself as deeply religious?
Deeply religious 9.0%
Slightly religious 48.0%
Not really religious 30.0%
Completely unreligious 11.0%
Unsure 2.0%









Do you consider yourself an active member of the Orthodox Church?
Active membership 0.5%
Non-active membership 2.5%
Consider themselves to be Orthodox
but not members of the church 97.0%










Chronological Timeline: Sultans, Bulgarian Exarchs, Ecumenical Patriarchs,
Bulgarian Monarchs, Presidents and Prime Ministers. From the Fall of



























































































1466 Rila Monastery rebuilt
after fire
























































































































1686 Veliko Turnovo peasant
revolt
1688 Chiprovets peasant revolt






























































1762 Paisii Hilendarski's Slavo
Bulgarian History published
1765 Sofroni Vrachanski




school opens in Svishtov
1824 Isl recorded Bulgarian
request for a Bulgarian bishop
1835 Is'Bulgarian secular
school opens in Gabrovo
1839 i Sherif
1844 Isl mandate to the Porte
for recognition of separate
Bulgarian church
1849 Bulgarians recognised as
a distinct people by Sultans
firman
1853-56 Crimean War
1856 I latt-i Humayun






































1908 Young Turk revolution
1908 Bulgaria declares full
independence
1912-13 Balkan Wars
1914-18 Is' World War







1939-45 2nd World War
1941 German invasion of
Balkans
1944-1945 Stefan





















































































































ABIIP (Russian Federation Archive of Foreign Politics)
AMBhP (Archive of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
ApxHB Ha Puna MaHacTHp (Rila Monastery Archive)
AL(HAH (Bulgarian Church History Archive and Archival Institute)
BHA HBKM (Bulgarian Historical Archive of the National Library "Sts. Cyril &
Methodius)
TAP® (Gosudarstven Russian Federation Archive)
rCY E® (Annual of Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". Theological Faculty)
UA-FLiobahb (State Archive- Plovdiv)
/(B (State Gazette)
HAHT (The Archive ofNaiden Gerov)
HA BAH (Academic Archive of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
HBKM Op. ota. (National Library "Sts. Cyril & Methodius", Oriental Department)
O/IA (Regional State Archive)
PH,XH/],HH (Russian Centre for Preservation and Study Documenting Modern
History)
C6 BAH (Collection of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
C6 HYHK (C6 HY) (Bulgarian Collection for National Folklore, Science and
Literature)
H,A (Bulgarian Church Archive)
LfBA (Bulgarian Central Military Archive)
Lf/IA (Bulgarian Central State Archive)
LWHA (Bulgarian Central State Historical Archive)
H,HAH (Bulgarian Central Historical Archival Institute)
H,nA (Bulgarian Central Party Archives)
AMAE CP (Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondance
Politique)
ANF (Archives Nationales de France)















Tlpaeocjiaeeu nacmup {Orthodox Pastor)
Cmaudapm {Standard)
Tpyd {Labour)
IfbpKoeeu eecmuuK {Church Paper)
Tuna {Tuna)




Student Association in Turnovo (23 June 2003)
Student Association in Varna (24 June 2003)
Student Association in Sofia (27 June 2003)
Meeting with artists and actors in Sofia (13 July 2003)
Meeting with philosophy graduates in Bankya (12 August 2003)
Orthodox Lay conference in Shumen (3 September 2003)
INDIVIDUALS
Dimitrina Merdjanova, interviewed by author, 13 January 2003
Maria Dimitrova, interviewed by author, 23 April 2003
Anonymous priest from the schismatic branch of the BOC, interviewed by author, 10
June 2003
Father Boyan Stanimirov, interviewed by author, 2 September 2003
Anonymous former Church employee who held a position within the BOC archive
department, interviewed by author, 25 August 2003.
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